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Common Stocks and
Uncommon Profits
and Other Writings

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Common Stocks and
Uncommon Profits
and Other Writings

PHIL A.

FSHER

WILEY

John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.

Published simultaneously in Canada.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:

Fisher, Philip A.

Common stocks and uncommon profits and other writings / by Philip A. Fisher,
p. cm. — (Wiley investment classic)

Originally published: Common stocks and uncommon profits. Harper & Brothers,
1958.

Includes index.

ISBN 0-471-44550-9

1. Stocks. 2. Investments. I. Fisher, Philip A. Common stocks and uncommon
profits. II. Tide. III. Series.

HG4661.F5 1996

332.83 '223— dc20 95-51449

Printed in the United States of America.

10 9 8 7

This book is dedicated
to all investors, large and small,
who do NOT adhere to the philosophy:
“I have already made up my mind,
don’t confuse me with facts. ”

Contents

Preface What I Learned from My Father s Writings xi

Kenneth L. Fisher

Introduction \

Kenneth L. Fisher

PART ONE COMMON STOCKS AND

UNCOMMON PROFITS

Preface

Clues from the Past

2 .

What “Scuttlebutt” Can Do

What to Buy: The Fifteen Points to Look for in a

Common Stock

What to Buy: Applying This to Your Own Needs

When to Buy

6 .

When to Sell: And When Not To

105

The Hullabaloo about Dividends

114

8 .

Five Don’ts for Investors

123

Five More Don’ts for Investors

135

10 .

How I Go about Finding a Growth Stock

162

11 .

Summary and Conclusion

172

PART TWO CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS
SLEEP WELL

Epigraph 176

Introduction 177

1 . The First Dimension of a Conservative

Investment 180

Contents

v i i i

2. The Second Dimension 187

3. The Third Dimension 198

4. The Fourth Dimension 207

5. More about the Fourth Dimension 213

6. Still More about the Fourth Dimension 218

PART THREE DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT

PHILOSOPHY

Dedication to Frank E. Block 226

1 . Origins of a Philosophy 227

The Birth of Interest 228

Formative Experiences 229

First Lessons in the School of Experience 231

Building the Basics 232

The Great Bear Market 234

A Chance to Do My Thing 235

From Disaster, Opportunity Springs 236

A Foundation Is Formed 237

2. Learning from Experience 238

Food Machinery as an Investment Opportunity 239

Zigging and Zagging 242

Contrary, but Correct 243

Patience and Performance 244

To Every Rule, There Are Exceptions . . . But

Not Many 247

An Experiment with Market Timing 248

Reaching for Price, Foregoing Opportunity 249

3. The Philosophy Matures 252

E Pluribus Unum 253

History versus Opportunity 255

Lessons from the Vintage Years 257

Do Few Things Well 259

Stay or Sell in Anticipation of Possible

Market Downturns? 260

In and Out May Be Out of the Money 263

The Long Shadow of Dividends 264

4. Is the Market Efficient? 266

The Fallacy of the Efficient Market 267

Contents i x

The Raychem Corporation 270

Raychem, Dashed Expectations, and the Crash 271

Raychem and the Efficient Market 274

Conclusion 275

Appendix Key Factors in Evaluating Promising Firms 279

Functional Factors 279

People Factors 281

Business Characteristics 282

Index 283

Preface

What I Learned from
My Father's Writings

This book grows on you. I know because it grew on me. It took me
about fifteen years to understand Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits.
When I first read the book, it made darned little sense. I was eight. It
was a waste of the start of a perfectly good summer vacation. Too many
big words that required I use a dictionary — ugh. But it was my father’s
book, and I was proud of him. I had heard at school and from neigh-
bors and had read in the local paper that his book was making a big
splash. I was told that it was the very first investment book ever to have
made the New York Times bestseller list, whatever that meant. I felt it was
my absolute duty to read it. So I did, and when completed, I was glad
to be finished and free for the summer.

Who knew that I would later go on to found a large investment
management firm serving thousands of clients, write my own books,
and become the sixth-longest-running columnist in Forbes magazine’s
formidable eighty-plus-year history or that I would write numerous
annual “Best of the Year” investment book reviews and recommend
dozens of books over the decades to readers? And, yes, maybe it helped
in route that I could say I’d read my first investment book when I was
eight, even if I didn’t understand it.

The book next seriously crossed my mind at age twenty as I faced
college graduation. Father had offered me a job working with him and

Preface

my older brother. Anxious, but skeptical, I was curious to see if this job
was really an opportunity. So, I read Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits
again. (There were only a few words I didn’t understand this time.)

Reading about my fathers fifteen points to look for in a stock, I
wondered if I could apply thelm to a local stock. If so, I thought this
would affirm the benefit of working with my father.

Well, it didn’t work. There was a local publicly-traded lumber stock,
Pacific Lumber, that looked like a good profit opportunity. But the few
folks I approached weren’t impressed with some wanna-be kid-sleuth
seeking competitive detail who was clearly ill-prepared to analyze or do
anything with it. I didn’t even know how to ask meaningful questions.
After being shut out by the first few folks I approached with my fact-
seeking questions, I gave up. But it showed me that I needed quite a bit
of polishing.

Working for my father was a bumpy ride, a bit like my first profes-
sional stock purchase — a reverse “ten bagger”: it fell from ten to one.
I tell you all this only so you can see that even a kid in his twenties,
without a lifetime at the top of his school class, having never attended a
big-name university, and with no major accomplishments under his belt
to brag on, even that kid could go on and in just a few years learn to
effectively use the principles in this book. And so can you.

THE FIFTEEN POINTS

Ultimately, when you’re a young man starting out in the industry as I was
and haven’t yet bought any stocks, figuring out what to buy seems
immediately more important than figuring out what to sell. Fortunately,
this book teaches that if you figure out the right things to buy, selling
becomes a lot less important because you can hold the stocks you own
longer. And what to buy derives directly from my father’s fifteen points.

Applying his fifteen points was a repeatable real-world experience
linked to “scuttlebutt,” as he described it, all aimed at researching one
stock here, another there. And it worked. I will not here recount in
detail the successes that the fifteen points helped me achieve early in my
career. But I gained tremendous career momentum by discovering a
handful of great stocks that did wonderful things for me. From the fif-
teen points, I could fathom generally where a firm fit into the world
and how it would or wouldn’t prosper. If it wouldn’t, what might its hic-

Ka? T cs\/-\-r\ ixrlrir rmr fr\7 rkt fVl P> nAinfC

Preface

failed. The craft is in the scuttlebutt, which, like all craft, takes time to
learn. Scuttlebutt is simply about finding out from real, “Main Street”
sources if a firm is strong or weak. Most folks don’t use this approach,
relying instead on the local rumor mill and Wall Street noise, most of
which is aimed at selling you prodiict.

As the century ended and a new one began, the power of scuttle-
butt should have been obvious to folks, but it wasn’t. If you had applied
the fifteen points in this book and got your information sources from
“Main Street” instead ofWall Street, you would never have bought any
of the scandal stocks that so penetrated the news of the 2000-2002 bear
market. The likes of Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom are always easily avoided.
Those who fell for these stocks depended on gossip and Wall Street
opinion rather than on “Main Street” verification of the business’s
strengths. The fifteen points are about very fundamental business fea-
tures that can’t be faked. Scuttlebutt means avoiding malarkey mills and
seeking information from competitors, customers, and suppliers, all of
whom have a vested interest in the target company, and few of whom
have any reason to see the firm unrealistically. It means talking to the
sales representatives of a company’s competitors, who inherently have a
basis to see the target company negatively but typically don’t if the target
is great. It means talking to the research people and management people
of competitors as well. If all those folks see reality and strength in the
target’s operations and respect it and even fear it, well, simply said, it isn’t
Enron or Adelphia.You can count on it.

Scuttlebutt itself can be a sort of art form that identifies character-
izations of the fifteen points. It’s the difference between learning to
play the piano (craft) and then composing (art). Art takes time to learn.
You probably won’t compose until you’re pretty competent at playing.
In almost any field, you can learn craft by repetition, but not otherwise.
You may appreciate the art without any ability to create it yourself. Or,
after mastering craft, you may turn yourself into an artist. But this book
allows you to sense the art, and fortunately it doesn’t take that long to
learn because a lot of it is common sense. The problem for most folks
is that they don’t know that this common sense can be applied, and
hence they don’t try. But Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits shows
you how.

Think about the fifteen points for a moment. I know, you haven’t read
them yet. Let me describe in a straightforward way what they prescribe,
and you will immediately see how universally desirable the attributes are.

Vni 1 nn rpo A tVl Pin in mr\V<a A&tm] in mu -fol-Vw^i-’c nnrl p-iitac fliAm

X I V

Preface

My father’s fifteen points are a prescription for what to buy. They
describe a firm with huge product and market potential and a manage-
ment determined to continue exploiting that potential far beyond the
current product generation. The prescription means an existing research
effectiveness to create future product, linked to a sales-force size and
efficiency that will overcome all obstacles in carrying existing and future
product to market. That is very futuristic. It means enough raw product
profitability, combining gross profit margins and the ratio of gross profits
to administrative costs to pay for the whole darned thing. It means a
real, concrete plan to maintain and to improve that profitability and
happy employees at all levels, in depth, who will be loyal and produc-
tive, again futuristic and open-ended, never ending. Then, too, it means
tight, great cost controls and some aspect, peculiar to its industry, that
allows the target to excel relative to others in the industry. And, finally,
all that must be wrapped up and guided by an open, articulate manage-
ment of unquestionable integrity.

Consider the scandal stocks or other overvalued portfolios. Not a
one could have passed the test via scuttlebutt because if you talked to
competitors, they weren’t overly scared of those slinky firms. If you
talked to customers or suppliers, they weren’t overly impressed either.
The customers weren’t impressed because the products weren’t all that
good by relative comparison. The venders and suppliers weren’t all that
impressed because the vendors’ other customers would have been doing
better and ordering more — the real sales volume wasn’t there. And the
competitors would not have held these firms in awe because they were
not held by them at competitive disadvantage.

Not only would the fifteen points have easily eliminated all scandal
stocks of the 2000-2002 bear market, they would have also eliminated
all the so-called 95 percent club — the tech stocks that lost 95 percent or
more of their value during the bear market because they were internet
pipe-dreams, or whatever, with basically 1999 hype but nothing real
there. Think of how many internet stocks had no real sales force (and
certainly none to intimidate a competitor), and no profit margin at all,
and no plan to achieve profitability much less improve it, and no
fundamental research, and no ability to exist without future equity
financing. And, and, and. They couldn’t have made it on half the fifteen
points. Then, too, the fifteen points by exclusion would have eliminated
quite a lot of other companies. But think of the firms of the prior
decades that the fifteen points would not have eliminated. They would

Preface

x v

have hooked you into real firms, whether cheap or expensive, and
would have allowed you to navigate the tricky currents of financial mar-
ket volatility whether your own personal inclinations were toward
growth stocks or value stocks, small stocks or big ones.

GOALS VERSUS SCUTTLEBUTT

My fathers goals and mine were never the same. But this book works
for both our goals — and for yours, too. My father was almost always a
growth-stock investor — almost always. It was simply who he was. I was,
in my youth, for a variety of reasons a value guy These days, I’m nei-
ther a value, growth, big cap, or small cap guy. I’m kind of prone to go
any which way I want, but that is a different story and not for this book.
Anyway, as a youth and a value guy, the fifteen points served me nicely,
getting me into high-quality firms with cheap stocks that as businesses
did spectacularly but that were overlooked as stocks in the mid- 1970 s.
He wanted stock in a firm that could grow and grow and grow, and he
wanted stock that could be bought at a reasonable price and virtually
never be sold. I wanted a dirt cheap stock that was a great firm with a
bad Wall Street image, a stock that could grow fundamentally and have
a price to multiple expansion so it could be sold at a premium multiple
or a big markup in five to ten years.

My point: Scuttlebutt and the fifteen points work for growth stocks
or value stocks, for big cap stocks or small cap stocks. Take point four:
An above-average sales organization is as important, or maybe more so,
to a value firm without great natural sales momentum behind it as it is
to one with the wind to its back. It is also critical for a small firm that
wants to overcome larger brethren. And an above-average sales organ-
ization is hard to accomplish but needed for a huge firm that wants to
stave off a myriad of small venture-capital-funded wanna-bes swarm-
ing mass capital after its market. Ditto for point five about a worth-
while profit margin. For example, in a commodity-type business, with-
out natural growth, it is true that market share, relative production
costs, and long-term profit margins all tend to be pretty tightly linked.
Good management gains market share and lowers relative production
costs, often by introducing enhanced production technology (the
application of technology rather than the production of it). Bad man-
agement simply but irregularly lowers margins until they disappear.

Preface

x v i

Hence, in 1976, I discovered Nucor, a tiny low-cost steel vendor —
great management, innovative technology, lower production cost, high
relative market share in tiny steel niches, gaining market share, and
adding niches. I bought it as a value guy; my father followed me and
promptly bought Nucor as a gfowth guy Same fifteen points. I sold
some years later at a huge profit, and my father held it for decades, selling
at a much larger profit, by which time it had become the second-largest
U.S. steel manufacturer.

I think my father, who was fifty-one when this book came out and
a bit of an eclectic genius and already very successful, failed to see how
the understanding of the craft, turning into an art, which had come to
him slowly and intuitively over the years, would take time for a neo-
phyte to learn. He regularly thought of things in his life differently than
how he initially explained them. It was a quirky part of how his brain
worked. As I write today, I am fifty-two, almost the same age as he was
then; and I know, because I had to learn the process rather than invent
it, that it takes time to learn.

I’m more linear than my father was and in many ways more intro-
spective, and I urge you to read this book multiple times spanning your
investment life. Take scuttlebutt, again. The scuttlebutt chapter is only
three pages long. But they are among the book’s most important pages.
It is clear to me, in retrospect, that my father simply skipped the craft part
of what otherwise might have been in the book. He just assumed it.

Over the years, I applied this process to lots of stocks on an indi-
vidual basis, gaining great insights. The key? Focus on customers, com-
petitors, and suppliers. I described the craft in my first book, Super Stocks
(Dow Jones- Irwin, 1984), including how to do it with several real-world
examples. My book was a good book, 1984— 1985’s best-selling stock
market book. And I’m proud I wrote it. But it was not nearly as good
as this book. Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits had much less that
would become obsolete over time than my first book had; and while
both books introduced new concepts, my father’s new concepts were
more radical for their day and more uniformly applied and more time-
less — which is what makes it such a great book. My book was mostly
about craft, not art. With craft, whenever you ask, you get answers. The
art is to get more questions — and the right questions — flowing from the
answers you receive to prior questions. I’ve seen people who rigidly run
down a standard question list, regardless of the responses they get. That
isn’t art: You ask; he or she answers. What question best flows from the

Preface

x v i i

answer? And so on. When you can do that well on a real-time basis, you
are a composer, an artist, a creative and investigative investor. That is
what my father in his prime did best.

I went with my father about a jillion times to visit companies
between 1972 and 1982. 1 worked' for him for only a year, but we did
lots of things together after that. In looking at companies, he always pre-
pared questions in advance, typed on yellow pages with space in
between so he could scribble notes. He always wanted to be prepared,
and he wanted the company to know he was prepared so they would
appreciate him. And he used the questions as a sort of outline of topics
to be covered. It was also a great backup in case the conversation went
cold, which occasionally it did. Then he could get things back on course
instantly with one of his prepared questions. But his very best questions
always popped out of his mind, unprepared, never having been written
down in advance because they were the angle he picked up on the fly,
as he heard an answer to a lesser question. Those creative questions were
the art. It is what, in my mind, made his querying great.

His mind was financially facile until he was pretty darned old. I
want to tell you about one of the best questions I never heard him use
in person and only heard about later from James Michaels. It wasn’t in
his books, but it would have made a great addition anywhere.

A great honor of my life was that for fifteen years before his retire-
ment I was edited personally in Forbes by the great James Walker
Michaels, who at his retirement as editor of Forbes in 1998 was beyond
doubt the dean of U.S. business journalism. He brought me into Forbes ,
took a personal interest in me, and edited virtually every column I wrote
by himself (which is rare for a periodical editor) until his retirement as
editor. He also admired my father greatly. Once, and only once, Jim and
I had a reason to spend a weekend together on the West Coast, and he
hoped to come a few hours early and sit down with my father, who
then would have been just shy of eighty-nine.

They met for a few hours in a conference room at my firm’s head-
quarters on top of Kings Mountain, in California. Jim and I then drove
north a few hours toward the Russian River and our destination; and en
route Jim kept asking me about “that question.” I had no clue what he
was talking about, and I knew my father better than anyone in the world.
It embarrassed me that I had no idea what he was seeking from me. For
about an hour, Jim staggered trying to put it together and pretty much
gave up. As often happens with our minds, when he quit trying, it popped

x v i i i

Preface

right out, and he said, “What are you doing that your competitors aren’t
doing yet?” What a great question! The emphasis was on the word yet.
Staggering. Most folks, when you ask them that question, aren’t doing
one darned thing of any great significance their competitors aren’t
already doing and feel awestruck that you asked them this and they hadn’t
thought of it themselves.

The firm that is always asking itself that question never becomes
complacent. It is never caught behind. It never starves for intellectual
grist to chew through toward a better future. It is the firm that, coupled
with integrity and raw management intellect, lives the fifteen points.
“What are you doing that your competitors aren’t doing yet?” implies
driving the product market, forcing others to follow, and dominating for
the betterment of customers, employees, and shareholders, which is sheer
greatness. Jim’s question both summed up my fathers lifelong aspirations
and summarized the gist of his fifteen points. And where he got it from
I still don’t know to this day. But it is a stunningly-cunning question.

Jim, who always had a nose for the twist that made a great story,
returned to New York after our weekend and composed a Forbes article
wrapped around that question. It combined the best of Jim and my
father, and the whole thing reminded me of how often in my life I was
the plodding, mechanical fly-wheel around my father’s eclectic bril-
liance. I’m not meaning to demean myself. I’ve done very well in life;
but I am more linear, more deductive, harder working, more driven, and
more direct than my father, who was vastly more a non-linear genius.

My firm has applied the fifteen points and scuttlebutt to firms of
most varieties, although primarily smaller, beat-up ones. Retailers,
technology companies of various forms, service firms, concrete, steel,
specialty chemicals, consumer products, gambling, you name it. The
fifteen points hasn’t always been the final decisive phenomena that
compelled me or the firm, but they often added value. I’ve always felt
free to pretty much do my own thing. While contemplating on a large
scale and attempting to reach conclusions on hundreds of stock yearly,
my firm mass-produced the process for many years in a process we
called Twelve-Call, which was run off an operations manual with
remote-location workers doing telephone interviews of customers,
competitors, and suppliers. It wasn’t as powerful by far as doing it your-
self on a single stock, but it let us cover lots of ground. Today, we have
replaced that with subsequent capital-markets technology; but that is,
again, another story and outside the scope of this book.

Preface

x i x

Today my firm is managing many, many billions of dollars aimed at
a handful of different goals while buying stocks around the globe and
using 500-plus employees. You probably aren’t doing that. You therefore
shouldn’t do what I’m doing, and I shouldn’t do what you need to do.
If you’re an individual, all of the fifteen points still apply. Tactically, you
use them the way I did as a young man when I didn’t have the machine
I have today. And you can’t cover the turf I now can, but that probably
isn’t necessary or even desirable to you. My point is that the fifteen
points are worthwhile whether used exactly as my father originally
envisioned them or on an altered, more superficial but more mass-
spectrum basis, for domestic or foreign stocks, for growth or value, or,
for that matter, if you move away from public stocks to buy private busi-
nesses, many or just that one that you might want to own and operate
personally, no matter how small. All of the same principles apply.

MUCH MORE AVAILABLE

Now, don’t get the idea that the only worthwhile parts of Common Stocks
and Uncommon Profits are scuttlebutt and the fifteen points. It’s just that I
think they are the jewels. There are smaller sparkles, too, bits of wisdom
well worn. For example, by 1990 I’d been a professional for eighteen
years and fairly successful. I’d been a Forbes columnist for six years. Enter
Saddam Hussein. As the threat of war grew, investors grew timid. The
market buckled. I’ve studied quite a bit of history and written two
financial history books. The history as I saw it said, “Buy.” But I hadn’t
lived that much history. One weekend, I buttressed my resolve by review-
ing Chapter Eight, “Five Don’ts for Investors,” and Chapter Nine, “Five
More Don’ts for Investors,” in Part One. And I knew that the war scare
had to be a market buying opportunity. From it, along with some of my
economic forecasting, came my well-timed late-1990 “buy” columns.
Timing that right, when most others were bearish, helped secure my
long-term place in Forbes, for which I’ve always been grateful. But you
might have found the same things useful more recently as we had
the 2000—2002 bear market and what could be thought of as Saddam
Hussein II.

As I write, in 2002, we have had the worst bear market since,
depending on how you look at it, my early career in 1974 or the Great
Depression in 1937-1938. Many have had their faith in prior

Preface

x x

investment beliefs shattered. Many have developed new-found faith in
other concepts that they will soon surely find shallow, vapid, and void
of eternal truth. What would my father say looking forward. He would
say simply that capitalism will prevail and the United States and the
Western world will progress, that you can debate where the market
bottom is, and that he rarely considered himself to be very good at that
(although he made a few spectacular market calls in his long career). He
would say that if you own companies that have the fifteen points and
don’t get carried away by what he referred to as “fads and fancies,” you
will come through this period just fine. He would say that if you don’t
own stocks, this is a perfectly fine time to buy companies that possess
his fifteen points. The bear market of 2000-2002 has seen to that.
Might they go lower before they go up? He would always acknowledge
that possibility. But he would say that it won’t matter much a few years
from now. Would he contemplate cutting, running, and selling out to
avoid the market here? Not for a moment. There is nothing he would
be less likely do. Yes, he did lighten up on stocks several times in his
ultra-long career, but only when he could know that the market
hadn’t fallen yet and still might, not after it had fallen, hoping it would
fall still more.

Would my father fear Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, or ter-
rorists? No. Would he fear war? He tells you directly in these pages
that he would not. Would he admire President Bush for pointing us
toward war? No. He rarely admired presidents because he saw them as
politicians and he came to not much care for politicians; and the few
he ever cared for weren’t so high up. He said, “The higher they go, the
liar they get.” And he hated war and rarely could see its justification.
Would he have worried about the myriad of other negatives in con-
temporary media, like corporate integrity, double-dip recession possi-
bilities, high market price-earnings ratios, the risk of Brazil defaulting,
or whatever? No, not much. He would have used this time while oth-
ers focused on the wrong things to refocus on the basic fundamentals
of the firms he owned and to see if he should still own them. And in
looking at the weakest among them, he would be contemplating if
there were one or two better firms he could find somewhere to
replace them. He always saw volatile, down markets as a great oppor-
tunity to upgrade the quality of his few stocks. And the more folks
fretted about the market, the more he would be fretting about what
he owned and didn’t own.

Preface

x x i

Late in his career when asked about market timing or sector issues,
he would say something like, “Well, my son has proven he can navigate
those waters much better than I’ve ever been able to, and here is what he
says . . . but, I still wouldn’t trust him.” He never trusted anyone to make
those kinds of decisions for him. H6 trusted the ownership of firms that
possessed his fifteen points to take care of him. And he would today.

Many times in my career, someone would tell me (a) that I was
wrong (which may have been and always may be quite true) and (b) that
my father never would have done what I’m doing. I would always know
generally that this person clearly didn’t know my father’s brain one iota
as well as I did and that he or she almost certainly hadn’t read his writ-
ings as often as I had. So, I never much worried about people’s assess-
ment of what my father would and wouldn’t have done. My point here
is that even being the one who knew him best, in a business sense, I read
him more than most. Even if you understand the material really well,
you will benefit from rereading these pages multiple times as your
investing life progresses, and you will hurt yourself if you rely solely on
the lessons from one reading. First, they fade in your mind. Second, the
more you read them, the more you get out of them. Without meaning
to sound heretical, it is like a little investing bible — a book that is meant
to be read multiple times and whose usefulness does not end with the
last page.

You will find lots of other jewels of your own in these pages that
may do as much for you as they have for me. But an important con-
cluding point to make on Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits is to
note its sheer fundamentalness. Not only does it teach the true basics of
fundamentals of investing, but it has been a core part of the training of
many leading investment practitioners. For many years, it has been part
of the curriculum in the investment class at the Stanford Graduate
School of Business. Students of all forms passed through Stanford, read
the book, and went on to become some of the nation’s leading investors.
But the book’s breadth was broader than that. For example, Warren
Buffett has long credited my father and Common Stocks and Uncommon
Profits as being fundamental to the development of his investment phi-
losophy. The first of my father’s “Don’ts” in Chapter Nine — “Don’t
overstress diversification” — gets you quickly to a key cornerstone of
Buffettism. And you can find it in the very same place Buffett first did.

Not much of great importance to market fundamentalism changed
between the writing of my father’s first book and that of his third and

Preface

x x ii

last book, Conservative Investors Sleep Well. But a lot of water went under
the investment bridge: a huge bull market, a huge bear market, 1958 to
1974 — lots of fads and fancies. By then my father was sixty-seven.
His last book was good, but it wasn’t nearly what Common Stocks and
Uncommon Profits was. He had dbne it so well the first time that his two
subsequent books only made incremental additions. If you can read only
one of my father’s writing, let it be his first book. It was his best. Still, if
you want to read more from my father, his next most important writ-
ing was his last book. It was also contributing fundamental ideas. It was
a bit topical at the time but has remained timeless.

I think in Conservative Investors Sleep Well that Chapter Six’s Motorola
section is vintage Phil Fisher. In it, he shows why Motorola, which others
then didn’t like so well, was a great firm and one for which he was per-
sonally ready to put his neck on the line in thinking forward a very long
time. It’s tough to read this section of that book and not appreciate that
Motorola was a true quality company. But look what happened after-
ward. In the next twenty- five years, the stock appreciated thirty-fold,
that is, before dividends — and all in a safe, well-managed firm, incurring
no brokerage costs year to year, no mutual fund operating expense
ratios, and not much effort for a true believer. How often does some-
one give you a successful multi-decade-long look-ahead? Darned near
never. Would anyone actually hold one stock for all those twenty-five
years? Well, I’m here to tell you for a certainty that one Philip A. Fish-
er did, as his largest personal holding, all the while it was trouncing the
Standard & Poor’s 500. And that is and was what Phil Fisher was all
about. Finding a very few great companies that he could really know
and holding them for a long, long, long time while those very stocks
appreciated phenomenally. Conservative Investors Sleep Well is simply the
best treatise I know on how to buy and hold growth stocks without tak-
ing much risk. You could get that, certainly, from either book, his first
or his third. The two in many ways are intellectually linked at the bod-
ies, separated by sixteen years. Still, if you only read one, read Common
Stocks. It offers more, is more radical for its time, is better written, is
more timeless, covers more turf, and is more intellectual. If you can read
both, do it.

In the book’s second preface, I tell you a little about my father that
isn’t well known. But over the years, people often asked me about my
relationship with my father, father and son having been in the same
industry and all that. And because he was weird, and I’m weird, and

Preface

x x i ii

often they are weird, I sometimes give weird answers. For example,
when they asked, as they often did, what experience from my memo-
ries with my father is my favorite, I regularly answered, “The next one.”
That is no more, but it was for a long time. They often tried to pin me
down with something like, “Well, weren’t there favorite moments when
you were younger?” I readily admit there were. Fie was the worlds
greatest bedtime storyteller, and his stories had absolutely nothing at all
to do with the stock market. Many were his own fictional creations. As
a small child, I loved every moment of those stories — and folks like the
growing legions of Buffett-philes hate that answer. They want some
notion about researching some stock. But there was never really a lot of
emotion about that. It was just work. So, then, in frustration, Tm often
asked, “Well, if you could distill advice from your father down to a single
sentence, what would it be?” I’d say, “Read his writings and try to live
them out.” And that is what you get with these pages. Enjoy them.

Kenneth L. Fisher

Kings Mountain , California
July 2003

Common Stocks and
Uncommon Profits
and Other Writings

Introduction

Kenneth L. Fisher

This is among the most beloved investment books of all times, among
the bestselling of classic investment books, and now forty-five years old.
My father wrote his original preface at my childhood home in September
1957. It remains herein. Forty-five years later in October 2002, in my
current home, I dare write this, this book’s first new preface in all those
decades.

If you’ve read my revised preface, you might think my father is
deceased. No. As I write, he is ninety-five and alive. But he is reduced
by the awesome wreckage induced by late stages of aged senile demen-
tia and probably by Alzheimer’s disease (there is no right way to be sure).
He is at home, in bed, about thirty feet away from where he wrote Com-
mon Stocks and Uncommon Profits and his other writings.

He deteriorates steadily. To those few of us taking care of him, it is
startlingly quickly. By the time you read this, he may well be deceased.
He will never read these words — were they read to him, he couldn’t fol-
low their meaning for more than a sentence or two before losing the
thread in dangling disconnects cut by his dread disease. He was a great
man but is now just a little, old man very late in life. But he is my little,
old man. What this disease routinely does to people is nothing to be
ashamed of; it is just a disease, not a failing. When I wrote my third book,
based on one hundred cameo biographies of dead pioneers of American
finance, I defined it as “dead” pioneers only on the premise that dead
people don’t sue, just in case I got anything wrong. But I also did so
because I purposefully didn’t want to cover my father in any regard. I
didn’t want to say anything that might hurt him if I interpreted him dif-
ferently than he might have wished, which I well might have.

Introduction

Now I need not worry about that because he won’t know what I
say here. So it is time to tell you a bit about the man who wrote one of
the best beloved investment books of all time. I’m best qualified to do
so because I know him better than anyone if you combine business and
personal matters. Oh, certainly' in other ways my mother, his wife, knew
him far better than anyone. My aunt, his sister, knew him longer than
anyone. But their relationships were basically personal, not business.Yes,
I have an eldest brother who worked very closely with him briefly and
was temporarily my business partner and to whom I’m close. But
Arthur’s professional time span around Father was fairly short. He
evolved to academic humanities, where he is today. Father always loved
Arthur foremost of his three sons, and Arthur was more emotionally
linked to Father than I was. But Arthur would be first to tell you I spent
vastly more business time around Father over many more years and had
a day-to-day relationship with him when Arthur couldn’t, materially
because Arthur lived a thousand miles away.

BEGINNINGS

My paternal ancestors were Jewish, mainly from Prague, Czechoslovakia,
and Germany, all arriving in San Francisco in the early 1850’s. My father’s
paternal grandfather was Philip Isaac Fisher and was both Levi Strauss s
original accountant and the person who opened and closed Strauss’s first
store for him on a daily basis and served Strauss his entire career. My
great-grandfather was not wealthy but at his death was financially com-
fortable. His wife died young, and his eldest daughter, Caroline or Cary,
donned an important role caring for her siblings. My grandfather,
Arthur Lawrence Fisher, the youngest of eight, adored Cary, who played
partial surrogate mother. Born in 1875 in San Francisco, Arthur
Lawrence Fisher grew, graduated from UC-Berkeley, and attended Johns
Hopkins Medical School, graduating in 1900 and returning to San
Francisco to practice medicine as a general practitioner. Later (perhaps
in World War I but maybe earlier, during post-doctoral scholarship-
based research at Rockefeller University), he developed a specialty in
orthopedics, becoming the third orthopedic surgeon west of the
Mississippi and a founding member of the Western Orthopedics Society.
In 1906, Philip Isaac Fisher died, stalling briefly Arthur Fishers marriage
to Eugenia Samuels. The marriage stalled again behind the infamous

Introduction

1906 fire and earthquake. Finally they married, and my father was born
the next year, on September 8, 1907. He was named originally Philip
Isaac Fisher, after his recently deceased grandfather.

Four years later in 191 1 , my father’s sister, his only sibling, was born.
She was named Caroline after Aunt 'Cary. Aunt Cary had married well,
to a Levi Strauss relative named Henry Sahlein, who was introduced to
Cary through her father. Aunt Cary played an important role in the lives
of Fishers for two generations, those of both my grandfather and father.
Aunt Cary not only secretly bankrolled my fathers education (some-
thing he never, ever knew), but also secretly gave my grandfather money
to buy a car for Father that became serendipitously seminal to his career
evolution. And Cary provided ongoing family social structure that
enriched Fathers fragile emotional existence as a child — a process that
continued for decades. If my parents had had a daughter, she would have
been named Cary, as was their first grandchild.

Unlike many doctors, my paternal grandfather was largely unin-
terested in money. He did a great deal of charity work and academic
medicine, but he didn’t care for business or money. When his private prac-
tice patients couldn’t pay, he simply cared for them anyway. When he
sent out bills that went unpaid, he ignored rebilling or collection
attempts. He was thought of by myriad people as saintly for his kind,
warm, and generous persona. Fortunately for his immediate family, he
had Aunt Cary to “secretly” bankroll him behind the scenes. Without
Cary, you likely would never have gotten this book.

Father was originally privately tutored. My grandfather didn’t
believe in the elementary schools of the day, and Aunt Cary could afford
better. Later, Father was enrolled in San Francisco’s prestigious Lowell
High School. He graduated at age sixteen. Smart, too young, well edu-
cated from tutoring, Father was also awkward and lacking in social skills
other children normally learn in elementary school. He was frail, brittle,
and uncoordinated sports-wise; and being young by comparison, he was
small relative to Lowell classmates. So he felt socially insecure, which was
furthered by his mother’s incessantly critical and negative nature. At
sixteen, Father started at UC-Berkeley; but later, with financial aide
from Aunt Cary and a car paid for by her, he transferred to smaller and
friendlier Stanford University. That transfer also proved fateful.

He dutifully returned to San Francisco on weekends, which began
with a ritual Friday night family dinner at Aunt Cary’s and Uncle
Henry’s. These dinners spanned almost fifty years, starting before Fathers

Introduction

birth, and included even distant family members. The dinners were cen-
tral to building Fathers early social skills. (The ritual still existed briefly
when I was a child.) My grandparents always attended. Father arrived
directly from Berkeley or later Stanford. Cary’s house, which if it existed
today would be called a mansion, was built in the 1890 s by Uncle Henry
on Jackson Street, just off Van Ness. The multi-course feast involved
much discourse and after-dinner debate that often turned various family
participants combative, something my grandfather loved watching. There
were lots of child-aged females; but as the only male of his generation,
Father became a particular favorite of Uncle Henry, which made these
events particularly memorable to father — his one chance as a young man
to stand out in a crowd. After dinner. Father returned home with his par-
ents, heading back to college Monday morning.

To Father, Stanford was spectacular. Warm, beautiful, laid-back, presti-
gious, he felt more comfortable at Stanford than at Cal or pretty much any-
where else. Upon graduating at twenty, and still insecure but feeling safe at
Stanford, he remained in the then brand-new first class of the Stanford
Graduate School of Business, again secretly underwritten by Aunt Cary.
Father never knew about Cary’s financial largesse on his behalf. Multiple
other family members knew. Cary and my grandfather believed it was bet-
ter if the beneficiary of the largesse thought it came from a father who
earned his savings rather than from a rich aunt who married money.

Stanford didn’t then have an investment class as it does now; but
as Father has described in other writings, there was then a class that
traveled to visit and analyze local businesses. Father had a car and
volunteered to drive the professor, Boris Emmett; so they spent a lot of
time together, which had a profound effect on Father. He felt he learned
more from those car rides with Emmett than from all of his other time
at Stanford combined. He described all that better than I could in his
1980 Financial Analysts Research Foundation (FAF) monograph,
“Developing an Investment Philosophy,” and so I won’t tread there. In
his original preface to Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, he
described his early business years, so I won’t tread that turf either.

MIDDLE LIFE

As World War II evolved, Father put his business interests on ice and
enlisted. Too old and too well educated for ideal cannon fodder, he got

Introduction

lucky. Long-time mentor Ed Heller enlisted ahead of him and pulled
some strings — somehow Father was made an instant officer and hence
never saw the front line. Instead, he fought the war from behind desks
all over mid-America, doing accounting and finance for the Army Air
Corps. On day one, he was a lieuteriant, which he found awkward. On
reporting for duty, in uniform, lower-ranking personnel would salute
him, yet he didn’t know how to respond. Senior personnel expected
respect and appropriate behavior, which he also didn’t know how to
deliver. It took time to adjust. He hated the military, thought of it as a
terrible time, despite admitting quite readily that he was treated well by
it. He hated the regimentation, the lack of freedom, and being ordered
about. When stationed in Little Rock, Arkansas, he met my mother,
Dorothy Whyte, who was also in service there. My mother came from
Camden, Arkansas, which is very close to where President Bill Clinton
was later raised. Father flipped head over heels for my mother instantly
and asked her to marry him only weeks into their relationship; she
immediately agreed. In 1944 my eldest brother, Arthur, was born —
mother having been sent ahead to San Francisco to be with my grand-
father for his medical supervision prior to and after birth. She remained
there until Father’s discharge, whereupon he returned home and renewed
his business interests as described in his monograph. Donald was born in
1947 and I in 1950. In between the birth of Donald and me, a daughter
died in childbirth.

Shortly after I was born, they bought a house on the site where they
now live in San Mateo, California, twenty minutes south of San Francis-
co. But they came to hate the house while loving the acre on which the
house sat. They loved the views, the trees, and the landscape. Father ripped
the house down and built the house in which I was raised and where he
and my mother resided ever after. We rented a house a block away during
construction. When complete, the house was big, all white, clean, and aus-
tere. In my father’s house, everything must be neat to a fault. Possessions
in all forms were sparse and exactly in their places or they drove him nuts.
He loved the yard. Until very late in life, he spent almost a complete day
each weekend in the bottom of the yard, which was almost wild but with
spectacular oak trees and wildflowers. He would weed and tend to his
wild-like garden and worry about all the things he fretted about, whether
the stock market, politics, family matters, or whatever; and to him that
time was a marvel, curative for everything annoying him. It was only as
his dementia started, causing him to fall often, that he gave up the garden.

Introduction

The late 1950 s and the 1960’s were the high point of Father’s life,
in my view. In 1958, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits was pub-
lished, making him an instant, national star. Locally, it made him sort of
the dean of the San Francisco investment community. I doubt anyone
had before received so much' instant stature from an investment book.
Certainly, tied to its era, Benjamin Graham’s Security Analysis took much
longer to become prominent. Local names that held sway in 1960
included Dean Witter, who founded and headed that great and locally-
based brokerage firm. But to Dean Witter, New York was the mecca.
And the public already fathomed that a broker was not a money man-
ager. The then famous Gerald Loeb, also of San Francisco Jewish origin
and also a broker, may have been bigger nationally, but he had long gone
on to New York and lost the local link. Simply put, in San Francisco by
1960, there was no investment advisory name as noted as Father’s. Dif-
ferent than today, all Northern California investing activities were geo-
graphically centralized in a few blocks around Montgomery and Bush
Streets in San Francisco. In that realm Father held prestige of which he
could have only fantasized in his insecure childhood.

There was a provision then in California state law, which still exists,
allowing an advisor who maintained fewer than fifteen clients and did
not hold himself out to the public as an investment advisor both to
avoid Securities and Exchange Commission registration and to main-
tain contracts for compensation for a percent of profits that were oth-
erwise made illegal in 1940, a point most investors don’t appreciate
today. Before then, scam artists would seek clients, tell half to do one
thing, tell the other half to do the reverse, charge 20 percent of the
profit on whatever happened, and pick up 10 percent of the spread no
matter what happened. Hence percentage-of-profit contracts were illegal
for all investment advisors for more than forty years unless the person
had fewer than fifteen clients and did not advertise as an investment
advisor. And it was in this way that Father structured his business on his
return from military service. With the fame from Common Stocks and
Uncommon Profits, he could easily maintain as clients a few very wealthy
local families who paid him well and yet required no real organization
to support him. That allowed him to feel superior to others who
required a more public clientele and to remain a very private person,
which fit well with his social awkwardness and insecurity. Despite his
fame and notoriety, he always felt uncomfortable in the public spotlight
and avoided it.

Introduction

Flashback to 1945. Herbert Dougall was hired by Stanford and started
the Graduate School of Business’s first dedicated investment course. In
all of history, only three people ever taught that course. Dougall
taught it from 1946 to 1968, twenty-two years in all, except for a two-
year sabbatical in 1961 and 1962 When Father taught the course on a
part-time, temporary basis. Among Fathers students was Jack McDonald,
who was hired by Stanford in 1 968 and who has taught the course ever
since. When Dougall was away, it was largely on my father’s reputation
deriving from Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits and from his alum-
nus status that caused him to be picked. Father loved it. It revived his
youthful love affair with Stanford. Had Dougall not returned, I could
envision my father doing that course, part time, forever. But Dougall did
return, and Jack McDonald took over in 1968. By Jack’s testimony, it
was Father who got him interested in markets. Before that, Jack had
been a young Hewlett-Packard engineer who changed the course of his
life’s work at the junction when he met Father. Jack has since said that
Fathers major contribution, as seen through Common Stocks and Uncommon
Profits, is to be the first person to link the models of sustainable growth
with the concept of competitive advantage. Today, that is a pretty standard
package, but not then. In some ways Jack sees Father more as a seminal
strategist than as a stock market innovator or operator.

Anyway, for the many students and business folks who hold Stan-
ford in awe and respect its MBAs highly and who think those who took
its graduate investment course advantaged, note; For a very long time,
that course was taught either by the author of the book you hold in
your hand (for two years) or by his disciple, and by only one man before,
ever. What a testament to Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits— one
few readers appreciate or know. For a very long time, until after I came
to temporarily own the book’s rights and then, subsequently, got into a
dumb fight with Jack McDonald (which was my fault), Jack always used
Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits as a formal or informal Stanford
textbook for the course. Over the years— not every year, but for many
years— Father drove down to Stanford at Jack’s request to deliver an
annual lecture and answer questions in Jack’s class. In May 2000, after
many years of absence and with Father well into dementia, Jack asked
him to return and lecture. I was scared to death Father would embarrass
himself because I knew he wasn’t at all the man he used to be. But Father
rose to the occasion and had one of his best days in a long time, deliver-
ing a rousing lecture and answering all questions from all comers. The

Introduction

whole thing, including Jack’s warm introduction of Father, was reprinted
verbatim in volume XV, number 7, of the Outstanding Investor Digest.

As Father’s dementia overtook him, he slowly lost more of the
memories of past businesspeople he had known. For the most part, the
earlier he knew them, the longer he remembered them, and the most
recent acquaintances faded first from memory. For example, he remem-
bered many people from the 1950’s, whereas he had forgotten pretty
much everyone he had known from the 1970’s. Dementia is like that. But
more emotional memories are embedded deeper in the mind; and Jack
McDonald, whom Father met in 1961, thirty-three years into a seventy-
two-year career, was one of the very last business personas to fade from
his recollection, demonstrating how much McDonald meant to him.

As the 1960’s passed, Father became ever less interested in his pub-
lic image and more interested in being quiet. He fancied himself a great
judge of businesspeople and largely was, but he knew that was a private
activity. He responded to few local requests for appearances but declined
ever more of them, and he wouldn’t travel to appear in public ever
again. In 1970, at sixty-three, he still didn’t have a gray hair on his head.
That same year, my oldest brother, Arthur, an ecclesiastical historian by
training and a very good one, went to work to join him. Two years later,

I joined. Fathers vision was that we would work for a few years and
then slowly take over his business.That could never happen. It took me
only about a year to realize why. Father was such a stickler for detail and
so focused and so socially awkward and insecure that he was absolutely
incapable of delegating in any way. So, Arthur and I could never really
evolve into any meaningful contributors. I was inherently high energy,
rebellious, and emotionally pretty brutal to people; and as soon as I real-
ized Father could never delegate, I knew I had to distance myself from
him for both our sakes. Otherwise, there was no opportunity for me,
and either he would hurt me or I would hurt him or both. It took
Arthur four more years to leave, and initially he left to join me. But it is
tough for an older brother to join his younger brother as a junior partner,
and that wasn’t meant to be. So, Arthur left the industry and I remained,
but separate, interacting but distanced from Father. These years were the
first real disappointments since Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits
appeared. They included both the brutal 1973-1974 bear market and
the beginning of Father’s body starting to slow a bit. In 1977, he was
seventy; and while he would never admit it and while still exceptionally
energetic for a man that age, he wasn’t as buoyant as he had been and

Introduction

for the first time began to show the early signs of aging. His hair was
thinning and partially gray now. In the afternoon train rides down the
peninsula, he started falling asleep regularly. Sometimes in the after-
noon, he fell asleep at his desk. He was due, but he couldn’t quit.

During these years, he determined that he would improve the quality
of his holdings by weeding out the weakest among the few he owned to
own even fewer of higher quality. In retrospect, and without him fathom-
ing it, what he was doing was cutting down the universe requiring his
attention to match diminishing energy. Early in his career, he might have
owned thirty stocks: a few big established ones, some mid-sized ones he
had bought as smaller companies and still held and would for decades,
some small ones for which he had high and long hopes, and a handful of
private-placement, venture cap— type holdings in tiny amounts that he
thought of as icing rather than cake. In the mid- 1970’s, he steadily and
slowly sold the ones he thought less of and concentrated on his favorite
holdings, so that by about 1990 he held six stocks and by 2000 he held
three. None of it went well. My advice to all investors is to stop making
investment decisions of any kind when you get old, whatever “old” means
to you. Stop before you get old. I’ve watched great investors age, and there
are no old, great investors. There are old men who were great; but the
process of investing is too vital to allow for old age and future greatness
together, and aging becomes more powerful than the prior greatness,
which eventually implodes foolishly. In medicine, “aged fragility” is a great
frontier as a future, new recognized, disease but now it stops all old great
investors. There simply are no great octogenarian investors. In his later
years, Father could talk well and think well, but he didn’t have the clarity
for great decisions and his sales were poorly timed, consistently. Late in life,
he would say things like he was looking for stocks he could hold for thirty
years, which sounded silly for an eighty-five-year-old. People often
thought it was charming, which was also pretty silly. I think a lot of other
people knew he was doing this because he loved it and couldn’t quit, even
if it wasn t good for him financially. But he was indulged by everyone,
including me. What did I care? If it made him happy, it was fine by me. But
some could see that he was a bit like a man hanging around the ballpark
with bat and glove when too old to play. His few late-in-life purchases were
not successful. He would have been much better off financially if he had
just quit doing anything at the age of eighty or even seventy It wouldn’t
have mattered if he sold and went into index funds or just held what he
owned until he died. As it was, his decisions detracted value steadily.

Introduction

1 0

His long-held prescription for investors had been to buy great com-
panies and pretty much hold them forever. And he had owned great
companies. Had he followed his own prescription late in life and not
attempted to fiddle and fix past his prime, he could have held what he
owned until death and done far better than he did. I don’t recall every-
thing he ever owned, but I recall the main holdings. In 1973, at the market’s
peak, he owned among then-big firms in big amounts Dow Chemical,
FMC Corporation, Motorola, and Texas Instruments. Among medium-
sized companies in big amounts, he owned Raychem and Reynolds and
Reynolds. Those six stocks then constituted two-thirds of his net worth.
The biggest positions were Motorola, Texas Instruments, and Raychem,
and had he held them all until now, despite the ravaging of the
2000-2002 bear market, he would have done very well. But with the
exception of Motorola, they were all sold and the timing was terrible in
every case, something he wouldn’t have done if he was younger. Among
smaller firms, he owned many, all selected between 1968 and 1973— and
few did well for him after 1973.The most spectacular by far was a ven-
ture capital holding in Manufacturing Data Systems, which went pub-
lic and then was acquired in the 1980 s and in which he made a hun-
dred times his money. The earliest of them, Rogers Corporation, he still
owns. Motorola he still owns. Late in life, he tended to sell the ones that
were long beat up, and often just before they came back to life with
spectacular bounces. He did that particularly with FMC and Texas
Instruments in the 1980’s and Raychem in the 1990 s.

Also in the 1970’s something happened in his mind that I dont
understand. His father had practiced medicine until very shortly before
he died in 1959. In just a few years, my grandfather got what today
would probably be diagnosed as Alzheimer’s or some form of dementia.
He quickly deteriorated, falling apart and then passing away. But Fathers
analysis was different. He thought his father fell apart because he
stopped working; and he concluded that if he stopped working, he, too,
would fall apart and die. And so he concluded he had to drive himself
on. For the rest of his life, work was life itself. Slowly, he resigned him-
self to being able to do less, but he pushed himself to do as much as he
could and did a remarkable job of it. He saw life as like a muscle if you
worked it hard, it kept working for you; but if you let it relax, it would
weaken (and in his mind it would lead to decay and death). Even when,
eventually, his dementia forced him to quit working completely, he
resented it terribly and believed it would cause his death rather than

Introduction

1 1

seeing it the other way around— that his dementia was taking him down
whether he worked or not. Even after the dementia was diagnosed, he
kept working, with monthly visits to the neurologist to appraise the sta-
tus of his condition. In 1999, with dementia impairing but not stopping
him, I moved his office into his home, into my old bedroom, including
everything that remained in his former office. He told his few remain-
ing clients about his condition and they remained with him; but he
could hold back the failing-memory march for only about eighteen
months longer. In 2000, he gave up completely. For the next year, he
talked to me steadily, asking about writing another book, how to get
back into business, whether he could travel around to universities to
lecture like he did to Stanford. He even made a stab at writing another
book, which he envisioned as What I’ve Learned in the Past Twenty-Five
Years. But he only got seven pages actually dictated. The energy was
draining from him almost monthly, and his mental capability steadily
diminished. As the disease will do, he talked about plans one morning
and forgot them by afternoon. When his career was over after seventy-two
years, he initially became tremendously depressed because his self-image
was so linked to his career functioning. As my deceased mother-in-law
used to say, “Old age isn’t for sissies.”

WHAT KIND OF MAN?

Father was sparse, Spartan, serious with a weird sense of humor linked
to plays on words. He loved puns and referred to anyone else’s pun as,
two-thirds of a pun, or PU!” When I was a child, my friends were all
scared to death of him because he had an unintentional cold stare that
pierced right through you. If you didn’t know him well, he scared you
to death — dark hair, dark complexion, not big (in fact, almost gaunt),
but scary looking, and often dressed in dark clothes. Had he been
twenty years younger and seventy-five years earlier, he would have
looked a bit like the archetypal image of the thin, dark-haired, dark-
dressed, bad-guy gunslinger in westerns. You could fantasize him saying,
Just one move and 1 11 plug you.” But he didn’t “plug” anyone. He
wasn’t mean. He just looked mean. He didn’t have to say a word. Still,
children tip-toed around him and scooted fast to avoid him. Again, he
wasn’t mean, but he wasn’t warm and fuzzy either; and he never, ever
praised anyone except my oldest brother, whom he adored from birth.

Introduction

1 2

Fact is, I’ve always known my father held me in high regard, maybe
higher regard than almost anyone he ever interacted with, even if he
displayed it in strange ways and often not at all. Often not at all. For
example, except once when I was sixteen that I recall very, very dis-
tinctly, he never, ever praised me directly about anything at all until
1 was well into my forties. It bothered me when I was young, but I
came to accept it. That was who he was. He just wasn’t the praising
kind. He would tell others how proud he was of me, almost bragging,
and I’d hear it from them; but he could never tell me. He later told me
he regretted that but hadn’t known how to deal with it. This type of
communication was difficult for my father.

Let me help you put that in perspective by describing a part of his
career. Decades before a world of computer screening, he had a
methodology he employed for finding new ideas for new stocks. He let
it be known that any young investment man could set an appointment
to meet him just once and talk investments. Usually he would never see
the man again. But if he thought the person unusually capable, he would
see him repeatedly and offer to swap ideas over time. He let the other
guy know what he was interested in and vice versa; and then over time
if they saw something of interest, they would swap ideas. These folks
passed on many ideas to father over the decades. Yet he was so clear in
what he wanted, relative to the fifteen points, and so focused to do
nothing else, that in his entire career he essentially only followed any
one man into a stock once. Other ideas from that same person he
brushed off because they were never quite good enough in his mind
not quite right.

He followed the thinking of two particular individuals twice. One
of the two had ideas that were money losers both times. The only
person he ever followed three times was me. He adopted three of my
stock ideas fully across his client base and for him and my mother and
made more than a thousand percent on each of them. That was the most
ideas he ever adopted from any one person, ever, and he did well with
all of them; mine all came in the mi d-to-later- 1970’s, late in his career,
which, as I’ve already told you, was a time when his successes were thin-
ning and should have been, therefore, doubly precious.

But let me show you who he was. Of those three stock ideas, two
he never acknowledged to me. The third? More than fifteen years later,
in my forties, he sent me a short note to tell me I had done well with
it — he owned it still then and years later. When I recalled the other two

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1 3

ideas to him, he acknowledged them but no further. No congratulations.
No thank you. Because I was always less fearful of him than others were,
I verbally kicked at him a bit at times, which I did then, asking who else
had he ever gotten three successful investment ideas from. He pointed
out to me that there was no one, but that wasn’t so important. The key
was in him, he explained, in knowing which ideas to follow and which
to discard and that he hadn’t followed any of my bad ideas. That annoyed
me. So, I retorted that he had followed plenty of other people's bad ideas,
and then he got mad at me and we didn’t speak for about a month. Then
he forgot he was ever mad at me, and the subject never came up again.
That was who he was: cool, cold, hard, tough, disciplined, non-social,
never quitting, ever confident externally but internally often scared. And
amazing. I know he respected me; but to the people he respected most,
he had the hardest time communicating that directly.

What was his daily grind like? In 1958, as Common Stocks and
Uncommon Profits was published, Father arrived home from work in the
late afternoon, changed clothes, ate dinner with the family formally in
the dining room, and then retired to the living room, where he read,
sometimes business materials but usually library murder mysteries —
until bedtime. When I was a child, he would take a break at our bed-
time to tell my brothers and me bedtime stories, which he lavished on
us more on me than on my brothers because I liked them better.
Sometimes they were non-fiction history about heroic figures or events,
like Joan of Arc, the American Revolution, Paul Reveres ride, the life
of Napoleon. Others were fiction of his own creation, something he
hoped eventually to turn into children’s books but never did. They were
all great. My brothers and I had separate bedrooms, and Father would
sit on the bed’s edge of whomever he was telling the story to. One or
more of us would lie on the floor nearby, and when we fell asleep, he
carried us to bed. He and mother went to bed about ten. In the morning,
he drove us kids to school at 7:30 in a beat-up old blue Oldsmobile and
drove on to a point a half mile from San Mateo’s train station. He walked
to the station and rode the rails into San Francisco. Early-morning San
Mateo retailers came to call him “the flash” because he walked so fast,
leaning forward in a world long before “power walking.” He believed
that if rain wasn t hard, it did no good, and that if walking wasn’t fast, it
was a waste of mileage. He loved the railroad train and had been riding
trains since childhood. His morning train departed at 8:00. It arrived at
the San Francisco depot at Third and Townsend Streets at 8:30 (a block

Introduction

from its current location). On the train he read business materials, every
day. If someone approached him to talk, he told them he was busy
working, which he was, and then kept reading. Cool. Solitary. He then
walked a mile to his office in Mills Tower at the corner of Bush and San-
some Streets. If someone wanted to walk with him, they couldnt
because he walked so fast that they couldn’t keep up. Cool. Solitary. A
sort of gunslinger of his own creation. At Mills Tower, he took the ele-
vator to the eighteenth floor and entered his office. Alone. Actually, he
had two offices over the years. He was at suite 1810 from World War II
until 1970, when he moved to suite 1820. The pictures on the back
cover of the dust jacket of Conservative Investors Sleep Well were in both
offices, and they sit today on the wall of a conference room at my cor-
porate headquarters.

His furniture never changed all those years. Same desk, which now
sits in my old childhood bedroom. Chairs, and every form of appoint-
ment — none of it changed for forty years and was all Spartan. He was
Spartan. His luxury there? The view of San Francisco Bay. When he
moved to 1820, he got the corner suite with bay views in two direc-
tions, high luxury. In the 1950s, Mills Tower was one of the city s two
tallest office buildings, along with the Russ Building. When he moved
in 1970 to suite 1820, the view to the bay out both windows in both
directions was clear. By the mid-1980s when I moved him out, he
could see nothing but the taller office buildings across the street in any
direction at all. Tied to the San Francisco office building boom of the
1970’s, the city just grew up around him — and with the lack of bay
view, much of his passion for being there faded.

Each night, he walked the mile back to the train station and read
more on the way home, although late in his life, as said earlier, he fell
asleep a lot on the train in the afternoon. He was in the office at 9:00
and left at 4:00 to return home. When it rained, he took the bus and
hated it. The bus put him in close contact with all kinds of street people —
after all, anyone can get on the bus — and even with the best of folks (and
he wasn’t a people person), he felt uncomfortable there. Compared to
most business successes, he never worked very long hours or all that hard
or frantically. Early on, I marveled at how someone could have succeeded
as well as he did working as few hours as he did or with as little stren-
uous effort as he exerted; but it was because of his genius. At times, he
was like a laser beam and beautiful to behold. You only need a relative
few of those times in a career to accomplish a great deal if you don’t

Introduction ] 5

screw up too badly at other times. He had the one and not the other,
and that made it work.

And he was always alone. Until my brother went to work with him
in 1970, he never had more than a part-time secretary around him,
several half-days a week. For decades, up until the early 1970 s (which
also marked the beginning of his business decline), it was one woman,
Mrs. Del Poso. As a young man, I never got to know her in any real way
at all, which I now regret because I’m sure I could have learned lots
about Father from her. Otherwise he was solitary. Non-social. Thinking.
Reading. Talking on the phone, yes, but not oriented toward being with
people. A very definite non-people person.

Father loved to watch election returns. Always. A passion. He had a
marvelous memory before dementia. Routinely, he memorized the
names of all 435 members of the House of Representatives and the
100 senators. To put himself to sleep at night, he would go state by state
through their names until he drifted off. He also memorized each state
capital and made me do it as a kid. To him, reciting them wasn’t chal-
lenging because they never changed. But congressmen did, which gave
him new grist. The only time this ever really backfired on him was
when Warren Buffett first started interacting with him. Because he had
Buffett’s father’s name stuck in his head from Howard Buffett’s days as
Omaha’s congressman, Father kept referring to Warren Buffett as
“Howard,” which came to periodically embarrass him when he caught
it. Warren never called it to his attention. I pointed it out to Father
several times, and he told me to mind my own business. But he loved
watching election returns because it was the beginning of the next
memorization cycle. It also linked to his interest in analyzing politics,
something that always fascinated him. And he wasn’t bad at it. He started
with an advantage. Because he had all these guys names already memo-
rized so well, he was a leg up on most folks. I’ll bet at any one time there
aren t 500 people in all of the United States who know all the names of
all members of the House and the Senate. But he did. Always.

Also, because he knew the names, it was easier for him than for most
folk, as elections approached, to learn and to memorize which were the
races that were close and could go either way. Long before folks like
political analyst Charles Cook refined his analytical structure, Father had
the races categorized into groups by region as to safe seats for either
party, semi-safe seats, and seats that were competitive to toss-ups. On
election night, he would hone in on those relatively few seats that were

Introduction

1 6

the closest races and likely to go either way. As returns came in, he loved
staying up late at night collecting data and writing them down and
re- calibrating what that meant to the balance of power in Congress in
the next two years and how that might effect the president and U.S. politics
in general. He was not very good at knowing what would cause those
close races to likely go one way or the other, nor did he think he was;
but he knew which ones were close and watched them like a hawk. Just
because I knew he wasn’t good at knowing what would cause them to
break one way or the other, I later put effort into getting specifically-
trained to do just that — because I wanted to learn something I knew he
didn’t know how to do. Late in his life, he marveled that I could do it
because it was inconceivable to him that anyone could. But it is a pret-
ty simple set of skills. The irony is that if earlier in his career someone
had taught him how to do it, he could readily have done it quite well
and, I’m sure, far better than I could. But another feature of his life was
that any technique he didn’t learn before age fifty, he probably never
learned. He had a lot going on by that age, which is just when Common
Stocks and Uncommon Profits appeared.

The book’s publication tied into other personal qualities that were
weird. Note his dedication in Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits. It
says, “This book is dedicated to all investors, large and small, who do
NOT adhere to the philosophy:! have already made up my mind, don’t
confuse me with facts.’ ” As long as I knew him, in any area outside
investing, he didn’t want to be confused with facts because he didn’t
want his life disrupted because he was a creature of habit, almost above
and beyond all things. Everything had to stay just as it was. You couldn’t
replace anything with a new-and-improved version. That he tore down
his house and re-built it was miraculous. He just didn’t want facts if they
might lead him to change. It impacted everything from his garden to his
cars, clothes, furniture, acquaintances; whatever it was, he didn’t want
change. When I worked for him briefly, I didn’t really know him well at
first in a business sense, but I could see that his office was antiquated. So
I set out to do minor improvements.

In 1972, he still had a battery of three rotary-dial telephones on his
desk, and he was hard of hearing. So, he would be talking on one and
another would ring and he would have no idea which one it was; and
he would regularly pick up the wrong one and slam it back down hur-
rying to the other. I installed a standard single-set, touch-tone phone
with multiple lines and flashing lights. It took him months to get over

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1 7

being mad at me. I interfered with his world, and he could not accept
it as an improvement. But he learned the business point of it, and for
business he would change; and he finally got used to it — it became a
new habit and he forgot he was ever mad at me. But when I was four-
teen and used money I’d saved from 'working part-time jobs to buy him
a jacket to wear in the woods with me on a family trip, he would never
wear it, preferring to wear, believe it or not, an old sport coat he had
owned forever. He hated change.

He had an old hand-crank adding machine in his office that was
probably first operated by Tyrannosaurus rex . When I first saw him
pounding on that darned thing, I thought his desk would implode or
his wrist would shatter. Three feet from where I sit now, I have a col-
lection of memorabilia. One item, from his office, was an October 20,
1961, Wall Street Journal announcement of what was the first four-
function calculator. It wasn’t called that at the time. It was called a
pocket computer, and it used integrated circuits (Jack Kilby of Texas
Instruments co-invented the integrated circuit in the 1950 s for which
he later won a Nobel prize), which were then called, “solid circuit semi-
conductor networks.” The calculators were for the space program and
weighed ten ounces and cost $29,350 each. My father had been one of
Texas Instruments’ earliest public investors as described in his FAF
monograph; and by the time I arrived, he was very devoted to Texas
Instruments. So, in 1973, 1 got him a very early commercial electronic
calculator and junked his aged hand-cranker. I thought he would like it
because it was from Texas Instruments and was so vastly superior to his
adding machine and because he could do all kinds of things not before
possible. But he didn’t like it one bit because it involved change; and it
took him most of a year to get over being annoyed at that habit change.
Still, he finally got used to it, and then it was as if he had always owned
it. He sold his Texas Instruments stock in the 1980 s but continued to
use old and antiquated Texas Instruments calculators the rest of his
career because he hated changing.

By Father’s admission, he had just five friends in his whole life —
David Samuels (his younger first cousin), Ed Heller, Frank Sloss, Louis
Langfeld, and John Herschfelder — and they from fairly early on and all
but one family connected. Despite all these friends being local, as a
mature adult, he rarely saw them. Father knew David Samuels all his life
and telephoned him regularly but only saw him, maybe, twice a year.
Mentioned earlier, Ed Heller was a half generation older and successful

Introduction

1 8

and wealthy before my fathers time and became a major mentor early
on. They met when Ed married a cousin. Heller was a successful stock
market investor, an overall businessman, and a venture capitalist and may
have been the man Father admired most until the early 1950’s, when
Father concluded Heller was a womanizer and ended the relationship.
Heller died soon thereafter. Frank Sloss shared a room with Father at
Stanford, and they remained close ever after and, hereto, Frank married
a cousin and Father and Frank remained close until Frank died in the
1980’s. Frank was what today we call an estate planning attorney in San
Francisco and did most of Father’s non-securities legal work until Frank
died; and in that way they spoke often. But they saw little of each other
otherwise. Louis Langfeld was himself a distant relative and a client of
father for many years, and they often commuted together into San
Francisco. I saw him far more often than the others because he lived
close by and picked father up to commute together on the train. Louis
died in the 1950’s; his son allegedly refused to pay the final bill, and
Father sued him and won. Cool. Tough. Pretty darned solitary. And the
son? He is now dead himself. Father’s longest lasting friend? John Her-
schfelder, an engineer, who had been close to Father since childhood.
But he only saw or spoke to Johnny maybe once every four years as an
adult. Father couldn’t stand the guy’s wife— drove him crazy. Still, when
Johnny was in the hospital, dying, Father made regular trips there to sit
with him. Johnny was important to Father. Yet in life, he couldnt find
ways to be with the man, because Father was solitary. Stoic. Alone,
except with my mother. He just didn’t like people very much. Most
people like to be around friends, just to be with them and bask in their
companionship, sort of glowing. He didn’t.

He liked to be alone or with my mother; and pretty much of the
time when he was with my mother, they were both alone, she in the
family den and he in the living room. It was just who he was. But he
was beyond anxious if he was separated from her when he wasn’t at
work or in the garden. Other people? He just didn’t like being around
other people much. He liked me, but if I was around him too much, it
bugged him. Or Arthur, and he liked Arthur better than anyone but my
mother. He cared for my brother Donald less than me, and that took a
toll on Donald. He cared for Arthur more than me, and that took a toll
on Arthur. But the reality is that Father was just a solitary guy. Regard-
less of with whom he interacted, it was all relative degrees of solitude.
When Arthur and then I came to work with him in the early 1970’s, it

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1 9

drove him nuts, in my opinion. He had been pretty much alone and
solitary his whole career, and being around us all that time was too
much. Seeing that it drove him nuts, realizing I hadn’t yet really learned
who he was and, as stated earlier, realizing there wasn’t a career oppor-
tunity with him because he coulidn’t delegate, I determined rather
promptly to distance myself a bit to make him and me less nuts. I quit
his employment and started out on my own within a year. But I
remained in the same building. I had an unusual ability to not be both-
ered much by Fathers weirdness and to separate from him but remain
fairly close. Arthur couldn’t do that. Too much emotion. Arthur isn’t as
emotionally tough as I am, never was; I don’t know why. I always
thought both my brothers took Father much too seriously and, ultimately,
couldn’t take him nearly as much or as well as I could. Ultimately
Father’s emotion took too big a toll on Arthur, and he left the industry
completely in 1977 and moved to Seattle and on to academics. My
father was simply not a man to be close to people.

He was pretty frugal sometimes; and when I was young and we
went somewhere on business, I had to share a hotel room with him. We
did this even after I could afford my own room because he couldn’t
handle the notion of me “wasting” the money. When I was about thirty,

I just couldn’t do it any more. But one night in the early 1970’s, we were
together in Monterey at one of the first elaborate dog-and-pony shows
for technology stocks — then known as “The Monterey Conference” —
put on by the American Electronics Association. At the Monterey Con-
ference, Father exhibited another quality I never forgot. The conference
announced a dinner contest. There was a card at each place setting, and
each person was to write down what he or she thought the Dow Jones
Industrials would do the next day, which is, of course, a silly exercise.
The cards were collected. The person who came closest to the Dow’s
change for the day would win a mini-color TV (which were hot new
items then). The winner would be announced at lunch the next day,
right after the market closed at one o’clock (Pacific time). Most folks, it
turned out, did what I did — wrote down some small number, like down
or up 5.57 points. I did that assuming that the market was unlikely to
do anything particularly spectacular because most days it doesn’t. Now
in those days, the Dow was at about 900, so 5 points was neither huge
nor tiny. That night, back at the hotel room, I asked Father what he put
down; and he said, “Up 30 points,” which would be more than 3 per-
cent. I asked why. He said he had no idea at all what the market would

Introduction

do; and if you knew him, you knew that he never had a view of what
the market would do on a given day. But he said that if he put down a
number like I did and won, people would think he was just lucky — that
winning at 5.57 meant beating out the guy that put down 5.5 or the
other guy at 6.0. It would all be transparently seen as sheer luck. But if
he won saying, “Up 30 points,” people would think he knew something
and was not just lucky If he lost, which was probable and he expected
to, no one would know what number he had written down, and it
would cost him nothing. Sure enough, the next day, the Dow was up 26
points, and father won by 10 points.

When it was announced at lunch that Phil Fisher had won and how
high his number was, there were discernable “Ooh” and “Ahhhh”
sounds all over the few-hundred-person crowd. There was, of course,
the news of the day, which attempted to explain the move; and for the
rest of that conference, Father readily explained to people a rationale for
why he had figured out all that news in advance, which was pure fiction,
and why the market had done what it did, again pure fiction and
nothing but false showmanship. But I listened pretty carefully, and
everyone he told all that to swallowed it hook, line, and sinker. Although
he was socially ill at ease always, and insecure, I learned that day that my
father was a much better showman than I had ever fathomed. And, oh,
he didn’t want the mini-TV because he had no use at all for change in
his personal life. So he gave it to me and I took it home and gave it to
mother, and she used it for a very long time.

THE THREE W's

What else did my father enjoy? Three big W’s: walking, worrying, and
work. He loved them all. I never really saw him relax in the ways most
folks do, I think because he loved to worry so much. Underneath his
surface was a sort of endless undulating nervous energy that he liked to
channel into worrying. He could worry about anything. It made him
feel safe in some way. It was as if he somehow believed if he worried
enough, he would have covered all the risks and nothing bad could hap-
pen to him. He would worry about the same things over and over and
over. Because he always worried so much and because I was always a
rebel, I never much worried. That bugged him. I have always been prone
to simply thinking things through as thoroughly as I can once and then

Introduction

going with my decision. If I conclude I’m wrong, I may conclude to
change. That drove him nuts. Father used to say to me, “Ken, I wish you
would run scared more often. How about just once? I just wish you
would run scared.” He prided himself on “running scared.” For the life
of me, I couldn’t think why I would want to live life that way; but he
not only wanted that for me, he wanted it for himself.

In the garden, my father could sit and worry about all the things he
cared about, and that made him feel better. It may well have contributed
to why he made fewer investment mistakes than most investors do. He
worried everything over until he had worried it to death. Maybe he had
reduced risk that way. But that also may well have contributed to why
he wasn’t richer than he was. He wasn’t willing to take risks on things
for which he hadn’t worried the mistakes down to marginality. In that
way, he was never a big risk taker, and those who get really rich take
bigger calculated risks than he was ever willing to take.

And walking? When Father was on a walk, his body was purging
that excess undulating energy, and he was the most relaxed I ever saw
him. He could take a long walk, in either the city or the woods, and
calm down. He could talk while he was walking and be calm about it.
He started every workday walking to and from the train station and
ended his day that way, too. And if he wasn’t walking fast, it didn’t count.
When Arthur and I used to take the train and walk into town with him
and back, we would be sweaty and uncomfortable and resentful. He
never sweated. He was one who liked it hot. But that was when he
could say what was on his mind in ways he never could without walking.
After I moved his office to San Mateo late in his career, he walked from
home and back, and he said it was the most peaceful time he had ever
known as an adult, walking through San Mateo’s residential gardens,
gazing at the bright flowers. He was a great walker, simply great. The
mans body was staggering. Tough. He could walk forever on legs that
wouldn’t quit no matter what, no matter how far or how steep the hill.
He loved it.

I live and work on top of a two-thousand-foot-tall redwood-
covered mountain overlooking the Pacific Ocean. I have lived there
thirty years, and I have two hundred of my five hundred people up there
at headquarters. And I own a stunning mountain-top ranch property
nearby that is the only in-holding inside a five-thousand-acre open-
space preserve. Once when father was eighty, my brother Donald was
down from Oregon. Father, Donald, my then twelve-year-old middle

Introduction

son, Nathan, and I left the rest of the extended family at the ranch and
started downhill, toward the Pacific, through the trees on the trails into
the heart of Purisima Canyon. Father whistled and talked as if he were
a boy No worries. Walking. Walking purged worry. I’ve been a moun-
tain man in this area most of my life and know it exceptionally well, and
my legs are used to hills from living here. At every trail junction, I would
say, “Now Father, this way is the shorter, less steep, quicker way to get
back, and that way is the longer, further-down-in-the-canyon, steeper
way. Which way do you want to take?” At every junction, he chose the
harder, longer way. We dropped thirteen hundred feet in elevation and
walked five miles, at which point we had to get back up. I was a bit
worried. I had an eighty-year-old father and a brother who was over-
weight and under-exercised and who didn’t have the world’s strongest
cardiovascular system. Don was also studying to be a nurse-practitioner
at the time. Huffing and puffing up the hill, Don was taking his own pulse
regularly. Father periodically looked back downhill at Don and asked if
he wanted us to wait for him or slow down. And Don periodically had
to stop to rest. When we stopped, Father wasn’t walking, so he would
start to worry. And he could worry about nothing at all and turn it into
a big worry. And right then he worried that my mother would be wor-
ried that we were stranded and hurt in the woods because it was taking
us so long to get back. So he harped at Don repeatedly that we had to
get going because mother would be worried. Poor Don; onward and
upward he plodded, huffing and puffing and taking his pulse. Nathan,
raised on the mountain, scampered ahead like a darting deer. As the sun
started setting, Father fretted more and wanted us to pick up the pace.
Of course, my mother wasn’t worried. She wasn’t the worrying kind.
That night, Don was staying at their home and told me later the next
day that his legs were so sore he could hardly get out of bed or a chair,
and Father waited on him, worrying the whole time. That’s what he
liked — walking, worrying, and work.

One of the best times I ever had with my father came about by
serendipity. I was fourteen. The family — Mother, Father, Donald, and
I — were having a Wyoming-dude-ranch summer vacation. Arthur was
gone from home by then. Father and I had been hiking daily. Donald
didn’t much like going along. I was a nut about wildlife at that time —
loved critters of all forms. One day we were out hiking and looking for
antelope. Father was walking and talking. I was looking for antelope. We
were way the heck away from the car, maybe four miles, in the high

Introduction

plateau, sparse chaparral. Summer clouds started to fill the sky, and we
started drifting back toward the car. Quickly the clouds turned deadly
dark. Out of nowhere, it cooled, and lightening and hail pounded all
around us — huge golf-ball-sized hail stones hitting us. We ran for the
car. Lightening was striking everywhere. We should have flattened our-
selves to the ground; but I was young and stupid and he didn’t know
any better, and we kept running. Lightening strikes hit the ground ten
and twenty-five feet from us over and over, and we were terrified. The
hail was hitting my father on the top of his head, and he was holding
his head and running. I was fifteen and reasonably athletic. He was fifty-
nine and could keep up with me running without much problem
because he had those legs that wouldn’t quit. We finally made it to the
car and piled into it. The lightening continued all around, but we were
finally safe— and I never saw my father laugh so hard. He had run so
hard that he didn’t worry for an hour.

In the early 1980’s, Father had some bad experiences walking from
the San Francisco depot to his office and back, including not watching
where he was going and bonking his head on a metal post once, pass-
ing out once, and getting accosted by a wanna-be mugger once. And,
so, mother and I convinced him to follow my lead by letting me move
his office down the peninsula, something I had done in 1977. I moved
him and set up his office in San Mateo in a little office building on Fifth
and El Camino Real. He continued to walk from home to work every
day and loved it. Gardens. No muggers. Few stop lights or crazy taxi
drivers to dodge. Beautiful flowers. No worries.

As mentioned earlier, late in his life, my father started falling down
in his garden on Sundays. It was an early warning of dementia s onset,
but no one saw it as such at the time. In retrospect, I can see that there
were other signs of it back then. But I knew nothing about demen-
tia and couldn’t recognize them. His father probably had Alzheimer’s,
too, but there was no such name for it back then. The early progression
of the disease is often very hard to detect and impossible if you don’t
know what to look for, which none of us around Father did. And if we
had, the tough old coot wouldn’t have listened to us anyway because he
was always ruggedly independent and self-willed.

One of his former Stanford students, Tony Spare, who went on to
run the Bank of California’s money management operations and then
started his own successful money management firm (since sold and a
shadow of its former self), long revered Father. On November 5, 1998,

Introduction

Tony was having a client seminar in San Francisco and asked Father to
come deliver a dinner speech. Father left his San Mateo office in the late
afternoon to walk to the train station to ride to the city, where he could
catch a taxi downtown to Tony’s event. Tony would drive him home that
night. The walk was wet from the afternoon’s light drizzle. As Father
passed through downtown San Mateo, he saw the next stop light start-
ing to shift from green to yellow and he ran to beat it, something he had
done all his life. As he ran off the near curb, he slipped and fell, break-
ing his right hip cleanly. The recovery went reasonably well, but from
moment one of that trauma, dementia flooded through the oppor-
tunity like a dam breaking.

As Father’s body recovered, his memory and logic did less so. I was
running his health care program and feeling pretty darned good about
how well he was improving. But as so often happens with a hip break in
the elderly, on January 15, 1999, he contracted pneumonia, which hit
him hard and almost killed him. By January 19, he was in intensive care,
and we were told to expect his death by morning. Mother was very
upset. Arthur flew down from Seattle and sat the night with him. By 3
A.M., the tough old coot was pulling through, coming out of the coma
and reacting initially to pin pricks to his toes. By 5 A.M., Arthur had me
back down there. By 8, 1 was calling mother, who was already grieving
his death, telling her to get back down to meet me because she could
once again talk with her husband, who was conscious and clear-eyed,
even if he was still on a respirator. I assembled an around-the-clock ded-
icated team of nurses and injected them into the hospital with my own
doctor s oversight to supervise Father as he came out of intensive care.
Hospitals do the best they can with elderly patients, but their care for
people in that condition is really totally inadequate; and there isn’t much
they can do about it because of how they function. And the family was
clear that we were going to do better. This particular hospital had never
before actually had anyone bring in a dedicated outside crew, but they
were very good to me as I put it in place, allowing us much more free-
dom than I expected or deserved. It turned out that father needed it.
He was nip and tuck with death twice more before finally pulling
through, including requiring on very short notice an emergency proce-
dure that drained a quart and a half of fluid from his lung by needle
injunction and vacuum removal. The fluid had filled his lungs almost
instantly. Without our dedicated crew to catch it fast, he would not have
survived. But all this trauma beat up his body and mind.

Introduction

The entire crisis, which included several small strokes, was still
another floodgate for the dementia to pour through en masse. Still, this
old man’s tough body recovered enough to where he could walk several
miles a day and talk clearly at length, even if he couldn’t remember
many things. By then, however, he' had forgotten pretty much every-
thing after about 1968. Slowly, as dementia does, his long-term memo-
ries became only about older and older events. He is at the stage now
where he recalls very little and recognizes very few people, typical of
late dementia. The slide was a slow, irregular decline that felt amazingly
swift to all of us as it occurred every few months. The only people he
always knows now are my mother and me. It shocked me when he first
failed to recognize Arthur, his favorite son, whom he now sometimes
knows and sometimes doesn’t. He remembers me because he sees me
more often and long has. At home, with around-the-clock in-home
help, he is bedridden, unable to walk, lacking his favorite activities of
most of his live — the walking, the worrying, and the third “W,” work-
ing. I take care of pretty much everything in terms of health care,
finances, and so on for both him and my mother. While my mother is
still pretty vital, my father isn’t the man I knew. Not at all. The man
I knew is long gone.

Today my mother puts in endless time on him but struggles under
the burden. Despite his health care providers doing an overall great job
for him, she never feels it is good enough and regularly injects herself
into the middle, which ultimately drains her to exhaustion. Then, with
her away, he starts calling out for her, and it is very tough on her and on
everyone. I can’t tell how much of a curse and how much of a blessing
it will be for her when he finally passes on. It is impossible to tell. The
only thing I know for sure is that old age isn’t for sissies.

They had eleven grandchildren and four great-grandchildren. The
first grandchild, Donald’s oldest daughter, was named after my aunt
who was named after Aunt Cary. The second was Arthur’s oldest son,
named after my father, Philip A. Fisher. They are the only real name-
sakes. My father always regretted that none of his grandchildren were
named after Mother, but she didn’t care. It wouldn’t be like her to fret
over something like that. Because Father had his own children fairly
late in life, he was really closest to his oldest grandchildren. Mother,
being the baby of her family, was more naturally drawn to her younger
grandchildren. Two of the great-grandchildren my parents barely know.
The other two they have never met, all residing far, far away. Only a

2 6 Introduction

few of the grandchildren have any real sense of the man I knew. They
never saw the mirror.

SIGNIFICANCE — THE MIRROR IMAGE

My father is a great man who influenced many people, great and small,
from national business leaders to students to students of his students
who went into other fields. He had a knack for getting people to see
things they wouldn’t see otherwise, not by telling them but by some-
how getting them to think thoughts they don’t believe they ever would
have thought without interaction with him. At times, it was like he was
a mirror held up to your brain.

I can’t tell you how many people over the decades said something
to me like, “I met him once. It was only briefly, but he said x, y, and z,
and that made me think, and that gave me the idea I used in starting
my company.” It was, of course, their idea, but they somehow credited
him with some of its creation. He brought that quality out in people.
Somehow he made people think things that they might have thought
anyway, but for sure they believed they thought them because of inter-
actions with Father. I remember some of these people clearly, and to
my certain knowledge Father didn’t say the things that some people
thought he said. But somehow they heard the right words anyway, and
that is all that counts for them. His writings are like that, too, and always
have been for many people. Many investors have told me over the
decades how they did this or that because of something they read in
Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits or in Conservative Investors Sleep
Well. Of course, they didn’t. They did whatever they did because of
something in them, in their mind. But they believe it was inspired by
something they read in those books. The books are good. The inspira-
tions are even better.

And that is a very good thing. If you read my father’s writings and
ideas come to you, ones he never really said, and if you are motivated
by them, so much the better. It is another reason that re-reading his
books is useful. Somehow, my father was a mirror for many people:
He let them see themselves in ways they believe they wouldn’t have
otherwise. Now, forty-five years after Common Stocks and Uncommon
Profits first appeared, my father will never directly have that impact on

Introduction

anyone again. But his writings carry on. If you’ve never read him,
I hope you enjoy this man. If you’ve read him before, I welcome you
back. With the response his writings have received over these forty-
five years, it is quite clear they will be here for you for the remain-
der of your life and probably far, lar after, just as his memory will be
for me.

Part One

COMMON STOCKS
AND UNCOMMON
PROFITS

Preface

T he publication of a new book in the field of investment may well
require some explanatory statement from its author. The following
remarks will therefore have to be somewhat personal in order to
supply an adequate explanation for my venturing to offer another book
on this subject to the investing public.

After one year in Stanford University’s then brand-new Graduate
School of Business Administration, I entered the business world in May
1928. I went to work for, and twenty months later was made the head
of, the statistical department of one of the main constituent units of the
present Crocker-Anglo National Bank of San Francisco. Under today’s
nomenclature I would have been called a security analyst.

Here I had a ringside seat at the incredible financial orgy that cul-
minated in the autumn of 1929 as well as the period of adversity that
followed. My observations led me to believe that there was a magnifi-
cent opportunity on the West Coast for a specialized investment coun-
seling firm that would make itself the direct antithesis of that ancient
but uncomplimentary description of certain stockbrokers — men who
know the price of everything and the value of nothing.

On March first 1931, 1 started Fisher & Co. which, at that time, was
an investment counseling business serving the general public but with
its interests centered largely around a few growth companies. This activ-
ity prospered. Then came World War II. For three and a half years, while
I was engaged in various desk jobs for the Army Air Force, I spent part
of such spare time as I had in reviewing both the successful and, more
particularly, the unsuccessful investment actions that I had taken and

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

that I had seen others take during the preceding ten years. I began
seeing certain investment principles emerge from this review which
were different from some of those commonly accepted as gospel in
the financial community.

When I returned to civiliah life I decided to put these principles
into practice in a business atmosphere as little disturbed by side issues as
possible. Instead of serving the general public, Fisher & Co. for over
eleven years has never served more than a dozen clients at one time.
Most of these clients have remained the same during this period. Instead
of being mainly interested in major capital appreciation, all Fisher & Co.
activity has been focused upon this one objective. I am aware that these
past eleven years have been a period of generally rising stock prices dur-
ing which anyone engaged in such activities should have made good
profits. Nevertheless by the degree to which these funds have consis-
tently forged ahead of the generally recognized indices of the market as
a whole, I find that following these principles has justified itself even
more thoroughly in the postwar period than was the case in the ten
prewar years when I was only partially applying them. Perhaps even
more significant, they have been no less rewarding during those of these
years when the general market was static or declining than when it was
sharply advancing.

In studying the investment record both of myself and others, two
matters were significant influences in causing this book to be written.
One, which I mention several times elsewhere, is the need for patience
if big profits are to be made from investment. Put another way, it is often
easier to tell what will happen to the price of a stock than how much
time will elapse before it happens. The other is the inherently deceptive
nature of the stock market. Doing what everybody else is doing at the
moment, and therefore what you have an almost irresistible urge to do,
is often the wrong thing to do at all.

For these reasons over the years I have found myself explaining in
great detail to the owners of the funds I manage the principles behind
one or another action I have taken. Only in this way would they have
enough understanding of why I was acquiring some, to them, totally
unknown security so that there would be no impulse to dispose of it
before enough time had elapsed for the purchase to begin justifying
itself in market quotations.

Gradually the desire arose to compile these investment principles
and have a printed record to which I could point. This resulted in the

Preface

first groping toward organizing this book. Then I began thinking of the
many people, most of them owners of far smaller funds than those
belonging to the handful of individuals it is my business to serve, who
have come to me over the years and asked how they as small investors
could get started off on the right pith.

I thought of the difficulties of the army of small investors who have
unintentionally picked up all sorts of ideas and investment notions that
can prove expensive over a period of years, possibly because they had
never been exposed to the challenge of more fundamental concepts.
Finally I thought of the many discussions I have had with another group
also vitally interested in these matters, although from a different stand-
point. These are the corporate presidents, financial vice presidents and
treasurers of publicly owned companies, many of whom show a deep
interest in learning as much as possible about these matters.

I concluded there was need for a book of this sort. I decided such
a book would have an informal presentation in which I would try to
address you, the reader, in the first person. 1 would use much the same
language and many of the same examples and analogies that I have
employed in presenting the same concepts to those whose funds I
manage. I hope my frankness, at times my bluntness, will not cause
offense. I particularly hope that you will conclude the merit of the
ideas 1 present may outweigh my defects as a writer.

Philip A. Fisher

San Mateo, California
September 195 7

Clues from the Past

Y ou have some money in the bank. You decide you would like to
buy some common stock. You may have reached this decision
because you desire to have more income than you would if you
used these funds in other ways. You may have reached it because you
want to grow with America. Possibly you think of earlier years when
Henry Ford was starting the Ford Motor Company or Andrew Mellon
was building up the Aluminum Company of America, and you wonder
if you could not discover some young enterprise which might today lay
the groundwork for a great fortune for you, too. Just as likely you are
more afraid than hopeful and want to have a nest egg against a rainy day
Consequently, after hearing more and more about inflation, you desire
something which will be safe and yet protected from further shrinkage
in the buying power of the dollar.

Probably your real motives are a mixture of a number of these
things, influenced somewhat by knowing a neighbor who has made
some money in the market and, possibly, by receiving a pamphlet in the
mail explaining just why Midwestern Pumpernickel is now a bargain. A
single basic motive lies behind all this, however. For one reason or
another, through one method or another, you buy common stocks in
order to make money.

Therefore, it seems logical that before even thinking of buying any
common stock the first step is to see how money has been most suc-
cessfully made in the past. Even a casual glance at American stock mar-
ket history will show that two very different methods have been used to
amass spectacular fortunes. In the nineteenth century and in the early

Clues from the Past

part of the twentieth century, a number of big fortunes and many small
ones were made largely by betting on the business cycle. In a period
when an unstable banking system caused recurring boom and bust, buy-
ing stocks in bad times and selling them in good had strong elements of
value. This was particularly true for' those with good financial connec-
tions who might have some advance information about when the bank-
ing system was becoming a bit strained.

But perhaps the most significant fact to be realized is that even in
the stock market era which started to end with the coming of the Fed-
eral Reserve System in 1913 and became history with the passage of the
securities and exchange legislation in the early days of the Roosevelt
administration, those who used a different method made far more
money and took far less risk. Even in those earlier times, finding the
really outstanding companies and staying with them through all the
fluctuations of a gyrating market proved far more profitable to far more
people than did the more colorful practice of trying to buy them cheap
and sell them dear.

If this statement appears surprising, further amplification of it may
prove even more so. It may also provide the key to open the first door
to successful investing. Listed on the various stock exchanges of the
nation today are not just a few, but scores of companies in which it
would have been possible to invest, say, $10,000 somewhere between
twenty-five and fifty years ago and today have this purchase represent
anywhere from $250,000 to several times this amount. In other words,
within the lifetime of most investors and within the period in which
their parents could have acted for nearly all of them, there were avail-
able scores of opportunities to lay the groundwork for substantial for-
tunes for oneself or ones children. These opportunities did not require
purchasing on a particular day at the bottom of a great panic. The shares
of these companies were available year after year at prices that were to
make this kind of profit possible. What was required was the ability to
distinguish these relatively few companies with outstanding investment
possibilities from the much greater number whose future would vary all
the way from the moderately successful to the complete failure.

Are there opportunities existing today to make investments that in
the years ahead will yield corresponding percentage gains? The answer
to this question deserves rather detailed attention. If it be in the affirma-
tive, the path for making real profits through common stock investment
starts to become clear. Fortunately, there is strong evidence indicating

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

that the opportunities of today are not only as good as those of the first
quarter of this century but are actually much better.

One reason for this is the change that has occurred during this peri-
od in the fundamental concept of corporate management and the cor-
responding changes in handling 'corporate affairs that this has brought
about. A generation ago, heads of a large corporation were usually mem-
bers of the owning family. They regarded the corporation as a personal
possession. The interests of outside stockholders were largely ignored. If
any consideration at all was given to the problem of management con-
tinuity — that is, of training younger men to step into the shoes of those
whose age might make them no longer available — the motive was large-
ly that of taking care of a son or a nephew who would inherit the job.
Providing the best available talent to protect the average stockholder’s
investment was seldom a matter in the forefront of the minds of man-
agement. In that age of autocratic personal domination, the tendency of
aging management was to resist innovation or improvement and fre-
quently to refuse even to listen to suggestions or criticism. This is a far
cry from today’s constant competitive search to find ways of doing
things better. Today’s top corporate management is usually engaged in
continuous self-analysis and, in a never-ending search for improvement,
frequently even goes outside its own organization by consulting all sorts
of experts in its effort to get good advice.

In former days there was always great danger that the most attrac-
tive corporation of the moment would not continue to stay ahead in its
field or, if it did, that the insiders would grab all the benefits for them-
selves. Today, investment dangers like these, while not entirely a thing of
the past, are much less likely to prove a hazard for the careful investor.

One facet of the change that has come over corporate management
is worthy of attention. This is the growth of the corporate research and
engineering laboratory — an occurrence that would hardly have benefit-
ed the stockholder if it had not been accompanied by corporate man-
agement’s learning a parallel technique whereby this research could be
made a tool to open up a golden harvest of ever-growing profits to the
stockholder. Even today, many investors seem but slightly aware of how
fast this development has come, how much further it is almost certain-
ly going, and its impact on basic investment policy.

Actually, even by the late 1920’s, only a half dozen or so industrial
corporations had significant research organizations. By today’s standards,
their size was small. It was not until the fear of Adolf Hitler accelerated

Clues from the Past 3 7

this type of activity for military purposes that industrial research really
started to grow.

It has been growing ever since. A survey made in the spring of 1956,
published in Business Week and a number of other McGraw-Hill trade
publications, indicated that in 1953'private corporate expenditures for
research and development were about $3.7 billion. By 1956 they had
grown to $5.5 billion and present corporate planning called for this to
be running at the rate of better than $6.3 billion by 1959. Equally star-
tling, this survey indicated that by 1959, or in just three years, a number
of our leading industries expect to get from 15 per cent to more than
20 per cent of their total sales from products which were not in com-
mercial existence in 1956.

In the spring of 1957 the same source made a similar survey. If the
totals revealed in 1956 were startling in their significance, those revealed
just one year later might be termed explosive. Research expenditures
were up 20 per cent from the previous year’s total to $7.3 billion! This
represents almost a 100 per cent growth in four years. It means the actu-
al growth in twelve months was $1 billion more than only a year before
had been expected as the total growth that would occur in the ensuing
thirty-six months. Meanwhile, anticipated research expenditures in
1960 were estimated at $9 billion! Furthermore, all manufacturing
industries, rather than just a few selected industries as represented in the
earlier survey, expected that 10 per cent of 1960 sales would be from
products not yet in commercial existence only three years before. For cer-
tain selected industries, this percentage — from which sales representing
merely new model and style changes had been excluded — was several
times higher.

The impact of this sort of thing on investment can hardly be over-
stated.The cost of this type of research is becoming so great that the cor-
poration which fails to handle it wisely from a commercial standpoint
may stagger under a crushing burden of operating expense. Furthermore,
there is no quick and easy yardstick for either management or the
investor to measure the profitability of research. Just as even the ablest
professional baseball player cannot expect to get a hit much more often
than one out of every three times he comes to bat, so a sizable number
of research projects, governed merely by the law of averages, are bound
to produce nothing profitable at all. Furthermore, by pure chance, an
abnormal number of such unprofitable projects may happen to be
bunched together in one particular span of time in even the best-run

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

commercial laboratory. Finally, it is apt to take from seven to eleven years
from the time a project is first conceived until it has a significant favor-
able effect on corporate earnings. Therefore, even the most profitable of
research projects is pretty sure to be a financial drain before it eventual-
ly adds to the stockholders profit.

But if the cost of poorly organized research is both high and hard
to detect, the cost of too little research may be even higher. During the
next few years, the introduction of many kinds of new materials and
new types of machinery will steadily narrow the market for thousands
of companies, possibly entire industries, which fail to keep pace with the
times. So will such major changes in basic ways of doing things as will
be brought about by the adoption of electronic computers for the keep-
ing of records and the use of irradiation for industrial processing. How-
ever, other companies will be alert to the trends and will maneuver to
make enormous sales gains from such awareness. The managements of
certain of such companies may continue to maintain the highest stan-
dards of efficiency in handling their day-to-day operations while using
equally good judgment in keeping ahead of the field on these matters
affecting the long-range future. Their fortunate stockholders, rather than
the proverbial meek, may well inherit the earth.

In addition to these influences of the changed outlook in corporate
management and the rise of research, there is a third factor likewise
tending to give today’s investor greater opportunities than those exist-
ing in most past periods. Later in this book — in those sections dealing
with when stocks should be bought and sold — it would seem more
appropriate to discuss what, if any, influence the business cycle should
have on investment policies. But discussion of one segment of this sub-
ject seems called for at this point. This is the greater advantage in own-
ing certain types of common stocks, as a result of a basic policy change
that has occurred within the framework of our federal government,
largely since 1932.

Both prior to and since that date, regardless of how little they had to
do with bringing it about, both major parties took and usually received
credit for any prosperity that might occur when they were in power.
Similarly, they were usually blamed by both the opposition and the gen-
eral public if a bad slump occurred. However, prior to 1 932 there would
have been serious question from the responsible leadership of either
party as to whether there was any moral justification or even political
wisdom in deliberately running a huge deficit in order to buttress ailing

Clues from the Past

segments of business. Fighting unemployment by methods far more cost-
ly than the opening of bread lines and soup kitchens would not have
been given serious consideration, regardless of which party might have
been in office.

Since 1932 all that is reversed. The Democrats may or may not be
less concerned with a balanced federal budget than the Republicans.
However, from President Eisenhower on down, with the possible
exception of former Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, the responsi-
ble Republican leadership has said again and again that if business
should really turn down they would not hesitate to lower taxes or make
whatever other deficit-producing moves were necessary to restore pros-
perity and eliminate unemployment. This is a far cry from the doctrines
that prevailed prior to the big depression.

Even if this change in policy had not become generally accepted,
certain other changes have occurred that would produce much the same
results, though possibly not so quickly. The income tax only became legal
during the Wilson administration. It was not a major influence on the
economy until the 1930 s. In earlier years, much of the federal revenue
came from customs duties and similar excise sources. These fluctuated
moderately with the level of prosperity but as a whole were fairly stable.
Today, in contrast, about 80 per cent of the federal revenue comes from
corporate and personal income taxes. This means that any sharp decline
in the general level of business causes a corresponding decline in federal
revenue.

Meanwhile, various devices such as farm price supports and unem-
ployment compensation have become imbedded in our laws. At just the
time that a business decline would be greatly reducing the federal gov-
ernment’s income, expenditures in these fields made mandatory by leg-
islation would cause governmental expenses to mount sharply. Add to
this the definite intention of reversing any unfavorable business trend by
cutting taxes, building more public works, and lending money to vari-
ous hard-pressed business groups, and it becomes increasingly plain that
if a real depression were to occur the federal deficit could easily run at
a rate of $25 to $30 billion per annum. Deficits of this type would pro-
duce further inflation in much the same way that the deficits resulting
from wartime expenditures produced the major price spirals of the
postwar period.

This means that when a depression does occur it is apt to be shorter
than some of the great depressions of the past. It is almost bound to be

40 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

followed by enough further inflation to produce the type of general price
rise that in the past has helped certain industries and hurt others. With this
general economic background, the menace of the business cycle may well
be as great as it ever was for the stockholder in the financially weak or
marginal company. But to the' stockholder in the growth company with
sufficient financial strength or borrowing ability to withstand a year or
two of hard times, a business decline under today’s economic conditions
represents far more a temporary shrinking of the market value of his hold-
ings than the basic threat to the very existence of the investment itself that
had to be reckoned with prior to 1932.

Another basic financial trend has resulted from this built-in infla-
tionary bias having become imbedded so deeply in both our laws and
our accepted concepts of the economic duties of government. Bonds
have become undesirable investments for the strictly long-term holdings
of the average individual investor. The rise in interest rates that had been
going on for several years gained major momentum in the fall of 1956.
With high-grade bonds subsequently selling at the lowest prices in
twenty-five years, many voices in the financial community were raised
to advocate switching from stocks which were selling at historically
high levels into such fixed-income securities. The abnormally high yield
of bonds over dividend return on stocks — in relation to the ratio that
normally prevails — would appear to have given strong support to the
soundness of this policy. For the short term, such a policy sooner or later
may prove profitable. As such, it might have great appeal for those mak-
ing short- or medium-term investments — that is, for “traders” with the
acuteness and sense of timing to judge when to make the necessary buy-
ing and selling moves. This is because the coming of any significant
business recession is almost certain to cause an easing of money rates and
a corresponding rise in bond prices at a time when equity quotations
are hardly likely to be buoyant. This leads us to the conclusion that high-
grade bonds may be good for the speculator and bad for the long-term
investor. This seems to run directly counter to all normally accepted
thinking on this subject. However, any understanding of the influences
of inflation will show why this is likely to be the case.

In its letter of December 1956, the First National City Bank of
New York furnished a table showing the worldwide nature of the
depreciation in the purchasing power of money that occurred in the
ten years from 1946 to 1956. Sixteen of the major nations of the free
world were included in this table. In every one of them the value of

Clues from the Past

4 1

money significantly declined. These declines ranged from a minimum
in Switzerland, where at the end of the ten-year period money would
buy 85 per cent of what could be purchased ten years before, to the
other extreme in Chile, where in ten years it had lost 95 per cent of
its former value. In the United States this decline amounted to 29 per
cent and in Canada to 35 per cent. This means that in the United
States the annual rate of monetary depreciation during the period was
3.4 per cent, and in Canada it was 4.2 per cent. In contrast, the yield
offered by United States Government bonds bought at the beginning
of the period, which admittedly was one of rather low interest rates,
was only 2.19 per cent. This means that the holder of this type of
high-grade, fixed-income security actually received negative interest
(or loss) of better than 1 per cent per annum if the real value of his
money is considered.

Suppose, however, that instead of acquiring bonds at the rather low
rates that prevailed at the beginning of this period, the investor could
have bought them at the rather high interest rates that prevailed ten
years later. The First National City Bank of New York in the same arti-
cle also supplied figures on this matter. At the end of the period covered
in the article, they estimated the return on United States Government
bonds at 3.27 per cent, which still would leave no return whatever, actu-
ally a slight loss, on the investment. However, six months after this arti-
cle was written, interest rates had risen sharply, and were above 3.5 per
cent. How would the investor actually have fared if he had had the
opportunity at the beginning of this period to invest with the highest
returns that have prevailed in over a quarter of a century? In the great
majority of cases he would still have gotten no real return on his invest-
ment. In many instances he would have had an actual loss. This is
because nearly all such bond purchasers would have had to pay at least
a 20 per cent income tax on the interest received before the genuine
rate of their return on the investment could have been calculated. In
many cases the bondholders tax would have been at a considerably
higher rate, since only the first $2000 to $4000 of taxable income qual-
ifies at this 20 per cent level. Similarly, if an investor had purchased tax-
free municipal bonds at this all-time high, the somewhat lower interest
rate that these tax-free securities carry would again not have provided
any real return on his investment.

Of course, these figures are only conclusive for this one ten-year
period. They do indicate, however, that these conditions are worldwide

4 2

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

and therefore not too likely to be reversed by political trends in any one
country. What is really important concerning the attractiveness of bonds
as long-term investments is whether a similar trend can be expected in
the period ahead. It seems to me that if this whole inflation mechanism
is studied carefully it becomes clear that major inflationary spurts arise
out of wholesale expansions of credit, which in turn result from large
government deficits greatly enlarging the monetary base of the credit
system. The huge deficit incurred in winning World War II laid such a
base. The result was that prewar bondholders who have maintained their
positions in fixed-income securities have lost over half the real value of
their investments.

As already explained, our laws, and more importantly our accepted !
beliefs of what should be done in a depression, make one of two courses
seem inevitable. Either business will remain good, in which event out-
standing stocks will continue to out-perform bonds, or a significant
recession will occur. If this happens, bonds should temporarily out-
perform the best stocks, but a train of major deficit-producing actions |
will then be triggered that will cause another major decline in the true
purchasing power of bond-type investments. It is almost certain that a j
depression will produce further major inflation; the extreme difficulty j
of determining when in such a disturbing period bonds should be sold
makes me believe that securities of this type are, in our complex economy,
primarily suited either to banks, insurance companies and other institu-
tions that have dollar obligations to offset against them, or to individu-
als with short-term objectives. They do not provide for sufficient gain
to the long-term investor to offset this probability of further deprecia-
tion in purchasing power.

Before going further, it might be well to summarize briefly the var-
ious investment clues that can be gleaned from a study of the past and
from a comparison of the major differences, from an investment stand-
point, between the past and the present. Such a study indicates that the
greatest investment reward comes to those who by good luck or good
sense find the occasional company that over the years can grow in sales
and profits far more than industry as a whole. It further shows that when
we believe we have found such a company we had better stick with it
for a long period of time. It gives us a strong hint that such companies
need not necessarily be young and small. Instead, regardless of size, what
really counts is a management having both a determination to attain fur-
ther important growth and an ability to bring its plans to completion.

Clues from the Past 4 3

The past gives us a further clue that this growth is often associated with
knowing how to organize research in the various fields of the natural sci-
ences so as to bring to market economically worthwhile and usually
interrelated product lines. It makes clear to us that a general characteris-
tic of such companies is a management that does not let its preoccupa-
tion with long-range planning prevent it from exerting constant vigi-
lance in performing the day-to-day tasks of ordinary business
outstandingly well. Finally, it furnishes considerable assurance that in spite
of the very many spectacular investment opportunities that existed twenty-
five or fifty years ago, there are probably even more such opportunities
available today.

What "Scuttlebutt"
Can Do

A s a general description of what to look for, all this may be helpful.
But as a practical guide for finding outstanding investments, it
obviously contributes relatively little. Granted that this furnishes a
broad outline of the type of investment that should be sought, how does
the investor go about finding the specific company which might open
the way to major appreciation?

One way that immediately suggests itself is logical but rather imprac-
tical. This is to find someone who is sufficiently skilled in the various facets
of management to examine each subdivision of a company’s organization
and by detailed investigation of its executive personnel, its production, its
sales organization, its research, and each of its other major functions, form
a worthwhile conclusion as to whether the particular company has out-
standing potentialities for growth and development.

Such a method may appear sensible. Unfortunately there are sever-
al reasons why it usually will not serve the average investor very well. In
the first place, there are only a few individuals who have the necessary
degree of top management skill to do a job of this kind. Most of them
are busy at top-level and high-paying management jobs. They have nei-
ther the time nor the inclination to occupy themselves in this way. Fur-
thermore, if they were so inclined, it is doubtful if many of the real
growth companies of the nation would allow someone outside their
own organization to have all the data necessary to make an informed
decision. Some of the knowledge gained in this way would be too valu-
able to existing or potential competition to permit its being passed on
to anyone having no responsibility to the company furnishing the data.

Whot "Scuttlebutt" Can Do

Fortunately, there is another course which the investor can pursue.
If properly handled, this method will provide the clues that are needed
to find really outstanding investments. For lack of a better term, I shall
call this way of proceeding the “scuttlebutt” method.

As this method is spelled out in detail in the pages that follow, the
average investor will have one predominant reaction. This is that regard-
less of how beneficial this “scuttlebutt” method may be to someone else,
it is not going to be helpful to him, because he just won’t have much
chance to apply it. I am aware that most investors are not in a position
to do for themselves much of what is needed to get the most from their
investment funds. Nevertheless I think they should thoroughly under-
stand just what is needed and why. Only in this way are they in a posi-
tion to select the type of professional advisor who can best help them.
Only in this way can they adequately evaluate the work of that advisor.
Furthermore, when they understand not only what can be accom-
plished, but also how it can be accomplished, they may be surprised at
how from time to time they may be in a position to enrich and make
more profitable the worthwhile work already being done for them by
their investment advisors.

The business “grapevine” is a remarkable thing. It is amazing what
an accurate picture of the relative points of strength and weakness of
each company in an industry can be obtained from a representative
cross-section of the opinions of those who in one way or another are
concerned with any particular company. Most people, particularly if
they feel sure there is no danger of their being quoted, like to talk about
the field of work in which they are engaged and will talk rather freely
about their competitors. Go to five companies in an industry, ask each
of them intelligent questions about the points of strength and weakness
of the other four, and nine times out of ten a surprisingly detailed and
accurate picture of all five will emerge.

However, competitors are only one and not necessarily the best
source of informed opinion. It is equally astonishing how much can be
learned from both vendors and customers about the real nature of the
people with whom they deal. Research scientists in universities, in
government, and in competitive companies are another fertile source of
worthwhile data. So are executives of trade associations.

In the case of trade association executives especially, but to a great
extent the other groups as well, it is impossible to lay too much stress
on the importance of two matters. The inquiring investor must be able

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

to make clear beyond any doubt that his source of information will
never be revealed. Then he must scrupulously live up to this policy. Oth-
erwise, the danger of getting an informant into trouble is obviously so
great that unfavorable opinions just do not get passed along.

There is still one further group which can be of immense help to
the prospective investor in search of a bonanza company. This group,
however, can be harmful rather than helpful if the investor does not use
good judgment and does not do plenty of cross-checking with others
to verify his own judgment as to the reliability of what is told him. This
group consists of former employees. Such people frequendy have a real
inside view in regard to their former employers strength and weakness.
Equally important, they will usually talk freely about them. But enough
such former employees may, rightly or wrongly, feel they were fired
without good cause or left because of a justified grievance that it is
always important to check carefully into why employees left the com-
pany being studied. Only then is it possible to determine the degree of
prejudice that may exist and to allow for it in considering what the for-
mer employee has to say.

If enough different sources of information are sought about a com-
pany, there is no reason to believe that each bit of data obtained should
agree with each other bit of data. Actually, there is not the slightest need
for this to happen. In the case of really outstanding companies, the pre-
ponderant information is so crystal clear that even a moderately experi-
enced investor who knows what he is seeking will be able to tell which
companies are likely to be of enough interest to him to warrant taking
the next step in his investigation. This next step is to contact the officers
of the company to try and fill out some of the gaps still existing in the
investor s picture of the situation being studied.

What to Buy

The Fifteen Points to Look for in a Common Stock

W hat are these matters about which the investor should learn if he
is to obtain the type of investment which in a few years might
show him a gain of several hundred per cent, or over a longer
period of time might show a correspondingly greater increase? In other
words, what attributes should a company have to give it the greatest
likelihood of attaining this kind of results for its shareholders?

There are fifteen points with which I believe the investor should con-
cern himself. A company could well be an investment bonanza if it failed
fully to qualify on a very few of them. I do not think it could come up to
my definition of a worthwhile investment if it failed to qualify on many.
Some of these points are matters of company policy; others deal with how
efficiently this policy is carried out. Some of these points concern matters
which should largely be determined from information obtained from
sources outside the company being studied, while others are best solved by
direct inquiry from company personnel. These fifteen points are:

POINT 1 . Does the company have products or services
with sufficient market potential to make possible a
sizable increase in sales for at least several years?

It is by no means impossible to make a fair one-time profit from com-
panies with a stationary or even a declining sales curve. Operating

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

economies resulting from better control of costs can at times create
enough improvement in net income to produce an increase in the mar-
ket price of a company’s shares. This sort of one-time profit is eagerly
sought by many speculators and bargain hunters. It does not offer the
degree of opportunity, howevef that should interest those desiring to
make the greatest possible gains from their investment funds.

Neither does another type of situation which sometimes offers a
considerably larger degree of profit. Such a situation occurs when a
changed condition opens up a large increase in sales for a period of a very
few years, after which sales stop growing. A large-scale example of this
is what happened to the many radio set manufacturers with the com-
mercial development of television. A huge increase in sales occurred
for several years. Now that nearly 90 per cent of United States homes
that are wired for electricity have television sets, the sales curve is
again static. In the case of a great many companies in the industry, a
large profit was made by those who bought early enough. Then as the
sales curve leveled out, so did the attractiveness of many of these
stocks.

Not even the most outstanding growth companies need necessar-
ily be expected to show sales for every single year larger than those of
the year before. In another chapter I will attempt to show why the
normal intricacies of commercial research and the problems of mar-
keting new products tend to cause such sales increases to come in an
irregular series of uneven spurts rather than in a smooth year-by-year
progression. The vagaries of the business cycle will also have a major
influence on year-to-year comparisons. Therefore growth should not
be judged on an annual basis but, say, by taking units of several years
each. Certain companies give promise of greater than normal growth
not only for the next several-year period, but also for a considerable
time beyond that.

Those companies which decade by decade have consistently shown
spectacular growth might be divided into two groups. For lack of bet-
ter terms I will call one group those that happen to be both “fortunate
and able” and the other group those that are “fortunate because they are
able.” A high order of management ability is a must for both groups. No
company grows for a long period of years just because it is lucky. It must
have and continue to keep a high order of business skill, otherwise it will
not be able to capitalize on its good fortune and to defend its compet-
itive position from the inroads of others.

W*” :

What to Buy

The Aluminum Company of America is an example of the “fortu-
nate and able” group. The founders of this company were men with
great vision. They correctly foresaw important commercial uses for their
new product. However, neither they nor anyone else at that time could
foresee anything like the full size of the market for aluminum products
that was to develop over the next seventy years. A combination of tech-
nical developments and economies, of which the company was far more
the beneficiary than the instigator, was to bring this about. Alcoa has and
continues to show a high order of skill in encouraging and taking
advantage of these trends. However, if background conditions, such as
the perfecting of airborne transportation, had not caused influences
completely beyond Alcoa’s control to open up extensive new markets,
the company would still have grown — but at a slower rate.

The Aluminum Company was fortunate in finding itself in an even
better industry than the attractive one envisioned by its early manage-
ment. The fortunes made by many of the early stockholders of this com-
pany who held on to their shares is of course known to everyone. What
may not be so generally recognized is how well even relative newcom-
ers to the stockholder list have done. When I wrote the original edition,
Alcoa shares were down almost 40 per cent from the all-time high made
in 1956. Yet at this “low” price the stock showed an increase in value of
almost 500 per cent over not the low price, but the median average
price at which it could have been purchased in 1947, just ten years
before.

Now let us take Du Pont as an example of the other group of
growth stocks — those which I have described as “fortunate because they
are able.” This company was not originally in the business of making
nylon, cellophane, lucite, neoprene, orlon, milar, or any of the many
other glamorous products with which it is frequently associated in the
public mind and which have proven so spectacularly profitable to the
investor. For many years Du Pont made blasting powder. In time of
peace its growth would largely have paralleled that of the mining industry.
In recent years, it might have grown a little more rapidly than this as
additional sales volume accompanied increased activity in road building.
None of this would have been more than an insignificant fraction of the
volume of business that has developed, however, as the company’s bril-
liant business and financial judgment teamed up with superb technical
skill to attain a sales volume that is now exceeding two billion dollars
each year. Applying the skills and knowledge learned in its original

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

powder business, the company has successfully launched product after
product to make one of the great success stories of American industry.

The investment novice taking his first look at the chemical indus-
try might think it is a fortunate coincidence that the companies which
usually have the highest investment rating on many other aspects of
their business are also the ones producing so many of the industry’s most
attractive growth products. Such an investor is confusing cause and
effect to about the same degree as the unsophisticated young lady who
returned from her first trip to Europe and told her friends what a nice
coincidence it was that wide rivers often happened to flow right
through the heart of so many of the large cities. Studies of the history
of corporations such as Du Pont or Dow or Union Carbide show how
clearly this type of company falls into the “fortunate because they are
able” group so far as their sales curve is concerned.

Possibly one of the most striking examples of these “fortunate
because they are able” companies is General American Transportation.
A little over fifty years ago when the company was formed, the railroad
equipment industry appeared a good one with ample growth prospects.
In recent years few industries would appear to offer less rewarding
prospects for continued growth. Yet when the altered outlook for the
railroads began to make the prospects for the freight car builders increas-
ingly less appealing, brilliant ingenuity and resourcefulness kept this
company’s income on a steady uptrend. Not satisfied with this, the man-
agement started taking advantage of some of the skills and knowledge
learned in its basic business to go into other unrelated lines affording still
further growth possibilities.

A company which appears to have sharply increasing sales for some
years ahead may prove to be a bonanza for the investor regardless of
whether such a company more closely resembles the “fortunate and
able” or the “fortunate because it is able” type. Nevertheless, examples
such as General American Transportation make one thing clear. In either
case the investor must be alert as to whether the management is and
continues to be of the highest order of ability; without this, the sales
growth will not continue.

Correctly judging the long-range sales curve of a company is of
extreme importance to the investor. Superficial judgment can lead to
wrong conclusions. For example, I have already mentioned radio-television
stocks as an instance where instead of continued long-range growth there
was one major spurt as the homes of the nation acquired television sets.

What to Buy 5 1

Nevertheless, in recent years certain of these radio-television companies
have shown a new trend. They have used their electronic skills to build
up sizable businesses in other electronic fields such as communication
and automation equipment. These industrial and, in some cases, military
electronic lines give promise of steady growth for many years to come.
In a few of these companies, such as Motorola for example, they already
are of more importance than the television operation. Meanwhile, cer-
tain new technical developments afford a possibility that in the early
1960 s current model television sets will appear as awkward and obso-
lete as the original wall-type crank-operated hand telephones appear
today.

One potential development, color television, has possibly been ov-
erdiscounted by the general public. Another is a direct result of transis-
tor development and printed circuitry. It is a screen-type television with
sets that would be little different in size and shape from the larger pic-
tures we now have on our walls. The present bulky cabinet would be a
thing of the past. Should such developments obtain mass commercial
acceptance, a few of the technically most skillful of existing television
companies might enjoy another major spurt in sales even larger and
longer lasting than that which they experienced a few years ago. Such
companies would find this spurt superimposed on a steadily growing
industrial and military electronics business. They would then be enjoy-
ing the type of major sales growth which should be the first point to be
considered by those desiring the most profitable type of investments.

I have mentioned this example not as something which is sure to
happen, but rather as something which could easily happen. I do so
because I believe that in regard to a company’s future sales curve there
is one point that should always be kept in mind. If a company’s man-
agement is outstanding and the industry is one subject to technological
change and development research, the shrewd investor should stay alert
to the possibility that management might handle company affairs so as
to produce in the future exactly the type of sales curve that is the first
step to consider in choosing an outstanding investment.

Since I wrote these words in the original edition, it might be inter-
esting to note, not what “is sure to happen” or “may happen,” but what
has happened in regard to Motorola. We are not yet in the early 1960’s,
the closest time to which I refer as affording a possibility of developing
television models that will obsolete those of the 1950’s. This has not
happened nor is it likely to do so in the near future. But in the meanwhile

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

let us see what an alert management has done to take advantage of tech-
nological change to develop the type of upward sales curve that I stat-
ed was the first requisite of an outstanding investment.

Motorola has made itself an outstanding leader in the field of two-
way electronic communication^ that started out as a specialty for police
cars and taxicabs, and now appears to offer almost unlimited growth.
Trucking companies, owners of delivery fleets of all types, public utili-
ties, large construction projects, and pipe lines are but a few of the users
of this type of versatile equipment. Meanwhile, after several years of cost-
ly developmental effort, the company has established a semi-conductor
(transistor) division on a profitable basis which appears headed toward
obtaining its share of the fabulous growth trend of that industry. It has
become a major factor in the new field of stereophonic phonographs
and is obtaining an important and growing new source of sales in this
way. By a rather unique style tie-in with a leading national furniture
manufacturer (Drexel), it has significantly increased its volume in the
higher-priced end of its television line. Finally, through a small acquisi-
tion it is just getting into the hearing-aid field and may develop other
new specialties as well. In short, while some time in the next decade
important major stimulants may cause another large spurt in its original
radio-television lines, this has not happened yet nor is it likely to hap-
pen soon. Yet management has taken advantage of the resources and
skills within the organization again to put this company in line for
growth. Is the stock market responding to this? When I finished writing
the original edition, Motorola was 4514. Today it is 122.

When the investor is alert to this type of opportunity, how prof-
itable may it be? Let us take an actual example from the industry we
have just been discussing. In 1947 a friend of mine in Wall Street was
making a survey of the infant television industry. He studied approxi-
mately a dozen of the principal set producers over the better part of a
year. His conclusion was that the business was going to be competitive,
that there were going to be major shifts in position between the lead-
ing concerns, and that certain stocks in the industry had speculative
appeal. However, in the process of this survey it developed that one of
the great shortages was the glass bulb for the picture tube. The most suc-
cessful producer appeared to be Corning Glass Works. After further
examination of the technical and research aspects of Corning Glass
Works it became apparent that this company was unusually well quali-
fied to produce these glass bulbs for the television industry. Estimates of

What to Buy

the possible market indicated that this would be a major source of new
business for the company. Since prospects for other product lines
seemed generally favorable, this analyst recommended the stock for both
individual and institutional investment. The stock at that time was sell-
ing at about 20. It has since been split 2H-for-l and ten years after his
purchase was selling at over 100, which was the equivalent of a price of
250 on the old stock.

POINT 2. Does the management have a determination to
continue to develop products or processes that will still
further increase total sales potentials when the growth
potentials of currently attractive product
lines have largely been exploited?

Companies which have a significant growth prospect for the next few
years because of new demand for existing lines, but which have neither
policies nor plans to provide for further developments beyond this may
provide a vehicle for a nice one-time profit. They are not apt to provide
the means for the consistent gains over ten or twenty-five years that are
the surest route to financial success. It is at this point that scientific
research and development engineering begin to enter the picture. It is
largely through these means that companies improve old products and
develop new ones. This is the usual route by which a management not
content with one isolated spurt of growth sees that growth occurs in a
series of more or less continuous spurts.

The investor usually obtains the best results in companies whose
engineering or research is to a considerable extent devoted to products
having some business relationship to those already within the scope of
company activities. This does not mean that a desirable company may
not have a number of divisions, some of which have product lines quite
different from others. It does mean that a company with research cen-
tered around each of these divisions, like a cluster of trees each growing
additional branches from its own trunk, will usually do much better
than a company working on a number of unrelated new products
which, if successful, will land it in several new industries unrelated to its
existing business.

At first glance Point 2 may appear to be a mere repetition of Point 1.
This is not the case. Point 1 is a matter of fact, appraising the degree of
potential sales growth that now exists for a company’s product. Point 2 is

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

a matter of management attitude. Does the company now recognize that
in time it will almost certainly have grown up to the potential of its pres-
ent market and that to continue to grow it may have to develop further
new markets at some future time? It is the company that has both a good
rating on the first point and an 'affirmative attitude on the second that is
likely to be of the greatest investment interest.

point 3. How effective are the company’s research
and development efforts in relation to its size?

For a large number of publicly-owned companies it is not too difficult
to get a figure showing the number of dollars being spent each year on
research and development. Since virtually all such companies report
their annual sales total, it is only a matter of the simplest mathematics to
divide the research figure by total sales and so learn the per cent of each
sales dollar that a company is devoting to this type of activity. Many pro-
fessional investment analysts like to compare this research figure for one
company with that of others in the same general field. Sometimes they
compare it with the average of the industry, by averaging the figures of
many somewhat similar companies. From this, conclusions are drawn
both as to the importance of a company’s research effort in relation to
competition and the amount of research per share of stock that the
investor is getting in a particular company.

Figures of this sort can prove a crude yardstick that may give a
worthwhile hint that one company is doing an abnormal amount of
research or another not nearly enough. But unless a great deal of further
knowledge is obtained, such figures can be misleading. One reason for
this is that companies vary enormously in what they include or exclude
as research and development expense. One company will include a type
of engineering expense that most authorities would not consider gen-
uine research at all, since it is really tailoring an existing product to a par-
ticular order — in other words, sales engineering. Conversely, another
company will charge the expense of operating a pilot plant on a com-
pletely new product to production rather than research. Most experts
would call this a pure research function, since it is directly related to
obtaining the know-how to make a new product. If all companies were
to report research on a comparable accounting basis, the relative figures
on the amount of research done by various well-known companies
might look quite different from those frequently used in financial circles.

5 5

What to Buy

In no other major subdivision of business activity are to be found
such great variations from one company to another between what goes
in as expense and what comes out in benefits as occurs in research. Even
among the best-managed companies this variation seems to run in a
ratio of as much as two to one. By this is meant some well-run compa-
nies will get as much as twice the ultimate gain for each research dollar
spent as will others. If averagely-run companies are included, this vari-
ation between the best and the mediocre is still greater. This is largely
because the big strides in the way of new products and processes are no
longer the work of a single genius. They come from teams of highly
trained men, each with a different specialty. One may be a chemist,
another a solid state physicist, a third a metallurgist and a fourth a math-
ematician. The degree of skill of each of these experts is only part of
what is needed to produce outstanding results. It is also necessary to
have leaders who can coordinate the work of people of such diverse
backgrounds and keep them driving toward a common goal. Conse-
quently, the number or prestige of research workers in one company
may be overshadowed by the effectiveness with which they are being
helped to work as a team in another.

Nor is a management s ability to coordinate diverse technical s kill s
into a closely-knit team and to stimulate each expert on that team to his
greatest productivity the only kind of complex coordination upon
which optimum research results depend. Close and detailed coordina-
tion between research workers on each developmental project and those
thoroughly familiar with both production and sales problems is almost
as important. It is no simple task for management to bring about this
close relationship between research, production, and sales.Yet unless this
is done, new products as finally conceived frequently are either not
designed to be manufactured as cheaply as possible, or, when designed,
fail to have maximum sales appeal. Such research usually results in products
vulnerable to more efficient competition.

Finally there is one other type of coordination necessary if research
expenditures are to attain maximum efficiency. This is coordination
with top management. It might perhaps better be called top manage-
ment’s understanding of the fundamental nature of commercial
research. Development projects cannot be expanded in good years and
sharply curtailed in poor ones without tremendously increasing the
total cost of reaching the desired objective. The “crash” programs so
loved by a few top managements may occasionally be necessary but are

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

often just expensive. A crash program is what occurs when important
elements of the research personnel are suddenly pulled from the proj-
ects on which they have been working and concentrated on some new
task which may have great importance at the moment but which, fre-
quently, is not worth all the disruption it causes. The essence of success-
ful commercial research is that only tasks be selected which promise to
give dollar rewards of many times the cost of the research. However,
once a project is started, to allow budget considerations and other extra-
neous factors outside the project itself to curtail or accelerate it invari-
ably expands the total cost in relation to the benefits obtained.

Some top managements do not seem to understand this. I have
heard executives of small but successful electronic companies express
surprisingly little fear of the competition of one of the giants of the
industry. This lack of worry concerning the ability of the much larger
company to produce competitive products is not due to lack of respect
for the capabilities of the larger company’s individual researchers or
unawareness of what might otherwise be accomplished with the large
sums the big company regularly spends on research. Rather it is the his-
toric tendency of this larger company to interrupt regular research proj-
ects with crash programs to attain the immediate goals of top manage-
ment that has produced this feeling. Similarly, some years ago I heard
that while they desired no publicity on the matter for obvious reasons,
an outstanding technical college quietly advised its graduating class to
avoid employment with a certain oil company. This was because top
management of that company had a tendency to hire highly skilled peo-
ple for what would normally be about five-year projects. Then in about
three years the company would lose interest in the particular project and
abandon it, thereby not only wasting their own money but preventing
those employed from gaining the technical reputation for accomplish-
ment that otherwise might have come to them.

Another factor making proper investment evaluation of research
even more complex is how to evaluate the large amount of research
related to defense contracts. A great deal of such research is frequently
done not at the expense of the company doing it, but for the account of
the federal government. Some of the subcontractors in the defense field
also do significant research for the account of the contractors whom they
are supplying. Should such totals be appraised by the investor as being as
significant as research done at a company’s own expense? If not, how
should it be valued in relation to company-sponsored research? Like so

What to Buy 5 7

many other phases in the investment field, these matters cannot be
answered by mathematical formulae. Each case is different.

The profit margin on defense contracts is smaller than that of non-
government business, and the nature of the work is often such that the
contract for a new weapon is subjedt to competitive bidding from gov-
ernment blueprints. This means that it is sometimes impossible to build
up steady repeat business for a product developed by government-
sponsored research in a way that can be done with privately sponsored
research, where both patents and customer goodwill can frequently be
brought into play. For reasons like these, from the standpoint of the
investor there are enormous variations in the economic worth of dif-
ferent government-sponsored research projects, even though such proj-
ects might be roughly equal in their importance so far as the benefits to
the defense effort are concerned. The following theoretical example
might serve to show how three such projects might have vastly different
values to the investor:

One project might produce a magnificent new weapon having no
non-military applications. The rights to this weapon would all be owned
by the government and, once invented, it would be sufficiently simple
to manufacture that the company which had done the research would
have no advantage over others in bidding for a production contract.
Such a research effort would have almost no value to the investor.

Another project might produce the same weapon, but the technique
of manufacturing might be sufficiently complex that a company not
participating in the original development work would have great diffi-
culty trying to make it. Such a research project would have moderate
value to the investor since it would tend to assure continuous, though
probably not highly profitable, business from the government.

Still another company might engineer such a weapon and in so
doing might learn principles and new techniques directly applicable to
its regular commercial lines, which presumably show a higher profit
margin. Such a research project might have great value to the investor.
Some of the most spectacularly successful companies of the recent past
have been those that show a high order of talent for finding complex
and technical defense work, the doing of which provides them at gov-
ernment expense with know-how that can legitimately be transferred
into profitable non-defense fields related to their existing commercial
activities. Such companies are providing the government the research
results the defense authorities vitally need. However, at the same time

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

they are obtaining, at little or no cost, related non-defense research ben-
efits which otherwise they would probably be paying for themselves.
This factor may well have been one of the reasons for the spectacular
investment success of Texas Instruments, Inc., which in four years rose
nearly 500 per cent from the firice of 514 at which it traded when first
listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1953; it may also have con-
tributed, in the same period, to the even greater 700 per cent rise expe-
rienced by Ampex shareholders from the time this company’s shares
were first offered to the public in the same year.

Finally, in judging the relative investment value of company research
organizations, another type of activity must be evaluated. This is some-
thing which ordinarily is not considered as developmental research at
all — the seemingly unrelated field of market research. Market research
may be regarded as the bridge between developmental research and
sales. Top management must be alert against the temptation to spend sig-
nificant sums on the research and development of a colorful product or
process which, when perfected, has a genuine market but one too small
to be profitable. By too small to be profitable I mean one that never will
enjoy a large enough sales volume to get back the cost of the research,
much less a worthwhile profit for the investor. A market research organ-
ization that can steer a major research effort of its company from one
project which if technically successful would have barely paid for itself,
to another which might cater to so much broader a market that it would
pay out three times as well, would have vastly increased the value to its
stockholders of that company’s scientific manpower.

If quantitative measurements — such as the annual expenditures on
research or the number of employees holding scientific degrees — are
only a rough guide and not the final answer to whether a company has
an outstanding research organization, how does the careful investor
obtain this information? Once again it is surprising what the “scuttle-
butt” method will produce. Until the average investor tries it, he prob-
ably will not believe how complete a picture will emerge if he asks
intelligent questions about a company’s research activities of a diversi-
fied group of research people, some from within the company and oth-
ers engaged in related lines in competitive industries, in universities, and
in government. A simpler and often worthwhile method is to make a
close study of how much in dollar sales or net profits has been con-
tributed to a company by the results of its research organization during
a particular span, such as the prior ten years. An organization which in

P"”

What to Buy

relation to the size of its activities has produced a good flow of prof-
itable new products during such a period will probably be equally pro-
ductive in the future as long as it continues to operate under the same
general methods.

POINT 4. Does the company have an above-average
sales organization?

In this competitive age, the products or services of few companies are
so outstanding that they will sell to their maximum potentialities if they
are not expertly merchandised. It is the making of a sale that is the most
basic single activity of any business. Without sales, survival is impossible.
It is the making of repeat sales to satisfied customers that is the first
benchmark of success.Yet, strange as it seems, the relative efficiency of a
company’s sales, advertising, and distributive organizations receives far
less attention from most investors, even the careful ones, than do pro-
duction, research, finance, or other major subdivisions of corporate
activity.

There is probably a reason for this. It is relatively easy to construct
simple mathematical ratios that will provide some sort of guide to the
attractiveness of a company’s production costs, research activity, or finan-
cial structure in comparison with its competitors. It is a great deal harder
to make ratios that have even a semblance of meaning in regard to sales
and distribution efficiency. In regard to research we have already seen
that such simple ratios are far too crude to provide anything but the first
clues as to what to look for. Their value in relation to production and
the financial structure will be discussed shortly. However, whether or
not such ratios have anything like the value frequently placed upon
them in financial circles, the fact remains that investors like to lean upon
them. Because sales effort does not readily lend itself to this type of for-
mulae, many investors fail to appraise it at all in spite of its basic impor-
tance in determining real investment worth.

Again, the way out of this dilemma lies in the use of the “scuttle-
butt” technique. Of all the phases of a company’s activity, none is easier
to learn about from sources outside the company than the relative effi-
ciency of a sales organization. Both competitors and customers know
the answers. Equally important, they are seldom hesitant to express their
views. The time spent by the careful investor in inquiring into this subject
is usually richly rewarded.

What to Buy 6 1

I am devoting less space to this matter of relative sales ability than I
did to the matter of relative research ability. This does not mean that I
consider it less important. In today’s competitive world, many things are
important to corporate success. However, outstanding production, sales,
and research may be considered th6 three main columns upon which
such success is based. Saying that one is more important than another is
like saying that the heart, the lungs, or the digestive tract is the most
important single organ for the proper functioning of the body. All are
needed for survival, and all must function well for vigorous health. Look
around you at the companies that have proven outstanding investments.
Try to find some that do not have both aggressive distribution and a
constantly improving sales organization.

I have already referred to the Dow Chemical Company and may do
so several times again, as I believe this company, which over the years
has proven so rewarding to its stockholders, is an outstanding example
of the ideal conservative long-range investment. Here is a company
which in the public mind is almost synonymous with outstandingly suc-
cessful research. However, what is not as well known is that this com-
pany selects and trains its sales personnel with the same care as it han-
dles its research chemists. Before a young college graduate becomes a
Dow salesman, he may be invited to make several trips to Midland so
that both he and the company can become as sure as possible that he
has the background and temperament that will fit him into their sales
organization. Then, before he so much as sees his first potential cus-
tomer, he must undergo specialized training that occasionally lasts only
a few weeks but at times continues for well over a year to prepare him
for the more complex selling jobs.This is but the beginning of the train-
ing he will receive; some of the company’s greatest mental effort is
devoted to seeking and frequently finding more efficient ways to solicit
from, service, and deliver to the customer.

Are Dow and the other outstanding companies in the chemical
industry unique in this great attention paid to sales and distribution?
Definitely not. In another and quite different industry, International
Business Machines is a company which has (speaking conservatively)
handsomely rewarded its owners. An IBM executive recently told me
that the average salesman spends a third of his entire time training in
company-sponsored schools! To a considerable degree this amazing ratio
results from an attempt to keep the sales force abreast of a rapidly chang-
ing technology. Nevertheless I believe it one more indication of the

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

weight that most successful companies give to steadily improving their
sales arm. A one-time profit can be made in the company which
because of manufacturing or research skill obtains some worthwhile
business without a strong distribution organization. However, such
companies can be quite vulnerable. For steady long-term growth a
strong sales arm is vital.

point 5. Does the company have a worthwhile
profit margin?

Here at last is a subject of importance which properly lends itself to
the type of mathematical analysis which so many financial people feel
is the backbone of sound investment decisions. From the standpoint of
the investor, sales are only of value when and if they lead to increased
profits. All the sales growth in the world won’t produce the right type
of investment vehicle if, over the years, profits do not grow correspond-
ingly. The first step in examining profits is to study a company’s profit
margin, that is, to determine the number of cents of each dollar of sales
that is brought down to operating profit. The wide variation between
different companies, even those in the same industry, will immediately
become apparent. Such a study should be made, not for a single year, but
for a series of years. It then becomes evident that nearly all companies
have broader profit margins — as well as greater total dollar profits — in
years when an industry is unusually prosperous. However, it also
becomes clear that the marginal companies — that is, those with the
smaller profit margins — nearly always increase their profit margins by a
considerably greater percentage in the good years than do the lower-
cost companies, whose profit margins also get better but not to so great
a degree. This usually causes the weaker companies to show a greater
percentage increase in earnings in a year of abnormally good business
than do the stronger companies in the same field. However, it should
also be remembered that these earnings will decline correspondingly
more rapidly when the business tide turns.

For this reason I believe that the greatest long-range investment
profits are never obtained by investing in marginal companies. The only
reason for considering a long-range investment in a company with an
abnormally low profit margin is that there might be strong indications
that a fundamental change is taking place within the company. This
would be such that the improvement in profit margins would be

PPT

What to Buy

occurring for reasons other than a temporarily expanded volume of
business. In other words, the company would not be marginal in the
true sense of the word, since the real reason for buying is that efficiency
or new products developed within the company have taken it out of
the marginal category. When such internal changes are taking place
in a corporation which in other respects pretty well qualifies as the
right type of long-range investment, it may be an unusually attractive
purchase.

So far as older and larger companies are concerned, most of the
really big investment gains have come from companies having relative-
ly broad profit margins. Usually they have among the best such mar-
gins in their industry. In regard to young companies, and occasionally
older ones, there is one important deviation from this rule — a deviation,
however, that is generally more apparent than real. Such companies will
at times deliberately elect to speed up growth by spending all or a very
large part of the profits they would otherwise have earned on even
more research or on even more sales promotion than they would oth-
erwise be doing. What is important in such instances is to make
absolutely certain that it is actually still further research, still further
sales promotion, or still more of any other activity which is being
financed today so as to build for the future, that is the real cause of the
narrow or non-existent profit margin.

The greatest care should be used to be sure that the volume of the
activities being credited with reducing the profit margin is not merely
the volume of these activities needed for a good rate of growth, but
actually represents even more research, sales promotion, etc., than this.
When this happens, the research company with an apparently poor
profit margin may be an unusually attractive investment. However, with
the exception of companies of this type in which the low profit margin
is being deliberately engineered in order to further accelerate the
growth rate, investors desiring maximum gains over the years had best
stay away from low-profit-margin or marginal companies.

POINT 6. What is the company doing to maintain or
improve profit margins?

The success of a stock purchase does not depend on what is generally
known about a company at the time the purchase is made. Rather it
depends upon what gets to be known about it after the stock has been

64 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

bought. Therefore it is not the profit margins of the past but those of
the future that are basically important to the investor.

In the age in which we live, there seems to be a constant threat to
profit margins. Wages and salary costs go up year by year. Many compa-
nies now have long-range labor contracts calling for still further increases
for several years ahead. Rising labor costs result in corresponding increases
in raw materials and supplies. The trend of tax rates, particularly real estate
and local tax rates, also seems to be steadily increasing. Against this back-
ground, different companies are going to have different results in the trend
of their profit margins. Some companies are in the seemingly fortunate
position that they can maintain profit margins simply by raising prices.
This is usually because they are in industries in which the demand for
their products is abnormally strong or because the selling prices of com-
petitive products have gone up even more than their own. In our econo-
my, however, maintaining or improving profit margins in this way usual-
ly proves a relatively temporary matter. This is because additional
competitive production capacity is created. This new capacity sufficiently
outbalances the increased gain so that, in time, cost increases can no longer
be passed on as price increases. Profit margins then start to shrink.

A striking example of this is the abrupt change that occurred in the
fall of 1956, when the aluminum market went in a few weeks from a
condition of short supply to one of aggressive competitive selling. Prior
to that time aluminum prices rose about with costs. Unless demand for
the product should grow even faster than production facilities, future
price increases will occur less rapidly. Similarly the persistent disinclina-
tion of some of the largest steel producers to raise prices of certain classes
of scarce steel products to “all the market would bear” may in part
reflect long-range thinking about the temporary nature of broad profit
margins that arise from no other cause than an ability to pass on
increased costs by higher selling prices.

The long-range danger of this is perhaps best illustrated by what
happened to the leading copper producers during this same second half
of 1956. These companies used considerable self-restraint, even going so
far as to sell under world prices in an attempt to keep prices from going
too high. Nevertheless, copper rose sufficiently to curtail demand and
attract new supply. Aggravated by curtailed Western European con-
sumption resulting from the closing of the Suez Canal, the situation
became quite unbalanced. It is probable that 1957 profit margins were
noticeably poorer than would have been the case if those of 1956 had

What to Buy

not been so good. When profit margins of a whole industry rise because
of repeated price increases, the indication is not a good one for the
long-range investor.

In contrast, certain other companies, including some within these
same industries, manage to improve profit margins by far more ingenious
means than just raising prices. Some companies achieve great success by
maintaining capital-improvement or product-engineering departments.
The sole function of such departments is to design new equipment that
will reduce costs and thus offset or partially offset the rising trend of
wages. Many companies are constantly reviewing procedures and meth-
ods to see where economies can be brought about. The accounting func-
tion and the handling of records has been a particularly fertile field for
this sort of activity. So has the transportation field. Shipping costs have
risen more than most expenses because of the larger percentage of labor
costs in most forms of transportation as compared to most types of man-
ufacturing. Using new types of containers, heretofore unused methods of
transportation, or even putting in branch plants to avoid cross-hauling
have all cut costs for alert companies.

None of these things can be brought about in a day. They all require
close study and considerable planning ahead. The prospective investor
should give attention to the amount of ingenuity of the work being
done on new ideas for cutting costs and improving profit margins. Here
the “scuttlebutt” method may prove of some value, but much less so
than direct inquiry from company personnel. Fortunately, this is a field
about which most top executives will talk in some detail. The compa-
nies which are doing the most successful work along this line are very
likely to be the ones which have built up the organization with the
know-how to continue to do constructive things in the future. They are
extremely likely to be in the group offering the greatest long-range
rewards to their shareholders.

POINT 7. Does the company have outstanding labor and
personnel relations?

Most investors may not fully appreciate the profits from good labor rela-
tions. Few of them fail to recognize the impact of bad labor relations.
The effect on production of frequent and prolonged strikes is obvious
to anyone making even the most cursory review of corporate financial
statements.

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

However, the difference in the degree of profitability between a
company with good personnel relations and one with mediocre per-
sonnel relations is far greater than the direct cost of strikes. If workers
feel that they are fairly treated by their employer, a background has been
laid wherein efficient leadership can accomplish much in increasing
productivity per worker. Furthermore, there is always considerable cost
in training each new worker. Those companies with an abnormal labor
turnover have therefore an element of unnecessary expense avoided by
better-managed enterprises.

But how does the investor properly judge the quality of a company’s
labor and personnel relations? There is no simple answer. There is no
set yardstick that will apply in all cases. About the best that can be done
is to look at a number of factors and then judge from the composite
picture.

In this day of widespread unionization, those companies that still
have no union or a company union probably also have well above aver-
age labor and personnel relations. If they did not, the unions would have
organized them long ago. The investor can feel rather sure, for example,
that Motorola, located in highly unionized Chicago, and Texas Instru-
ments, Inc., in increasingly unionized Dallas, have convinced at least an
important part of their work force of the company’s genuine desire and
ability to treat its employees well. Lack of affiliation with an interna-
tional union can only be explained by successful personnel policies in
instances of this sort.

On the other hand, unionization is by no means a sign of poor labor
relations. Some of the companies with the very best labor relations are
completely unionized, but have learned to get along with their unions
with a reasonable degree of mutual respect and trust. Similarly, while a
record of constant and prolonged strikes is a good indication of bad
labor relations, the complete absence of strikes is not necessarily a sign
of fundamentally good relations. Sometimes the company with no
strikes is too much like the henpecked husband. Absence of conflict may
not mean a basically happy relationship so much as fear of the conse-
quences of conflict.

Why do workers feel unusually loyal to one employer and resentful
of another? The reasons are often so complex and difficult to trace that
for the most part the investor may do better to concern himself with
comparative data showing how workers feel, rather than with an
attempt to appraise each part of the background causing them to feel

What to Buy 6 7

that way. One series of figures that indicates the underlying quality of
labor and personnel policies is the relative labor turnover in one compa-
ny as against another in the same area. Equally significant is the relative
size of the waiting list of job applicants wanting to work for one com-
pany as against others in the same locality. In an area where there is no
labor surplus, companies having an abnormally long list of personnel
seeking to enter their employ are usually companies that are desirable for
investment from the standpoint of good labor and personnel relations.

Nevertheless, beyond these general figures there are a few specific
details the investor might notice. Companies with good labor relations
usually are ones making every effort to settle grievances quickly. The
small individual grievances that take long to settle and are not consid-
ered important by management are ones that smoulder and finally flare
up seriously. In addition to appraising the methods set up for settling
grievances, the investor might also pay close attention to wage scales.
The company that makes above-average profits while paying above-
average wages for the area in which it is located is likely to have good
labor relations. The investor who buys into a situation in which a sig-
nificant part of earnings comes from paying below-standard wages for
the area involved may in time have serious trouble on his hands.

Finally the investor should be sensitive to the attitude of top
management toward the rank-and-file employees. Underneath all the
fine-sounding generalities, some managements have little feeling of
responsibility for, or interest in, their ordinary workers. Their chief con-
cern is that no greater share of their sales dollar go to lower echelon per-
sonnel than the pressure of militant unionism makes mandatory. Workers
are readily hired or dismissed in large masses, dependent on slight
changes in the company’s sales outlook or profit picture. No feeling of
responsibility exists for the hardships this can cause to the families affect-
ed. Nothing is done to make ordinary employees feel they are wanted,
needed, and part of the business picture. Nothing is done to build up the
dignity of the individual worker. Managements with this attitude do not
usually provide the background for the most desirable type of investment.

POINT 8. Does the company have outstanding
executive relations?

If having good relations with lower echelon personnel is important, cre-
ating the right atmosphere among executive personnel is vital. These are

68 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

the men whose judgment, ingenuity, and teamwork will in time make
or break any venture. Because the stakes for which they play are high,
the tension on the job is frequently great. So is the chance that friction
or resentment might create conditions whereby top executive talent
either does not stay with a corhpany or does not produce to its maxi-
mum ability if it does stay.

The company offering greatest investment opportunities will be
one in which there is a good executive climate. Executives will have
confidence in their president and/or board chairman. This means,
among other things, that from the lowest levels on up there is a feeling
that promotions are based on ability, not factionalism. A ruling family is
not promoted over the heads of more able men. Salary adjustments are
reviewed regularly so that executives feel that merited increases will
come without having to be demanded. Salaries are at least in line with
the standard of the industry and the locality. Management will bring
outsiders into anything other than starting jobs only if there is no pos-
sibility of finding anyone within the organization who can be promot-
ed to fill the position. Top management will recognize that wherever
human beings work together, some degree of factionalism and human
friction will occur, but will not tolerate those who do not cooperate in
team play so that such friction and factionalism is kept to an irreducible
minimum. Much of this the investor can usually learn without too
much direct questioning by chatting about the company with a few
executives scattered at different levels of responsibility. The further a cor-
poration departs from these standards, the less likely it is to be a really
outstanding investment.

point 9. Does the company have depth to its
management?

A small corporation can do extremely well and, if other factors are right,
provide a magnificent investment for a number of years under really able
one-man management. However, all humans are finite, so even for
smaller companies the investor should have some idea of what can be
done to prevent corporate disaster if the key man should no longer be
available. Nowadays this investment risk with an otherwise outstanding
small company is not as great as it seems, in view of the recent tenden-
cy of big companies with plenty of management talent to buy up out-
standing smaller units.

What to Buy

However, companies worthy of investment interest are those that
will continue to grow. Sooner or later a company will reach a size where
it just will not be able to take advantage of further opportunities unless
it starts developing executive talent in some depth. This point will vary
between companies, depending on the industry in which they are
engaged and the skill of the one-man management. It usually occurs
when annual sales totals reach a point somewhere between fifteen and
forty million dollars. Having the right executive climate, as discussed in
Point 8, becomes of major investment significance at this time.

Those matters discussed in Point 8 are, of course, needed for devel-
opment of proper management in depth. But such management will not
develop unless certain additional policies are in effect as well. Most
important of these is the delegation of authority. If from the very top on
down, each level of executives is not given real authority to carry out
assigned duties in as ingenious and efficient a manner as each individ-
ual s ability will permit, good executive material becomes much like
healthy young animals so caged in that they cannot exercise. They do
not develop their faculties because they just do not have enough oppor-
tunity to use them.

Those organizations where the top brass personally interfere with
and try to handle routine day-to-day operating matters seldom turn
out to be the most attractive type of investments. Cutting across the
lines of authority which they themselves have set up frequently results
in well-meaning executives significantly detracting from the invest-
ment caliber of the companies they run. No matter how able one or
two bosses may be in handling all this detail, once a corporation reach-
es a certain size executives of this type will get in trouble on two fronts.
Too much detail will have arisen for them to handle. Capable people
just are not being developed to handle the still further growth that
should lie ahead.

Another matter is worthy of the investor’s attention in judging
whether a company has suitable depth in management. Does top man-
agement welcome and evaluate suggestions from personnel even if, at
times, those suggestions carry with them adverse criticism of current
management practices? So competitive is today’s business world and so
great the need for improvement and change that if pride or indifference
prevent top management from exploring what has frequently been
found to be a veritable gold mine of worthwhile ideas, the investment
climate that results probably will not be the most suitable one for the

70 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

investor. Neither is it likely to be one in which increasing numbers of
vitally needed younger executives are going to develop.

POINT 10. How good are the company’s cost analysis
and accounting controls?

No company is going to continue to have outstanding success lor a
long period of time if it cannot break down its over-all costs with suf-
ficient accuracy and detail to show the cost of each small step in its
operation. Only in this way will a management know what most needs
its attention. Only in this way can management judge whether it is
properly solving each problem that does need its attention. Further-
more, most successful companies make not one but a vast series of
products. If the management does not have a precise knowledge of the
true cost of each product in relation to the others, it is under an
extreme handicap. It becomes almost impossible to establish pricing
policies that will insure the maximum obtainable over-all profit consis-
tent with discouraging undue competition. There is no way of know-
ing which products are worthy of special sales effort and promotion.
Worst of all, some apparently successful activities may actually be oper-
ating at a loss and, unknown to management, may be decreasing rather
than swelling the total of over-all profits. Intelligent planning becomes
almost impossible.

In spite of the investment importance of accounting controls, it is
usually only in instances of extreme inefficiency that the careful
investor will get a clear picture of the status of cost accounting and
related activities in a company in which he is contemplating invest-
ment. In this sphere, the “scuttlebutt” method will sometimes reveal
companies that are really deficient. It will seldom tell much more than
this. Direct inquiry of company personnel will usually elicit a com-
pletely sincere reply that the cost data are entirely adequate. Detailed
cost sheets will often be shown in support of the statement. However,
it is not so much the existence of detailed figures as their relative accu-
racy which is important. The best that the careful investor usually can
do in this field is to recognize both the importance of the subject and
his own limitations in making a worthwhile appraisal of it. Within these
limits he usually can only fall back on the general conclusion that a
company well above average in most other aspects of business skill will
probably be above average in this field, too, as long as top management

What to Buy

understands the basic importance of expert accounting controls and
cost analysis.

point 11. Are there other aspects of the business,
somewhat peculiar to the industry involved, which will
give the investor important clues as to how outstanding
the company may be in relation to its competition?

By definition, this is somewhat of a catch-all point of inquiry. This is
because matters of this sort are bound to differ considerably from each
other those which are of great importance in some lines of business
can, at times, be of little or no importance in others. For example, in
most important operations involving retailing, the degree of skill a com-
pany has in handling real estate matters — the quality of its leases, for
instance— is of great significance. In many other lines of business, a high
degree of skill in this field is less important. Similarly, the relative skill
with which a company handles its credits is of great significance to some
companies, of minor or no importance to others. For both these matters,
our old friend the scuttlebutt” method will usually furnish the investor
with a pretty clear picture. Frequently his conclusions can be checked
against mathematical ratios such as comparative leasing costs per dollar
of sales, or ratio of credit loss, if the point is of sufficient importance to
warrant careful study.

In a number of lines of business, total insurance costs mount to an
important per cent of the sales dollar. At times this can matter enough so
that a company with, say, a 35 per cent lower overall insurance cost than
a competitor of the same size will have a broader margin of profit. In
those industries where insurance is a big enough factor to affect earnings,
a study of these ratios and a discussion of them with informed insurance
people can be unusually rewarding to the investor. It gives a supplemen-
tal but indicative check as to how outstanding a particular management
may be. This is because these lower insurance costs do not come solely
from a greater skill in handling insurance in the same way, for example, as
skill in handling real estate results in lower than average leasing costs.
Rather they are largely the reflection of over-all skill in handling people,
inventory, and fixed property so as to reduce the over-all amount of acci-
dent, damage, and waste and thereby make these lower costs possible. An
index of insurance costs in relation to the coverage obtained points out
clearly which companies in a given field are well run.

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

Patents are another matter having varying significance from com-
pany to company. For large companies, a strong patent position is usu-
ally a point of additional rather than basic strength. It usually blocks
off certain subdivisions of the company’s activities from the intense
competition that might otherwise prevail. This normally enables these
segments of the company’s product lines to enjoy wider profit margins
than would otherwise occur. This in turn tends to broaden the aver-
age of the entire line. Similarly, strong patent positions may at times
give a company exclusive rights to the easiest or cheapest way of mak-
ing a particular product. Competitors must go a longer way round to
get to the same place, thereby giving the patent owner a tangible com-
petitive advantage although frequently a small one.

In our era of widespread technical know-how it is seldom that
large companies can enjoy more than a small part of their activities
in areas sheltered by patent protection. Patents are usually able to
block off only a few rather than all the ways of accomplishing the
same result. For this reason many large companies make no attempt
to shut out competition through patent structure, but for relatively
modest fees license competition to use their patents and in return
expect the same treatment from these licensees. Influences such as
manufacturing know-how, sales and service organization, customer
good will, and knowledge of customer problems are depended on far
more than patents to maintain a competitive position. In fact, when
large companies depend chiefly on patent protection for the main-
tenance of their profit margin, it is usually more a sign of investment
weakness than strength. Patents do not run on indefinitely. When
the patent protection is no longer there, the company’s profit may
suffer badly.

The young company just starting to develop its production, sales,
and service organization, and in the early stages of establishing cus-
tomer good will is in a very different position. Without patents its
products might be copied by large entrenched enterprises which
could use their established channels of customer relationship to put
the small young competitor out of business. For small companies in
the early years of marketing unique products or services, the investor
should therefore closely scrutinize the patent position. He should get
information from qualified sources as to how broad the protection
actually may be. It is one thing to get a patent on a device. It may be
quite another to get protection that will prevent others from making

m Tr

What to Buy

it in a slightly different way. Even here, however, engineering that is
constantly improving the product can prove considerably more advan-
tageous than mere static patent protection.

For example, a few years ago when it was a much smaller organ-
ization than as of today, a young W6st Coast electronic manufacturer
had great success with a new product. One of the giants of the indus-
try made what was described to me as a “Chinese copy” and market-
ed it under its well-known trade name. In the opinion of the young
company s designer, this large competitor managed to engineer all the
small company’s engineering mistakes into the model along with
the good points. The large company’s model came out at just the time
the small manufacturer introduced its own improved model with the
weak points eliminated. With a product that was not selling, the large
company withdrew from the field. As has been true many times
before and since, it is the constant leadership in engineering, not
patents, that is the fundamental source of protection. The investor
must be at least as careful not to place too much importance on
patent protection as to recognize its significance in those occasional
places where it is a major factor in appraising the attractiveness of a
desirable investment.

point 12. Does the company have a short-range or
long-range outlook in regard to profits?

Some companies will conduct their affairs so as to gain the greatest
possible profit right now. Others will deliberately curtail maximum
immediate profits to build up good will and thereby gain greater over-
all profits over a period of years. Treatment of customers and vendors
gives frequent examples of this. One company will constantly make
the sharpest possible deals with suppliers. Another will at times pay
above contract price to a vendor who has had unexpected expense in
making delivery, because it wants to be sure of having a dependable
source of needed raw materials or high-quality components available
when the market has turned and supplies may be desperately needed.
The difference in treatment of customers is equally noticeable. The
company that will go to special trouble and expense to take care of the
needs of a regular customer caught in an unexpected jam may show
lower profits on the particular transaction, but far greater profits over
the years.

74 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

The “scuttlebutt” method usually reflects these differences in poli-
cies quite clearly. The investor wanting maximum results should favor
companies with a truly long-range outlook concerning profits.

point 13. In the foreseeable future will the growth of the
company require sufficient equity financing so that the
larger number of shares then outstanding will largely
cancel the existing stockholders’ benefit from this
anticipated growth?

The typical book on investment devotes so much space to a discussion
on the corporations cash position, corporate structure, percentage of
capitalization in various classes of securities, etc., that it may well be
asked why these purely financial aspects should not be given more than
the amount of space devoted to this one point out of a total of fifteen.
The reason is that it is the basic contention of this book that the intel-
ligent investor should not buy common stocks simply because they are
cheap but only if they give promise of major gain to him.

Only a small percentage of all companies can qualify with a high rat-
ing for all or nearly all of the other fourteen points listed in this discus-
sion. Any company which can so qualify could easily borrow money, at
prevailing rates for its size company, up to the accepted top percentage
of debt for that kind of business. If such a company needed more cash
once this top debt limit has been reached — always assuming of course
that it qualifies at or near the top in regard to further sales growth, prof-
it margins, management, research, and the various other points we are
now considering — it could still raise equity money at some price, since
investors are always eager to participate in ventures of this sort.

Therefore, if investment is limited to outstanding situations, what real-
ly matters is whether the company’s cash plus further borrowing ability is
sufficient to take care of the capital needed to exploit the prospects of the
next several years. If it is, and if the company is willing to borrow to the
limit of prudence, the common stock investor need have no concern as to
the more distant future. If the investor has properly appraised the situation,
any equity financing that might be done some years ahead will be at prices
so much higher than present levels that he need not be concerned. This is
because the near-term financing will have produced enough increase in
earnings, by the time still further financing is needed some years hence, to
have brought the stock to a substantially higher price level.

If this borrowing power is not now sufficient, however, equity
financing becomes necessary. In this case, the attractiveness of the invest-
ment depends on careful calculations as to how much the dilution
resulting from the greater number of shares to be outstanding will cut
into the benefits to the present cotnmon stockholder that will result
from the increased earnings this financing makes possible. This equity
dilution is just as mathematically calculable when the dilution occurs
through the issuance of senior securities with conversion features as
when it occurs through the issuance of straight common stock. This is
because such conversion features are usually exercisable at some moder-
ate level above the market price at the time of issuance — usually from
10 to 20 per cent. Since the investor should never be interested in small
gains of 10 to 20 per cent, but rather in gains which over a period of
years will be closer to ten or a hundred times this amount, the conver-
sion price can usually be ignored and the dilution calculated upon the
basis of complete conversion of the new senior issue. In other words, it
is well to consider that all senior convertible issues have been convert-
ed and that all warrants, options, etc., have been exercised when calcu-
lating the real number of common shares outstanding.

If equity financing will be occurring within several years of the time
of common stock purchase, and if this equity financing will leave com-
mon stockholders with only a small increase in subsequent per-share
earnings, only one conclusion is justifiable. This is that the company has
a management with sufficiently poor financial judgment to make the
common stock undesirable for worthwhile investment. Unless this situ-
ation prevails, the investor need not be deterred by purely financial con-
siderations from going into any situation which, because of its high rat-
ing on the remaining fourteen points covered, gives promise of being
outstanding. Conversely, from the standpoint of making maximum prof-
its over the years, the investor should never go into a situation with a
poor score on any of the other fourteen points, merely because of great
financial strength or cash position.

point 14. Does the management talk freely to investors
about its affairs when things are going well but “clam
up” when troubles and disappointments occur?

It is the nature of business that in even the best-run companies unex-
pected difficulties, profit squeezes, and unfavorable shifts in demand for

What to Buy

their products will at times occur. Furthermore, the companies into
which the investor should be buying if greatest gains are to occur are
companies which over the years will constantly, through the efforts of
technical research, be trying to produce and sell new products and new
processes. By the law of averages, sotne of these are bound to be costly
failures. Others will have unexpected delays and heartbreaking expens-
es during the early period of plant shake-down. For months on end,
such extra and unbudgeted costs will spoil the most carefully laid prof-
it forecasts for the business as a whole. Such disappointments are an
inevitable part of even the most successful business. If met forthrightly
and with good judgment, they are merely one of the costs of eventual
success. They are frequently a sign of strength rather than weakness in a
company.

How a management reacts to such matters can be a valuable clue to
the investor. The management that does not report as freely when things
are going badly as when they are going well usually “clams up” in this
way for one of several rather significant reasons. It may not have a pro-
gram worked out to solve the unanticipated difficulty. It may have
become panicky. It may not have an adequate sense of responsibility to
its stockholders, seeing no reason why it should report more than what
may seem expedient at the moment. In any event, the investor will do
well to exclude from investment any company that withholds or tries to
hide bad news.

point 15. Does the company have a management of
unquestionable integrity?

The management of a company is always far closer to its assets than is
the stockholder. Without breaking any laws, the number of ways in
which those in control can benefit themselves and their families at the
expense of the ordinary stockholder is almost infinite. One way is to
put themselves — to say nothing of their relatives or in-laws — on the
payroll at salaries far above the normal worth of the work performed.
Another is to own properties they sell or rent to the corporation at
above-market rates. Among smaller corporations this is sometimes hard
to detect, since controlling families or key officers at times buy and
lease real estate to such companies, not for purposes of unfair gain but
in a sincere desire to free limited working capital for other corporate
purposes.

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

Another method for insiders to enrich themselves is to get the cor-
poration s vendors to sell through certain brokerage firms which perform
little if any service for the brokerage commissions involved but which are
owned by these same insiders and relatives or friends. Probably most
costly of all to the investor is the' abuse by insiders of their power of issu-
ing common stock options. They can pervert this legitimate method of
compensating able management by issuing to themselves amounts of
stock far beyond what an unbiased outsider might judge to represent a
fair reward for services performed.

There is only one real protection against abuses like these. This is to
confine investments to companies the managements of which have a
highly developed sense of trusteeship and moral responsibility to their
stockholders. This is a point concerning which the “scuttlebutt” method
can be very helpful. Any investment may still be considered interesting
if it falls down in regard to almost any other one of the fifteen points
which have now been covered, but rates an unusually high score in
regard to all the rest. Regardless of how high the rating may be in all
other matters, however, if there is a serious question of the lack of a
strong management sense of trusteeship for stockholders, the investor
should never seriously consider participating in such an enterprise.

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

Like so many other widespread misconceptions, this mental picture
has just enough accuracy to make it highly dangerous for anyone want-
ing to get the greatest long-range benefit from common stocks.

As already pointed out in the discussion of the fifteen points to be
considered if a major investment winner is to be selected by any means
other than pure luck, a few of these matters are largely determined by
cloistered mathematical calculation. Furthermore, as mentioned near
the beginning of this book, there is more than one method by which
an investor, if sufficiently skilled, can over the years make some
money — occasionally even really worthwhile money — through invest-
ment. The purpose of this book is not to point out every way such
money can be made. Rather it is to point out the best way. By the best
way is meant the greatest total profit for the least risk. The type of
accounting-statistical activity which the general public seems to visual-
ize as the heart of successful investing will, if enough effort be given it,
turn up some apparent bargains. Some of these may be real bargains. In
the case of others there may be such acute business troubles lying ahead,
yet not discernible from a purely statistical study, that instead of being
bargains they are actually selling at prices which in a few years will have
proven to be very high.

Meanwhile, in the case of even the genuine bargain, the degree by
which it is undervalued is usually somewhat limited. The time it takes
to get adjusted to its true value is frequently considerable. So far as I
have been able to observe, this means that over a time sufficient to give
a fair comparison — say five years — the most skilled statistical bargain
hunter ends up with a profit which is but a small part of the profit
attained by those using reasonable intelligence in appraising the business
characteristics of superbly managed growth companies. This, of course,
is after charging the growth-stock investor with losses on ventures
which did not turn out as expected, and charging the bargain hunter for
a proportionate amount of bargains that just didn’t turn out.

The reason why the growth stocks do so much better is that they
seem to show gains in value in the hundreds of per cent each decade.
In contrast, it is an unusual bargain that is as much as 50 per cent
undervalued. The cumulative effect of this simple arithmetic should be
obvious.

At this point, the potential investor may have to start revising his
ideas about the amount of time needed to locate the right investments
for his purpose, to say nothing of the characteristics he must have if he

What to Buy 8 1

is to find them. Perhaps he looked forward to spending a few hours each
week in the comfort of his home, studying scads of written material
which he felt would unlock the door to worthwhile profits. He just
does not have the time to seek out, cultivate, and talk with all the vari-
ous people it might be wise to contact if he wants to handle his com-
mon stock investments to his optimum benefit. Perhaps he does have
the time. He still may not have the inclination and personality to seek
out and chat with a group of people, most of whom he previously had
not known very well if at all. Furthermore, it is not enough just to chat
with them; it is necessary to arouse their interest and their confidence
to a point where they will tell what they know. The successful investor
is usually an individual who is inherently interested in business prob-
lems. This results in his discussing such matters in a way that will arouse
the interest of those from whom he is seeking data. Naturally he must
have reasonably good judgment or all the data he gets will avail him
nothing.

An investor may have the time, inclination, and judgment but still
be blocked from getting maximum results in the handling of his com-
mon stocks. The matter of geography is also a factor. An investor, for
example, living in or near Detroit would have opportunities for learn-
ing about automotive accessory and parts companies that would not be
available to one equally diligent or able in Oregon. But so many major
companies and industries are today organized on a nation-wide basis
with distribution, if not manufacturing, centers in most key cities, that
investors living in larger industrial centers or their suburbs usually have
ample opportunities to practice the art of finding at least a few out-
standing long-range investments. This unfortunately is not equally true
for those living in rural areas remote from such centers.

However, the rural investor or the overwhelming majority of other
investors who may not have the time, inclination, or ability to uncover
outstanding investments for themselves are by no means barred from
making such investments because of this. Actually, the investor s work is
so specialized and so intricate that there is no more reason why an indi-
vidual should handle his own investments than that he should be his
own lawyer, doctor, architect, or automobile mechanic. He should per-
form these functions if he has special interest in and skill at the partic-
ular field. Otherwise, he definitely should go to an expert.

What is important is that he know enough of the principles involved
so that he can pick a real expert rather than a hack or a charlatan. In some

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

ways it is easier for a careful layman to pick an outstanding investment
advisor than, say, a comparably superior doctor or lawyer. In other ways
it is much harder. It is harder because the investment field has devel-
oped much more recently than most comparable specialties. As a result
mass ideas have not yet crystallized to the point where there is an
accepted line of demarcation between true knowledge and mumbo-
jumbo. There are not as yet the barriers to weed out the ignorant and
the incompetent in the financial field that exist, for example, in the
fields of law or medicine. Even among some of the so-called authori-
ties on investment, there is still enough lack of agreement on the basic
principles involved that it is as yet impossible to have schools for train-
ing investment experts comparable to the recognized schools for teach-
ing law or medicine. This makes even more remote the practicability of
government authorities licensing those having the necessary back-
ground of knowledge to guide others in investments in a manner com-
parable to the way our states license the practicing of law or medicine.
It is true that many of our states do go through the form of licensing
investment advisors. However in such instances only known dishonesty
or financial insolvency, rather than a lack of training or skill, provides
the basis for denying a license.

All this probably results in a higher percentage of incompetence
among financial advisors than may exist in fields such as law and med-
icine. However, there are compensating factors that can enable an
individual with no personal expertness in investments to pick a capa-
ble financial advisor more easily than a comparably outstanding doctor
or lawyer. Finding out which physician had lost the smallest percent-
age of his practice through deaths would not be a good way to pick a
superb doctor. Neither would a corresponding box score of cases won
and lost show the relative skill of attorneys. Fortunately, most medical
treatments are not matters of immediate life or death, and a good
lawyer will frequently avoid going into litigation at all.

In the investment advisor’s case it is quite different, however. There
is a score board that, after enough time has elapsed, should pretty
much reflect that advisor’s investment skill. In occasional cases it may
take as much as five years for investments to demonstrate their real
merit. Usually it does not take that long. It would normally be fool-
hardy for anyone to entrust his savings to the skill of a so-called advi-
sor who, working either for himself or others, had less than five years
experience. Therefore, in the case of investments, there is no reason

What to Buy

why those trying to pick a professional advisor should not demand to
see a fair cross-section of results obtained for others. Those results,
compared to a record of security prices for the same period of time,
give a real clue to the advisor s ability.

Two more steps are then necessary before an investor should make
final determination of the individual or organization to which he will
delegate the important responsibility for his funds. One is the obvious
step of being certain of that advisors complete and unquestioned hon-
esty. The other step is more complex. A financial advisor may have
obtained far above average results during a period of falling prices not
because of skill but because he always keeps a large part of the funds he
manages in, let us say, high-grade bonds. At another time, after a long
period of rising prices, another advisor may have obtained above-average
results because of a tendency to go into risky, marginal companies. As
explained in the discussion of profit margins, such companies usually do
well only in such a period and subsequently do rather poorly. Still a
third advisor might do well in both such periods because of a tendency
to try to guess what the security markets are going to do. This can pro-
duce magnificent results for a while, but is almost impossible to contin-
ue indefinitely.

Before selecting an advisor, an investor should learn from that advi-
sor the nature of his basic concept of financial management. He should
then only accept an advisor with concepts fundamentally the same as
the investor’s own. Naturally, I believe that the concepts expressed in
this book are those which fundamentally should govern. Many, reared
in the old-time financial atmosphere of “buy them when they are
cheap and sell them when they are high,“ would strongly disagree with
this conclusion.

Assuming an investor desires the type of huge, long-range gain
which I believe should be the objective of nearly all common stock pur-
chases, there is one matter which he must decide for himself whether
he uses an investment advisor or handles his own affairs. It is a decision
which must be made because the type of stocks which qualify most sat-
isfactorily under the previously discussed fifteen points can vary con-
siderably among themselves in their investment characteristics.

At one end of the scale are large companies which in spite of out-
standing prospects of major further growth are so financially strong,
with roots going so deep into the economic soil, that they qualify
under the general classification of “institutional stocks.” This means

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

that insurance companies, professional trustees, and similar institutional
buyers will buy them. They will do so because they feel that, while they
may misjudge market prices and could lose a part of their original
investment should they be forced to sell such stocks at a time of lower
quotations, they are avoiding the greater danger of loss they could suf-
fer if they bought into a company that subsequently fell from its pres-
ent competitive position.

The Dow Chemical Company, Du Pont, and International Business
Machines are good examples of this type of growth stock. In Chapter
One I mentioned the totally insignificant return available from high-
grade bonds during the ten-year period 1946 to 1956. At the close of
this period, each of these three stocks — Dow, Du Pont, and IBM — had
a value approximately five times what it sold for at the beginning of the
period. Nor during these ten years did their holders suffer from the
standpoint of current income. Dow, for example, is almost notorious for
the low rate of return it customarily pays on current market price. Yet
the investor who bought Dow at the start of this period would at the
end of it be doing well from the standpoint of current income. Although
Dow at the time of purchase would only have provided a return of
about 2k> per cent (this was a period when yields on all stocks were
high), just ten years later it had increased dividends or split stock so
many times that the investor would have been enjoying a dividend
return of between 8 and 9 per cent on the price of his investment ten
years earlier. More significantly, the ten-year period covered is not an
unusual one for companies of the caliber of these three. Decade after
decade, with only occasional interruptions from such one-time influ-
ences as the great 1929—1932 bear market or World War II, these stocks
have given almost fabulous performance.

At the other end of the scale, also of extreme interest for the right
sort of long-range investment, are small and frequently young compa-
nies which may only have total sales of from one to six or seven million
dollars per annum, but which also have products that might bring a sen-
sational future. To qualify under the fifteen points already described,
such companies will usually have a combination of outstanding business
management and equally capable scientific personnel who are pioneer-
ing in a new or economically promising field. The Ampex Corporation
at the time the stock was first offered to the public in 1953 might serve
as a good example of this type of company. Within four years the value
of this stock had increased over seven-fold.

What to Buy

Between these two extremes lie a host of other promising growth
companies varying all the way from those as young and risky as was Ampex
in 1953 to those as strong and well entrenched as are Dow, Du Pont, and
IBM today. Assuming it is time to buy at all (see the next chapter), which
type should the investor buy? '

The young growth stock offers by far the greatest possibility of
gain. Sometimes this can mount up to several thousand per cent in a
decade. But making at least an occasional investment mistake is
inevitable even for the most skilled investor. It should never be for-
gotten that if such a mistake is made in this type of common stock,
every dollar put into the investment can be lost. In contrast, if the
stock is bought according to the rules described in the next chapter,
any losses that might occur in the older and more established growth
stocks should be temporary, resulting from a period of unanticipated
decline in the stock market as a whole. The long-range gain in value
of this class of big company growth stock will, over the years, be con-
siderably less than that of the small and usually younger enterprise.
Nevertheless it will mount to thoroughly worthwhile totals. Even in
the most conservative of the growth stocks it should run to at least
several times the original investment.

Therefore, for anyone risking a stake big enough to be of real sig-
nificance to himself or his family, the rule to follow should be rather
obvious. It is to put “most” of his funds into the type of company
which, while perhaps not as large as a Dow, a Du Pont, or an Interna-
tional Business Machines, at least comes closer to that type of stock
than to the small young company. Whether this “most” be 60 per cent
or 100 per cent of total investments varies with the needs or require-
ments of each individual. A widow with a half million dollars of total
assets and no children might put all her funds in the more conserva-
tive class of growth stocks. Another widow with a million dollars to
invest and three children for whom she would like to increase her
assets — to a degree that would not, however, jeopardize her scale of
living — might well put up to 15 per cent of her assets in carefully
selected small young companies. A businessman with a wife, two chil-
dren, a present investment worth $400,000, and an income big enough
to save $10,000 per annum after taxes might put all his present
$400,000 into the more conservative-type growth companies but ven-
ture the $10,000 of new savings each year on the more risky half of
the investment scale.

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

In all these cases, however, the gain in value over the years of the
more conservative group of stocks should be enough to outweigh even
complete loss of all funds put into the more risky type. Meanwhile, if
properly selected, the more risky type could significantly increase the
total capital gain. Equally impdrtant if this happens, these young risky
companies will by that time have reached a point in their own devel-
opment where their stocks will no longer be carrying anything like the
former degree of risk but may even have progressed to a status where
institutions have begun buying them.

The problems of the small investor are somewhat more difficult. The
large investor can often completely ignore the matter of dividend
returns in his endeavor to employ all his funds in situations affording
maximum growth potential. After his funds are so invested he may still
obtain from them sufficient dividends either to take care of his desired
standard of living or to enable him to attain this standard if the dividend
income is added to his other regular earning power. Most small investors
cannot live on the return on their investment no matter how high a
yield is obtained, since the total value of their holdings is not great
enough. Therefore for the small investor the matter of current dividend
return usually comes down to a choice between a few hundred dollars
a year starting right now, or the chance of obtaining an income many
times this few hundred dollars a year at a later date.

Before reaching a decision on this crucial point, there is one matter
which the small investor should face squarely. This is that the only funds
he should consider using for common stock investment are funds that
are truly surplus. This does not mean using all funds that remain over
and above what he needs for everyday living expense. Except in the
most unusual circumstances, he should have a backlog of several thousand
dollars, sufficient to take care of illnesses or other unexpected contin-
gencies, before attempting to buy anything with as much intrinsic risk
as a common stock. Similarly, funds already set aside for some specific
future purpose, such as sending a child through college, should never be
risked in the stock market. It is only after taking care of matters of this
sort that he should consider common stock investment.

The objective which the small investor then has for this surplus
becomes somewhat a matter of personal choice and of his particular
circumstances, including the size and nature of his other income. A
young man or woman, or an older investor with children or other heirs
of whom he or she is particularly fond, may be willing to sacrifice a

What to Buy

dividend income of, say, $30 or $40 a month in order to obtain an
income ten times that size in fifteen years. In contrast, an elderly per-
son with no close heirs would naturally prefer a larger immediate
income. Similarly, a person earning a relatively small income and with
heavy financial obligations might have no choice but to provide for
immediate needs.

However, for the great majority of small investors, the decision on
the importance of immediate income is one of personal choice. It prob-
ably is largely dependent on the psychology of each individual investor.
My own purely personal view is that a small amount of additional
income (after taxes) palls in comparison to an investment that in the
years ahead could bring me a sizable income and, in time, might make
my children really wealthy. Others may feel quite differently about this.
It is to the large investor, and to the small investor who feels as I do on
this subject and desires an intelligent approach to the principles that
have made this kind of results possible, that the procedures set forth in
this book are presented.

The success which any particular individual will have in applying
these principles to his own investments will depend on two things. One
is the degree of skill with which he applies them. The other is, of course,
the matter of good fortune. In an age when an unforeseeable discovery
might happen tomorrow in a research laboratory in no way connected
with the company in which the investment has been made, and in an
age when five years from now that unrelated research development
could result in either tripling or cutting in half the profits of this invest-
ment, good fortune obviously can play a tremendous part so far as any
one investment is concerned. This is why even the medium-sized
investor has an advantage over those of very small means. This element
of good or bad fortune will largely average out if several well-selected
investments are chosen.

However, for both large and small investors who prefer far greater
income some years from now to maximum possible return today, it is
well to remember that during the past thirty-five years numerous stud-
ies have been made by various financial authorities. These have com-
pared the results obtained from the purchase of common stocks which
afford a high dividend yield with those obtained from the purchase of
low-yield stocks of companies that have concentrated on growth and
the reinvestment of assets. As far as I know, every one of these studies
has shown the same trend. The growth stocks, over a five- or ten-year

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

span, have proven spectacularly better so far as their increase in capital
value is concerned.

More surprising, in the same time span such stocks have usually so
increased their dividends that, while still paying a low return in relation
to the enhanced value at which' they were by then selling, they were by
this time paying a greater dividend return on the original investment
than were the stocks selected for yield alone. In other words, the growth
stocks had not only shown a marked superiority in the field of capital
appreciation, but given a reasonable time, they had grown to a point
where they showed superiority in the matter of dividend return as well.

When to Buy

T he preceding chapters attempted to show that the heart of succes-
sful investing is knowing how to find the minority of stocks that in
the years ahead will have spectacular growth in their per-share earn-
ings. Therefore, is there any reason to divert time or mental effort from
the main issue? Does not the matter of when to buy become of rela-
tively minor importance? Once the investor is sure he has definitely
found an outstanding stock, isn’t any time at all a good time to buy it?
The answer to this depends somewhat on the investors objective. It also
depends on his temperament.

Let us take an example. With the ease of hindsight it can be made the
most extreme example in modern financial history. This would be the
purchase of several superbly selected enterprises in the summer of 1929
or just before the greatest stock market crash of American history. In time
such a purchase would have turned out well. But twenty-five years later
it would provide a much smaller percentage gain than would have been
the case if, having done the hardest part of the job in selecting his com-
panies properly, an investor had made the small extra effort needed to
understand a few simple principles about the timing of growth stocks.

In other words, if the right stocks are bought and held long enough
they will always produce some profit. Usually they will produce a hand-
some profit. However, to produce close to the maximum profit, the kind
of spectacular profit defined earlier, some consideration must be given
to timing.

The conventional method of timing when to buy stocks is, I believe,
just as silly as it appears on the surface to be sensible. This method is to

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

marshal a vast mass of economic data. From these data conclusions are
reached as to the near- and medium-term course of general business.
More sophisticated investors will usually form opinions about the future
course of money rates as well as business activity. Then, if their forecasts
for all these matters indicate no riiajor worsening of background condi-
tions, the conclusion is that the desired stock may be bought. It some-
times appears that dark clouds are forming on the horizon. Then those
who use this generally accepted method will postpone or cancel pur-
chases they otherwise would make.

My objection to this approach is not that it is unreasonable in the-
ory. It is that in the current state of human knowledge about the eco-
nomics which deal with forecasting future business trends, it is impos-
sible to apply this method in practice. The chances of being right are
not good enough to warrant such methods being used as a basis for
risking the investment of savings. This may not always be the case. It
might not even be the case five or ten years from now. At present, able
men are attempting to harness electronic computers to establish
“input-output” series of sufficient intricacy that perhaps at some future
date it may be possible to know with a fair degree of precision what
the coming business trends will be.

When, if ever, such developments occur, the art of common stock
investment may have to be radically revised. Until they occur, however,
I believe that the economics which deal with forecasting business trends
may be considered to be about as far along as was the science of chem-
istry during the days of alchemy in the Middle Ages. In chemistry then,
as in business forecasting now, basic principles were just beginning to
emerge from a mysterious mass of mumbo-jumbo. However, chemistry
had not reached a point where such principles could be safely used as a
basis for choosing a course of action.

Occasionally, as in 1929, the economy gets so out of line that spec-
ulative enthusiasm for the future runs to unprecedented proportions.
Even in our present state of economic ignorance, it is possible to make
a pretty accurate guess as to what will occur. However, I doubt if the
years when it is safe to do this have averaged much more than one out
of ten. They may be even rarer in the future.

The typical investor is so used to having economic forecasts made
for him that he may start by trusting too strongly the dependability of
such forecasts. If so, I suggest that he look over a file of the back issues
of the Commercial & Financial Chronicle for any year he may choose since

»Pfr

When to Buy 9 1

the end of World War II. As a matter of fact it might pay him to look
over such a file even though he is aware of the fallibility of these fore-
casts. Regardless of the year he selects he will find, among other mate-
rial, a sizable number of articles in which leading economic and finan-
cial authorities give their views of'the outlook for the period ahead.
Since the editors of this journal appear to select their material so as to
give the ablest available presentations of both optimistic and pessimistic
opinions, it is not surprising that opposing forecasts will be found in any
such series of back issues. What is surprising is the degree by which such
experts disagree with each other. Even more surprising is how strong
and convincing some of the arguments were bound to seem at the time
they were written. This is particularly true of some of the forecasts that
turned out to be most wrong.

The amount of mental effort the financial community puts into
this constant attempt to guess the economic future from a random
and probably incomplete series of facts makes one wonder what
might have been accomplished if only a fraction of such mental effort
had been applied to something with a better chance of proving use-
ful. I have already compared economic forecasting with chemistry in
the days of alchemy. Perhaps this preoccupation with trying to do
something which apparently cannot yet be done properly permits
another comparison with the Middle Ages.

That was a period when most of the Western world lived in an envi-
ronment of unnecessary want and human suffering. This was largely
because the considerable mental ability of the period was devoted to
fruitless results. Consider what might have been accomplished if half as
much thought had been given to fighting hunger, disease, and greed as
was devoted to debating such points as the number of angels that could
balance on the head of a pin. Perhaps just part of the collective intelli-
gence nowadays employed in the investment community’s attempt to
guess the future trend of the business cycle could produce spectacular
results if it were harnessed to more productive purposes.

If, then, conventional studies of the near-term economic prospect
do not provide the right method of approach to the proper timing of
buying, what does provide it? The answer lies in the very nature of
growth stocks themselves.

At the risk of being repetitious, let us review for a moment some of
the basic characteristics of outstandingly desirable investments, as dis-
cussed in the preceding chapter. These companies are usually working

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

in one way or another on the very frontiers of scientific technology.
They are developing various new products or processes from the labo-
ratory through the pilot plant to the early stages of commercial pro-
duction. All of this costs money in varying amounts. All of it is a drain
on other profits of the business! Even in the early stage of commercial
production the extra sales expense involved in building sufficient vol-
ume for a new product to furnish the desired margin of profit is such
that the out-of-pocket losses at this stage of development may be greater
than they were during the pilot-plant period.

From the standpoint of the investor there are two aspects of all this
that have particular significance. One of these is the impossibility of
depending on any sure time table in the development cycle of a new
product. The other is that even for the most brilliantly-managed enter-
prises, a percentage of failures is part of the cost of doing business. In a
sport, such as baseball, even the most outstanding league champions will
have dropped some percentage of their scheduled games.

The point in the development of a new process that is perhaps
worth the closest scrutiny from the standpoint of timing the buying of
common stocks is that at which the first full-scale commercial plant is
about to begin production. In a new plant for even established proces-
ses or products, there will probably be a shake-down period of six to
eight weeks that will prove rather expensive. It takes this long to get the
equipment adjusted to the required operating efficiency and to weed
out the inevitable “bugs” that seem to occur in breaking in modern
intricate machinery. When the process is really revolutionary, this expen-
sive shake-down period may extend far beyond the estimate of even the
most pessimistic company engineer. Furthermore, when problems final-
ly do get solved, the weary stockholder still cannot look forward to
immediate profits. There are more months of still further drain while
even more of the company’s profits from older lines are being ploughed
back into special sales and advertising efforts to get the new product
accepted.

It may be that the company making all this effort is having such
growth in revenue from other and older products that the drain on prof-
its is not noticed by the average stockholder. Frequently, however, just
the opposite happens. As word first gets out about a spectacular new
product in the laboratory of a well-run company, eager buyers bid up
the price of that company’s shares. When word comes of successful
pilot-plant operation, the shares go still higher. Few think of the old

ifT

When to Buy

analogy that operating a pilot plant is like driving an automobile over a
winding country road at ten miles per hour. Running a commercial
plant is like driving on that same road at 100 miles per hour.

Then when month after month difficulties crop up in getting the
commercial plant started, these unexpected expenses cause per-share
earnings to dip noticeably. Word spreads that the plant is in trouble.
Nobody can guarantee when, if ever, the problems will be solved. The
former eager buyers of the stock become discouraged sellers. Down
goes the price of the stock. The longer the shake-down lasts the more
market quotations sag. At last comes the good news that the plant is
finally running smoothly. A two-day rally occurs in the price of the
stock. However, in the following quarter when special sales expenses
have caused a still further sag in net income, the stock falls to the low-
est price in years. Word passes all through the financial community that
the management has blundered.

At this point the stock might well prove a sensational buy. Once the
extra sales effort has produced enough volume to make the first pro-
duction scale plant pay, normal sales effort is frequently enough to con-
tinue the upward movement of the sales curve for many years. Since the
same techniques are used, the placing in operation of a second, third,
fourth, and fifth plant can nearly always be done without the delays and
special expenses that occurred during the prolonged shake-down peri-
od of the first plant. By the time plant Number Five is running at capac-
ity, the company has grown so big and prosperous that the whole cycle
can be repeated on another brand new product without the same drain
on earnings percentage-wise or the same downward effect on the price
of the company’s shares. The investor has acquired at the right time an
investment which can grow for him for many years.

In the original edition I then used the following words to describe
an example of this type of opportunity. I used an example that was still
fairly recent at that time. I said:

“Immediately prior to the 1954 congressional elections, certain
investment funds took advantage of this type of situation. For several
years before this time, American Cyanamid shares had sold in the mar-
ket at a considerably lower price-earnings ratio than most of the other
major chemical companies. I believe this was because the general feel-
ing in the financial community was that, while the Lederle division
represented one of the world’s most outstanding pharmaceutical

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

organizations, the relatively larger industrial and agricultural chemical
activities constituted a hodge-podge of expensive and inefficient
plants flung together in the typical ‘stock market’ merger period of the
booming 1920’s. These properties were generally considered anything
but a desirable investment.

“Largely unnoticed was the fact that a new management was steadi-
ly but without fanfare cutting production costs, eliminating dead wood,
and streamlining the organization. What was noticed was that this com-
pany was ‘making a huge bet’ — making a major capital expenditure, for
a company its size, in a giant new organic chemical plant at Fortier,
Louisiana. So much complex engineering was designed into this plant
that it should have surprised no one when the plant lagged many
months behind schedule in reaching the break-even point. As the prob-
lems at Fortier continued, however, the situation added to the general-
ly unfavorable light in which American Cyanamid shares were then
being regarded. At this stage, in the belief a buying point was at hand,
the funds to which I have already referred acquired their holdings at an
average price of 45%. This would be 22% on the present shares as a
result of a 2-for-l stock split which occurred in 1957.

“What has happened since? Sufficient time has elapsed for the com-
pany to begin getting the benefits of some of the management activities
that were creating abnormal costs in 1954. Fortier is now profitable. Earn-
ings have increased from $1.48 per (present) common share in 1954 to
$2.10 per share in 1956 and promise to be slightly higher in 1957, a year
in which most chemical (though not pharmaceutical) profits have run
behind those of the year before. At least as important, ‘Wall Street’ has
come to realize that American Cyanamid’s industrial and agricultural
chemical activities are worthy of institutional investment. As a result, the
price-earnings ratio of these shares has changed noticeably. A 37 per cent
increase in earnings that has taken place in somewhat under three years
has produced a gain in market value of approximately 85 per cent.”

Since writing these words, the financial community’s steady upgrad-
ing of the status of American Cyanamid appears to have continued.With
earnings for 1959 promising to top the previous all-time peak of $2.42
in 1957, the market price of these shares has steadily advanced. It now
is about 60, representing a gain of about 70 per cent in earning power
and 163 per cent in market value in the five years since the shares
referred to in the first edition were acquired.

When to Buy

I would like to end the discussion of American Cyanamid on this
happy note. However, in the preface to this revised edition I stated I
intended to make this revision an honest record and not the most favor-
able sounding record it might appear plausible to present. You may have
noticed that in the original edition I referred to this 1954 purchase of
Cyanamid stock by “certain funds”; these funds are no longer retaining
the shares, which were sold in the spring of 1959 at an average price of
about 49. This was of course significantly below the current market but
still represented a profit of about 110 per cent.

The size of the profit had nothing whatsoever to do with the deci-
sion to sell. There were two motives behind this decision. One was that
the long-range outlook for another company appeared even better. You
will find this discussed in the next chapter as one of the valid reasons
for selling. While not enough time has yet passed to give conclusive
proof one way or the other, so far comparative market quotations for
both stocks appear to have warranted this move.

However, there was a second motive behind this switch of invest-
ments which hindsight may prove to be less creditable. This was concern
that in relation to the most outstanding of competitive companies, Amer-
ican Cyanamid s chemical (in contrast to its pharmaceutical) business was
not making as much progress in broadening profit margins and estab-
lishing profitable new lines as had been hoped. Concern over these fac-
tors was accentuated by uncertainty over the possible costs of the com-
pany’s attempt to establish itself in the acrylic fiber business in the highly
competitive textile industry. This reasoning may prove to be correct and
still could turn out to have been the wrong investment decision, because
of bright prospects in the Lederle, or pharmaceutical, division. These
prospects have become more apparent since the shares were sold. The
possibilities for a further sharp jump in Lederle earning power in the
medium-term future center around 1) a new and quite promising antibi-
otic, and 2) in time a sizable market for an oral “live” polio vaccine, a field
in which this company has been a leader. These developments make it
problematic and a matter that only the future will decide as to whether
this decision to dispose of Cyanamid shares may not have been an invest-
ment mistake. Because studying possible mistakes can be even more
rewarding than reviewing past successes, I am going to suggest — even at
the risk of appearing presumptuous — that anyone seriously interested in
bettering his investment technique mark these last several paragraphs and
reread them after having read the coming chapter on “When to Sell.”

COMMON STOCKS AND UN ( 0

Now let me turn to the next and mo fe '' ^
of purchasing opportunity which I cited ^ ^

“A somewhat similar situation may b e ^
of 1 957 in the case of the Food Machinery
A few large institutional buyers have liked ^

Many more, however, seem to feel that ^

interest they want evidence concerning ^ \ \

ing shares. To understand this attitude it is ^ ^ *1 / K

the background. \

“Prior to World War II this company ^ ^ \ *

diversified line of machinery manufacture, a ^ 1^

agement and equally brilliant develops s ^ ^ T V'f

Machinery had become one of the specta Cll |^b^ ^
of the prewar period. Then during the war c ^ Ik ^ ^ h k

related line of ordnance manufacture at n* V

comparably successful, the company built np X ^ N

ness. Reason for this was a desire to stabili^ * h ^

•tk H R ^ ' ^VYV' •

machinery business through the manufacti^X ^ X

^ ''N

sales of which over the years could be cora t -^ p>

research in much the same manner as had N

in the machinery and ordnance divisions. b ^ ' R 1 ^

“By 1952, four separate companies h ac j
converted into four (now five) divisions

VV\\W

s,. *;

slightly less than half the total sales volun^kX^ . v\ s

included, slightly more than half if only th e ^ u X \ nV \

^ "'tW \\V

ities are considered. Before and in the ear |
chemical units varied enormously. One w as ^ ^

ing field with broad profit margins and ^ ^

the industry. Another suffered from obsol ete ”%j. ^ Xa
poor morale. The average of all left much t 0 \k|\%

with the real leaders among chemical cot^ ^ ^ \
were intermediate products without basic r a ^

were plenty of low-profit raw materials, b^ j X\

profit margins that could be built from these ^

“The financial community reached .

sions on all this. The machinery divisions^y ^

of 9 to 10 per cent per annum (comparabj e ^ X ^

.> XW

as a whole), with a demonstrated ability t 0 !" n ’hr ■ \\

%> A\ AN

When to Buy 9 7

and commercially worthwhile new products year after year, and with
some of the lowest cost plants in their respective fields — represented
the highest grade investment. However, until the chemical divisions
could demonstrate broader over-all profit margins and other evidence
of intrinsic quality, there was little' desire to invest in this combined
enterprise.

“Meanwhile, the management went aggressively to work to solve
this problem. What did they do? Their first move was through internal
promotions and external recruitments to build up a top management
team. This new team spent money on modernizing old plant, develop-
ing new plant, and on research. Entirely aside from plant expenditures
that are normally capitalized, it is impossible to undergo major mod-
ernization and plant expansion without running up current expenses as
well. It is rather surprising that all the abnormal expenses that occurred
in 1955, 1956, and 1957 did not cause reported chemical earnings to
decline during that period. The fact that earnings held steady gives
strong indication of the worth of what had already been done.

“In any event, if projects have been properly planned, the cumula-
tive effect of those already completed must in time outweigh the abnor-
mal expense of those still to come. Something of this sort might have
happened as far back as 1956 if research expenditures in that year had
not been increased about 50 per cent above the 1955 levels. This was
done even though in 1955 these expenditures for chemical research
were not far below the average of the industry, and those for machinery
research were well above that of most segments of the machinery busi-
ness. In spite of continuing this higher level of research, such an earning
spurt was expected in the second half of 1957. At midyear the company’s
modernized chlorine cells at South Charleston, West Virginia, were
scheduled to go on stream. Unexpected troubles, characteristic of the
chemical industry but from which this company had been surprisingly
free in most of its other modernization and expansion programs, indi-
cate that it will be the first quarter of 1958 before this earning spurt will
now occur.

“I suspect that until this earning betterment comes and chemical
profit margins grow and continue to broaden for a period of time, the
institutional buyer will generally fail to look beneath the surface and
will largely stay away from this stock. If, as I suspect will happen, such a
development manifests itself in 1958 and 1959, financial sentiment some
time in that period will come around to recognizing the basic improve-

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

ment in fundamentals that started several years before. At that time the
stock, which may then continue to grow for years, will be selling at a
price that has advanced partly because of the improvement in per-share
earnings that had already occurred but even more because of the
changed price-earnings ratio that results from a general reappraisal of
the company’s intrinsic quality.”

I believe the record of the past two years emphatically validates
these comments. Possibly the first general recognition of what had been
happening beneath the surface came when in the depression-like year
of 1958, a year when nearly all chemical and machinery companies
showed a decided drop in earning power. Food Machinery reported
profits at an all-time peak of $2.39 per share. This was moderately above
the levels of the several preceding years when the general economy was
at higher levels. It was a tip-off that the chemical divisions were at last
being brought to a point where they could take their place along with
the machinery end of the business as a highly desirable and not a mar-
ginal investment. While 1959 profits are not yet available as these words
are written, the sharp gains in earning power reported for the first nine
months over the corresponding period of 1958 give further assurance
that the long period of reorganizing the chemical divisions is bearing
rich fruit. The 1959 gains are perhaps particularly significant in that this
is the year in which the ordnance division is in transition from its for-
mer principal product of an armored personnel and light equipment
amphibious tank-like carrier made of steel, to an aluminum one that can
be dropped from the air by parachute. This means that 1959 was the one
year in the recent past or foreseeable future in which ordnance activi-
ties made no significant contribution to total earning power. Yet an
important new earning peak was attainted.

How is the market responding to all this? At the end of September
1957, when writing of the first edition was concluded, these shares were
selling at 25 K. Today they are at 51, a gain of 102 per cent. It is begin-
ning to look as though the financial sentiment I mentioned in the orig-
inal edition is beginning “to recognize the basic improvement in funda-
mentals that started some years before.”

Other events are confirming this trend and may give further impetus
to it. In 1959 the McGraw-Hill Publications inaugurated a new custom.
They decided each year to give an award for outstanding management
achievement in the chemical industries. To determine the first winner

When to Buy

of this honor they selected an unusually distinguished and informed
panel of ten members. Four represented leading university graduate
schools of business administration, three came from major investment
institutions with heavy holdings in the chemical industry, and three
were leading members of prominent chemical consulting firms. Twenty-
two companies were nominated and fourteen submitted presentations.
This award for management accomplishment did not go to one or
another of the giants of the industry, the managements of several of
which, with very good reason, are highly respected in Wall Street.
Instead it went to the Chemical Divisions of the Food Machinery
Corporation which, two years before, had been regarded by most and is
still regarded by many institutional stock buyers as a rather undesirable
investment!

Why is a matter of this sort of major importance to long-range
investors? First, it gives strong assurance that, plus or minus the trend of
general business activity, the earnings of such a company will grow for
years to come. Informed chemical businessmen would not give this kind
of award in the industry to a company that did not have the research
departments to keep developing worthwhile new products and the chem-
ical engineers to produce them profitably. Secondly, this type of award will
leave its impression on the investment community. Nothing is more desir-
able for stockholders than the influence on share prices of an upward
trend of earnings multiplied by a comparable upward trend in the way
each dollar of such earnings is valued in the market place, as I mentioned
in my concluding remarks about this company in the original edition.

Other matters besides the introduction of new products and the
problems of starting complex plants can also open up buying opportu-
nities in the unusual company. For example, a Middle Western electronic
company was, among other things, well known for its unusual and
excellent labor relations. It grew to a point where size alone forced
some change in its method of handling employees. An unfortunate
interplay of personalities caused friction, slow-down strikes, and low
productivity in an enterprise heretofore known for its good labor rela-
tions and high labor productivity. At just this time the company made
one of the very few mistakes it has made in judging the potential mar-
ket for a new product. Earnings dropped precipitously and so did the
price of the shares.

The unusually able and ingenious management made plans at once
to correct this situation. While plans can be made in a matter of weeks,

100 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

putting them into effect takes much longer. As results from these plans
began coming through to earnings, the stock reached what might be
called buying point A. However, it took about a year and a half before all
the benefits could flow through to the profit statement. Toward the end
of this period a second strike occurred, settlement of which was the last
step needed to enable the company to restore competitive efficiency.
This strike was not a long one. Nevertheless, while this short and rela-
tively inexpensive strike was occurring, word went through the finan-
cial community that labor matters were going from bad to worse. In
spite of heavy buying from officers of the company, the stock went
lower. It did not stay lower for long. This proved to be another of the
right sort of buying opportunities from the standpoint of timing, and
might be called buying point B. Those who looked beneath the surface
and saw what was really happening were able to buy, at bargain prices,
a stock that may well grow for them for many years.

Let us see just how profitable it might have been if an investor had
bought at either buying point A or buying point B. I do not intend to
use the lowest price which a table of monthly price ranges would show
that this stock reached in either period. This is because only a few hun-
dred shares changed hands at the extreme low point. If an investor had
bought at the absolute lows, it would have been more a matter of luck
than anything else. Instead, I will use a figure moderately above the low
in one case and several points above in the other. In each instance a
good many thousand shares were available and changed hands at these
levels. I will use only prices at which the shares could easily have been
bought by anyone making a realistic study of the situation.

At buying point A the stock had slipped in just a few months by
about 24 per cent from its former peak. Within about a year those who
bought here would have had a gain in market value of between 55 per
cent and 60 per cent. Then came the strike that produced buying point
B. The stock dropped back almost 20 per cent. Strangely enough, it
remained there for some weeks after the strike ended. At this time, a
brilliant employee of a large investment trust explained to me that he
knew how good the situation was and what was almost sure to happen.
Nevertheless he would not recommend the purchase to his financial
committee. He said certain of the members were sure to check with
Wall Street friends and not only turn down his recommendation, but
rebuke him for bringing to their attention a company with a sloppy
management and hopeless labor relations!

101

When to Buy

As I write this not so many months later, the stock has already
risen 50 per cent from buying point B. This means that it is now up
over 90 per cent from buying point A. More important, the company’s
future looks brilliant, with every prospect that it will enjoy abnormal
growth for years to come just as it did for some years before the com-
bination of unusual and temporary unfortunate occurrences produced
buying points A and B. Those who bought at either time got into the
right sort of company at the right sort o£ time.

In short, the company into which the investor should be buying is
the company which is doing things under the guidance of exceptional-
ly able management. A few of these things are bound to fail. Others will
from time to time produce unexpected troubles before they succeed.
The investor should be thoroughly sure in his own mind that these
troubles are temporary rather than permanent. Then if these troubles
have produced a significant decline in the price of the affected stock and
give promise of being solved in a matter of months rather than years, he
will probably be on pretty safe ground in considering that this is a time
when the stock may be bought.

All buying points do not arise out of corporate troubles. In indus-
tries such as chemical production, where large amounts of capital are
required for each dollar of sales, another type of opportunity sometimes
occurs. The mathematics of such situations are usually about like this: A
new plant or plants will be erected for, say, $10 million. A year or two
after these plants are in full-scale operation, the company’s engineers
will go over them in detail. They will come up with proposals for spend-
ing an additional, say, %\Vi million. For this 15 per cent greater total cap-
ital investment the engineers will show how the output of the plants can
be increased by perhaps 40 per cent of previous capacity.

Obviously, since the plants are already profitable and 40 per cent
more output can be made and sold for only 15 per cent more capital
cost, and since almost no additional general overhead is involved, the
profit margin on this extra 40 per cent of output will be unusually
good. If the project is large enough to affect the company’s earnings as
a whole, buying the company’s shares just before this improvement in
earning power has been reflected in the market price for these shares
can similarly mean a chance to get into the right sort of company at the
right time.

What is the common denominator of each of the examples just
given? It is that a worthwhile improvement in earnings is coming in the

102 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

right sort of company, but that this particular increase in earnings has
not yet produced an upward move in the price of that company’s shares.
I believe that whenever this situation occurs the right sort of investment
may be considered to be in a buying range. Conversely, when it does not
occur, an investor will still in the long run make money if he buys into
outstanding companies. However, he had then better have a somewhat
greater degree of patience for it will take him longer to make this
money and percentage-wise it will be a considerably smaller profit on
his original investment.

Does this mean that if a person has some money to invest he should
completely ignore what the future trend of the business cycle may be
and invest 100 per cent of this fund the moment he has found the right
stocks, as defined in Chapter Three, and located a good buying point, as
indicated in this chapter? A depression might strike right after he has
made his investment. Since a decline of 40 to 50 per cent from its peak
is not at all uncommon for even the best stock in a normal business
depression, is not completely ignoring the business cycle rather a risky
policy?

I think this risk may be taken in stride by the investor who, for a con-
siderable period of time, has already had the bulk of his stocks placed in
well-chosen situations. If properly chosen, these should by now have
already shown him some fairly substantial capital gains. But now, either
because he believes one of his securities should be sold or because some
new funds have come his way, such an investor has funds to purchase
something new. Unless it is one of those rare years when speculative buy-
ing is running riot in the stock market and major economic storm signals
are virtually screaming their warnings (as happened in 1928 and 1929), I
believe this class of investor should ignore any guesses on the coming
trend of general business or the stock market. Instead he should invest the
appropriate funds as soon as the suitable buying opportunity arises.

In contrast to guessing which way general business or the stock
market may go, he should be able to judge with only a small probabili-
ty of error what the company into which he wants to buy is going to
do in relation to business in general. Therefore he starts off with two
advantages. He is making his bet upon something which he knows to
be the case, rather than upon something about which he is largely guess-
ing. Furthermore, since by definition he is only buying into a situation
which for one reason or another is about to have a worthwhile increase
in its earning power in the near- or medium-term future, he has a sec-

When to Buy j q 3

ond element of support. Just as his stock would have risen more than
the average stock when this new source of earning power became rec-
ognized in the market place if business had remained good, so if by bad
fortune he has made his new purchase just prior to a general market
break this same new source of earnitigs should prevent these shares from
declining quite as much as other stocks of the same general type.

However, many investors are not in the happy position of having a
backlog of well-chosen investments bought comfortably below present
prices. Perhaps this may be the first time they have funds to invest. Per-
haps they may have a portfolio of bonds or relatively static non-growth
stocks which at long last they desire to convert into shares that in the
future will show them more worthwhile gains. If such investors get pos-
session of new funds or develop a desire to convert to growth stocks
after a prolonged period of prosperity and many years of rising stock
prices, should they, too, ignore the hazards of a possible business depres-
sion? Such an investor would not be in a very happy position if, later
on, he realized he had committed all or most of his assets near the top
of a long rise or just prior to a major decline.

This does create a problem. However, the solution to this problem
is not especially difficult as in so many other things connected with
the stock market it just requires an extra bit of patience. I believe
investors in this group should start buying the appropriate type of
common stocks just as soon as they feel sure they have located one or
more of them. However, having made a start in this type of purchas-
ing, they should stagger the timing of further buying. They should
plan to allow several years before the final part of their available funds
wiH have become invested. By so doing, if the market has a severe
decline somewhere in this period, they will still have purchasing
power available to take advantage of such a decline. If no decline
occurs and they have properly selected their earlier purchases, they
should have at least a few substantial gains on such holdings. This
would provide a cushion so that if a severe decline happened to occur
at the worst possible time for them — which would be just after the
final part of their funds had become fully invested— the gains on the
earlier purchases should largely, if not entirely, offset the declines on
the more recent ones. No severe loss of original capital would there-
fore be involved.

There is an equally important reason why investors who have not
already obtained a record of satisfactory investments, and who have

104 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

enough funds to be able to stagger their purchases should do so. This is
that such investors will have had a practical demonstration, prior to
using up all their funds, that they or their advisors are sufficient masters
of investment technique to operate with reasonable efficiency. In the
event that such a record had not been attained, at least all of an investor s
assets would not be committed before he had had a warning signal to
revise his investment technique or to get someone else to handle such
matters for him.

All types of common stock investors might well keep one basic
thought in mind; otherwise the financial community’s constant worry
about and preoccupation with the danger of downswings in the busi-
ness cycle will paralyze much worthwhile investment action. This
thought is that here in the mid-twentieth century the current phase of
the business cycle is but one of at least five powerful forces. All of these
forces, either by influencing mass psychology or by direct economic
operation, can have an extremely powerful influence on the general
level of stock prices.

The other four influences are the trend of interest rates, the over-all
governmental attitude toward investment and private enterprise, the
long-range trend to more and more inflation, and — possibly most pow-
erful of all — new inventions and techniques as they affect old industries.
These forces are seldom all pulling stock prices in the same direction at
the same time. Nor is any one of them necessarily going to be of vast-
ly greater importance than any other for long periods of time. So com-
plex and diverse are these influences that the safest course to follow will
be the one that at first glance appears to be the most risky. This is to take
investment action when matters you know about a specific company
appear to warrant such action. Be undeterred by fears or hopes based on
conjectures, or conclusions based on surmises.

When to Sell

And When Not To

T here are many good reasons why an investor might decide to sell
common stocks. He may want to build a new home or finance his
son in a business. Any one of a number of similar reasons can, from
the standpoint of happy living, make selling common stocks sensible.
This type of selling, however, is personal rather than financial in its
motive. As such it is well beyond the scope of this book. These com-
ments are only designed to cover that type of selling that is motivated
by a single objective — obtaining the greatest total dollar benefit from
the investment dollars available.

I believe there are three reasons, and three reasons only, for the sale
of any common stock which has been originally selected according to
the investment principles already discussed. The first of these reasons
should be obvious to anyone. This is when a mistake has been made
in the original purchase and it becomes increasingly clear that the fac-
tual background of the particular company is, by a significant margin,
less favorable than originally believed. The proper handling of this
type of situation is largely a matter of emotional self-control. To some
degree it also depends upon the investor’s ability to be honest with
himself.

106 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

Two of the important characteristics of common stock investment
are the large profits that can come with proper handling, and the high
degree of skill, knowledge, and judgment required for such proper han-
dling. Since the process of obtaining these almost fantastic profits is so
complex, it is not surprising that a certain percentage of errors in pur-
chasing are sure to occur. Fortunately the long-range profits from really
good common stocks should more than balance the losses from a nor-
mal percentage of such mistakes. They should leave a tremendous mar-
gin of gain as well. This is particularly true if the mistake is recognized
quickly. When this happens, losses, if any, should be far smaller than if
the stock bought in error had been held for a long period of time. Even
more important, the funds tied up in the undesirable situation are freed
to be used for something else which, if properly selected, should pro-
duce substantial gains.

However, there is a complicating factor that makes the handling of
investment mistakes more difficult. This is the ego in each of us. None
of us likes to admit to himself that he has been wrong. If we have made
a mistake in buying a stock but can sell the stock at a small profit, we
have somehow lost any sense of having been foolish. On the other hand,
if we sell at a small loss we are quite unhappy about the whole matter.
This reaction, while completely natural and normal, is probably one of
the most dangerous in which we can indulge ourselves in the entire
investment process. More money has probably been lost by investors
holding a stock they really did not want until they could “at least come
out even” than from any other single reason. If to these actual losses are
added the profits that might have been made through the proper rein-
vestment of these funds if such reinvestment had been made when the
mistake was first realized, the cost of self-indulgence becomes truly
tremendous.

Furthermore this dislike of taking a loss, even a small loss, is just as
illogical as it is natural. If the real object of common stock investment is
the making of a gain of a great many hundreds per cent over a period
of years, the difference between, say, a 20 per cent loss or a 5 per cent
profit becomes a comparatively insignificant matter. What matters is not
whether a loss occasionally occurs.What does matter is whether worth-
while profits so often fail to materialize that the skill of the investor or
his advisor in handling investments must be questioned.

While losses should never cause strong self-disgust or emotional
upset, neither should they be passed over lightly. They should always

When to Sell

107

be reviewed with care so that a lesson is learned from each of them. If
the particular elements which caused a misjudgment on a common
stock purchase are thoroughly understood, it is unlikely that another
poor purchase will be made through misjudging the same investment
factors. '

We come now to the second reason why sale should be made of a
common stock purchased under the investment principles already out-
lined in Chapters Two and Three. Sales should always be made of the
stock of a company which, because of changes resulting from the pas-
sage of time, no longer qualifies in regard to the fifteen points outlined
in Chapter Three to about the same degree it qualified at the time of
purchase. This is why investors should be constantly on their guard. It
explains why it is of such importance to keep at all times in close contact
with the affairs of companies whose shares are held.

When companies deteriorate in this way they usually do so for one
of two reasons. Either there has been a deterioration of management, or
the company no longer has the prospect of increasing the markets for
its product in the way it formerly did. Sometimes management deteri-
orates because success has affected one or more key executives. Smug-
ness, complacency, or inertia replace the former drive and ingenuity.
More often it occurs because a new set of top executives do not meas-
ure up to the standard of performance set by their predecessors. Either
they no longer hold to the policies that have made the company out-
standingly successful, or they do not have the ability to continue to
carry out such policies. When any of these things happen the affected
stock should be sold at once, regardless of how good the general market
may look or how big the capital gains tax may be.

Similarly it sometimes happens that after growing spectacularly for
many years, a company will reach a stage where the growth prospects of
its markets are exhausted. From this time on it will only do about as well
as industry as a whole. It will only progress at about the same rate as the
national economy does. This change may not be due to any deteriora-
tion of the management. Many managements show great skill in devel-
oping related or allied products to take advantage of growth in their
immediate field. They recognize, however, that they do not have any
particular advantage if they go into unrelated spheres of activity. Hence,
if after years of being experts in a young and growing industry, times
change and the company has pretty well exhausted the growth prospects
of its market, its shares have deteriorated in an important way from the

108 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

standards outlined under our frequently mentioned fifteen points. Such
a stock should then be sold.

In this instance, selling might take place at a more leisurely pace than
if management deterioration had set in. Possibly part of the holding might
be kept until a more suitable investment could be found. However, in any
event, the company should be recognized as no longer suitable for worth-
while investment. The amount of capital gains tax, no matter how large,
should seldom prevent the switching of such funds into some other situ-
ation which, in the years ahead, may grow in a manner similar to the way
in which this investment formerly grew.

There is a good test as to whether companies no longer adequately
qualify in regard to this matter of expected further growth. This is for
the investor to ask himself whether at the next peak of a business cycle,
regardless of what may happen in the meantime, the comparative per-
share earnings (after allowances for stock dividends and stock splits but
not for new shares issued for additional capital) will probably show at
least as great an increase from present levels as the present levels show
from the last known peak of general business activity. If the answer is in
the affirmative, the stock probably should be held. If in the negative, it
should probably be sold.

For those who follow the right principles in making their original
purchases, the third reason why a stock might be sold seldom arises, and
should be acted upon only if an investor is very sure of his ground. It
arises from the fact that opportunities for attractive investment are
extremely hard to find. From a timing standpoint, they are seldom
found just when investment funds happen to be available. If an investor
has had funds for investment for quite a period of time and found few
attractive situations into which to place these funds, he may well place
some or all of them in a well-run company which he believes has def-
inite growth prospects. However, these growth prospects may be at a
slower average annual rate than may appear to be the case for some
other seemingly more attractive situation that is found later. The
already-owned company may in some other important aspects appear to
be less attractive as well.

If the evidence is clear-cut and the investor feels quite sure of his
ground, it will, even after paying capital gains taxes, probably pay him
handsomely to switch into the situation with seemingly better
prospects. The company that can show an average annual increase of
12 per cent for a long period of years should be a source of consider-

When to Sell

109

able financial satisfaction to its owners. However, the difference between
these results and those that could occur from a company showing a
20 per cent average annual gain would be well worth the additional
trouble and capital gains taxes that might be involved.

A word of caution may not be amiss, however, in regard to too read-
ily selling a common stock in the hope of switching these funds into a
still better one. There is always the risk that some major element in the
picture has been misjudged. If this happens, the investment probably will
not turn out nearly as well as anticipated. In contrast, an alert investor
who has held a good stock for some time usually gets to know its less
desirable as well as its more desirable characteristics. Therefore, before
selling a rather satisfactory holding in order to get a still better one, there
is need of the greatest care in trying to appraise accurately all elements
of the situation.

At this point the critical reader has probably discerned a basic
investment principle which by and large seems only to be understood
by a small minority of successful investors. This is that once a stock has
been properly selected and has borne the test of time, it is only occa-
sionally that there is any reason for selling it at all. However, recom-
mendations and comments continue to pour out of the financial com-
munity giving other types of reasons for selling outstanding common
stocks. What about the validity of such reasons?

Most frequently given of such reasons is the conviction that a gen-
eral stock market decline of some proportion is somewhere in the off-
ing. In the preceding chapter I tried to show that postponing an attrac-
tive purchase because of fear of what the general market might do will,
over the years, prove very costly. This is because the investor is ignoring
a powerful influence about which he has positive knowledge through
fear of a less powerful force about which, in the present state of human
knowledge, he and everyone else is largely guessing. If the argument is
valid that the purchase of attractive common stocks should not be
unduly influenced by fear of ordinary bear markets, the argument
against selling outstanding stocks because of these fears is even more
impressive. All the arguments mentioned in the previous chapter equal-
iy apply here. Furthermore, the chance of the investor being right in
making such sales is still further diminished by the factor of the capital
gains tax. Because of the very large profits such outstanding stocks
should be showing if they have been held for a period of years, this cap-
ital gains tax can still further accentuate the cost of making such sales.

110 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

There is another and even more costly reason why an investor
should never sell out of an outstanding situation because of the possi-
bility that an ordinary bear market may be about to occur. If the com-
pany is really a right one, the next bull market should see the stock mak-
ing a new peak well above those so far attained. How is the investor to
know when to buy back? Theoretically it should be after the coming
decline. However, this presupposes that the investor will know when the
decline will end. I have seen many investors dispose of a holding that
was to show stupendous gain in the years ahead because of this fear of
a coming bear market. Frequently the bear market never came and the
stock went right on up. When a bear market has come, I have not seen
one time in ten when the investor actually got back into the same shares
before they had gone up above his selling price. Usually he either wait-
ed for them to go far lower than they actually dropped, or, when they
were way down, fear of something else happening still prevented their
reinstatement.

This brings us to another line of reasoning so often used to cause
well-intentioned but unsophisticated investors to miss huge future prof-
its. This is the argument that an outstanding stock has become over-
priced and therefore should be sold. What is more logical than this? If a
stock is overpriced, why not sell it rather than keep it?

Before reaching hasty conclusions, let us look a little bit below the
surface. Just what is overpriced? What are we trying to accomplish? Any
really good stock will sell and should sell at a higher ratio to current
earnings than a stock with a stable rather than an expanding earning
power. After all, this probability of participating in continued growth is
obviously worth something. When we say that the stock is overpriced,
we may mean that it is selling at an even higher ratio in relation to this
expected earning power than we believe it should be. Possibly we may
mean that it is selling at an even higher ratio than are other compara-
ble stocks with similar prospects of materially increasing their future
earnings.

All of this is trying to measure something with a greater degree of
preciseness than is possible.The investor cannot pinpoint just how much
per share a particular company will earn two years from now. He can at
best judge this within such general and non-mathematical limits as
“about the same,” “up moderately,” “up a lot,” or “up tremendously.”
As a matter of fact, the company’s top management cannot come a great
deal closer than this. Either they or the investor should come pretty

When to Sell

1 1 1

close in judging whether a sizable increase in average earnings is likely
to occur a few years from now. But just how much increase, or the exact
year in which it will occur, usually involves guessing on enough vari-
ables to make precise predictions impossible.

Under these circumstances, ho’sfr can anyone say with even moder-
ate precision just what is overpriced for an outstanding company with
an unusually rapid growth rate? Suppose that instead of selling at twenty-
five times earnings, as usually happens, the stock is now at thirty-five
times earnings. Perhaps there are new products in the immediate future,
the real economic importance of which the financial community has
not yet grasped. Perhaps there are not any such products. If the growth
rate is so good that in another ten years the company might well have
quadrupled, is it really of such great concern whether at the moment
the stock might or might not be 35 per cent overpriced? That which
really matters is not to disturb a position that is going to be worth a
great deal more later.

Again our old friend the capital gains tax adds its bit to these conclu-
sions. Growth stocks which are recommended for sale because they are
supposedly overpriced nearly always will cost their owners a sizable cap-
ital gains tax if they are sold. Therefore, in addition to the risk of losing a
permanent position in a company which over the years should continue
to show unusual further gains, we also incur a sizable tax liability. Isn’t it
safer and cheaper simply to make up our minds that momentarily the
stock may be somewhat ahead of itself? We already have a sizable profit in
it. If for a while the stock loses, say, 35 per cent of its current market quo-
tation, is this really such a serious matter? Again, isn’t the maintaining of
our position rather than the possibility of temporarily losing a small part
of our capital gain the matter which is really important?

There is still one other argument investors sometimes use to sepa-
rate themselves from the profits they would otherwise make. This one is
the most ridiculous of all. It is that the stock they own has had a huge
advance. Therefore, just because it has gone up, it has probably used up
most of its potential. Consequently they should sell it and buy some-
thing that hasn’t gone up yet. Outstanding companies, the only type
which I believe the investor should buy, just don’t function this way.
How they do function might best be understood by considering the fol-
lowing somewhat fanciful analogy:

Suppose it is the day you were graduated from college. If you did not
go to college, consider it to be the day of your high school graduation;

112 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

from the standpoint of our example it will make no difference whatso-
ever. Now suppose that on this day each of your male classmates had an
urgent need of immediate cash. Each offered you the same deal. If you
would give them a sum of money equivalent to ten times whatever they
might earn during the first twelve months after they had gone to work,
that classmate would for the balance of his life turn over to you one
quarter of each year’s earnings! Finally let us suppose that, while you
thought this was an excellent proposition, you only had spare cash on
hand sufficient to make such a deal with three of your classmates.

At this point, your reasoning would closely resemble that of the
investor using sound investment principles in selecting common stocks.
You would immediately start analyzing your classmates, not from the
standpoint of how pleasant they might be or even how talented they
might be in other ways, but solely to determine how much money they
might make. If you were part of a large class, you would probably elim-
inate quite a number solely on the ground of not knowing them suffi-
ciently well to be able to pass worthwhile judgment on just how finan-
cially proficient they actually would get to be. Here again, the analogy
with intelligent common stock buying runs very close.

Eventually you would pick the three classmates you felt would have
the greatest future earning power. You would make your deal with
them. Ten years have passed. One of your three has done sensationally.
Going to work for a large corporation, he has won promotion after pro-
motion. Already insiders in the company are saying that the president
has his eye on him and that in another ten years he will probably take
the top job. He will be in line for the large compensation, stock options,
and pension benefits that go with that job.

Under these circumstances, what would even the writers of stock mar-
ket reports who urge taking profits on superb stocks that “have gotten ahead
of the market” think of your selling out your contract with this former class-
mate, just because someone has offered you 600 per cent on your original
investment? You would think that anyone would need to have his head
examined if he were to advise you to sell this contract and replace it with
one with another former classmate whose annual earnings still were about
the same as when he left school ten years before. The argument that your
successful classmate had had his advance while the advance of your (finan-
cially) unsuccessful classmate still lay ahead of him would probably sound
rather silly. If you know your common stocks equally well, many of the
arguments commonly heard for selling the good one sound equally silly.

You may be thinking all this sounds fine, but actually classmates are
not common stocks. To be sure, there is one major difference. That dif-
ference increases rather than decreases the reason for never selling the
outstanding common stock just because it has had a huge rise and may
be temporarily overpriced. This difference is that the classmate is finite,
may die soon and is sure to die eventually. There is no similar life span
for the common stock. The company behind the common stock can
have a practice of selecting management talent in depth and training
such talent in company policies, methods, and techniques in a way
which will retain and pass on the corporate vigor for generations. Look
at Du Pont in its second century of corporate existence. Look at Dow
years after the death of its brilliant founder. In this era of unlimited
human wants and incredible markets, there is no limitation to corporate
growth such as the life span places upon the individual.

Perhaps the thoughts behind this chapter might be put into a single
sentence: If the job has been correctly done when a common stock is
purchased, the time to sell it is — almost never.

The Hullabaloo about
Dividends

T here is a considerable degree of twisted thinking and general
acceptance of half truths about a number of aspects of common
stock investments. However, whenever the significance and impor-
tance of dividends are considered, the confusion of the typical investor
becomes little short of monumental.

This confusion and acceptance of half truths spreads over even to the
choice of words customarily used in describing various types of dividend
action. A corporation has been paying no dividend or a small one. Its
president requests the board of directors to start paying a substantial div-
idend. This is done. In speaking of this action he or the board will often
describe it by saying that the time had come to “do something” for
stockholders. The inference is that by not paying or raising the dividend
the company had been doing nothing for its stockholders. This could
possibly be true. However, it certainly was not true just because no div-
idend action had been taken. It is possible that by spending earnings not
as dividends but to build a new plant, to launch a new product line, or
to install some major cost-saving equipment in an old plant, the man-
agement might have been doing much more to benefit the stockholder
than it would have been doing just by passing these earnings out as div-
idends. No matter what might be done with any earnings not passed on
as dividends, increases in the dividend rate are invariably referred to as
“favorable” dividend action. Possibly with greater reason, reduction or
elimination of dividends is nearly always called “unfavorable.”

One of the main reasons for the confusion about dividends in the
public mind is the great variation between the amount of benefit, if any,

The Hullabaloo about Dividends

1 1 5

that accrues to the stockholder each time earnings are not passed on to
him but retained in the business. At times he is not benefited at all by
such retained earnings. At others he is benefited only in a negative
sense. If the earnings were not retained, his holdings would decrease in
value. However, the retained earnings in no sense increase the value of
his holdings, therefore, they seem of no benefit to him. Finally, in the
many cases where the stockholder benefits enormously from retained
earnings the benefits accrue in quite different proportions to different
types of stockholders within the same company, thereby confusing
investor thinking even more. In other words, each time earnings are not
passed out as dividends, such action must be examined on its own merit
to see exactly what is actually happening. It might pay to look a little
below the surface here and discuss some of these differences in detail.

When do stockholders get no benefit from retained earnings? One
way is when managements pile up cash and liquid assets far beyond any
present or prospective needs of the business. The management might
have no nefarious motive in doing this. Some executives get a sense of
confidence and security from steadily piling up unneeded liquid
reserves. They dont seem to realize they are buttressing their own feel-
ings of security by not turning over to the stockholder wealth which he
should be entided to use in his own way and as he sees fit. Today there
are tax laws which tend to curb this evil so that while it still occurs, it
is no longer the factor which it once was.

There is another and more serious way in which earnings are fre-
quently retained in the business without any significant benefit to stock-
holders. This occurs when substandard managements can get only a sub-
normal return on the capital already in the business, yet use the retained
earnings merely to enlarge the inefficient operation rather than to make
it better. What normally happens is that the management having in time
built up a larger inefficient domain over which to rule usually succeeds in
justifying bigger salaries for itself on the grounds that it is doing a bigger
job. The stockholders end up with little or no profit.

Neither of these situations is likely to affect the investor who fol-
lows the concept discussed in this book. He is buying stocks because
they are outstanding and not just because they are cheap. Managements
with inefficient and substandard operations would fail to qualify under
our fifteen points. Meanwhile, managements of the type that do quali-
fy would almost certainly be finding uses for surplus cash and not just
piling it up!

116 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

How can it happen that earnings retained in the business can be
vitally needed yet have no possibility of increasing the value of the
stockholder shares? This can occur in one of two ways. One way is
when a change in custom or public demand forces each competitive
company to spend money on so-called assets which in no sense increase
the volume of business, but which would cause a loss of business if the
expenditure had not been made. A retail store installing an expensive air
conditioning system is a classic example of this sort of thing. After each
competitive store has installed such equipment, no net increase in busi-
ness will occur, yet any store which had not met the competitive move
might find very few customers on a hot summer day. Since for some
strange reason our accepted accounting system and the tax laws which
are based on it make no differentiation between “assets” of this type and
those which have actually increased the value of the business, the stock-
holder frequently thinks that he has been badly treated when earnings
have not been passed out to him and yet he can see no increase in value
coming to him from what was retained in the business.

The other and even more important way that retained earnings fail
to produce increased profits results from an even more serious failure of
our accepted accounting methods. In our world of rapid and major
changes in the purchasing value of our money units, standard account-
ing proceeds as though the dollar were a fixed unit of value. Accoun-
tants say this is all accounting is supposed to do. This may very well be
true; but if a balance sheet is supposed to have any relationship to the
real values of the assets described thereon, the confusion that results
seems about parallel to what would happen if engineers and scientists
made their calculations in our three dimensional world by using only
two dimensional plane geometry.

The depreciation allowance in theory should be enough to replace
an existing asset when that asset is no longer economically usable. If the
depreciation rate were properly calculated and the replacement cost of
the asset remained unchanged over its useful life, this would happen. But
with ever rising costs, the total accumulated depreciation is seldom
enough to replace the outmoded asset. Therefore, additional sums must
be retained from the earnings merely to make up the difference if the
corporation is to continue to have what it had before.

This type of thing, while affecting all investors, usually affects hold-
ers of growth companies less than any other class. This is because the
rate of acquiring new capital assets (as against merely replacing existing

The Hullabaloo about Dividends 1 1 7

and about-to-be-retired assets) is usually so fast that more of the depre-
ciation is on recently acquired assets installed at somewhere near today’s
values. A smaller percentage of it is for assets installed years ago at a
fraction of todays costs.

It would be repetitious to go int'o detail concerning the cases where
retaining earnings for building new plants and launching new products
has proven of spectacular advantage to investors. However, consideration
of how much one type of investor benefits in relation to another is wor-
thy of careful consideration for two reasons. It is a matter about which
there is always misunderstanding throughout the financial community.
It is also a matter the proper understanding of which provides an easy
key to evaluating the real significance of dividends.

Let us examine these misconceptions about who benefits most from
dividends by taking a fictitious example. The well-managed XYZ
Corporation has had a steady growth in its earnings over the last sever-
al years. The dividend rate has remained the same. Consequently, where-
as four years ago it took 50 per cent of earnings to pay the dividend, so
much additional earning power has developed in these four years that
paying the same dividend now requires only 25 per cent of this year’s
earnings. Some directors want to raise the dividend. Others point out
that never before has the corporation had so many attractive places to
invest their retained earnings. They further point out that only by main-
taining rather than raising the rate will it be possible to exploit all the
attractive opportunities available. Only in this way can the maximum
growth be attained. At this point a lively discussion breaks out as to what
course to follow.

Someone on this fictitious board of directors is then sure to state
one of the financial community’s most common half-truths about div-
idends. This is that if the XYZ Corporation does not raise its dividend,
it will be favoring its large stockholders at the expense of its small ones.
The theory behind this is that the big stockholder is presumably in the
higher bracket. After paying taxes, the big stockholder can retain a much
smaller percentage of his dividends than the small stockholder. There-
fore he does not want the increased dividend, whereas the small stock-
holder does want it.

Actually, whether it is more to the interest of any individual XYZ
Corporation stockholder to have the dividend raised or to have more
funds ploughed back into the growth depends upon something quite
different from the size of his income. It depends upon whether or not

118 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

each stockholder is at the point where he is putting any part of his
income aside for additional investment. Millions of stockholders in the
lower income brackets are handling their affairs so that each year they
put something, no matter how little, aside for additional investment. If
they are doing this and if, as is 'likely to be the case, they are paying
income tax, it is a matter of elementary arithmetic that the board of
directors would be acting against their interests by raising the dividend
at a time when all these worthwhile opportunities are available for
using retained company earnings. In contrast, the raised dividend might
be to the interest of a big stockholder who had urgent need of addi-
tional funds, a contingency not entirely unknown to those in high tax
brackets.

Let us see just why all this is so. Almost anyone having enough sur-
plus funds to own common stocks will probably also have enough
income to be in at least the lowest tax bracket. Therefore, once he has
used up his individual dividend exemption of $50, even the smallest
stockholder will presumably have to pay as tax at least 20 per cent of any
additional income he receives as dividends. In addition, he must pay a
brokerage commission on any stock he buys. Because of odd lot
charges, minimum commissions, etc., these costs run to a much larger
percentage of the sums involved in small purchases than in large ones.
This will bring the actual capital available for reinvestment well below
80 per cent of the amount received. If the shareholder is in a higher tax
bracket, the percentage of a dividend increase which he can actually use
for reinvestment becomes proportionately less.

There are, of course, certain special types of stockholders such as uni-
versities and pension funds that pay no income tax. There are also some
individuals with dividend income less than the $50 individual exemp-
tion, although the total number of shares owned by this group appears to
be small. For these special groups the equation is somewhat different.
However, for the great majority of all stockholders, regardless of size,
there is no avoiding this one basic fact about dividends. If they are sav-
ing any part of their income rather than spending it and if they have their
funds invested in the right sort of common stocks, they are better off
when the managements of such companies reinvest increased earnings
than they would be if these increased earnings were passed on to them
as larger dividends which they would have to reinvest themselves.

Nor is this advantage — having 100 per cent of such funds put to
work for them in place of the smaller amount that would be available

The Hullabaloo about Dividends

1 1 9

after income taxes and brokerage charges — the only one the stockhold-
ers get. Selecting the right common stock is not an easy or simple mat-
ter. If the company considering the dividends is a good one, the investor
has already wisely done his task of selection. Therefore, he is usually run-
ning less risk in having this good management make the additional
investment of these retained extra earnings than he would be running if
he had to again risk serious error in finding some new and equally
attractive investment for himself. The more outstanding the company
considering whether to retain or pass on increased earnings, the more
important this factor can become. This is why even the stockholder who
does not pay income tax and who is not spending every bit of his
income finds it almost as much to his interest as to the interest of his
tax-paying counterpart to have such companies retain funds to take
advantage of worthwhile new opportunities.

Measured against this background dividends begin to fall into true
perspective. For those desiring the greatest benefit from the use of their
funds, dividends begin rapidly to lose the importance that many in the
financial community give them. This is as true for the conservative
investor going into the institutional type growth stock as for those willing
and able to take greater risks for greater gain. The opinion is sometimes
expressed that a high dividend return is a factor of safety. The theory
behind this is that since the high-yield stock is already offering an above-
average return, it cannot be overpriced and is not likely to go down very
much. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Every study I have seen
on this subject indicates that far more of those stocks giving a bad per-
formance price-wise have come from the high dividend-paying rather
than the low dividend-paying group. An otherwise good management
which increases dividends, and thereby sacrifices worthwhile opportuni-
ties for reinvesting increased earnings in the business, is like the manager
of a farm who rushes his magnificent livestock to market the minute he
can sell them rather than raising them to the point where he can get the
maximum price above his costs. He has produced a little more cash right
now but at a frightful cost.

I have commented about a corporation raising its dividend rather
than about it paying any dividend at all. I am aware that while the occa-
sional investor might not need any income, nearly all do. It is only in rare
cases even among outstanding corporations that the opportunity for
growth is so great that the management cannot afford to pay some part
of earnings and still — through retaining the rest and through senior

120 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

financing — obtain adequate cash to take advantage of worthwhile
growth opportunities. Each investor must decide in relation to his own
needs how much, if any, money to put into corporations with such
abnormal growth factors that no dividends whatsoever are justified.
What is most important, however, is that stocks are not bought in com-
panies where the dividend pay-out is so emphasized that it restricts real-
izable growth.

This brings us to what is probably the most important but least dis-
cussed aspect of dividends. This is regularity or dependability. The wise
investor will plan his affairs. He will look ahead to what he can or can-
not do with his income. He may not care about immediately increas-
ing income but he will want assurance against the decreased income
and unexpected disruption of his plans that this can cause. Further-
more, he will want to make his own decisions between companies
which should plough back a great part or all of their earnings and those
that may grow at a good but slower rate and need to plough back a
smaller proportion.

For these reasons, those who set wise policies on stockholder relations
and those who enjoy the high price-earnings ratios for their shares which
such policies help bring about usually avoid the muddled thinking that
typifies so many corporate treasurers and financial vice presidents. They
set a dividend policy and will not change it. They will let stockholders
know what this policy is. They may substantially change the dividend but
seldom the policy.

This policy will be based on the percentage of earnings that should
be retained in the business for maximum growth. For younger and rap-
idly growing companies, it may be that no dividends at all will be paid
for so many years. Then when assets have been brought to the point
where the depreciation flow-back is greater, from 25 to 40 per cent of
profits will be paid out to stockholders. For older companies this pay-
out ratio will vary from company to company. However, in no case will
the rough percentages govern the exact amount paid out; this would
make each years dividend different from that of the year before. This is
just what stockholders do not want, since it makes impossible independ-
ent long-range planning on their part. What they desire is a set amount
approximating these percentages and paid out regularly — quarterly,
semiannually, or annually, as the case may be. As earnings grow, the
amount will occasionally be increased to bring the pay-out up to the
former percentage. This, however, will only be done when a) funds are

The Hullabaloo about Dividends

121

otherwise available for taking advantage of all the good opportunities
for growth that the management is uncovering and b) there is every rea-
son to believe that this new regular rate can be maintained from this
time on, after allowing for all reasonable probabilities of a subsequent
downturn in the business or the appearance of additional opportunities
for growth.

The managements whose dividend policies win the widest approval
among discerning investors are those who hold that a dividend should
be raised with the greatest caution and only when there is great proba-
bility that it can be maintained. Similarly, only in the gravest of emer-
gencies should such dividends be lowered. It is surprising how many
corporate financial officers will approve the paying of one-shot extra
dividends. They do this even though such unanticipated extra dividends
almost always fail to leave a permanent impact on the market price of
their shares — which should indicate how contrary such policies are to
the desires of most long-range investors.

No matter how wise or foolish a dividend policy may be, a corpo-
ration can usually in time get an investor following which likes the par-
ticular policy, provided that the corporation follows the policy consis-
tently. Many stockholders, whether it is to their best interests or not, still
like a high rate of return. Others like a low rate. Others like none at all.
Some like a very low rate combined with a small regular annual stock
dividend. Others do not want this stock dividend, preferring the low
rate by itself. If a management selects one of these policies in line with
its natural needs, it usually builds up a stockholder group which likes
and comes to expect the continuation of such a policy. A wise manage-
ment wishing to obtain investment prestige for its stock will respect that
desire for continuity.

There is perhaps a close parallel between setting policy in regard to
dividends and setting policy on opening a restaurant. A good restaurant
man might build up a splendid business with a high-priced venture. He
might also build up a splendid business with an attractive place selling
the best possible meals at the lowest possible prices. Or he could make
a success of Hungarian, Chinese, or Italian cuisine. Each would attract a
following. People would come there expecting a certain kind of meal.
However, with all his skill, he could not possibly build up a clientele if
one day he served the costliest meals, the next day low-priced ones, and
then without warning served nothing but exotic dishes. The corpora-
tion that keeps shifting its dividend policies becomes as unsuccessful in

122 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

attracting a permanent shareholder following. Its shares do not make the
best long-range investments.

As long as dividend policy is consistent, so that investors can plan
ahead with some assurance, this whole matter of dividends is a far less
important part of the investment picture than might be judged from the
endless arguments frequently heard about the relative desirability of this
dividend policy or that. The large groups in the financial community
that would dispute this view fail to explain the number of stocks that
have offered no prospect of anything but below-average yield for years
ahead, yet which have done so well for their owners. Several examples
of such stocks have already been mentioned. Another typical investment
of this type is Rohm & Haas. This stock first became publicly available
in 1949, when a group of investment bankers purchased a large block
held by the Alien Property Custodian and reoffered it publicly. The
public offering price was $41.25. At that time the stock was paying only
$1.00 in dividends, supplemented by stock dividends. Many investors
felt that in view of the low yield the stock was unattractive for conser-
vative investment. Since this date, however, the company has continued
to pay stock dividends, has raised the cash dividend at frequent intervals
although the yield has remained very low, and the stock has sold at well
over 400. The original owner of Rohm & Haas has received stock div-
idends of 4 per cent each year from 1949 through 1955, and 3 per cent
in 1956, so his capital gain has been well over ten-fold.

Actually dividend considerations should be given the least, not the
most, weight by those desiring to select outstanding stocks. Perhaps the
most peculiar aspect of this much-discussed subject of dividends is that
those giving them the least consideration usually end up getting the best
dividend return. Worthy of repetition here is that over a span of five to
ten years, the best dividend results will come not from the high-yield
stocks but from those with the relatively low yield. So profitable are the
results of the ventures opened up by exceptional managements that
while they still continue the policy of paying out a low proportion of
current earnings, the actual number of dollars paid out progressively
exceed what could have been obtained from high-yield shares. Why
shouldn’t this logical and natural trend continue in the future?

Five Don'ts for Investors

1. Don’t buy into promotional companies.

Close to the very heart of successful investing is finding companies
which are developing new products and processes or exploiting new
markets. Companies that have just started or are about to be started are
frequently attempting to do just this. Many of them are formed to
develop a colorful new invention. Many are started to participate in
industries, such as electronics, in which there is great growth potential.
Another large group is formed to discover mineral or other natural
wealth — a field where the rewards for success can be outstanding. For
these reasons, young companies not yet earning a profit on their oper-
ations may at first glance appear to be of investment value.

There is another argument which frequently increases interest. This
is that by buying now when the first shares are offered to the public,
there is a chance to “get in on the ground floor.” The successful com-
pany is now selling at several times the price at which it was originally
offered. Therefore why wait and have somebody else make all this
money? Instead why not use the same methods of inquiry and judg-
ment in finding the outstanding new enterprise now being promoted as
can be used in finding the outstanding established corporation?

From the investment standpoint, I believe there is a basic matter
which puts any company without at least two or three years of com-
mercial operation and one year of operating profit in a completely dif-
ferent category from an established company — even one so small that
it may not have more than a million dollars of annual sales. In the

124 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

established company, all the major functions of the business are cur-
rently operating. The investor can observe the company’s production,
sales, cost accounting, management teamwork, and all the other
aspects of its operations. Perhaps even more important, he can obtain
the opinion of other qualified observers who are in a position to
observe regularly some or all of these points of relative strength or
weakness in the company under consideration. In contrast, when a
company is still in the promotional stage, all an investor or anyone else
can do is look at a blueprint and guess what the problems and the
strong points may be. This is a much more difficult thing to do. It
allows a much greater probability of error in the conclusions reached.

Actually, it is so difficult to do that no matter how s killf ul the
investor, it makes it impossible to obtain even a fraction of the “batting
average” for selecting outstanding companies that can be attained if
judgment is confined to established operations. All too often, young
promotional companies are dominated by one or two individuals who
have great talent for certain phases of business procedure but are lack-
ing in other equally essential talents. They may be superb salesmen but
lack other types of business ability. More often they are inventors or pro-
duction men, totally unaware that even the best products need skillful
marketing as well as manufacture. The investor is seldom in a position
to convince such individuals of the skills missing in themselves or their
young organizations. Usually he is even less in a position to point out
to such individuals where such talents may be found.

For these reasons, no matter how appealing promotional companies
may seem at first glance, I believe their financing should always be left
to specialized groups. Such groups have management talent available to
bolster up weak spots as unfolding operations uncover them. Those who
are not in a position to supply such talent and to convince new man-
agements of the need of taking advantage of such help will find invest-
ing in promotional companies largely a disillusioning experience. There
are enough spectacular opportunities among established companies that
ordinary individual investors should make it a rule never to buy into a
promotional enterprise, no matter how attractive it may appear to be.

2. Don’t ignore a good stock just because it is traded
“over the counter.”

The attractiveness of unlisted stocks versus those fisted on a stock
exchange is closely related to the marketabilitv of one eroun as against

Five Don'ts for Investors

127

securities of interest to stockholders in that locality. These are compiled
by close contact with the over-the-counter houses most active in trad-
ing each of these securities. Unlike those furnished by the stock
exchanges, these quotations are not the price ranges within which trans-
actions took place. They cannot be, fdr there is no central clearing house
to which transactions are reported. Instead these are bid-and-ask quota-
tions. Such quotations supposedly give the highest price at which any
of the interested financial houses will bid for each of these shares and
the lowest offering price at which they will sell them.

Close checking will nearly always show that the reported quotations
on the bid or buy side are closely in line with what could be obtained
for shares at the moment the quotation was furnished. The sales or ask
side is usually higher than the bid by an amount several times greater
than the equivalent stock exchange commission for shares selling at the
same price. This difference is calculated to enable the over-the-counter
house to buy at the bid price, pay its salesmen an appropriate commis-
sion for the time spent in selling the security, and still leave a reasonable
profit after allowing for general overhead. On the other hand, if a cus-
tomer, particularly a large customer, approaches the same financial house
with a bid to buy this stock so that no salesmans commission is
involved, he can usually buy it at the bid price plus just about the equiv-
alent of the stock exchange commission. As one over-the-counter deal-
er expressed it, “We have one market on the buy side. On the selling side
we have two. We have a retail and a wholesale market, depending part-
ly on the size of the purchase and partly on the amount of selling and
servicing that is involved.”

This system in the hands of an unscrupulous dealer is subject to
obvious abuse. So is any other system. But if the investor picks the over-
the-counter dealer with the same care he should employ in choosing
any other specialist to serve him, it works surprisingly well. The average
investor has neither the time nor the ability to select his own securities.
Through the close supervision dealers give the securities they permit
their salesmen to offer, he is receiving in effect something closely resem-
bling investment counsel. As such it should be worth the cost involved.

From the standpoint of the more sophisticated investor, however,
the real benefits of this system are not in regard to buying. They are in
regard to the increased liquidity or marketability which it produces for
those unlisted stocks he may desire to own. Because the profit margin
available for dealers in such stocks is large enough to make it worthwhile,

128 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

a great many over-the-counter dealers keep a regular inventory of the
stocks they normally handle. They usually are not at all reluctant to take
on additional 500- or 1000-share lots when they become available.
When larger blocks appear in their favorite issues, they will frequently
hold a sales meeting and put on >a special drive to move the shares that
may be available. Normally they will ask a special selling commission of
a point or so for doing this. However, all this means that if an over-the-
counter stock is regularly dealt in by two or more high-grade over-the-
counter dealers, it usually has a sufficient degree of marketability to take
care of the needs of most investors. Depending on the amount offered,
a special selling commission may or may not be required to move a large
block. However, for what is at most a relatively small percentage of the
sales price, the stock which the investor desires to sell can actually be
converted into cash without breaking the market.

How does this compare with the marketability of a stock listed on a
stock exchange? The answer depends largely on what stock and on what
stock exchange. For the larger and more active issues listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, even under todays conditions a big enough auc-
tion market still exists so that in normal times all but the largest blocks
can be moved at the low prevailing commission rates without depressing
prices. For the less active stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
this marketability factor is still fair, but at times can sag rather badly if reg-
ular commissions are depended on when large selling orders appear. For
common stocks listed on the small exchanges, it is my opinion that this
marketability factor frequently becomes considerably worse.

The stock exchanges have recognized this situation and have taken
steps to meet it. Nowadays, whenever a block of a listed stock appears
which the exchange thinks is too big to market in the normal fashion,
permission may be given for the use of devices such as “special offer-
ings.” This simply means that the offering is made known to all mem-
bers, who are given a predetermined larger commission for selling these
shares. In other words, when the block is too large for the brokers to
handle it as brokers, they are given commissions large enough to reward
them for selling as salesmen.

All this narrows the apparent gap between listed and unlisted mar-
kets in a period such as the present, when more and more purchases
are being handled by salesmen rather than by brokers who just take
orders. It does not mean that from the standpoint of marketability a
well-known, actively-traded stock on the New York Stock Exchange

Five DoiTts for Investors

129

has no advantage over the better over-the-counter stocks. It does
mean that the better of these over-the-counter stocks are frequently
more liquid than the shares of many of the companies listed on the
American Stock Exchange and the various regional stock exchanges.
I imagine those connected with the smaller stock exchanges would
sincerely disagree with this statement. Nevertheless, I believe an
unprejudiced study of the facts would show it to be true. It is why a
number of the more progressive of smaller and medium-size compa-
nies have in recent years refused to list their stocks on the smaller
exchanges. Instead they have chosen the over-the-counter markets
until their companies reach a size that would warrant “big board” —
that is, New York Stock Exchange — listing.

In short, so far as over-the-counter securities are concerned, the
rules for the investor are not too different from those for listed securi-
ties. First, be very sure that you have picked the right security. Then be
sure you have selected an able and conscientious broker. If an investor is
on sound ground in both these respects, he need have no fear of pur-
chasing stock just because it is traded “over-the-counter” rather than on
an exchange.

3. Don’t buy a stock just because you like the “tone”
of its annual report.

Investors are not always careful to analyze just what has caused them to
buy one stock rather than another. If they did, they might be surprised
how often they were influenced by the wording and format of the gen-
eral comments in a company’s annual report to stockholders. This tone
of the annual report may reflect the management s philosophies, policies,
or goals with as much accuracy as the audited financial statement should
reflect the dollars and cents results for the period involved. The annual
report may also, however, reflect little more than the skill of the compa-
ny’s public relations department in creating an impression about the
company in the public mind.There is no way of telling whether the pres-
ident has actually written the remarks in an annual report, or whether a
public relations officer has written them for his signature. Attractive pho-
tographs and nicely colored charts do not necessarily reflect a close-knit
and able management team working in harmony and with enthusiasm.

Allowing the general wording and tone of an annual report to influ-
ence a decision to purchase a common stock is much like buying a

130 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

product because of an appealing advertisement on a billboard. The prod-
uct may be just as attractive as the advertisement. It also may not be. For
a low-priced product it may be quite sensible to buy in this way, to find
out how attractive the purchase really is. With a common stock, howev-
er, few of us are rich enough to afford impulse buying. It is well to
remember that annual reports nowadays are generally designed to build
up stockholder good will. It is important to go beyond them to the
underlying facts. Like any other sales tool they are prone to put a cor-
porations “best foot forward.” They seldom present balanced and com-
plete discussions of the real problems and difficulties of the business.
Often they are too optimistic.

If, then, an investor should not let a favorable reaction to the tone
of an annual report overly influence his subsequent action, how about
the opposite? Should he let an unfavorable reaction influence him?
Usually not, for again it is like trying to appraise the contents of a box
by the wrapping paper on the outside. There is one important excep-
tion to this, however. This is when such reports fail to give proper
information on matters of real significance to the investor. Companies
which follow such policies are usually not the ones most likely to pro-
vide the background for successful investment.

4. Don’t assume that the high price at which a stock

may be selling in relation to earnings is necessarily an
indication that further growth in those earnings has
largely been already discounted in the price.

There is a costly error in investment reasoning that is common enough
to make it worthy of special mention. To explain it, let us take a ficti-
tious company. We might call it the XYZ Corporation. XYZ has qual-
ified magnificently for years in regard to our fifteen points. For three
decades there has been constant growth in both sales and profits, and
also there have been enough new products under development to fur-
nish strong indication of comparable growth in the period ahead. The
excellence of the company is generally appreciated throughout the
financial community. Consequently for years XYZ stock has sold for
from twenty to thirty times current earnings. This is nearly twice as
much for each dollar earned as the sales price of the average stock that
has made up, say, the Dow Jones Industrial Averages.

Five Don'ts for Investors

1 3 1

Today this stock is selling at just twice the price-earnings ratio of
the Dow Jones averages. This means that its market price is twice as high
in relation to each dollar it is earning as is the average of the stocks com-
prising these Dow Jones averages in relation to each dollar they are
earning. The XYZ management has just issued a forecast indicating it
expects to double earnings in the next five years. On the basis of the
evidence at hand, the forecast looks valid.

Whereupon a surprising number of investors jump to false conclu-
sions. They say that since XYZ is selling twice as high as stocks in gen-
eral, and since it will take five years for XYZ s earnings to double, the
present price of XYZ stock is discounting future earnings ahead. They
are sure the stock is overpriced.

No one can argue that a stock discounting its earnings five years
ahead is likely to be overpriced. The fallacy in their reasoning lies in the
assumption that five years from now XYZ will be selling on the same
price-earnings ratio as will the average Dow Jones stock with which
they compare it. For thirty years this stock, because of all those factors
which make it an outstanding company, has been selling at twice the
price-earnings ratio of these other stocks. Its record has been rewarding
to those who have placed their faith in it. If the same policies are con-
tinued, five years from now its management will bring out still another
group of new products that in the ensuing decade will swell earnings in
the same way that new products are increasing earnings now and oth-
ers did five, ten, fifteen, and twenty years ago. If this happens, why
shouldn’t this stock sell five years from now for twice the price-earnings
ratio of these more ordinary stocks just as it is doing now and has done
for many years past? If it does, and if the price-earnings ratio of all stocks
remain about the same, XYZ’s doubling of earnings five years from now
will also cause its price to have doubled in the market over this five-year
period. On this basis, this stock, selling at its normal price-earnings ratio,
cannot be said to be discounting future earnings at all!

Obvious, isn’t it? Well, look around you and see how many suppos-
edly sophisticated investors get themselves crossed up on this matter of
what price-earnings ratio to use in considering how far ahead a stock is
actually discounting future growth. This is particularly true if a change
has been taking place in the background of the company being studied.
Let us now consider the ABC Company instead of the XYZ Corpora-
tion. The two companies are almost exactly alike except that the ABC

132 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

Company is much younger. Only in the last two years has its funda-
mental excellence been appreciated by the financial community to the
point that its shares, too, are now selling at twice the price-earnings ratio
of the average Dow Jones stock. It seems almost impossible for many
investors to realize, in the case of 'a stock that in the past has not sold at
a comparably high price-earnings ratio, that the price-earnings ratio at
which it is now selling may be a reflection of its intrinsic quality and
not an unreasonable discounting of further growth.

What is important here is thoroughly understanding the nature of
the company, with particular reference to what it may be expected to
do some years from now. If the earning spurt that lies ahead is a one-
time matter, and the nature of the company is not such that compara-
ble new sources of earning growth will be developed when the present
one is fully exploited, that is quite a different situation. Then the high
price-earnings ratio does discount future earnings. This is because, when
the present spurt is over, the stock will settle back to the same selling
price in relation to its earnings as run-of-the-mill shares. However, if the
company is deliberately and consistently developing new sources of
earning power, and if the industry is one promising to afford equal
growth spurts in the future, the price-earnings ratio five or ten years in
the future is rather sure to be as much above that of the average stock
as it is today. Stocks of this type will frequently be found to be dis-
counting the future much less than many investors believe. This is why
some of the stocks that at first glance appear highest priced may, upon
analysis, be the biggest bargains.

5. Don’t quibble over eighths and quarters.

I have used fictitious examples in attempting to make clear various other
matters. This time I will use an actual example. A little over twenty years
ago, a gentleman who in most respects has demonstrated a high order of
investment ability wanted to buy one hundred shares of a stock listed on
the New York Stock Exchange. On the day he decided to buy, the stock
closed at 35 On the following day it sold repeatedly at that price. But
this gentleman would not pay 35 /T He decided he might as well save fifty
dollars. He put his order in at 35. He refused to raise it. The stock never
again sold at 35. Today, almost twenty-five years later, the stock appears to
have a particularly bright future. As a result of the stock dividends and splits
that have occurred in the intervening years, it is now selling at over 500.

Five Don'ts for Investors

133

In other words, in an attempt to save fifty dollars, this investor failed
to make at least $46,500. Furthermore, there is no question that this
investor would have made the $46,500, because he still has other shares
of this same company which he bought at even lower figures. Since
$46,500 is about 930 times 50, this means that our investor would have
had to save his fifty dollars 930 times just to break even. Obviously, fol-
lowing a course of action with this kind of odds against it borders on
financial lunacy.

This particular example is by no means an extreme one. I purposely
selected a stock which for a number of years was more of a market lag-
gard than a market leader. If our investor had picked any one of perhaps
fifty other growth stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange, mis-
sing $3500 worth of such stock in order to save $50 would have cost a
great deal more than the $46,500.

For the small investor wanting to buy only a few hundred shares of
a stock, the rule is very simple. If the stock seems the right one and the
price seems reasonably attractive at current levels, buy “at the market.”
The extra eighth, or quarter, or half point that may be paid is insignifi-
cant compared to the profit that will be missed if the stock is not
obtained. Should the stock not have this sort of long-range potential, I
believe the investor should not have decided to buy it in the first place.

For the larger investor, wanting perhaps many thousands of shares,
the problem is not quite as simple. For all but a very small minority of
stocks, the available supply is usually sufficiently limited that an attempt
to buy at the market even half of this desired amount could well cause
a sizable advance in quotations. This sudden price rise might, in turn,
produce two further effects, both tending to make accumulating a block
of this stock even more difficult. The price spurt by itself might be
enough to arouse the interest and competition of other buyers. It might
also cause some of those who have been planning to sell to hold their
shares off the market with the hope that the rise might continue. What
then should a large buyer do to meet this situation?

He should go to his broker or securities dealer. He should disclose
to him exactly how much stock he desires to buy. He should tell the
broker to pick up as much stock as possible but authorize him to pass
up small offerings if buying them would arouse many competitive bids.
Most important, he should give his broker a completely free hand on
price up to a point somewhat above the most recent sale. How much
above should be decided in consultation with the broker or dealer after

134 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

taking into account such factors as the size of the block desired, the nor-
mal activity of the shares, how eager the investor may be for the hold-
ing, and any other special factors that might be involved.

The investor may feel he does not have a broker or dealer upon
whom he may rely as having sufficient judgment or discretion to han-
dle something of this sort. If so, he should proceed forthwith to find a
broker or dealer in whom such confidence can be placed. After all,
doing exactly this sort of thing is the primary function of a broker or
the trading department of a securities dealer.

Five More Don'ts
for Investors

1. Don’t overstress diversification.

No investment principle is more widely acclaimed than diversification.
(Some cynics have hinted that this is because the concept is so simple
that even stock brokers can understand it!) Be that as it may, there is very
little chance of the average investor being influenced to practice insuf-
ficient diversification. The horrors of what can happen to those who
put all their eggs in one basket” are too constantly being expounded.

Too few people, however, give sufficient thought to the evils of the
other extreme. This is the disadvantage of having eggs in so many bas-
kets that a lot of the eggs do not end up in really attractive baskets, and
it is impossible to keep watching all the baskets after the eggs get put
into them. For example, among investors with common stock holdings
having a market value of a quarter to a half million dollars, the percent-
age who own twenty-five or more different stocks is appalling. It is not
this number of twenty-five or more which itself is appalling. Rather it
is that in the great majority of instances only a small percentage of such
holdings is in attractive stocks about which the investor or his advisor
has a high degree of knowledge. Investors have been so oversold on
diversification that fear of having too many eggs in one basket has
caused them to put far too little into companies they thoroughly know
and far too much in others about which they know nothing at all. It
never seems to occur to them, much less to their advisors, that buying a
company without having sufficient knowledge of it may be even more
dangerous than having inadequate diversification.

136 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

How much diversification is really necessary and how much is dan-
gerous? It is somewhat like infantrymen stacking rifles. A rifleman can-
not get as firm a stack by balancing two rifles as he can by using five
or six properly placed. However, he can get just as secure a stack with
five as he could with fifty. In this matter of diversification, however,
there is one big difference between stacking rifles and common stocks.
With rifles, the number needed for a firm stack does not usually
depend on the kind of rifle used. With stocks, the nature of the stock
itself has a tremendous amount to do with the amount of diversifica-
tion actually needed.

Some companies, such as most of the major chemical manufactur-
ers, have a considerable degree of diversification within the company
itself. While all of their products may be classified as chemicals, many of
these chemicals may have most of the attributes found in products from
completely different industries. Some may have completely different
manufacturing problems. They may be sold against different competi-
tion to different types of customers. Furthermore at times when only
one type of chemical is involved, the customer group may be such a
broad section of industry that a considerable element of internal diver-
sification may still be present.

The breadth and depth of a company’s management personnel —
that is, how far a company has progressed away from one-man manage-
ment — are also important factors in deciding how much diversification
protection is intrinsically needed. Finally, holdings in highly cyclical
industries — that is, those that fluctuate sharply with changes in the state
of the business cycle — also inherently require being balanced by some-
what greater diversification than do shares in lines less subject to this
type of intermittent fluctuation.

This difference between the amount of internal diversification
found in stocks makes it impossible to set down hard and fast rules as to
the minimum amount of diversification the average investor requires for
optimum results. The relationship between the industries involved will
also be a factor. For example, an investor with ten stocks in equal
amounts, but eight of them bank stocks, may have completely inade-
quate diversification. In contrast, the same investor with each of his ten
stocks in a completely different industry may have far more diversifica-
tion than he really needs.

Recognizing, therefore, that each case is different and that no pre-
cise rules can be laid down, the following is suggested as a rough guide

Five More Don'ts for Investors

137

to what might be considered as minimum diversification needs for all but
the very smallest type of investor:

A. All investments might be confined solely to the large entrenched
type of properly selected growth stock, of which Dow, Du Pont, and
IBM have already been mentioned as typical examples. In this event, the
investor might have a minimum goal of five such stocks in all. This
means that he would not invest over 20 per cent of his total original
commitment in any one of these stocks. It does not mean that should
one grow more rapidly than the rest, so that ten years later he found
40 per cent of his total market value in one stock, he should in any sense
disturb such a holding. This assumes, of course, that he has gotten to
know his holding and the future continues to look at least as bright for
these stocks as has the recent past.

An investor using this guide of 20 per cent of his original invest-
ment for each company should see that there is no more than a mod-
erate amount of overlapping, if any, between the product lines of his five
companies. Thus, for example, if Dow were one of his five companies
there would seem to me to be no reason why Du Pont might not be
another. There are relatively few places where the product lines of these
two companies overlap or compete. If he were to have Dow and some
other company closer to Dow in its fields of activity, his purchase might
still be a wise one provided he had sufficient reason for making it.
Having these two stocks in similar lines of activity might prove very
profitable over the years. However, in such an instance the investor
should keep in mind that his diversification is essentially inadequate, and
therefore he should be alert for troubles which might affect the indus-
try involved.

B. Some or all of his investments might fall into the category of
stocks about midway between the young growth companies with their
high degree of risk and the institutional type of investment described
above. These would be companies with a good management team rather
than one-man management. They would be companies doing a volume
of business somewhere between fifteen and one hundred million dollars
a year and rather well entrenched in their industries. At least two of such
companies should be considered as necessary to balance each single
company of the A type. In other words, if only companies in this B
group were involved, an investor might start out with 10 per cent of his
available funds in each. This would make a total of ten stocks in all.
However, companies in this general classification can vary considerably

138 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

among themselves as to their degree of risk. It might be prudent to con-
sider those with the greater inherent risk as candidates for 8 per cent of
original investment, rather than 10 per cent. In any event, looking to
each stock of this class as a candidate for 8 to 10 per cent of total orig-
inal investment — in contrast to 20 per cent for the A group should
again provide the framework for adequate minimum diversification.

Companies of this B group are usually somewhat harder for the
investor to recognize than those of the A or institutional type. There-
fore it might be worthwhile to furnish a brief description of one or two
such companies which I have had the opportunity to observe rather
closely and which could be considered typical examples.

Let us see what I said about such companies in the original edition
and how they appear today. The first B company to which I referred
was P. R. Mallory. I said:

“P. R. Mallory & Co., Inc., enjoys a surprising degree of internal
diversification. Its principal products are components for the electronic
and electrical industries, special metals, and batteries. For its more
important product lines it is a major factor in the respective industries,
and in a few of them it is the largest producer. Many of its product lines,
such as electronic components and special metals, serve some of the
most rapidly growing segments of American industry, giving indications
that Mallory’s growth should continue. In ten years sales have increased
almost four-fold to a volume of about $80,000,000 in 1957, with about
one-third of this increase resulting from carefully planned outside acqui-
sitions and about two-thirds from internal growth.

“Profit margins over this period have been a bit lower than would
normally be considered satisfactory for a company of this B group, but
part of this is attributable to above-average expenditures on research.
More significantly, steps have been taken which are beginning to show
indications of important improvement in this factor. Management has
demonstrated considerable ingenuity under a dynamic president, and
in recent years has been increasing importantly in depth. Mallory
shares enjoyed about a five-fold increase in value during the ten-year
period of 1946 to 1956, frequently selling around fifteen times current
earnings.

“Perhaps investment-wise one of the most important factors about
Mallory lies not within the company itself but in its anticipated one-
third interest in the Mallory-Sharon Metals Corporation. This company

Five More Don'ts for Investors

139

is being planned as a combination of the Mallory-Sharon Titanium
Corporation — half of which is owned by P. R. Mallory & Co., and
which has already proved to be an interesting venture for Mallory — and
National Distillers operations in the raw-material stages of the same
industry. This new company gives' indication of being one of the
lowest-cost integrated titanium producers and as such should play a
major role in the probable growth of this young industry. Meanwhile
the corporation in 1958 is expected to start its first commercially sig-
nificant zirconium product and has within its organization considerable
know-how in other commercially new “wonder metals” such as tanta-
lum and columbium.This partially owned company gives indications of
becoming a world leader in not one but a series of metals that promise
to play a growing part in the atomic, chemical, and guided-missile age
of tomorrow. As such it could be an asset of tremendous dollar signifi-
cance to increase the growth that appears inherent in Mallory itself.”

If I were writing these words today, slightly over two years later, I
would write them somewhat differently. I would tone down moderate-
ly my enthusiasm for the possible contributions of the one-third owned
Mallory-Sharon Metals Corporation. I think everything I said two years
ago could still occur. However, particularly so far as titanium is con-
cerned, I believe it may take longer to find and develop sizable markets
for this metal than had seemed to be the case two years ago.

On the other hand, I would be inclined to strengthen my words for
the Mallory company itself by about the degree I would weaken them
for its affiliate. The trend I mentioned of increasing management in
depth has progressed importantly during this period. While Mallory, as
a component supplier to the durable goods industry, is in a line of busi-
ness that is bound to feel the ravages of any major general slide, the
management showed unusual adroitness in adjusting to 1958 conditions
and held earnings to $1.89 per share against the all-time peak of $2.06
the year before. Earnings came back fast in 1959 and promise to make
new records for the full year somewhere around $2.75 per share. Fur-
thermore these earnings are being established in the face of decreasing
but still heavy costs for certain of the newer divisions. This showing
gives promise that if general economic conditions remain reasonably
prosperous significant further growth in profits will be seen in 1960.

Mallory stock is one of the few examples cited in this book that to
date has done worse rather than better than the market as a whole.

140 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

Although I suspect this company has been more successful than some of
its competitors in meeting Japanese competition in the electronic com-
ponents phases of its business, this threat may be a reason for the rela-
tively poor market action. Another reason may be lack of interest by
much of the financial community in a business that is not easily classi-
fied in one industry or another, but cuts across several. This may change
in time, particularly as awareness grows that its miniature battery lines
are not so far removed from some glamorous growth fields, for they
should grow with the steady trend toward miniaturization in electronics.
At any rate, this stock which was at 35 when the first edition was writ-
ten, after allowing for two 2 per cent stock dividends since, is now sell-
ing at 3714.

Now let us see what I said about the other B group example I
discussed in the original edition:

“The Beryllium Corporation is another good example of a group
B investment. The corporate title of this company has a young-company
implication that causes uninformed people to assume that the stock
carries with it a greater degree of risk than may actually exist. A low-
cost producer, it is the only integrated company making master alloys
of beryllium copper and beryllium aluminum and also operating a fab-
ricating plant in which the master alloy is turned into rod, bar, strip,
extrusions, etc., and, in the case of tools, into finished products. Sales
have increased about six times during the ten-year period ending in
1957 to a total of approximately $16,000,000. A growing percentage of
these sales is to electronic, computing machine, and other industries
promising rapid growth in the years ahead. With important new uses
such as beryllium copper dies just beginning to be of sales importance,
it would seem that the good growth rate of the past ten years may be
just an indication of what is to come. This would tend to justify the
price-earnings ratio of around 20 at which this stock has frequently
sold in the past five years.

“Indicating that this growth may continue for many years to come,
the Rand Corporation, brilliant research arm of the Air Force owned
by the government, has been quoted in the press as predicting an
important future in the 1960’s for the as yet almost non-existent field
of beryllium metal as a structural material. The Rand Corporation,
among other things correctly foretold, shortly after the war, the devel-
opment in titanium.

Five More Don'ts for Investors

1 4 1

“More immediate than any eventual market that may develop for
beryllium as a structural material, 1958 should see this company bring
into volume production another brand-new product. This is beryllium
metal for atomic purposes. This product, being made in a completely
separate plant from the older master-alloy lines, is under long-term con-
tract to the Atomic Energy Commission. It gives indications of having
a big future in the nuclear industry where demand will probably occur
from both government and private industry sources. Management is
alert. In fact, this company qualifies rather favorably under our fifteen
points in regard to all aspects but one, where the deficiency is realized
and steps have already been started to correct it.”

As in the case of Mallory, the past two years have brought both plus-
es and minuses to the picture I portrayed at that time. However, the favor-
able developments seem to have by far outweighed the unfavorable, as
should be the case if a company is to prove the right sort of investment.
On the unfavorable side, the prospects for beryllium copper dies, men-
tioned two years before, appear to have lost much of their luster and the
long-term growth curve of the entire alloy end of the business may be
somewhat less brisk than indicated in that description. Meanwhile,
nuclear demand for beryllium metal over the next few years appears to be
somewhat less now than it did then. However, possibly far outbalancing
this, there are steadily increasing signs that there may be a most dramatic
growth in the demand for beryllium metal for many types of airborne pur-
poses. The start of this demand is already here. It is appearing in so many
places and for so many different kinds of products that no one is safe in pre-
dicting what its limitations may be. This may not prove quite as favorable
as might otherwise be judged, for it may make the field so attractive as to
bring threats of a major competitive technological breakthrough from
some company not now in the field. However, fortunately, the company
may have made major strides in strengthening itself in the only one of our
fifteen points where it had been weak. This was in its research activities.

How has the stock responded to all this? When the first edition was
written it was at 16.16, after allowing for the various stock dividends
that have been paid since. Today it is at 2616, a gain of 64 per cent.

A few other companies, with which I am somewhat less familiar but
which I believe have management, trade position, growth prospects, and
other characteristics which easily qualify them as good examples of this
B group are Foote Minerals Company, Friden Calculating Machine

142 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

Co., Inc., and Sprague Electric Company. Each of these companies has
proven a highly desirable investment for those who have held the shares
for a period of years. Sprague Electric roughly quadrupled in value dur-
ing the 1947-1957 period. Friden stock was first offered to the public
in 1954, but in less than three years it had increased about two and a half
times in market value. By 1957 it was selling at better than four times
the price at which blocks of stock are believed to have changed hands
privately about a year prior to this public offering. These price increases,
satisfactory as they might appear to most investors, were relatively
minor compared to what has happened to the shares of the Foote
Minerals Company. This stock was listed on the New York Stock
Exchange early in 1957. Prior to that time the stock was traded over the
counter and was first available to the public in 1947. At that time the
stock was selling at about $40 per share. Due to stock dividends and
split-ups the investor who purchased 100 shares at the time of the orig-
inal financing in 1947 and held on now has over 2400 shares. The stock
recently sold at approximately $50.

C. Finally there are the small companies with staggering possibili-
ties of gain for the successful, but complete or almost complete loss of
investment for the unsuccessful. I have already pointed out elsewhere
why I believe the amount, if any of such securities in an investment list
should vary according to the circumstances and goals of the particular
investor. However, there are two good rules to follow in regard to
investments of this type. One has already been mentioned. Never put
any funds into them that you cannot afford to lose. The other is that
larger investors should never at the time of the original investment put
over 5 per cent of available funds into any one such company. As point-
ed out elsewhere, one of the risks of the small investor is that he may be
too small to obtain the spectacular prospects of this type of investment
and still get the benefits of proper diversification.

In the original edition, I referred to Ampex as it was in 1953 and
Elox in 1956 as examples of the huge-potential but high-risk compa-
nies that fall into the C classification. How have these companies done
since? Elox, which was at 10 when the first edition was completed, is
at 1 % today. In contrast, Ampex s market performance continues bril-
liant and demonstrates why once an outstanding management has
proven itself and fundamental conditions have not changed, shares
should never be sold just because the stock has had a huge rise and may
seem temporarily high priced. In the discussion on research in Chapter

Five More Don'ts for Investors

143

Three, I mentioned that in the first four years following the offering
of this stock to the public in 1953, it had risen 700 per cent. When I
finished the original edition, it was at 20. Today with sales and earn-
ings up dramatically year after year and with 80 per cent of today s
sales in products that were not in existence only four years ago, it is at
107V^.This is a gain of 437 per cent in just over two years. It is a gain
of over 3500 per cent in six years. In other words, $10,000 placed in
Ampex in 1953 would have a market value of over $350,000 today in
a company with a proven ability to score one technical and business
triumph after another.

Other situations with which I am less familiar but which might well
fall in this category were Litton Industries, Inc., when its shares were
first offered to the public, and Metal Hydrides. However, one charac-
teristic of this type of company should be kept in mind from the stand-
point of diversification. They entail so much risk and offer such prom-
ising prospects that, in time, one of two things usually happens. Either
they fail, or else they grow in trade position, management depth, and
competitive strength to a point where they can be classified in the B
rather than the C group.

When this has happened, the shares held in them usually have
advanced so spectacularly in market price that, depending on what has
happened to the value of an investors other holdings during the period,
they may then represent a considerably greater per cent of the total
portfolio than they formerly did. However, B stocks are so much safer
than C stocks that they may be retained in greater volume without sac-
rificing proper diversification. Therefore, if the company has changed in
this way, there is seldom reason to sell stock — at least not on the ground
that the market rise has resulted in this company representing too great
a percentage of total holdings.

This change from a C to a B company is, for example, exactly what
happened during the 1956-1957 period in the case of Ampex. As the
company tripled in size and profits rose even faster, and as the market
for its magnetic recorders and the components thereof broadened into
more and more growth industries, this company grew in intrinsic
strength to a point where it could be classified in the B group. It no
longer carried with it the element of extreme investment risk. When
this point had been reached, a considerably larger percentage of total

* After allowing for the 2l4-to-l stock split that has since occurred.

144 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

investment might be held in Ampex without violating principles of
prudent diversification.

All the above percentages represent merely a minimum or prudent
standard of diversification. Going below this limit is a bit like driving an
automobile above normal speeds.'A driver doing this may get where he
wants to go sooner than he otherwise would. However, he should keep
in mind that he is driving at a rate requiring extra alertness and vigi-
lance. Forgetting this, he may not only fail to arrive at his destination
more quickly — he may never get there at all.

How about the other side of the coin? Is there any reason an
investor should not have more diversification than something resem-
bling the minimum amounts mentioned? There is no reason whatsoever,
as long as the additional holdings are ones which appear equivalent in
attractiveness to this minimum number of holdings in regard to two
matters. These additional securities should be equivalent to the other
holdings in regard to the degree of growth which appears attainable in
relation to the risks involved. They should also be equivalent in regard
to the investor s ability to keep in touch with and follow his investment,
once he has made it. However, practical investors usually learn their
problem is finding enough outstanding investments, rather than choos-
ing among too many. The occasional investor who does find more such
unusual companies than he really needs seldom has the time to keep in
close enough touch with all additional corporations.

Usually a very long list of securities is not a sign of the brilliant
investor, but of one who is unsure of himself. If the investor owns stock
in so many companies that he cannot keep in touch with their man-
agements directly or indirecdy, he is rather sure to end up in worse
shape than if he had owned stock in too few companies. An investor
should always realize that some mistakes are going to be made and that
he should have sufficient diversification so that an occasional mistake
will not prove crippling. However, beyond this point he should take
extreme care to own not the most, but the best. In the field of common
stocks, a little bit of a great many can never be more than a poor sub-
stitute for a few of the outstanding.

2. Don’t be afraid of buying on a war scare.

Common stocks are usually of greatest interest to people with imagina-
tion. Our imagination is staggered by the utter horror of modern war.

Five More Don'ts for Investors

145

The result is that every time the international stresses of our world pro-
duce either a war scare or an actual war, common stocks reflect it. This
is a psychological phenomenon which makes little sense financially.

Any decent human being becomes appalled at the slaughter and
suffering caused by the mass killings of war. In today’s atomic age,
there is added a deep personal fear for the safety of those closest to us
and for ourselves. This worry, fear, and distaste for what lies ahead can
often distort any appraisal of purely economic factors. The fears of
mass destruction of property, almost confiscatory higher taxes, and
government interference with business dominate what thinking we
try to do on financial matters. People operating in such a mental cli-
mate are inclined to overlook some even more fundamental economic
influences.

The results are always the same. Through the entire twentieth cen-
tury, with a single exception, every time major war has broken out any-
where in the world or whenever American forces have become involved
in any fighting whatever, the American stock market has always plunged
sharply downward. This one exception was the outbreak of World
War II in September 1939. At that time, after an abortive rally on
thoughts of fat war contracts to a neutral nation, the market soon was
following the typical downward course, a course which some months
later resembled panic as news of German victories began piling up.
Nevertheless, at the conclusion of all actual fighting — regardless of
whether it was World War I, Wo rid War II, or Korea — most stocks were
selling at levels vastly higher than prevailed before there was any thought
of war at all. Furthermore, at least ten times in the last twenty-two years,
news has come of other international crises which gave threat of major
war. In every instance, stocks dipped sharply on the fear of war and
rebounded sharply as the war scare subsided.

What do investors overlook that causes them to dump stocks both
on the fear of war and on the arrival of war itself, even though by the
end of the war stocks have always gone much higher than lower? They
forget that stock prices are quotations expressed in money. Modern war
always causes governments to spend far more than they can possibly col-
lect from their taxpayers while the war is being waged. This causes a vast
increase in the amount of money, so that each individual unit of money,
such as a dollar, becomes worth less than it was before. It takes lots more
dollars to buy the same number of shares of stock. This, of course, is the
classic form of inflation.

146 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

In other words, war is always bearish on money. To sell stock at the
threatened or actual outbreak of hostilities so as to get into cash is
extreme financial lunacy. Actually just the opposite should be done. If an
investor has about decided to buy a particular common stock and the
arrival of a full-blown war scare starts knocking down the price, he
should ignore the scare psychology of the moment and definitely begin
buying. This is the time when having surplus cash for investment
becomes least, not most, desirable. However, here a problem presents
itself. How fast should he buy? How far down will the stock go? As long
as the downward influence is a war scare and not war, there is no way
of knowing. If actual hostilities break out, the price would undoubted-
ly go still lower, perhaps a lot lower. Therefore, the thing to do is to buy
but buy slowly and at a scale-down on just a threat of war. If war occurs,
then increase the tempo of buying significantly. Just be sure to buy into
companies either with products or services the demand for which will
continue in wartime, or which can convert their facilities to wartime
operations. The great majority of companies can so qualify under todays
conditions of total war and manufacturing flexibility.

Do stocks actually become more valuable in war time, or is it just
money which declines in value? That depends on circumstances. By the
grace of God, our country has never been defeated in any war in which
it has engaged. In war, particularly modern war, the money of the
defeated side is likely to become completely or almost worthless, and
common stocks would lose most of their value. Certainly, if the United
States were to be defeated by Communist Russia, both our money and
our stocks would become valueless. It would then make little difference
what investors might have done.

On the other hand, if a war is won or stalemated, what happens to
the real value of stocks will vary with the individual war and the indi-
vidual stock. In World War I, when the enormous prewar savings of
England and France were pouring into this country, most stocks prob-
ably increased their real worth even more than might have been the case
if the same years had been a period of peace. This, however, was a one-
time condition that will not be repeated. Expressed in constant dollars —
that is, in real value — American stocks in both World War II and the
Korean period undoubtedly did fare less well than if the same period
had been one of peace. Aside from the crushing taxes, there was too
great a diversion of effort from the more profitable peace-time lines to
abnormally narrow-margin defense work. If the magnificent research

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effort spent on these narrow-margin defense projects could have been
channelled to normal peace-time lines, stockholders’ profits would have
been far greater — assuming, of course, that there would still have been
a free America in which any profits could have been enjoyed at all. The
reason for buying stocks on war ot fear of war is not that war, in itself,
is ever again likely to be profitable to American stockholders. It is just
that money becomes even less desirable, so that stock prices, which are
expressed in units of money, always go up.

3. Don’t forget your Gilbert and Sullivan.

Gilbert and Sullivan are hardly considered authorities on the stock mar-
ket. Nevertheless, we might keep in mind their “flowers that bloom in
the spring, tra-la” which, they tell us, have “nothing to do with the
case.” There are certain superficial financial statistics which are fre-
quently given an undeserved degree of attention by many investors.
Possibly it is an exaggeration to say that they completely parallel Gilbert
and Sullivan’s flowers that bloom in the spring. Instead of saying they
have nothing to do with the case, we might say they have very little to
do with it.

Foremost among such statistics are the price ranges at which a stock
has sold in former years. For some reason, the first thing many investors
want to see when they are considering buying a particular stock is a
table giving the highest and lowest price at which that stock has sold in
each of the past five or ten years. They go through a sort of mental
mumbo-jumbo, and come up with a nice round figure which is the
price they are willing to pay for the particular stock.

Is this illogical? Is it financially dangerous? The answer to both
questions is emphatically yes. It is dangerous because it puts the empha-
sis on what does not particularly matter, and diverts attention from what
does matter. This frequently causes investors to pass up a situation in
which they would make big profits in order to go into one where the
profits will be much smaller. To understand this we must see why the
mental process is so illogical.

What makes the price at which a stock sells? It is the composite esti-
mate at that moment of what all those interested think the corrective
value of such shares may be. It is the composite appraisal of the outlook
for this company by all potential buyers and sellers, weighted by the
number of shares each buyer or seller is disposed to bid for or offer, in

148 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

relation to a similar appraisal, at the same moment, of the outlook for
other companies with their individual prospects. Occasionally, some-
thing like forced liquidation will produce a moderate deviation from
this figure. This happens when a large holder presses stock on the mar-
ket for reasons — such as liquidating an estate or paying off a loan —
which may not be directly related to the seller s view of the real value
of the shares. However, such pressures usually cause only moderate vari-
ation from the composite appraisal of the prevailing price of the shares,
since bargain hunters normally step in to take advantage of the situation,
which thereby adjusts itself.

The point which is of real significance is that the price is based on
the current appraisal of the situation. As changes in the affairs of the com-
pany become known, these appraisals become correspondingly more or
less favorable. In relation to other stocks, these particular shares then
move up or down. If the factors appraised were judged correctly, the
stock becomes permanently more or less valuable in relation to other
stocks. The shares then stay up or down. If more of these same factors
continue to develop, they in turn are recognized by the financial com-
munity. The stock then goes and stays either further up or down, as the
case may be.

Therefore, the price at which the stock sold four years ago may have
little or no real relationship to the price at which it sells today. The
company may have developed a host of able new executives, a series of
new and highly profitable products, or any number of similar desirable
attributes that make the stock intrinsically worth four times as much in
relation to the price of other stocks as it was worth four years ago. The
company might have fallen into the hands of an inefficient management
and slipped so badly in relation to competition that the only way recov-
ery could occur would be through the raising of much new capital. This
might force such a dilution of the shares that the stock today could not
possibly be worth more than a quarter of the price of four years ago.

Against this background, it can be seen why investors so frequently
pass up stocks which would have brought them huge future gains, for
ones where the gain is very much smaller. By giving heavy emphasis to
the “stock that hasn’t gone up yet” they are unconsciously subscribing
to the delusion that all stocks go up about the same amount and that
the one that has already risen a lot will not climb further, while the
one that has not yet gone up has something “due” it. Nothing could
be further from the truth. The fact that a stock has or has not risen in

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149

the last several years is of no significance whatsoever in determining
whether it should be bought now. What does matter is whether enough
improvement has taken place or is likely to take place in the future to
justify importantly higher prices than those now prevailing.

Similarly, many investors will give heavy weight to the per-share
earnings of the past five years in trying to decide whether a stock should
be bought. To look at the per-share earnings by themselves and give the
earnings of four or five years ago any significance is like trying to get
useful work from an engine which is unconnected to any device to
which that engines power is supposed to be applied. Just knowing, by
itself, that four or five years ago a company’s per-share earnings were
either four times or a quarter of this year’s earnings has almost no sig-
nificance in indicating whether a particular stock should be bought or
sold. Again, what counts is knowledge of background conditions. An
understanding of what probably will happen over the next several years
is of overriding importance.

The investor is constantly being fed a diet of reports and so-called
analyses largely centered around these price figures for the past five
years. He should keep in mind that it is the next five years’ earnings, not
those of the past five years, that now matter to him. One reason he is
fed such a diet of back statistics is that if this type of material is put in a
report it is not hard to be sure it is correct. If more important matters
are gone into, subsequent events may make the report look quite silly.
Therefore, there is a strong temptation to fill up as much space as pos-
sible with indisputable facts, whether or not the facts are significant.
However, many people in the financial community place emphasis on
this type of prior years’ statistics for a different set of reasons. They seem
to be unable to grasp how great can be the change in just a few years’
time in the real value of certain types of modern corporations. There-
fore they emphasize these past earnings records in a sincere belief that
detailed accounting descriptions of what happened last year will give a
true picture of what will happen next year. This may be true for certain
classes of regulated companies such as public utilities. For the type of
enterprise which I believe should interest an investor desiring the best
results for his money, it can be completely false.

A striking example of this centers around events with which I had
the good fortune to be quite familiar. In the summer of 1956, an oppor-
tunity arose to buy a fair-sized block of shares in Texas Instruments, Inc.,
from its principal officers who were also its largest stockholders. Careful

150 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

study of this company revealed that it rated not just well but magnifi-
cently in regard to our fifteen-point test. Reason for the officers to sell
appeared entirely legitimate; this occurs frequently in true growth com-
panies. Their holdings had already advanced so much that several of
them had become millionaires so far as their holdings in their own
company were concerned. In contrast, their other assets were relatively
negligible. Therefore, particularly since they were selling but a tiny part
of the shares they owned, some diversification seemed entirely in order.
The ever-present possibility of estate tax liability alone would be suffi-
cient to make such a course prudent from the standpoint of these key
executives, regardless of the future of their company

At any rate, negotiations were completed to acquire these shares at
a price of 14. This represented twenty times the anticipated 1956 per-
share earnings of about 700. To anyone who gave particular weight to
past statistics, this seemed well beyond the bounds of prudence. Per-
share earnings had been reported at 390, 400, 480, and 500 for the prior
four years of 1952 to 1955 respectively — hardly an exciting growth
record. Even more depressing to those who subordinate the more
important factors of management and current business trends to super-
ficial statistical comparisons, the company, through a corporate acquisi-
tion, had obtained the benefits of some loss carry-forward, which had
made possible subnormal income tax charges during much of this period.
This made any price calculated on the basis of past statistics seem even
higher. Finally, even if 1956 earnings were included in an evaluation, a
superficial study of this situation might still have produced grave fore-
bodings. True, the company was currently doing remarkably well in the
promising field of transistors. But regardless of the obviously glowing
future for the semi-conductor industry as a whole, how long could a
company of this size be expected to maintain its strong trade position
against the larger and older companies, with much stronger balance
sheets, which were sure to make a major competitive effort to partici-
pate in the great growth that lay ahead for transistors?

When the usual SEC channels reported this officers selling, a rash
of heavy trading broke out in Texas Instruments shares with relative-
ly little change in price. Much of this selling, I suspect, was induced
by various brokerage comments that appeared. Most of these fur-
nished the past statistical record and commented on the historically
high price, the competition that lay ahead, and the inside selling. One
such bulletin went so far as to express complete agreement with the

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151

management of Texas Instruments. It reported the officers were sel-
ling and stated: “We agree with them and recommend the same
course!” The major buyer during this period, I have been told, was a
large and well-informed institution.

What happened in the next twelve months? Texas Instruments’ geo-
physical and military electronic business, overlooked in the flurry of
controversy, continued to grow. The semi-conductor (transistor) division
grew even more rapidly. More important than the growth in transistor
volume were the great strides taken by this able management in
research, in plans for mechanization, and in building up the distribution
organization in this key semi-conductor field. As evidence piled up that
1956 results were not a flash in the pan but that this relatively small
company would continue as one of the largest and lowest cost producers
in what promises to be one of the fastest growing segments of American
industry, the financial community began revising upward the price-
earnings ratio it would pay for a chance to participate in this well-run
enterprise. As the summer of 1957 came around and the management
publicly estimated that year’s per-share earnings at around $1.10, the
54 per cent growth in earnings had produced in just twelve months an
approximate 100 per cent increase in market value.

In the original edition I went on to say:

“I suspect that if the headquarters of the principal divisions of this
company were not located in Dallas and Houston, but were situated along
the northern half of the Atlantic seaboard or in the Los Angeles metropol-
itan area — where more financial analysts and other managers of important
funds could more easily learn about the company — this price-earnings
ratio might have gone even higher during this period. If, as appears prob-
able, Texas Instruments’ sales and earnings continue their sharp upward
trend for some years to come, it will be interesting to see whether this con-
tinued growth, of itself, does not in time provide some further upward
change in the price-earnings ratio. If this happens, the stock would again
go up at an even faster rate than the earnings are advancing, the combina-
tion which always produces the sharpest increases in share prices.”

Has this optimistic forecast been confirmed? A look at the record
may jolt those who still insist that it is possible to appraise an investment
by a superficial analysis of past earnings and little more. Profits rose from
$1.11 per share in 1957 to $1.84 in 1958 and give promise of topping

152 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

$3.50 in 1959. Since the first edition of this book was completed, the
company attained honors that were bound to rivet the attention of the
financial community upon it. In 1958, in the face of competition from
some of the generally acclaimed giants of the electronics and electrical
equipment industry, International Business Machines Corporation,
overwhelmingly the largest electronic calculating machine manufactur-
er in the world, selected Texas Instruments to be its associate for joint
research effort in the application of semi-conductors to this type of
equipment. Again, in 1959 Texas Instruments announced a technologi-
cal breakthrough whereby it was possible to use semi-conductor mate-
rial of approximately the same size as existing transistors, not alone for
a transistor but for a complete electronic circuit! What this may bring
about in the way of miniaturization almost staggers the imagination. As
the company has grown, its unusually able product research and devel-
opment groups have increased proportionately. Today few informed
people have much doubt that the company’s long series of technical and
business “firsts” will continue in the years ahead.

How has the market price of these shares responded to all this? Has
the price-earnings ratio continued to advance as, twenty-two months
ago, I indicated appeared probable? The record would appear to be in
the affirmative. Per-share earnings have a little more than tripled since
1957. The stock is up over five times from the price of 26 Vi at which it
was selling when the first edition was completed. The current price,
incidentally, represents a gain of better than 1000 per cent from the
price of 14, which was mentioned in the original edition as the price at
which a fair-sized block of this stock had been bought less than three
and one-half years before. In spite of this steep rise it will be interesting
to see whether further gains in sales and earnings in the years ahead do
not produce still more worthwhile appreciation.

This brings up another line of reasoning which causes some
investors to pay undue attention to these unrelated statistics on past
price ranges and per-share earnings. This is the belief that whatever has
happened for a number of years is bound to continue indefinitely. In
other words, some investors will find a stock the per-share earnings and
market price of which have risen in each of the past five or ten years.
They will conclude that this trend is almost certain to continue indefi-
nitely. I will agree that this might happen. But in view of the uncertainty
in timing the results of research and of the costliness of bringing out the
new products that make this type of growth possible, it is quite common

Five More Don'ts for investors

1 53

for even the most outstanding growth companies to have occasional
one- to three-year dips in their rate of earnings. Such dips can produce
sharp declines in their shares. Therefore, to give emphasis to this kind of
past earning record, rather than to the background conditions that can
control the future earning curve, may prove very costly.

Does all this mean that past earnings and price ranges should be
completely ignored in deciding whether to buy a stock? No. It is only
when given an importance they do not deserve that they become dan-
gerous. They are helpful as long as it is realized they are only auxiliary
tools to be used for specialized purposes and not major factors in decid-
ing the attractiveness of a common stock. Thus, for example, a study of
per-share earnings for various prior years will throw considerable light
on how cyclical a stock may be, that is, on how much the company’s
profits will be affected by the varying stages of the business cycle. More
important, comparing past per-share earnings with price ranges will fur-
nish the price-earnings ratio at which the stock sold in the past. This
serves as a base from which to start measuring what the price-earnings
ratio may be in the future. Here again, however, it must be kept in mind
that it is the future and not the past which governs. Perhaps the shares
for years have steadily sold at only eight times earnings. Now, however,
changes in management, establishment of an outstanding research
department, etc., are putting the company into the class that is current-
ly selling around fifteen times earnings instead of eight. Then anyone
estimating future earnings and figuring the anticipated value of the
shares at only eight instead of fifteen times earnings might again be
leaning too heavily on past statistics.

I headed this subdivision of my comments “Don’t forget your
Gilbert and Sullivan.” Perhaps I should have headed it “Don’t be influ-
enced by what doesn’t matter.” Statistics of former years’ earnings and
particularly of per-share price ranges of these former years quite fre-
quently “have nothing to do with the case.”

4. Don’t fail to consider time as well as price in buying
a true growth stock.

Let us consider an investment situation that occurs frequently. A compa-
ny qualifies magnificently as to the standards set up under our fifteen
points. Furthermore, very important gains in earning power are going to
appear about a year from now, due to factors about which the financial

154 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

community is, as yet, completely unaware. Even more important, there
are strong indications that these new sources of earnings are going to
grow importantly for at least several years after that.

Under normal circumstances this stock would obviously be a buy.
However, there is a factor that gives us pause. Success of other ventures
in prior years has given this stock so much glamour in the financial
world that if it were not for these new and generally unknown influ-
ences, the stock might be considered to be reasonably priced around
20 and out of all reason at its present price of 32. Assuming that five
years from now these new influences could easily cause it to be fully
worth 75, should we, right now, pay 32 — or 60 per cent more than we
believe the stock is worth? There is always the chance that these new
developments might not turn out to be as good as we think. There is
also the possibility that this stock might sink back to what we consider
its real value of 20.

Confronted with this situation, many conservative investors would
watch quotations closely. If the stock got near 20 they would buy it
eagerly. Otherwise they would leave the shares alone. This happens often
enough to be worthy of somewhat closer analysis.

Is there anything sacred about our figure of 20? No, because it
admittedly does not take into consideration an important element of
future value — the factors we know and most others don’t know which
we believe will in a few years justify a price of 75. What is really impor-
tant here is to find a way that we can buy the stock at a price close to
the low point at which it will sell from here on in. Our concern is that
if we buy at 32, the stock may subsequently go somewhere around 20.
This would not alone cause us a temporary loss. More significant, it
would mean that if the stock subsequently went to 75, we would have
for our money only about 60 per cent of the shares that we could have
gotten if we had waited and bought at 20. Assuming that in twenty years
still other new ventures would have given these shares a value not of
75 but of 200, this factor of the total number of shares we could have
obtained for our money would prove extremely important.

Fortunately, in a situation of this sort there is another guide-post
which may be relied on, even if some of my friends in the insurance
and banking worlds seem to regard it as about as safe as trying to walk
over water. This is to buy the shares not at a certain price, but at a cer-
tain date. From a study of other successful ventures carried through in
the past by this same company, we can learn that these ventures were

Five More Don'ts for Investors

1 55

reflected in the stock’s price at a particular point in their development.
Perhaps it averaged about one month before these ventures reached the
pilot-plant stage. Assuming that our company’s shares are still selling
around 32, why not plan to buy these shares five months from today,
which will be just one month before the pilot plant goes on stream? Of
course, the shares can still go down after that. However, even if we had
bought these shares at 20, there would have been no positive guarantee
against a further drop. If we have a fair chance of buying at about as low
a price as possible, aren’t we accomplishing our objective, even if we feel
that on the basis of the publicly known factors the stock should be
lower? Under these circumstances, isn’t it safer to decide to buy at a cer-
tain date rather than a certain price?

Fundamentally, this approach does not ignore the concept of value
at all. It only appears to ignore it. Except for the probability that there
would be a far greater increase in value coming in the future, it would
be just as illogical as some of my financial friends claim it to be to decide
to buy on a specific future date rather than at a specific price. However,
when the indications are strong that such an increase is coming, decid-
ing the time you will buy rather than the price at which you will buy
may bring you a stock about to have extreme further growth at or near
the lowest price at which that stock will sell from that time on. After all,
this is exactly what you should be trying to do when you make any
stock purchase.

5. Don’t follow the crowd.

There is an important investment concept which is frequently difficult
to understand without considerable financial experience. This is because
its explanation does not lend itself easily to precise wording. It does not
lend itself at all to reduction to mathematical formulae.

Time and again throughout this book I have touched upon differ-
ent influences that have resulted in a common stock going up or down
in price. A change in net income, a change in a company’s management,
appearance of a new invention or a new discovery, a change in interest
rates or tax laws — these are but a few random examples of conditions
that will bring about a rise or fall in the quotations for a particular com-
mon stock. All these influences have one thing in common. They are
real occurrences in the world about us. They are actions which have
happened or are about to happen. Now we come to a very different

156 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

type of price influence. This is a change which is purely psychological.
Nothing has changed in the outside or economic world at all. The great
majority of the financial community merely look upon the same cir-
cumstances from a different viewpoint than before. As a result of this
changed way of appraising the same set of basic facts, they make a
changed appraisal of the price or the price-earnings ratio they will pay
for the same shares.

There are fads and styles in the stock market just as there are in
women’s clothes. These can, for as much as several years at a time, pro-
duce distortions in the relationship of existing prices to real values
almost as great as those faced by the merchant who can hardly give away
a rack full of the highest quality knee-length dresses in a year when
fashion decrees that they be worn to the ankle. Let me give a specific
example: In 1948 I was chatting with a gentleman whom I believe to
be an able investment man. He has served as president of the New York
Society of Security Analysts, a position which is usually awarded only to
the more able in the financial community. At any rate, I had just arrived
in New York from a visit to the headquarters of the Dow Chemical
Company at Midland, Michigan. I mentioned that earnings for the fis-
cal year just closing would be at new high levels and that I thought the
stock was a real buy. He replied that he felt it was of historic and per-
haps statistical interest that a company such as Dow could ever earn this
much per share. He felt, however, that these earnings did not make the
stock attractive, since it was obvious that the company was enjoying a
temporary postwar boom that could not last. He further explained that
he felt it was impossible to judge the real value of stocks of this sort
until there had occurred the same type of postwar depression that
within a few years followed the Civil War and World War I. His rea-
soning, unfortunately, completely ignored all the potential further
increase in value to this stock promised by the many new and interest-
ing products the company was then developing.

That in no future year did Dow’s earnings fall anywhere near as low
as this supposedly abnormal peak is not what should concern us here.
Neither is the fact that from this supposedly high plateau at which it was
then selling, the stock has since climbed many hundreds per cent. Our
interest should be in why this normally able investment man would take
this set of facts and derive from it a quite different conclusion as to the
intrinsic value of the stock than he would have derived from the same
facts in some other year.

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157

The answer is that for these three years, from 1947 to 1949, almost
the whole financial community was indulging in a mass delusion. With
all the ease of hindsight we can now sit back and see that what appeared
so frightening then was almost as little related to reality as the terror that
gripped most of Christopher Columbus’s crew in 1492. Night after
night most of the common seamen on the Santa Maria were unable to
sleep because of a paralyzing fear that at any moment their ship would
fall off the ends of the earth and be lost forever. In 1948, the investment
community gave little value to the earnings of any common stock
because of the widespread conviction that nothing could prevent the
near future bringing the same type of bitter depression and major stock
market crash that happened about the same number of years after each
of the two preceding major wars. In 1949, a slight depression did occur.
When its modest nature was appraised and the financial community
found that the subsequent trend was up, not down, a tremendous psy-
chological change occurred in the way common stocks were regarded.
Many common stocks more than doubled in price in the following few
years, due to nothing more than this psychological change. Those com-
mon stocks which also had the benefit of more tangible outside occur-
rences improving their fundamental worth did a great deal better than
just doubling.

These great shifts in the way the financial community appraises the
same set of facts at different times are by no means confined to stocks
as a whole. Particular industries and individual companies within those
industries constantly change in financial favor, due as often to altered
ways of looking at the same facts as to actual background occurrences
themselves.

For example, in certain periods the armament industry has been
considered unattractive by the investment community. One of its most
outstanding characteristics has been considered to be domination by a
single customer, the government. This customer in some years goes in
for heavy military procurement, and in others cuts buying way down.
Therefore the industry never knows from one year to the next when
it may be subject to major contract cancellations and drying up of
business.

To this must be added the abnormally low profit margin that
customarily prevails in government work, and the tendency of the
renegotiation laws to take most of what profit is made, but never
correspondingly to allow for a mistake in calculations that causes a

158 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

loss. Furthermore, the constant necessity to keep bidding on new mod-
els in a field where engineering changes come continuously means that
risk and turmoil are the order of the day It is impossible, no matter how
good your engineering, to standardize anything that gives your compa-
ny a long-term advantage over the aggressive competition. Finally, there
is always the danger” that peace might break out with an accompany-
ing decline in business. When this view prevails, as it has many times in
the past twenty years, the defense shares sell at a quite low price in rela-
tion to their earnings.

However, the financial community has at times in the recent past
derived other conclusions from the same set of facts. The world situa-
tion is such that the need of heavy expenditures for airborne defense
equipment will be with us for years. While the total value may vary from
year to year, the pace of engineering change is causing more and more
expensive equipment to be needed, so that the long-range trend will be
upward. This means that the happy investor in these securities will be in
one of the few industries which will in no sense feel the next business
depression, which sooner or later will be felt by most other industries.
While the profit margin is limited by law, so much business is available
to the well-run company that this proves no ceiling upon total net prof-
its. When this view prevails, a quite different appraisal is being given to
exactly the same background facts. These stocks then sell on a quite dif-
ferent basis.

Examples could be given for industry after industry which in the past
twenty years has been looked upon first one way, then another, by the
financial community, with a resultant change in quoted values. In 1950,
pharmaceutical stocks were generally regarded as having about the same
set of desirable characteristics usually credited to industrial chemical
companies. Endless growth due to the wonders of research and a steady
rise in the standard of living seemed to warrant the best of these shares
selling at the same ratio to earnings as the best of the chemicals. Then a
single manufacturer got into trouble on a heretofore glamorous item. The
realization swept the financial community that this was a field in which
dominance today is no assurance of being even one of the top compa-
nies tomorrow. A reappraisal of the entire industry took place. Com-
pletely different price-earnings ratios prevailed, due, in all cases but one,
not to a different set of facts but a different appraisal of the same facts.

In 1958, just the reverse took place. In the business slump of that
year, one of the few industries that enjoyed increased rather than

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159

decreased demand for its products was the drug manufacturing indus-
try. Profits of most companies in this group rose to new highs. At the

same time earnings of the chemical producers fell rather sharply

largely because of excess capacity from major expansion moves that had
just been completed. The volatile financial community again started
sharply upgrading the price-earnings ratio of drug shares. Meanwhile
sentiment started to grow that the chemical stocks were not as attrac-
tive as had previously been supposed. All this represented only changed
financial appraisals. Nothing of fundamental or intrinsic consideration
had happened.

A year later, some of this new sentiment had already been reversed.
As the better chemical companies proved among the first to recover lost
earning power and as their growth trend caused profits soon to go to
new all-time high levels, they rather quickly regained their temporarily
lost prestige. With the long-range significance of an ever-growing num-
ber of important new drugs tending further to bolster the status of the
pharmaceutical stocks as against governmental attacks on pricing and
patent policies of this industry working in the opposite direction, it will
be interesting to observe over the next several years whether the recent-
ly regained standing of the pharmaceutical stocks grows still further or
starts to shrink.

In the original edition I went on to give one (then) current exam-
ple of this same sort of changed financial appraisal, by saying:

One more example is a change in outlook that is taking place
right now. For years the shares of the machine tool manufacturers have
sold at a very low ratio to earnings. It was almost unanimously felt that
machine tools were the epitome of a feast or famine industry. No mat-
ter how good such earnings were, they did not mean much because
they were just the product of a prevailing boom and could not last.
Recently, however, a new school, while by no means predominating
the thinking on this subject, has been gaining converts. This school
believes that since World War II a fundamental change has taken place
affecting these companies. All industry has been swinging from short-
to long-range planning of capital expenditures. As a result, the cause of
extreme fluctuation for the machine tool companies has disappeared.
High and rising wage rates will prevent for many years, if not forever,
a return to the feast or famine nature of this business. The steady pace
of engineering advance has increased and will further increase the pace

160 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

of obsolescence of this industry’s products. Therefore, in place of the
largely cyclical prewar trends, the growth trend of the recent past will
continue further into the future. Automation may cause this growth
trend to be spectacular.

“Under the influence of' those who think this way, the better
machine tool stocks are now appraised on a somewhat more favorable
basis in relation to the market as a whole than they were only a few
years ago. They still sell at a rather low ratio to earnings because the
influence of the feast or famine idea is still strong, even if it is not as
strong as it used to be. If the financial community comes more and more
to accept this non-cyclical and growth outlook for machine tool stocks,
their price-earnings ratio will improve more and more. They will then
do much better than the market. If the old feast or famine concept
regains its former hold, these shares will sell at a lower ratio to earnings
than prevails today.

“This current machine tool example brings into clear relief what the
common stock investor must do if he is to purchase shares to his great-
est advantage. He must examine factually and analytically the prevailing
financial sentiment about both the industry and the specific company of
which he is considering buying shares. If he can find an industry or a
company where the prevailing style or mode of financial thinking is con-
siderably less favorable than the actual facts warrant, he may reap himself
an extra harvest by not following the crowd. He should be extra careful
when buying into companies and industries that are the current darlings
of the financial community, to be sure that these purchases are actually
warranted — as at times they well may be — and that he is not paying a
fancy price for something which, because of too favorable interpretation
of basic facts, is the investment fad of the moment.”

Today, of course, we know the answer to the recent ideas of some
that the machine tool industry is no longer feast or famine in its
nature. The 1957 recession completely exploded the idea that long-
range corporate planning now cushions these stocks from their nor-
mal extreme vulnerability to downward movements in the business
cycle. However, for every problem of this sort which gets solved, the
ever-increasing pace of todays technology opens up a dozen others
from which the wise investor can profit if he can think independent-
ly of the crowd and reach the right answer when the majority of
financial opinion is leaning the other way. Are the “exotic” fuel stocks

Five More Don'ts for Investors

1 6 1

and certain of the smaller electronics intrinsically worth the high
appraisals being given them today? Is there such a future for manufac-
turers of ultrasonic equipment that ordinary price-earnings may be
disregarded? Is a company better or worse for the American investor
if an abnormally large part of its earning power is derived from for-
eign operations? These are all matters about which the ideas of the
multitude may have swung too far or not far enough right now. If he
is thinking of participating in the affected companies, the wise investor
must determine which are fundamental trends that will go further, and
which are fads of the moment.

These investment fads and misinterpretations of facts may run for
several months or several years. In the long run, however, realities not
only terminate them, but frequently, for a time, cause the affected stocks
to go too far in the opposite direction. The ability to see through some
majority opinions to find what facts are really there is a trait that can
bring rich rewards in the field of common stocks. It is not easy to develop,
however, for the composite opinion of those with whom we associate
is a powerful influence upon the minds of all of us. There is one factor
which all of us can recognize, however, and which can help powerfully
in not just following the crowd. This is realization that the financial
community is usually slow to recognize a fundamentally changed con-
dition, unless a big name or a colorful single event is publicly associat-
ed with that change. The ABC Company’s shares have been selling at a
very low price, in spite of the attractiveness of its industry, because it has
been badly managed. If a widely known man is put in as the new pres-
ident, the shares will usually not only respond at once, but will proba-
bly over-respond. This is because the time it takes to bring about basic
improvement will probably be overlooked in the first enthusiasm. How-
ever, if the change to a superb management comes from the brilliance
of heretofore little-known executives, months or years may go by dur-
ing which the company will still have poor financial repute and sell at a
low ratio to earnings. Recognizing such situations — prior to the price
spurt that will inevitably accompany the financial community’s correc-
tion of its appraisal — is one of the first and simplest ways in which the
fledgling investor can practice thinking for himself rather than follow-
ing the crowd.

How I Go about Finding
a Growth Stork

A fter the publication of the original edition of Common Stocks and
Uncommon Profits, I began receiving an amazing, to me, number of
letters from readers all over the country. One of the most common
requests made was for more detailed data about just what an investor
(or his financial advisor) should do to find investments that will lead
to spectacular gains in market price. Since there is so much interest in
this matter, it may be beneficial to include some comments on this
subject here.

Doing these things takes a great deal of time, as well as skill and
alertness. The small investor may feel a disproportionate amount of work
is involved for the sums he has at his disposal. It would be nice, not only
for him but also for the large investor, if there were some easy, quick way
of selecting bonanza stocks. I strongly doubt that such a way exists. How
much time should be spent on these matters is, of course, something
each investor must decide for himself in relation to the sums he has
available for investment, his interests, and his capabilities.

I cannot say with any assurance that my method is the only possible
system for finding bonanza investments. Nor can I even be completely
sure that it is the best method although, obviously, if I thought some other
available approach were better I would not be using this one. For some
years, however, I have followed the steps I am about to outline in detail;
doing this has worked and worked well for me. Particularly in the highly
important earlier stages, someone else with greater background knowl-
edge, better contacts, or more ability might make some important varia-
tions in these methods and attain further improvement in over-all results.

How I Go about Finding a Growth Stock 1 6 3

There are two stages in the following outline, at each of which the
quality of the decisions made will have tremendous effect upon the
financial results obtained. Everyone will recognize instantly the over-
whelming importance of the decision at the second of these two critical
points, which is, “Do I now buy this particular stock or do I not?” What
may not be as easy to recognize is that right at the start of an organized
method for selecting common stocks, decisions must also be made that
can have just about as great impact on the chance of uncovering an
investment that ten years later will have increased, say, twelve-fold in
value one rather than that has not quite doubled.

This is the problem that confronts anyone about to start on a quest
for a major growth security: there are literally thousands of stocks in
dozens of industries that could conceivably qualify as worthy of the
most intensive study. You cannot be sure about many of them until con-
siderable work has been done. However, no one could possibly have the
time to investigate more than a tiny per cent of the available field. How
do you select the one or the very few stocks to the investigation of
which you will devote such time as you have to spare?

This is a far more complex problem than it seems. You must make
decisions that can easily screen out from investigation situations that a
few years later have produced fortunes. You may make decisions that
limit your work to rather barren soil, in that as you gather more data the
outlook appears more and more clear that you are approaching the
answer you are bound to find in the overwhelming majority of all inves-
tigations. This is that the company is run of the mill or maybe a little
better, but that it just is not the occasional bonanza that leads to spec-
tacular profit. Yet this key decision determines whether, financially
speaking, you are prospecting rich ore or poor on the basis of relatively
little knowledge of the facts. This is because you must make decisions
on what to or what not to spend your time before you have done
enough work to have a proper basis for your conclusion. If you have
done enough work to have adequate background for your decisions,
you will have already spent so much time on each situation that, in
effect, you will have made this vital first decision on a snap basis any-
way. You just will not have realized that you have done so.

Some years ago I would sincerely but mistakenly have told you that
I used what would have sounded like a neat method for solving this
problem. As a result of companies which I had already investigated, and
particularly as a result of familiarity with the companies in which the

164 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

funds I manage were concentrated, I had become friendly with a sizable
number of quite able business executives and scientists. I could talk to
these people about companies other than their own. I believed that ideas
and leads furnished by such unusually well-informed contacts would
provide a magnificent supply of prospects for investigation that would
contain an abnormally large per cent of companies that might prove to
have the outstanding characteristics I am constantly seeking.

However, I attempt to use the same analytical and self-critical meth-
ods of improving the techniques of my own business that I expect the
companies in which I invest to use to improve their operations. There-
fore, some years ago I made a study to determine two things. How had
I come to select the companies which I had chosen for investigation?
With hindsight to help me, were there significant variations in the per-
centage of worthwhile results (in the way of outstanding investments
subsequently acquired) between investigations made as a result of the
original “spark plug” idea coming from one type of source and those
coming from sources of a completely different nature?

What I found astonished me but is entirely logical on analysis. The
business executive-scientist classification which I had believed was my
main source of original ideas causing me to investigate one company
rather than another, actually had furnished only about one-fifth of the
leads that had excited me enough to engage in a further study. Of even
greater significance, these leads had not proven an above average source
of good investments. This one-fifth of total investigations had led to
only about one-sixth of all worthwhile purchases.

In contrast, the first original idea for almost four-fifths of the inves-
tigations and almost five-sixths of the ultimate pay-out (as measured by
worthwhile purchases) had come from a quite different group. Across
the nation I had gradually come to know and respect a small number of
men whom I had seen do outstanding work of their own in selecting
common stocks for growth. A not necessarily complete list of these able
investment men would include one or more living in such widely scat-
tered places as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Buffalo, Chicago, San
Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego. In many instances I might not
agree at all with the conclusions of any of these men as to a stock they
particularly liked, even to the point of feeling it worthy of investigation.
In one or two cases, I might even consider the thoroughness of their
work as suspect. However, because in each case I knew their financial
minds were keen and their records impressive, I would be disposed to

165

How I Go about Finding a Growth Stock

listen eagerly to details they might furnish concerning any company
within my range of interests that they considered unusually attractive for
major appreciation.

Furthermore, since they were trained investment men, I could usu-
ally get rather quickly their opinion upon the key matters most impor-
tant to me in my decision as to whether it might be a good gamble to
investigate the company in question. What are these key matters? Essen-
tially they cover how the company would measure up to our already
discussed fifteen points, with special emphasis in this preliminary stage
on two specific subjects. Is the company in, or being steered toward,
lines of business affording opportunities of unusual growth in sales? Are
these lines where, as the industry grows, it would be relatively simple for
newcomers to start up and displace the leading units? If the nature of
the business is such that there is little way of preventing newcomers
from entering the field, the investment value of such growth as occurs
may prove rather slight.

How about using investment men of fewer accomplishments or less
ability as a source of original leads on what to investigate? If I did not
feel that better men were available, I doubtless would use them some-
what more than I do. I always try to find the time at least to listen once
to any investment man, if only to be on the alert for keen younger men
coming up in the business and to be sure I am not overlooking one.
However, the competition for time is terrific. As I downgrade either a
financial man’s investment judgment or his reliability as to facts pre-
sented, I find my tendency to spend time investigating the company he
presents decreasing even more than proportionally.

How about selecting original leads for investigation from the ideas in
printed material? Occasionally I have been influenced by the special
reports issued by the most reliable brokerage houses when these reports are
not for widespread distribution but solely to a few selected people. How-
ever, on the whole, I would feel the typical public printed brokerage bul-
letin available to everyone is not a fertile source. There is too much danger
of inaccuracies in them. More important, most only repeat what is already
common knowledge in the financial community. Similarly, I will occa-
sionally get a worthwhile idea from the best of the trade and financial peri-
odicals (which I find quite helpful for completely different purposes); but
because I believe they have certain inherent limitations on what they can
print about many of the matters of greatest interest to me, I do not find
them a rich source of new ideas on the best companies to investigate.

166 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

There is another possible source of worthwhile original leads which
others with better technical backgrounds or greater ability might be
able to employ profitably, although I have not successfully done so. This
source is the major consulting research laboratories such as Arthur D.
Little, Stanford Research Institute, or Battelle. I have found that person-
nel of these organizations have great understanding of just the business
and technical developments from which worthwhile original invest-
ment ideas should come. However, I have found the usefulness of this
group largely blocked by their tendency (which is entirely praiseworthy)
to be unwilling to discuss most of what they know because it might vio-
late the confidence of the client companies for which they have
worked. If someone smarter than I am could find a way, without injury
to these client companies, of unlocking the mine of investment infor-
mation I suspect these organizations possess, he might well have found
a means of importantly improving on my methods regarding this par-
ticular step in the quest for growth stocks.

So much for step one. On the basis of a few hours’ conversation, usu-
ally with an outstanding investment man, occasionally with a business
executive or scientist, I have made a decision that a particular company
might be exciting. I will start my investigation. What do I do next?

There are three things I emphatically do not do. I do not (for rea-
sons that I think will soon become clear) approach anyone in the man-
agement at this stage. I do not spend hours and hours going over old
annual reports and making minute studies of minor year-by-year
changes in the balance sheet. I do not ask every stockbroker I know
what he thinks of the stock. I will, however, glance over the balance
sheet to determine the general nature of the capitalization and financial
position. If there is an SEC prospectus I will read with care those parts
covering breakdown of total sales by product lines, competition, degree
of officer or other major ownership of common stock (this can also usu-
ally be obtained from the proxy statement), and all earning statement
figures throwing light on depreciation (and depletion, if any), profit
margins, extent of research activity, and abnormal or non-recurring
costs in prior years’ operations.

Now I am ready really to go to work. I will use the “scuttlebutt”
method I have already described just as much as I possibly can. Here,
rather than as a source of original ideas for investment, is where the peo-
ple I have come to know in the business executive -scientist group can
be of inestimable value. I will try to see (or reach on the telephone)

How I Go about Finding a Growth Stock 1 ^ 7

every key customer, supplier, competitor, ex-employee, or scientist in a
related field that I know or whom I can approach through mutual
friends. However, suppose I still do not know enough people or do not
have a friend of a friend who knows enough of the people who can
supply me with the required background. What do I do then?

Frankly, if I am not even close to getting much of the information
I need, I will give up the investigation and go on to something else. To
make big money on investments it is unnecessary to get some answer to
every investment that might be considered. What is necessary is to get
the right answer a large proportion of the very small number of times
actual purchases are made. For this reason, if way too little background
is forthcoming and the prospects for a great deal more is bleak, I believe
the intelligent thing to do is to put the matter aside and go on to some-
thing else.

However, suppose quite a bit of background has become available.
You have called on everyone you know or can readily approach, but
have spotted one or two people who you believe could do much to
complete your picture if they would talk freely to you. I would not just
walk in on them off the street. Most people, interested as they may be
in the industry in which they are engaged, are not inclined to tell to
total strangers what they really think about the strong and weak points
of a customer, a competitor, or a supplier. I would find out the com-
mercial bank of the people I want to meet. If in matters of this sort you
approach a commercial bank that knows you, tell them frankly whom
you want to meet and exactly why, it is surprising how obliging most
commercial bankers will be in trying to help you — provided you do not
bother them too often. It is possibly even more surprising how helpful
most businessmen will try to be if you are introduced to them by their
regular bankers. Of course this help will only be forthcoming if the
bankers in question have no doubt whatsoever that the information you
are seeking is solely for background purposes in determining whether
to make an investment, and that under no circumstance would you ever
embarrass anyone by quoting the source of any derogatory information.

If you follow these rules, banking help can, at times, help complete the
stage of an investigation that otherwise might never be complete
enough to be of any value.

It is only after “scuttlebutt” has obtained for you a large part of the
data that in our chapter on the fifteen points 1 indicated can best be
obtained from such sources, that you should be ready to take the next

168 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

step and think about approaching the management. I think it rather
important that investors thoroughly understand why this is so.

Good managements, those most suitable for outstanding invest-
ment, are nearly all quite frank in answering questions about the com-
pany’s weak points as fully as about its strong points. However, no mat-
ter how punctilious a management may be in this respect, no
corporate officer in his own self-interest can be expected, unasked, to
volunteer some of the most significant matters for you, the investor, to
know. How can a vice president to whom you say, “Is there anything
else you think I, as a prospective investor, should know about your
company?” give a reply to the effect that the other top members of the
management team are doing splendidly but several years of poor work
by the vice president for marketing is beginning to cause weakness in
sales? Could he possibly volunteer further that this may not be too
important, since young Williams, on the marketing staff, has out-
standing ability and in another six months he will be in charge and
the situation brought back under control? Of course he could not
volunteer these things. However, I have found that if he learns you
already know of the marketing weakness, his remark may be diplo-
matically worded, but with the right type of management and if they
have confidence in your judgment, you will be furnished with a real-
istic answer as to whether anything is or is not being done to remedy
weaknesses of this type.

In other words, only by having what “scuttlebutt” can give you
before you approach management, can you know what you should
attempt to learn when you visit a company. Without it you may be
unable to determine that most basic of points — the competency of top
management itself. In even a medium-sized company, there may be a
key management team of as many as five men. You are not apt to meet
all of them on your first or second visit. If you do, you will probably
meet some for such a short time you will have no basis for determining
their relative ability. Frequently one or two men of the five will be far
more able or far less able than the others. Without “scuttlebutt” to guide
you, depending on whom you meet you may form far too high or far
too low an estimate of the entire management. With “scuttlebutt” you
may have formed a fairly accurate idea of who is particularly strong or
particularly weak, and are in a better position to ask to meet the specif-
ic officers you may want to know better, thereby satisfying yourself as
to whether this “scuttlebutt” impression is correct.

169

How I Go about Finding a Growth Stock

It is my opinion that in almost any field nothing is worth doing
unless it is worth doing right. When it comes to selecting growth stocks,
the rewards for proper action are so huge and the penalty for poor judg-
ment is so great that it is hard to see why anyone would want to select
a growth stock on the basis of superficial knowledge. If an investor or
financial man wants to go about finding a growth stock properly, I
believe one rule he should always follow is this: he should never visit the
management of any company he is considering for investment until he
has first gathered together at least 50 per cent of all the knowledge he
would need to make the investment. If he contacts the management
without having done this first, he is in the highly dangerous position of
knowing so little of what he should seek that his chance of coming up
with the right answer is largely a matter of luck.

There is another reason I believe it so important to get at least half
the required knowledge about a company before visiting it. Prominent
management and managements in companies in colorful industries get
a tremendous number of requests for their time from people in the
investment business. Because the price at which their stock sells can
have so much significance to them in so many ways, they will usually
devote the time of valuable people to such visitors. However, from com-
pany after company I have heard the same type of comment. To no one
will they be rude, but the amount of time furnished by key men, rather
than by those who receive financial visitors but make few executive
decisions, depends far more on the company’s estimate of the compe-
tence of the visitor than it does on the size of the financial interest he
represents. More important, the degree of willingness to furnish infor-
mation that is, how far the company will go in answering specific
questions and discussing vital matters — depends overwhelmingly on this
estimate of each visitor. Those who just drop in on a company without
real advance preparation, often have two strikes against them almost
before the visit starts.

This matter of whom you see (that it be the men who make the real
decisions, rather than a sort of financial public relations officer) is so
important that it is wise to go to considerable trouble to be introduced
to a management by the right people. An important customer or a
major stockholding interest known to management can be an excellent
source of introduction to pave the way for a first visit. So can the com-
pany’s investment banking connections. In any event, those really want-
ing to get optimum results from their first visit should make sure that

170 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

those introducing them have a high regard for the visitor and pass the
reasons for this good opinion on to the management.

Just a few weeks prior to my writing these words an incident
occurred which may illustrate how much preparation I feel should be
made prior to a first call on management. I was lunching with two rep-
resentatives of a major investment firm, one which is the investment
banker for two of the handful of companies in which the funds I man-
age are invested. Knowing the small number of situations I go into and
the long time I normally hold them, one of these gentlemen asked me
the ratio between the new (to me) companies I visited and the ones of
these into which I actually bought. I asked him to guess. He estimated
I bought into one for every two hundred and fifty visited. The other
gentleman ventured that it might be one for every twenty-five. Actual-
ly it runs somewhere between one to every two and one to every two
and one-half! This is not because one out of every two and one-half
companies I look at measures up to what I believe are my rather rigor-
ous standards for purchase. If he had substituted “companies looked at”
for “companies visited” perhaps one in forty or fifty might be about
right. If he had substituted “companies considered as possibilities for
investigation” (whether I actually investigated them or not) then the
original estimate of one stock bought for every two hundred and fifty
considered would be rather close to the mark. What he had overlooked
was that I believe it so impossible to get much benefit from a plant visit
until a great deal of pertinent “scuttlebutt” work has been done first, and
that I have found that “scuttlebutt” so many times furnishes an accurate
forecast of how well a company will measure up to my fifteen points,
that usually by the time I am ready to visit the management there will
be at least a fair chance that I will want to buy into the company. A great
many of the less attractive situations will have been weeded out along
the way.

This about sums up how I go about finding growth stocks. Possi-
bly one-fifth of my first investigations start from ideas gleaned from
friends in industry and four-fifths from culling what I believe are the
more attractive selections of a small number of able investment men.
These decisions are frankly a fast snap judgment on which companies
I should spend my time investigating and which I should ignore. Then
after a brief scrutiny of a few key points in an SEC prospectus, I will
seek “scuttlebutt” aggressively, constantly working toward how close to
our fifteen-point standard the company comes. I will discard one

171

How I Go about Finding a Growth Stock

prospective investment after another along the way. Some because the
evidence piles up that they are just run of the mill. Others because I
cannot get enough evidence to be reasonably sure one way or the other.
Only in the occasional case when I have a great amount of favorable
data do I then go to the final step of contacting the management. Then
if after meeting with management I find my prior hopes pretty well
confirmed and some of my previous fears eased by answers that to me
make sense, at last I am ready to feel I may be rewarded for all my
efforts.

Because I have heard them so many times, I know the objections a
few of you will make to this approach. How can anyone be expected to
spend this amount of time finding just one investment? Why are not the
answers already neatly worked out for me by the first person in the
investment business to whom I ask what I should buy? I would ask
those with this reaction to look at the world around them. In what
other line of activity could you put $10,000 in one year and ten years
later (with only occasional checking in the meantime to be sure man-
agement continues of high caliber) be able to have an asset worth from
$40,000 to $150,000? This is the kind of reward gained from selecting
growth stocks successfully Is it either logical or reasonable that anyone
could do this with an effort no harder than reading a few simply worded
brokers free circulars in the comfort of an armchair one evening a
week? Does it make sense that anyone should be able to pick up this
type of profit by paying the first investment man he sees a commission
of $135, which is the New York Stock Exchange charge for buying
500 shares of stock at $20 per share? So far as I know, no other fields of
endeavor offer these huge rewards this easily. Similarly, they cannot be
made in the stock market unless you or your investment advisor utilize
the same traits that will bring large rewards in any other field of activity.
These are great effort combined with ability and enriched by both
judgment and vision. If these attributes are employed and something
fairly close to the rules laid down in this chapter are used to find com-
panies measuring well on our fifteen-point standard but not yet enjoy-
ing as much status in the financial community as such an appraisal
would warrant, the record is crystal clear that fortune-producing growth
stocks can be found. However, they cannot be found without hard work
and they cannot be found every day

Summary and Conclusion

W e are starting the second decade of a half century that may well
see the standard of living of the human race advance more than
it has in the preceding five thousand years. Great have been the
investment risks of the recent past. Even greater have been the financial
rewards for the successful. However, in this field of investment, the risks
and rewards of the past hundred years may be small beside those of the
next fifty.

In these circumstances it may be well to take stock of our situation.
We almost certainly have not conquered the business cycle. We may not
even have tamed it. Nevertheless, we have added certain new factors that
significantly affect the art of investment in common stocks. One of these
is the emergence of modern corporate management, with all that this
has done to strengthen the investment characteristics of common shares.
Another is the economic harnessing of scientific research and develop-
mental engineering.

The emergence of these factors has not changed the basic principles
of successful common stock investment. It has made them more impor-
tant than ever. This book has attempted to show what these basic prin-
ciples are, what type of stock to buy, when to buy it, and most particu-
larly, never to sell it — as long as the company behind the common stock
maintains the characteristics of an unusually successful enterprise.

It is hoped that those sections dealing with the most common mis-
takes of many otherwise able investors will prove of some interest. It
should be remembered, however, that knowing the rules and under-
standing these common mistakes will do nothing to help those who do

Summary and Conclusion 1 7 3

not have some degree of patience and self-discipline. One of the ablest
investment men I have ever known told me many years ago that in the
stock market a good nervous system is even more important than a
good head. Perhaps Shakespeare unintentionally summarized the
process of successful common stoch investment: “There is a tide in the
affairs of men which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune.”

Part Two

CONSERVATIVE
INVESTORS SLEEP
WELL

All of my business life, I have believed that the success of my own busi-
ness — or any business — depends on following the principles of two Is
and an H. These principles are integrity, ingenuity, and hard work. I
would like to dedicate this book to my three sons in the belief that
Arthur and Ken are following the principles of the two I’s and an H in
businesses very similar to mine, as is Don in one that is quite different.

Introduction

W hile these things are hard to measure precisely, indications are
overwhelming that only once before in this century has the
morale of the American investor been at anything like the low
ebb that exists as these words are being written. The well-known and
much publicized Dow Jones Industrial Average is an excellent indicator
of the day-to-day change in stock-market levels. However, when a
longer period is under consideration, this average may mask rather than
reveal the full extent of the injuries suffered by many who have held
common stocks in the recent past. One index that purports to show
what has happened to all publicly traded common stocks but that does
not weigh each stock issue by the number of shares outstanding shows
the average stock in mid-1974 down 70 percent from its 1968 peak.

Faced with this kind of loss, large groups of investors have acted in
completely predictable ways. One group has pulled out of stocks com-
pletely. Yet many corporations are doing surprisingly well. In an envi-
ronment where more and more inflation appears inevitable, properly
selected stocks may be far less risky than some other placements that
appear safer. There is an even larger group that is of particular interest:
people who have decided that “from now on we will act more conserv-
atively.” The usual rationale here is to confine purchases only to the
largest companies, the names of which at least are known to almost
everyone. There are probably few investors in the United States and
almost none in the Northeast who do not know the names Penn Central
and Consolidated Edison or the nature of these companies’ services. By
conventional standards, Penn Central some years ago and Consolidated

178 CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

Edison more recently were considered conservative investments. Unfor-
tunately, often there is so much confusion between acting conservative-
ly and acting conventionally that for those truly determined to conserve
their assets, this whole subject needs considerable untangling — which
should start with not one definition but two:

1. A conservative investment is one most likely to conserve (i.e.,
maintain) purchasing power at a minimum of risk.

2. Conservative investing is understanding of what a conservative
investment consists and then, in regard to specific investments,
following a procedural course of action needed properly to
determine whether specific investment vehicles are, in fact, con-
servative investments.

Consequently, to be a conservative investor, not one but two things
are required either of the investor or of those whose recommendations
he is following. The qualities desired in a conservative investment must
be understood. Then a course of inquiry must be made to see if a par-
ticular investment so quaHfies. Without both conditions being present the
buyer of common stocks may be fortunate or unfortunate, conventional
in his approach or unconventional, but he is not being conservative.

It seems to me of overriding importance that confusion on matters
such as these be swept aside for all time to come. Not only stockhold-
ers themselves but also the American economy as a whole cannot afford
ever again to have those who make a sincere effort to understand the rules
suffer the type of bloodbath recently experienced by this generation of
investors — a bloodletting exceeded only by that which another genera-
tion experienced in the Great Depression some forty years earlier.
America today has unparalleled opportunities for improving the way of
life for all its people. It certainly has the technical knowledge and the
know-how to do so. However, to do these things in the traditional
American way will require some genuine re-education as to the basic
fundamentals for a great many investors as well as for many of those in
the investment industry itself. Only if many more investors come to feel
financially secure because they truly are secure will there be a reopen-
ing of the markets for new stock issues that will enable companies legit-
imately requiring additional equity funds to be in a position to secure
them on a basis conducive to going ahead with new projects. If this does
not happen, all that is left is to try to go ahead with what needs to be

Introduction

179

done in the way that, both here and abroad, has always proven so costly,
wasteful, and inefficient — by government financing, with management
under the dead hand of bureaucratic officialdom.

For these reasons I believe that the investors’ problems of today
should be met head on and forthrightly. In an attempt to deal with these
problems in this book, I have leaned heavily on the counsel of my son,
Ken, who contributed the title as well as many other matters, including
part of the basic conception of what lies herein. I cannot adequately
acknowledge his assistance in this presentation.

This book is divided into four distinct sections. The first deals with
the anatomy — if the word may be used — of a conservative stock invest-
ment as delineated in definition number one. The second analyzes the
part played by the financial community — the mistakes, if you will — that
helped produce the current bear market. This critique was not intend-
ed merely to throw rocks but to point out that similar errors can be
avoided in the future and that certain basic investment principles
become clear when the mistakes of the recent past are studied. The third
section deals with the course of action that must be taken to qualify as
conservative investing as delineated in definition number two. The final
section deals with some of the influences rampant in today s world that
have caused grave doubts in the minds of many as to whether any
common stock is a suitable means for preserving assets — in other words,
whether for anything other than as gambling vehicles common stocks
should be considered at all. This book will, I hope, throw light on
whether the problems that helped produce the recent bear market have
created a condition where stock ownership is just a trap for the unwary
or whether, as in every prior major bear market in U.S. history, they
have created a magnificent opportunity for those with the ability and
the self-discipline to think for themselves and to act independently of
the popular emotions of the moment.

Philip A. Fisher
San Mateo, California

The First Dimension
of a Conservative
Investment

Superiority in Production, Marketing,
Research, and Financial Skills

A corporation of the size and type to provide a conservative invest-
ment is necessarily a complex organization. To understand what
must be present in such an investment we might start by portray-
ing one dimension of the characteristics we must be sure exist. This
dimension breaks down into four major subdivisions:

LOW-COST PRODUCTION

To be a truly conservative investment a company — for a majority if not
for all of its product lines — must be the lowest-cost producer or about
as low a cost producer as any competitor. It must also give promise of
continuing to be so in the future. Only in this way will it give its own-
ers a broad enough margin between costs and selling price to create two

The First Dimension of o Conservative Investment 1 8 1

vital conditions. One is sufficient leeway below the break-even point of
most competition. When a bad year hits the industry, prices are unlike-
ly to stay for long under this break-even point. As long as they do, loss-
es for much of the higher-cost competition will be so great that some
of these competitors will be forced to cease production. This almost
automatically increases the profits of the surviving low-cost companies
because they benefit from the increased production that comes to them
as they take over demand formerly supplied by the closed plants. The
low-cost company will benefit even more when the decreased supply
from competitors enables it not only to do more business but also to
increase prices as excess supplies stop pressing on the market.

The second condition is that the greater than average profit margin
should enable a company to earn enough to generate internally a sig-
nificant part or perhaps all of the funds required for financing growth.
This avoids much or even all of the need for raising additional long-
term capital that can (a) result in new shares being issued and diluting
the value of already outstanding shares and/or (b) create an additional
burden of debt, with fixed interest payments and fixed maturities (which
must largely be met from future earnings) which greatly increase the
risks of the common-stock owners.

However, it should be realized that, just as the degree to which a
company is a low-cost producer increases the safety and conservatism of
the investment, so in a boom period in a bullish market does it decrease
its speculative appeal. The percentage that profits rise in such times will
always be far greater for the high-cost, risky, marginal company. Simple
arithmetic will explain why. Let us take an imaginary example of two
companies of the same size that, when times were normal, were selling
widgets at ten cents apiece. Company A has a profit of four cents per
widget and Company B of one cent. Now let us suppose that costs
remain the same but a temporary extra demand for widgets pushes up
the price to twelve cents, with both companies remaining the same size.
The strong company has increased profits from four cents per widget to
six cents, a gain of 50 percent, but the high-cost company has made a
300 percent profit gain, or tripled its profits. This is why, short-range, the
high-cost company sometimes goes up more in a boom and also why, a
few years later, when hard times come and widgets fall back to eight
cents, the strong company is still making a reduced but comfortable
profit. If the high-cost company doesn’t go bankrupt, it is likely to pro-
duce another crop of badly hurt investors (or perhaps speculators who

182

CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

thought they were investors) who are sure something is wrong with the
system rather than with themselves.

All of the above has been written with manufacturing companies in
mind; hence the term production has been used. Many companies, of
course, are not manufacturers but ire in service lines, such as wholesal-
ing, retailing or one of the many subdivisions of the financial world such
as banking or insurance. The same principles apply, but the word opera-
tions is substituted for production and a low- or high-cost operator for a
low- or high-cost producer.

STRONG MARKETING ORGANIZATION

A strong marketer must be constantly alert to the changing desires of its
customers so that the company is supplying what is desired today, not
what used to be desired. At the turn of the century, for example, there
was something wrong with the marketing efforts of a leading manufac-
turer of horse-drawn buggies if it persisted in trying to compete by
making finer and finer buggies rather than turning to automobiles or
going out of business altogether. To bring our example up to date, per-
haps well before the Arab oil embargo made every home in America
aware that large automobiles were big gas guzzlers, there was something
wrong with the segment of the automobile industry that failed to rec-
ognize the ever-increasing popularity of small imported compacts as a
sign that public demand was swinging toward a product that cost less,
was cheaper to operate, and was easier to park than the larger, flashier
models that for so many years had been favorites.

But recognizing changes in public taste and then reacting promptly
to these changes is not enough. As has been said before, in the business
world customers simply do not beat a path to the door of the man with
the better mousetrap. In the competitive world of commerce it is vital
to make the potential customer aware of the advantages of a product or
service. This awareness can be created only by understanding what the
potential buyer really wants (sometimes when the customer himself
doesn’t clearly recognize why these advantages appeal to him) and
explaining it to him not in the seller’s terms but in his terms.

Whether this is best done by advertising, by salesmen making calls,
by specialized independent marketing organizations, or by any combi-
nation of these depends on the nature of the business. But what is

The First Dimension of o Conservative Investment

183

required in every instance is close control and constant managerial
measurement of the cost effectiveness of whatever means are used. Lack
of outstanding management in these areas can result (a) in losing a sig-
nificant volume of business that would otherwise be available; (b) in
having much higher costs and therefore obtaining smaller profit on
what business is obtained; and (c) because of companies’ having varia-
tions in the profitability of various elements of their product line, in fail-
ing to attain the maximum possible profit mix within the line. An effi-
cient producer or operator with weak marketing and selling may be
compared to a powerful engine that, because of a loose pulley belt or
badly adjusted differential, is producing only a fraction of the results it
otherwise would have attained.

OUTSTANDING RESEARCH AND
TECHNICAL EFFORT

Not so very long ago it seemed that outstanding technical ability was
vital only to a few highly scientifically oriented industries such as elec-
tronics, aerospace, pharmaceutical and chemical manufacturing. As these
have grown, their ever-widening technologies have so penetrated virtu-
ally all lines of manufacturing and nearly all the service industries that
today to have outstanding research and technical talent is nearly, if not
quite, as important for a shoe manufacturer, a bank, a retailer or an
insurance company as it is for what were once considered the exotic sci-
entific industries that maintained large research staffs. Technological
efforts are now channeled in two directions: to produce new and better
products (in this connection, research scientists may, of course, do some-
what more for a chemical company than for a grocery chain) and to
perform services in a better way or at a lower cost than in the past. With
regard to the latter objective, outstanding technical talent can be equal-
ly valuable for either group. Actually, in some of the service businesses,
technological groups are opening up new product lines as well as paving
the way for performing old services better. Banks are an example. Low-
cost electronic input devices and minicomputers are enabling them to
offer accounting and bookkeeping services to customers, thus creating
a new product line for these institutions.

In research and technology, there is as much variation between the
efficiency of one company and another as there is in marketing. In new

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CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

product development, the complexity of the task almost guarantees this.
Important as it is, the degree of technical competence or ingenuity of
one company’s research staff as compared to that of another is only one
of the factors affecting the benefits that the company derives from its
research efforts. Developing new products usually calls for the pooling
of the efforts of a number of researchers, each skilled in a different tech-
nological specialty. How well these individuals work together (or can be
induced by a leader to work together and stimulate each other) is often
as important as the individual competence of the people involved. Fur-
thermore, to maximize profits, it is vital not to develop just any prod-
uct but one for which there will be significant customer demand, one
that (nearly always) can be sold by the company’s existing marketing
organization, and one that can be made at a price that will yield a
worthwhile profit. All of this requires efficient liaison between research
and both marketing and production. The best corporate research team
in the world can become nothing but a liability if it develops only prod-
ucts that cannot be readily sold. For true investment superiority a com-
pany must have above-average ability to control all these complex rela-
tionships yet at the same time not so overcontrol them as to cause its
researchers to lose the drive and the ingenuity that made them out-
standing in the first place.

FINANCIAL SKILL

Again and again in this discussion of production, marketing and
research, the terms profit and profit margin have been used. In a large
company with a diverse product line, it is not a simple matter to be sure
of the cost of each product in relation to the rest, as most costs other
than materials and direct labor are spread over a number of such prod-
ucts, maybe over all of them. Companies with above-average financial
talent have several significant advantages. Knowing accurately how
much they make on each product, they can make their greatest efforts
where these will produce maximum gains. Intimate knowledge of the
extent of each element of costs, not just in manufacturing but in selling
and research as well, spotlights in even minor phases of company activ-
ity the places where it is logical to make special efforts to reduce costs,
either through technological innovations or by improving people s spe-
cific assignments. Most important of all, through skillful budgeting and

The First Dimension of a Conservative Investment

185

accounting, the truly outstanding company can create an early-warning
system whereby unfavorable influences that threaten the profit plan can
be quickly detected. Remedial action can then be taken to avoid the
painful surprises that have jolted investors in many companies. Nor do
the “goodies” that accrue to investors from superior financial skills stop
at this point. They usually lead to a better choice of capital investments
that bring the highest return on the company’s investment capital. They
also can lead to better control of receivables and inventory, a matter of
increasing importance in periods of high interest rates.

To summarize: The company that qualifies well in this first dimen-
sion of a conservative investment is a very low-cost producer or opera-
tor in its field, has outstanding marketing and financial ability and a
demonstrated above-average skill on the complex managerial problem
of attaining worthwhile results from its research or technological organ-
ization. In a world where change is occurring at an ever-increasing pace,
it is (1) a company capable of developing a flow of new and profitable
products or product lines that will more than balance older lines that
may become obsolete by the technological innovations of others; (2) a
company able now and in the future to make these lines at costs suffi-
ciently low so as to generate a profit stream that will grow at least as fast
as sales and that even in the worst years of general business will not
diminish to a point that threatens the safety of an investment in the
business; and (3) a company able to sell its newer products and those
which it may develop in the future at least as profitably as those with
which it is involved today.

This is a one-dimensional picture of a prudent investment — one
which, if not spoiled by the view from other dimensions, represents an
investment with which the investor is unlikely to become disillusioned.
But before going on to examine these other dimensions, there is one
additional point that should be fully understood. If the objective is con-
serving one’s funds, if the goal is safety, why have we been talking about
growth and the development of new and additional product lines? Why
isn’t it enough to maintain a business at its existing size and level of prof-
its without running all the risks that occur when new endeavors are
started? When we come to a discussion of the influence of inflation on
investments, other reasons for the importance of growth will present
themselves. But fundamentally it should never be forgotten that, in a
world where change is occurring at a faster and faster pace, nothing long
remains the same. It is impossible to stand still. A company will either

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CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

grow or shrink. A strong offense is the best defense. Only by growing
better can a company be sure of not growing worse. Companies that
have failed to go uphill have invariably gone downhill — and, if that has
been true in the past, it will be even more true in the future. This is
because, in addition to an ever-ihcreasing pace of technological innova-
tion, changing social customs and buying habits and new demands of
government are altering at an ever-increasing pace the rate at which
even the stodgiest industries are changing.

The Second Dimension

The People Factor

B riefly summarized, the first dimension of a conservative investment
consists of outstanding managerial competence in the basic areas of
production, marketing, research, and financial controls. This first
dimension describes a business as it is today, being essentially a matter of
results. The second dimension deals with what produced these results
and, more importantly, will continue to produce them in the future. The
force that causes such things to happen, that creates one company in an
industry that is an outstanding investment vehicle and another that is
average, mediocre, or worse, is essentially people.

Edward H. Heller, a pioneer venture capitalist whose comments
during his business life greatly influenced some of the ideas expressed
in this book, used the term “vivid spirit” to describe the type of indi-
vidual to whom he was ready to give significant financial backing. He
said that behind every unusually successful corporation was this kind
of determined entrepreneurial personality with the drive, the origi-
nal ideas, and the skill to make such a company a truly worthwhile
investment.

Within the area of very small companies that grew into consider-
ably larger and quite prosperous ones (the field of his greatest interest
and where he scored his most spectacular successes), Ed Heller was
undoubtedly right. But as these smaller companies grow larger on the

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CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

way to becoming suitable for conservative investment, Ed Heller’s view
might be tempered by that of another brilliant businessman who
expressed serious doubts about the wisdom of investing in a company
whose president was his close personal friend. This mans reason for lack
of enthusiasm: “My friend is orle of the most brilliant men I’ve ever
known. He always has to be right. In a small company this may be fine.
But as you grow, your men have to be right sometimes, too.”

Here is an indication of the heart of the second dimension of a truly
conservative investment: a corporate chief executive dedicated to long-
range growth who has surrounded himself with and delegated consider-
able authority to an extremely competent team in charge of the various
divisions and functions of the company. These people must be engaged
not in an endless internal struggle for power but instead should be work-
ing together toward clearly outlined corporate goals. One of these goals,
which is absolutely essential if an investment is to be a truly successful
one, is that top management take the time to identify and train qualified
and motivated juniors to succeed senior management whenever a
replacement is necessary. In turn, at each level down through the chain
of command, detailed attention should be paid to whether those at this
level are doing the same thing for those one level below them.

Does this mean that a company that qualifies for truly conservative
investing should promote only from within and should never recruit
from the outside except at the lowest levels or for those just starting
their careers? A company growing at a very rapid rate may have such
need for additional people that there just isn’t time to train from with-
in for all positions. Furthermore, even the best-run company will at
times need an individual with a highly specialized skill so far removed
from the general activities of the company that such a specialty simply
cannot be found internally. Someone with expertise in a particular sub-
division of the law, insurance, or a scientific discipline well removed
from the company’s main line of activity would be a case in point. In
addition, occasional hiring from the outside has one advantage: It can
bring a new viewpoint into corporate councils, an injection of fresh
ideas to challenge the accepted way as the best way.

In general, however, the company with real investment merit is the
company that usually promotes from within. This is because all compa-
nies of the highest investment order (these do not necessarily have to be
the biggest and best-known companies) have developed a set of policies
and ways of doing things peculiar to their own needs. If these special

The Second Dimension

189

ways are truly worthwhile, it is always difficult and frequently impossi-
ble to retrain those long accustomed to them to different ways of get-
ting things done. The higher up in an organization the newcomer may
be, the more costly the indoctrination can be. While I can quote no sta-
tistics to prove the point, it is my observation that in better-run com-
panies a surprising number of executives brought in close to the top
tend to disappear after a few years.

Of one thing the investor can be certain: A large company’s need to
bring in a new chief executive from the outside is a damning sign of
something basically wrong with the existing management — no matter
how good the surface signs may have been as indicated by the most
recent earnings statement. It may well be that the new president will do
a magnificent job and in time will build a genuine management team
around him so that such a jolt to the existing organization will never
again become necessary. Consequently, in time such a stock may
become one worthy of a wise investor. But such rebuilding can be so
long and risky a process that, if an investor finds this sort of thing hap-
pening in one of his holdings, he will do well to review all his invest-
ment activities to determine whether his past actions have really been
proceeding from a sound base.

A worthwhile clue is available to all investors as to whether a man-
agement is predominantly one man or a smoothly working team (this
clue throws no light, however, on how good that team may be). The annu-
al salaries of top management of all publicly owned companies are made
public in the proxy statements. If the salary of the number-one man is
very much larger than that of the next two or three, a warning flag is fly-
ing. If the compensation scale goes down rather gradually, it isn’t.

For optimum results for the investor it is not enough that manage-
ment personnel work together as a team and be capable of filling vacan-
cies above them. There should also be present the greatest possible num-
ber of those “vivid spirits” of Ed Heller’s — people with the ingenuity
and determination not to leave things just at their present, possibly quite
satisfactory, state but to build significant further improvements upon
them. Such people are not easy to find. Motorola, Inc., has for some
time been conducting an activity that the financial community has paid
little or no attention to that indicates it is possible to accomplish dra-
matically more in this area than is generally considered possible.

In 1967 Motorola management recognized that the rapid rate of
growth anticipated in the years ahead would inevitably require steady

190 CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

expansion in the upper layers of management. It was decided to meet
the problem head on. In that year Motorola opened its Executive Insti-
tute at Oracle, Arizona. It was designed so that, in an atmosphere remote
from the daily details of the company’s offices and plants, two things
would happen: Motorola persorinel of apparent unusual promise would
be trained in matters beyond the scope of their immediate activities in
order to be able to take on more important jobs; top management
would be furnished significant further evidence as to the degree of pro-
motability of these same people.

At the time of the Executive Institute’s founding, skeptics within the
management questioned whether the effort would be worth the cost.
This was largely because of their belief that fewer than a hundred peo-
ple would be found in the whole Motorola organization with sufficient
talent to make it worthwhile from the company’s standpoint to pro-
vide them with this special training. Events have proven these skeptics
spectacularly wrong. The Institute handles five to six classes a year, with
fourteen in each class. By mid- 1974 about 400 Motorola people had
gone through the school; and a significant number, including some pres-
ent vice-presidents, were found to have capabilities vastly greater than
anything contemplated at the time they were approved for admission.
Furthermore, those involved in this work feel that, from the company’s
standpoint, results in the more recent classes are even more favorable than
in the earlier ones. It now appears that, as total employment at Motorola
continues to expand with the company’s growth, enough promising
Motorola people can be found to maintain this activity indefinitely. All
of this shows, from the investor’s standpoint, that if enough ingenuity is
used, even the companies with well-above-average growth rates can also
“grow” the needed unusual people from within so as to maintain com-
petitive superiority without running the high risk of friction and failure
that so often occurs when a rapidly growing company must go to the
outside for more than a very small part of its outstanding talent.

Everyone has a personality — a combination of character traits that
sets him or her apart from every other individual. Similarly, every cor-
poration has its own ways of doing things — some formalized into well-
articulated policies, others not — that are at least slightly different from
those of other corporations. The more successful the corporation, the
more likely it is to be unique in some of its policies. This is particularly
true of companies that have been successful for a considerable period of
time. In contrast to individuals, whose fundamental character traits

The Second Dimension

191

change but little once they reach maturity, the ways of companies are
influenced not only by outside events but by the reactions to those
events of a whole series of different personalities who, as time goes on,
follow one another in the top posts within the organization.

However much policies may differ among companies, there are
three elements that must always be present if a company’s shares are to
be worthy of holding for conservative, long-range investment.

1. The company must recognize that the world in which
it is operating is changing at an ever-increasing rate.

All corporate thinking and planning must be attuned to challenge what
is now being done — to challenge it not occasionally but again and
again. Every accepted way of doing things must be examined and re-
examined to be as sure as is permitted by human fallibility that this way
is really the best way. Some risks must be accepted in substituting new
methods to meet changing conditions. No matter how comfortable it
may seem to do so, ways of doing things cannot be maintained just
because they worked well in the past and are hallowed by tradition. The
company that is rigid in its actions and is not constantly challenging
itself has only one way to go, and that way is down. In contrast, certain
managements of large companies that have deliberately endeavored to
structure themselves so as to be able to change have been those pro-
ducing some of the most striking rewards for their shareholders. An
example of this is the Dow Chemical Company, with a record of
achievements over the last ten years that is frequently considered to sur-
pass that of any other major chemical company in this country, if not in
the entire world. Possibly Dows most significant departure from past
ways was to break its management into five separate managements on
geographical lines (Dow USA, Dow Europe, Dow Canada, etc. ). It was
believed that only in this way could local problems be handled quickly
as best suited local conditions and without suffering from the bureau-
cratic inefficiencies that so often accompany bigness. The net effect of
this as told by the president of Dow Europe: “The results that today
challenge us are being made by our sister [Dow] companies throughout
the world. They, not our direct competitors, are turning in the gains that
push us to be first.” From the investor’s standpoint perhaps the most
important feature of this change was not that it was made but that it was
made when Dow still had a total sales volume much smaller than many

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CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

other multinational companies that were operating successfully in the
established way. In other words, change and improvement arose from
innovative thinking to make a workable system better — not from a
forced reaction to a crisis.

This is but one of the many ways this pioneering company has bro-
ken with the past to attain its striking competitive record. Another was
the unprecedented step for an industrial company of starting from
scratch to make a success of a wholly owned bank in Switzerland so as
to help finance the needs of its customers in the export market. Here
again the management did not hesitate to break with the past in ways
that engendered some risk in the early stages but that ended up by
enhancing the intrinsic strength of the company.

Many other examples could be cited from the record of this compa-
ny. However, just one more will be mentioned merely to show the
extreme variety of areas such actions may cover. Far earlier than most
other companies, Dow not only recognized the need to spend sizable
sums to avoid pollution but concluded that, if major results were to be
attained, something more was needed than just exhortations from top
management. It was necessary to obtain the consistent cooperation of
middle-level managers. It was decided that the surest way of doing this
was to appeal to the profit motives of those most directly involved. They
were encouraged to find profitable methods of converting the polluting
materials to salable products.The rest is now business history. With the full
power of top management, plant management, and highly skilled chemi-
cal engineers behind these projects, Dow has achieved a series of firsts in
eliminating pollution that has won them the praise of many environmen-
tal groups that are usually quite antibusiness in their viewpoints. Possibly
more important, they have avoided hostility in most, although not all, of
the communities where their plants are located. They have done this at
very little over-all dollar cost and in some cases at an operating profit.

2. There must always be a conscious and continuous
effort, based on fact, not propaganda, to have employees
at every level, from the most newly hired blue-collar or
white-collar worker to the highest levels of management,
feel that their company is a good place to work.

This is a world that requires most of us to put in a substantial number
of hours each week doing what is asked of us by others in order to

The Second Dimension

1 93

receive a paycheck even though we might prefer to spend those hours
on our own amusement or recreation. Most people recognize the neces-
sity for this. When a management can instill a belief, not just among a
few top people but generally among the employees, that it is doing
everything reasonably to be expected to create a good working envi-
ronment and take care of its employees’ interests, the rewards the com-
pany receives in greater productivity and lower costs can vastly out-
weigh the costs of such a policy.

The first step in this policy is seeing (not just talking about it but
actually assuring) that every employee is treated with reasonable digni-
ty and consideration. A year or so ago I read in the press that a union
official claimed that one of the nation’s largest companies was com-
pelling its production-line employees to eat lunch with grease-stained
hands because there was not sufficient time, with the number of wash-
room facilities available, for most of them to be able to wash before
lunch. The stock of this company was of no investment interest to me
for quite different reasons. Therefore, I have no knowledge of whether
the charge was based on fact or was made in the heat of an emotional
battle over wage negotiations. However, if true, this condition alone
would, in my opinion, make the shares of this company unsuitable for
holding by careful investors.

Besides treating employees with dignity and decency, the routes to
obtaining genuine employee loyalty are many and varied. Pension and
profit-sharing plans can play a significant part. So can good communi-
cation to and from all levels of employees. Concerning matters of gen-
eral interest, letting everyone know not only exactly what is being done
but why frequently eliminates friction that might otherwise occur.
Actually knowing what people in various levels of the company are
thinking, particularly when that view is adverse, can be even more
important. A feeling throughout the company that people can express
their grievances to superiors without fear of reprisal can be beneficial,
although this open-door policy is not always simple to maintain because
of the time wasted by cranks and nuts. When grievances occur, decisions
on what to do about them should be made quickly. It is the long-smol-
dering grievance that usually proves the most costly.

A striking example of the benefits that may be attained through cre-
ating a unity of purpose with employees is the “people-effectiveness”
program of Texas Instruments. The history of this program is an excel-
lent example of how brilliant management perseveres with and perfects

194

CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

policies of this sort even when new outside influences force some redi-
rection of these policies. From the early days of this company, top man-
agement held a deep conviction that everyone would gain if a system
could be set up whereby all employees participated in managerial-type
decisions to improve performance but that, to sustain interest on the
part of employees, all participants must genuinely benefit from the
results of their contributions. In the 1950s semiconductor production
was largely a matter of hand assembly, offering many opportunities for
employees to make brilliant individual suggestions for improving per-
formance. Meetings, even formal classes, were held in which production
workers were shown how they could as individuals or groups show the
way to improving operations. At the same time, through both profit-
sharing plans and awards and honors, those participating benefited both
financially and by feeling they were part of the picture. Then mecha-
nization of these former manual operations started to appear. As this
trend grew, there was somewhat less opportunity for certain types of
individual contributions, as in certain ways the machines controlled
what would be done. A few foremen within the organization began
feeling that there was no longer a place for lower-level contributions to
management-type participation. Top management took quite the oppo-
site viewpoint: People-participation would play a greater role than ever
before. Now, however, it would be a group or team effort with the
workers as a group estimating what could be done and setting their own
goals for performance.

Because workers started feeling that they (1) were genuinely partic-
ipating in decisions, not just being told what to do, and (2) were being
rewarded both financially and in honors and recognition, the results
have been spectacular. In instance after instance, teams of workers have
set for themselves goals quite considerably higher than anything man-
agement would have considered suggesting. At times when it appeared
that targeted goals might not be met or when inter-team competition
was producing rivalry, the workers proposed and voluntarily voted such
unheard-of things (for this day and age) as cutting down on coffee
breaks or shortening lunch periods to get the work out. The pressure of
peer groups on the tardy or lazy worker who threatens the goals the
group has set for itself dwarfs any amount of discipline that might be
exerted from above through conventional management methods. Nor
are these results confined to U.S. workers with their lifelong back-
ground in political democracy. They appear to be equally effective and

The Second Dimension

195

mutually beneficial to people, regardless of the color of their skin and
their origins from countries of quite different economic backgrounds.
Though the performance-goal plan was first initiated in the United
States, equally striking results have appeared not just in Texas Instru-
ments plants in the so-called developed industrial nations such as France
and Japan but also in Singapore, with its native Asian employees, and in
Curagao, where those on the payroll are overwhelmingly black. In all
countries the morale effects appear striking when worker teams not
only report directly to top management levels but also know their
reports will be heeded and their accomplishments recognized and
acknowledged.

What all this has meant to investors was spelled out when compa-
ny president Mark Shepherd, Jr., addressed stockholders at the 1974
annual meeting. He stated that a people-effectiveness index had been
established consisting of the net sales billed divided by the total payroll.
Since semiconductors, the company’s largest product line, are one of the
very few products in today’s inflationary world that consistently decline
in unit price and since wages have been rising at the company’s plants
at rates from 7 percent a year in the United States to 20 percent in Italy
and Japan, it would be logical to expect, in spite of improvements in
people-effectiveness, this index to decline. Instead it rose from about
2.25 percent in 1969 to 2.5 percent by the end of 1973. Furthermore,
with definite plans for additional improvement and with further
increases in profit-sharing funds tied into such improvement, it was
announced that it was the company’s goal to bring the index up to
3.1 percent by 1980 — a goal that, if attained, would make the company
a dramatically profitable place to work. Over the years Texas Instruments
has frequently publicized some rather ambitious long-range goals and to
date has rather consistently accomplished them.

From the investment standpoint, there are some extremely impor-
tant similarities in the three examples of people-oriented programs that
were chosen to illustrate aspects of the second dimension of a conser-
vative investment. It is a relatively simple matter to mention and give a
general description of Motorola’s institute for selecting and training
unusual talent to handle the growing needs of the company. It is an
equally simple affair to mention that Dow found a means to stimulate
people to work together to master environmental problems and to make
them profitable for the company, or to state a few facts about the remark-
able people-effectiveness program at Texas Instruments. However, if

196

CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

rWided to start programs like these from scratch, the
another company might be infinitely more complicated than

problems t at cou of directors to approve the necessary appro-

merely persua mg ^fod are easy to f ormu l at e, but their imple-

priation. Programs ^ rent jitter. Mistakes can be very costly. It is
mentation is a q ul e might happen if a training school such as

not hard to lmagm wrQng pe0 pl e for promotion, with the result
Motorola s se ecte the company in disgust. Similarly, suppose

that the best jum f ^ in general, a people-effectiveness plan but
a company trie an ’atmosphere where workers genuinely felt

either fai e o ^ tQ com pensate their employees adequate-

themselves invo they became disillusioned. The misapplication of

ly, with t e resu i: tera Hy wreck a company. Meanwhile, companies
such a program C °^ QUS pe ople-oriented policies and techniques

that do perfect a ^ ways to benefit from them. For these com-

usually find more d techniques— these special ways of approaching
pames, sue po * , . fo e m— are in a sense proprietary. For this reason

It has already been pointed out that in this rapidly changing world com-
it nas ai y They must elt h er get better or worse, improve

0^ downhill. The true investment objective of growth is not just to
, • u , m woid loss. There are very few companies whose man-

make gams u daims to being growth companies. However, a

agements wi abou t being growth-oriented is not necessarily

management a companies seem to have an irresistible urge to

actually so orien e _ le fits at foe end of each accounting period-
show the greates cent down to the bottom line. This a true

to bring every pos ^ never do Its f ocus must be on earning

growth- or lente ^ ^ finance the costs of expanding the business,

sufficient curren n j n g the required additional financial strength

When a justrnen ^ worthy of farsighted investment will give

has been ma e maximum immediate profits when there are gen-

priority to cur wnities for developing new products or process-

ume wort w pro duct lines or for any one of the hundred and

es or or startin S ti ons w hereby a dollar spent today may mean

one more mundane a

The Second Dimension

197

many dollars earned in the future. Such actions can vary all the way
from hiring and training new personnel that will be needed as the busi-
ness grows to forgoing the greatest possible profit on a customer’s order
to build up his permanent loyalty by rushing something to him when
he needs it badly. For the conservative investor, the test of all such
actions is whether management is truly building up the long-range
profits of the business rather than just seeming to. No matter how well
known, the company with a policy that only gives lip service to these
disciplines is not likely to prove a happy vehicle for investment funds.
Neither is one that tries to follow these disciplines but falls down in
executing them, as, for example, a company that makes large research
expenditures but so mishandles its efforts as to gain little from them.

The Third Dimension

Investment Characteristics
of Some Businesses

T he first dimension of a conservative stock investment is the degree
of excellence in the company’s activities that are most important to
present and future profitability. The second dimension is the quali-
ty of the people controlling these activities and the policies they create.
The third dimension deals with something quite different: the degree to
which there does or does not exist within the nature of the business itself
certain inherent characteristics that make possible an above-average
profitability for as long as can be foreseen into the future.

Before examining these characteristics it may be well to point out
why above-average profitability is so important to the investor, not only
as a source of further gain but as a protection for what he already has.
The vital role of growth in this connection has already been discussed.
Growth costs money in many ways. Part of what otherwise would be
the profit stream has to be diverted to experimenting, inventing, test-
marketing, new-product marketing, and all the other operating costs of
expansion, including the complete loss of the inevitable percentage of
such expansion attempts that are bound to fail. Even more costly may
be the additions to factories or stores or equipment that must be made.
Meanwhile, as the business grows, more inventory will inevitably be

The Third Dimension

199

needed to fill the pipelines. Finally, except for the very few businesses
that sell only for cash, there will be a corresponding drain on corporate
resources to take care of the growing volume of receivables. To accom-
plish all these things, profitability is vital.

In inflationary periods the mdtter of profitability becomes even
more important. Usually when prices and, therefore, costs are rising on
a broad front, a business can, in time, pass these costs along through
higher prices of its own. However, this often cannot be done immedi-
ately. During the interim, obviously a much smaller bite is taken out of
the profits of the broad-profit-margin company than occurs for its high-
er-cost competition, since the higher-cost company is probably facing
comparably increased costs of doing business.

Profitability can be expressed in two ways. The fundamental way,
which is the yardstick used by mtist managements, is the return on
invested assets. This is the factor that will cause a company to decide
whether to go ahead with a new product or process. What percent
return can the company expect on the part of its capital invested in this
particular way in comparison to what the return might be if the same
amount of its assets was employed in some other way? It is considerably
more difficult for the investor to use this yardstick than it is for the cor-
porate executive. What the investor usually sees is not the return on a
specific amount of present-day dollars utilized in a specific subdivision
of the business but the total earnings of the business as a percentage of
its total assets. When the cost of capital equipment has risen as much as
it has in the last forty years, comparisons of the return on total invested
capital between one company and another may be so distorted by vari-
ations in the price levels at which different companies made major
expenditures that the figures are highly misleading. For this reason,
comparing the profit margins per dollar of sales may be more helpful as
long as one other point is kept in mind. This is that a company that has
a high rate of sales in relation to assets may be a more profitable com-
pany than one with a higher profit margin to sales but a slower rate of
sales turnover. For example, a company that has annual sales three times
its assets can have a lower profit margin but make a lot more money
than one that needs to employ a dollar of assets in order to obtain each
dollar of annual sales. However, while from the standpoint of profitability
return on investment must be considered as well as profit margin on
sales, from the standpoint of safety of investment all the emphasis is on
profit margin on sales. Thus if two companies were each to experience

200

CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

a 2 percent increase in operating costs and were unable to raise prices,
the one with a 1 percent margin of profit would be running at a loss
and might be wiped out, while, if the other had a 10 percent margin,
the increased costs would wipe out only one-fifth of its profits.

There is one final matter to be kept in mind in order to place this
dimension of conservative investing in proper perspective: In todays
highly fluid and competitive business world, obtaining well-above-aver-
age profit margins or a high return on assets is so desirable that, when-
ever a company accomplishes this goal for any significant period of time,
it is bound to be faced with a host of potential competitors. If the poten-
tial competitors actually enter the field, they will cut into markets the
established company now has. Normally, when potential competition
becomes actual competition the ensuing struggle for sales results in any-
thing from a minor to a major reduction in the high profit margin that
had theretofore existed. High profit margins may be compared to an
open jar of honey owned by the prospering company. The honey will
inevitably attract a swarm of hungry insects bent on devouring it. In the
business world there are but two ways a company can protect the con-
tents of its honey jar from being consumed by the insects of competi-
tion. One is by monopoly, which is usually illegal, although, if the
monopoly is due to patent protection, it may not be. In any event,
monopolies are likely to end quite suddenly and do not commend them-
selves as vehicles for the safest type of investing. The other way for the
honey-jar company to keep the insects out is to operate so much more
efficiently than others that there is no incentive for present or potential
competition to take action that will upset the existing situation.

Now let us turn from this background discussion of relative prof-
itability to the heart of the third dimension of conservative investing —
namely, the specific characteristics that enable certain well-managed
companies to maintain above-average profit margins more or less indef-
initely. Possibly the most common characteristic is what businessmen call
the “economies of scale.” A simple example of economy of scale: A well-
run company making one million units a month will often have a lower
production cost for each unit than a company producing only 100,000
units in the same period. The difference between the cost per unit of
these two companies, one ten times larger than the other, can vary con-
siderably from one line of business to another. In some there may be
almost no difference at all. Furthermore, it should never be forgotten that
in any industry the larger company will have a maximum advantage only

126 COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

thing from what it used to be. For the reasons already explained,
today’s corporation is designed to be far more suitable as an invest-
ment medium for those desiring long-range growth than as a vehicle
for in-and-out trading.

All this has profoundly changed the market place. It undoubtedly
represents tremendous improvement — improvement, however, at the
expense of marketability. The liquidity of the average stock has
decreased rather than increased. In spite of breathtaking economic
growth and a seemingly endless procession of stock splits, the volume of
trading on the New York Stock Exchange has declined. For the smaller
exchanges it has almost vanished. The gambler, the in-and-out buyer,
and even the “sucker” trying to outguess the pool manipulator were not
conducive to a healthy economy. They did, however, help provide a
ready market.

I do not want to get involved in semantics. Nevertheless, it must be
realized that this has resulted in the gradual decline of the “stock
broker” and the rise of what might be called the “stock salesman.” So far
as stocks are concerned, the broker works in an auction market. Fie takes
an order from someone who has already decided on his investment
course. Fie matches this order with an order he or some other broker
has received to sell. This process is not overly time-consuming. If the
orders received are for a large rather than small number of shares, the
broker can operate on a very small commission for each share handled
and still end the year with a handsome profit.

Contrast him with the salesman, who must go through the far more
time-consuming routine of persuading the customer on the course of
action to be taken. There are only a given number of hours in the day.
Therefore, to make a profit commensurate with that of a broker, he
must charge a higher commission for his services. This is particularly
true if the salesman is serving a large number of small customers rather
than a few big ones. Under todays economic conditions, small customers
are the ones most salesmen must serve.

The stock exchanges are still primarily operating as a vehicle for
stock brokers rather than stock salesmen. Their commission rates have
gone up. They have only gone up, however, about in proportion to that
of most other types of services. In contrast, the over-the-counter mar-
kets work on a quite different principle. Each day, designated members
of the National Association of Securities Dealers furnish the newspapers
of that region with quotations on a long list of the more active unlisted

Five Don'ts for Investors

125

the other. Everyone should recognize the importance of marketability.
Normally, most if not all buying should be confined to stocks which can
be sold should a reason — either financial or personal — arise for such
selling. However, some confusion seems to exist in the minds of
investors as to what gives adequate protection in this regard and what
does not. This in turn gives rise to even more confusion concerning the
desirability of those stocks not listed on any exchange. Such stocks are
commonly called “over-the-counter” stocks.

The reason for this confusion lies in basic changes that have come
over common stock buying in the last quarter century — changes that
make the markets of the 1950’s very different even from those as recent
as the never-to-be-forgotten 1920 s. During most of the 1920’s and in
all of the period before that, the stock broker had as customers a rela-
tively small number of rather rich men. Most buying was done in large
blocks, frequently in multiples of thousands of shares. The motive was
usually to sell out to someone else at a higher price. Gambling rather
than investment was the order of the day. Buying on margin — that is,
with borrowed funds — was then the accepted method of operation.
Today a very large percentage of all buying is on a cash basis.

Many things have happened to change these colorful markets of the
past. High income and inheritance tax rates are one. A more important
influence is the tendency toward a levelling of incomes that continues
year after year in every section of the United States. The very rich and
the very poor each year grow smaller in number. Each year the middle
groups grow larger. This has produced a steady shrinkage of big stock
buyers, and an even greater growth of small stock buyers. Along with
them has come a tremendous growth in another class of stock buyer, the
institutional buyer. The investment trust, the pension and profit-sharing
trusts, even to some degree the trust departments of the great banks do
not represent a few big buyers. Rather they are a few professional man-
agers entrusted with handling the collective savings of innumerable
small buyers.

Partly as a result of all this, and partly as a cause helping to bring
it about, basic changes have come in our laws and institutions as they
affect the stock market. The Securities and Exchange Commission
has been created to prevent the type of manipulation and pool oper-
ation that spurred on the rampant stock market gambling of the past.
Rules are in force limiting margin buying to a fraction of what was
formerly considered customary. But most important of all, as already dis-
cussed in an earlier chapter, the corporation of today is a very different

The Third Dimension

20 1

if it is exceedingly well run. The bigger a company is, the harder it is to
manage efficiently. Quite often the inherent advantages of scale are fully
balanced or even more than balanced by the inefficiencies produced by
too many bureaucratic layers of middle management, consequent delays
in making decisions, and, at times, the seeming inability of top executives
m the largest companies to know quickly just what needs corrective
attention in various subdivisions of their far-flung complexes.

On the other hand, when a company clearly becomes the leader in
its field, not just in dollar volume but in profitability, it seldom gets dis-
placed from this position as long as its management remains highly
competent. As discussed in examining the second dimension of a con-
servative investment, such a management must retain the ability to
change corporate ways to match the ever-changing external environ-
ment. There is a school of investment thinking that advocates acquiring
shares in the number-two or -three company in a field because “these
can go up to number one, whereas the leader is already there and might
slip.” There are some industries where the largest company does not
have a clear leadership position; but, where it does, we emphatically do
not agree with this viewpoint. It has been our observation that, in
many years of trying, Westinghouse has not surpassed General Electric,
Montgomery Ward has not overtaken Sears, and — once IBM estab-
lished early dominance in its areas of the computer market— even the
extreme efforts of some of the largest companies in the country,
including General Electric, did not succeed in displacing IBM from its
overwhelming share of that market. Neither have scores of smaller
price-cutting suppliers of peripheral equipment been able to displace
IBM as the main and most profitable operator in that phase of the
computer industry.

What enables a company to obtain this advantage of scale in the first
place? Usually getting there first with a new product or service that
meets worthwhile demand and backing this up with good enough mar-
keting, servicing, product improvement, and, at times, advertising to
keep existing customers happy and coming back for more. This fre-
quently establishes an atmosphere in which new customers will turn to
the leader largely because that leader has established such a reputation
for performance (or sound value) that no one is likely to criticize the
buyer adversely for making this particular selection. In the heyday of the
attempts of others to cut into IBM’s computer business, no one will ever
know how many employees of corporations planning to use a computer

202

CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

for the first time recommended IBM rather than a smaller competitor
whose equipment they privately thought was better or cheaper. In such
instances the primary motive was probably a feeling that if, later on, the
equipment should fail to perform, those making the recommendation
would not be blamed if they had chosen the industry leader but could
very well find their necks out a mile if a failure occurred and they had
chosen a smaller company without an established reputation.

There is a saying in the pharmaceutical industry that, when a truly
worthwhile new drug is created, the company that gets in first takes and
holds 60 percent of the market, thereby making by far the bulk of the
profits. The next company to introduce a competitive version of the
same product gets perhaps 25 percent of the market and makes moder-
ate profits. The next three companies to arrive divide perhaps 10 per-
cent to 15 percent of the market and earn meager profits. Any further
entrants usually find themselves in a quite unhappy position. A trend
toward the substitution of generic for trade names may or may not upset
these ratios, and in any case there cannot be said to be an exact formu-
la applicable to other industries; nevertheless, the concept behind them
should be kept in mind when an investor attempts to appraise which
companies have a natural advantage in regard to profitability and which
do not.

Lower production costs and greater ability to attract new customers
because of a well-recognized trade name are not the only ways that scale
can consistently give a company competitive strength. Examining some
of the factors behind the investment strength of the soup division of the
Campbell Soup Company is illuminating. In the first place, as by far the
largest soup canners in the nation, this company can reduce total costs
through backward integration as smaller companies cannot. Making
many of their own cans exactly to meet their own needs is a case in
point. More important, Campbell has enough business so that it can
scatter canning plants at strategic spots across the nation, which makes
for a sizable double advantage: It is both a shorter haul for the grower
delivering his produce to the cannery and a shorter average haul from
cannery to supermarket. Since canned soup is heavy in relation to its
value, freight costs are significant. This puts the smaller canner with only
one or two plants at a big disadvantage in trying to compete in a
nationwide market. Next, and probably most important of all, because
Campbell s is a recognized product that the customer knows and wants
when he enters the supermarket, the retailer automatically awards to it

The Third Dimension

203

a prominent and fairly sizable area of his always sought-after shelf space.
In contrast, he is usually quite reluctant to do as much for a less-known
or unknown competitor. This prominent shelf space helps to sell the
soup and is still another factor tending to keep the number-one com-
pany on top, a factor extremely discouraging for potential competitors.
Also discouraging for them is Campbell’s normal advertising budget,
which adds very much less to the cost per can sold than such a budget
would for a competitor with a very much smaller output. For reasons
such as these, this particular company has strong inherent forces tending
to protect profit margins. However, to present a complete picture, we
must note some influences working in the opposite direction. When
Campbell s own costs rise, as they can do sharply in an inflationary peri-
od, prices to the consumer cannot be raised more than the average of
other foods or there could be a shift in demand away from soups to
other staples. Far more important, Campbell has a major competitor that
most companies do not have to contend with and that, as rising pro-
duction costs cause higher prices to the consumer, can cut significantly
into Campbell s market. This is the American housewife fighting her
battle of the budget by making soup in her own kitchen. This point is
mentioned merely to show that even when scale affords huge compet-
itive advantages and a company is well run, these characteristics, impor-
tant as they are, do not, of themselves, assure extreme profitability.

Scale is by no means the only investment factor tending to perpet-
uate the much greater profitability and investment appeal of some com-
panies over others. Another which we believe is of particular interest is
the difficulty of competing with a highly successful, established produc-
er in a technological area where the technology depends on not one sci-
entific discipline but the interplay of two or preferably several quite dif-
ferent disciplines. To explain what I mean, let us suppose that someone
develops an electronic product that promises to open up sizable new
markets in either the computer or instrument field. There are enough
highly capable companies in both areas that have in-house experts able
to duplicate both the electronic hardware and the software program-
ming that such products require so that if the new market appears large
enough, sufficient competition may soon develop to make the profits of
the smaller innovator rather tenuous. In areas such as these, the success-
ful large company has a further built-in advantage. Many such lines can-
not be sold unless a network of service people is available to make rapid
repair at the customers’ locations. The large established company usually

204

CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

has such an organization in being. It is extremely difficult and expensive
for a small new company introducing a worthwhile new product to
establish such a network. It may be even harder for the new company
to convince a potential buyer that it has the financial staying power not
only to have the service network in place when the sale is made but to
keep it there in the future. Furthermore, while all these influences have
made it difficult in the past for the newcomer with an exciting product
to establish real leadership in most subdivisions of the electronics indus-
try, although a few companies have done so, it is likely to be still more
difficult in the future. This is because the semiconductor is becoming a
larger and larger percentage of both the total content and the total tech-
nical know-how of more and more products. The leading companies
making these devices also now have at least as much in-house knowl-
edge as the top old-line computer and instrument companies if they
elect to compete in many new product areas that are largely electronic.
A case in point is the dramatic success ofTexas Instruments in the sen-
sationally growing area of hand-held calculators and the difficulties of
some of the early pioneers in this field.

However, notice how the balance changes if, instead of just a tech-
nology based on electronic hardware and software, producing the prod-
uct calls for these skills to be combined with some quite different ones
such as nucleonics or some highly specialized area of chemistry. The
large electronic companies simply do not have the in-house skills to
enter these interdisciplinary technologies. This affords the best-run
innovators a far better opportunity to build themselves into the type of
leadership position in their particular product line that carries with it
the broad profit margin that tends to continue as long as managerial
competence does not weaken. I believe that some of these multidisci-
plinary technological companies, in not all of which is electronics a sig-
nificant factor, have recently proven some of the finest opportunities for
truly farsighted investing. I am inclined to think that more such oppor-
tunities will occur in the future. Thus, for example, I suspect that some-
time in the future new leading companies will arise through products
or processes that utilize some of these other disciplines combined with
biology, although so far I have not seen any company in this area that so
qualifies. This is not to say that none exists.

Technological development and scale are not the only aspects of a
company’s activities in which unusual circumstances may raise opportu-
nities for sustained high profit margins. In certain circumstances these

The Third Dimension

205

can also occur in the area of marketing or sales. An example is a company
that has created in its customers the habit of almost automatically spec-
ifying its products for reorder in a way that makes it rather uneconom-
ical for a competitor to attempt to displace them. Two sets of conditions
are necessary for this to happen. First, the company must build up a rep-
utation for quality and reliability in a product (a) that the customer rec-
ognizes is very important for the proper conduct of his activities,
(b) where an inferior or malfunctioning product would cause serious
problems, (c) where no competitor is serving more than a minor seg-
ment of the market so that the dominant company is nearly synony-
mous in the public mind with the source of supply, and yet (d) the cost
of the product is only a quite small part of the customers total cost of
operations. Consequently, moderate price reductions yield only very
small savings in relation to the risk of taking a chance on an unknown
supplier. However, even this is not enough to ensure that a company
fortunate enough to get itself in this position will be able to enjoy
above-average profit margins year after year. Second, it must have a
product sold to many small customers rather than a few large ones.
These customers must be sufficiently specialized in their nature that it
would be unlikely for a potential competitor to feel they could be
reached through advertising media such as magazines or television. They
constitute a market in which, as long as the dominant company main-
tains the quality of its product and the adequacy of its service, it can be
displaced only by informed salesmen making individual calls .Yet the size
of each customer’s orders make such a selling effort totally uneconom-
ical! A company possessing all these advantages can, through marketing,
maintain an above-average profit margin almost indefinitely unless a
major shift in technology (or, as already mentioned, a slippage in its own
efficiency) should displace it. Companies of this type can most often be
found in the moderately high technology supply area. One of their
characteristics is to maintain their image of leadership by holding fre-
quent technical seminars on the use of their product, a marketing tool
that proves highly effective once a company attains this type of position.

It should be noted that the “above-average” profit margin or
“greater than normal” return on investment need not be — in fact,
should not be — many times that earned by industry in general to give
a company’s shares great investment appeal. Actually, if the profit or
return on investment is too spectacular, it can be a source of danger, as
the inducement then becomes almost irresistible for all sorts of compa-

206

CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

nies to try to compete so as to get a share of the unusual honey pot. In
contrast, a profit margin consistently just 2 or 3 percent of sales greater
than that of the next best competitor is sufficient to ensure a quite out-
standing investment.

To summarize the matter of the third dimension of a truly conser-
vative investment: It is necessary not just to have the quality of person-
nel discussed in the second dimension but to have had that personnel
(or their predecessors) steer the company into areas of activity where
there are inherent reasons within the economics of the particular busi-
ness so that above-average profitability is not a short-term matter. Put
simply, the question to ask in regard to this third dimension is: “What
can the particular company do that others would not be able to do
about as well?” If the answer is almost nothing, so that, as the business
gets more prosperous, others can rush in to share in the company’s pros-
perity on about equal terms, the evidence is conclusive that while the
company’s stock may be cheap, the investment fails to qualify as to this
third dimension.

The Fourth Dimension

Price of a Conservative Investment

T he fourth dimension of any stock investment involves the price-
earnings ratio — that is, the current price divided by the earnings
per share. In the attempt to appraise whether the price-earnings
ratio is in line with a proper valuation for that specific stock, trouble
begins to arise. Most investors, including many professionals who
should know better, become confused on this point because they don’t
have a clear understanding of what makes the price of the particular
stock go up or down by a significant amount. This misunderstanding
has resulted in losses in billions of dollars by investors who find out
later that they own stocks bought at prices that they never should have
paid. Even more billions have been lost as investors have sold out, at the
wrong time and for the wrong reasons, shares they had every reason to
hold and which, if held, would have become extremely profitable as
long-range investments. Still another result is one that, if it happens
repeatedly, will seriously impair the ability of deserving corporations to
obtain adequate financing, with all that this could mean in a lower
standard of living for everyone: Every time individual stocks take sick-
ening plunges, another group of badly burned investors places the
blame on the system rather than on their own mistakes or those of their
advisors. They conclude that common stocks of any type are not suit-
able for their savings.

208

CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

The other side of the coin is that many other investors can be found
who over the years have prospered mightily from holding the right
stocks for considerable periods of time. Their success may be due to
understanding basic investment rules. Or it may be due to just plain
good luck. However, the common denominator in this success has been
the refusal to sell certain unusual high-quality stocks simply because
each has had such a sharp fast rise that its price-earnings ratio suddenly
looks high in relation to that to which the investment community had
become accustomed.

In view of the importance of all this, it is truly remarkable that so
few have looked beneath the surface to understand exactly what causes
these sharp price changes. Yet the law that governs them can be stated
reasonably simply: Every significant price move of any individual common
stock in relation to stocks as a whole occurs because of a changed appraisal of that
stock by the financial community.

Let us see how this works in practice. Two years ago company G was
considered quite ordinary. It had earned $1 per share and was selling at
ten times earnings, or $10. During these last two years most companies
in its industry have been showing a downward profit trend. In contrast,
a series of brilliant new products, combined with better profit margins
on old products, enabled G company to report $1.40 per share last year
and $1.82 this year and to give promise of further gains over the next
several years. Obviously the actions within the company that produced
the sharp contrast between G’s recent results and those of others in the
industry could not have started just two years ago but must have been
going on for some time; otherwise the operating economies and the
brilliant new products would not have occurred. However, belated
recognition (i.e., appraisal) of how well G is qualifying in regard to mat-
ters covered in our discussions of the first three dimensions has now
caused the price-earnings ratio to rise to 22. When compared with
other stocks showing similar above-average business characteristics and
comparable growth prospects, this ratio of 22 does not appear at all high.
Since 22 times $1.82 is $40, here is a stock that has legitimately gone up
400 percent in two years. Equally important, a record such as G’s is fre-
quently an indication that there is now functioning a management team
capable of continued growth for many years ahead. Such a growth, even
at a more modest rate averaging, say, 15 percent in the next decade or
two, could easily result in profits by that time running into the thou-
sands rather than the hundreds of percent.

The Fourth Dimension

209

The matter of appraisal ’ is the heart of understanding the seeming
vagaries of price-earnings ratios. It should never be forgotten that an
appraisal is a subjective matter. It has nothing necessarily to do with
what is going on in the real world about us. Rather, it results from what
the person doing the appraising believes is going on, no matter how far
from the actual facts such a judgment may be. In other words, any indi-
vidual stock does not rise or fall at any particular moment in time
because of what is actually happening or will happen to that company.
It rises or falls according to the current consensus of the financial com-
munity as to what is happening and will happen regardless of how far
off this consensus may be from what is really occurring or will occur.

At this point many pragmatic individuals simply throw up their
hands in disbelief. If the huge price changes that occur in individual
stocks are made solely because of changed appraisals by the financial
community, with these appraisals sometimes completely at variance
with what is going on in the real world of a company’s affairs, what sig-
nificance have the other three dimensions? Why bother with the
expertise of business management, scientific technology, or accounting
at all? Why not just depend on psychologists?

The answer involves timing. Because of a financial-community
appraisal that is at variance with the facts, a stock may sell for a consid-
erable period for much more or much less than it is intrinsically worth.
Furthermore, many segments of the financial community have the habit
of playing “follow the leader,” particularly when that leader is one of the
larger New York City banks. This sometimes means that when an unre-
alistic appraisal of a stock is already causing it to sell well above what a
proper recognition of the facts would justify, the stock may stay at this
too high level for a long period of time. Actually, from this already too
high a price it may go even higher.

These wide variations between the financial community’s appraisal
of a stock and the true set of conditions affecting it may last for several
years. Always, however sometimes within months, sometimes only
after a much longer period of time — the bubble bursts. When a stock
has been selling too high because of unrealistic expectations, sooner or
later a growing number of stockholders grow tired of waiting.Their sell-
ing soon more than exhausts the buying power of the small number of
additional buyers who still have faith in the old appraisal. The stock then
comes tumbling down. Sometimes the new appraisal that follows is
quite realistic. Frequently, however, as this re-examination evolves under

210 CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

the emotional pressure of falling prices, the negative is overemphasized,
resulting in a new financial-community appraisal that is significantly less
favorable than the facts warrant and that may then prevail for some time.
However, when this happens, much the same thing occurs as when the
appraisal is too favorable. The only difference is that the process is
reversed. It may take months or years for a more favorable image to sup-
plant the existing one. Nevertheless, as pleasing earnings mount upward,
sooner or later this happens.

Fortunate holders — those who don’t sell out as such a stock starts to
rise — then benefit from the phenomenon that provides the greatest
reward in relation to the risk involved the stock market can produce.
This is the dramatic improvement in price that results from the com-
bined effect of both a steady improvement in per-share earnings and a
sharp, simultaneous increase in the price-earnings ratio. As the financial
community quite correctly discovers that the fundamentals of the com-
pany (now its new image) have much more investment worth than had
been recognized when the old image was in effect, the resulting increase
in the price-earnings ratio is frequently an even more important factor
in the increased price of the stock than the actual increase in per-share
earnings that accompanies it. This is precisely what happened in our G-
company example.

We are now in a position to begin to get a true perspective on the
degree of conservatism — that is, of basic risk in any investment. On
the lowest end of the risk scale and most suitable for wise investment
is the company that measures quite high in regard to the first three
dimensions but currently is appraised by the financial community as
less worthy, and therefore has a lower price-earnings ratio, than these
fundamental facts warrant. Next least risky and usually quite suitable
for intelligent investment is the company rating quite high in regard
to the first three dimensions and having an image and therefore a
price-earnings ratio reasonably in line with these fundamentals. This is
because such a company will continue to grow if it truly has these
attributes. Next least risky and, in my opinion, usually suitable for
retention by conservative investors who own them but not for fresh
purchase with new funds are companies that are equally strong in
regard to the first three dimensions but, because these qualities have
become almost legendary in the financial community, have an apprais-
al or price-earnings ratio higher than is warranted by even the strong
fundamentals.

The Fourth Dimension

21 1

In my opinion there are important reasons such stocks should usu-
ally be retained, even though their prices seem too high: If the funda-
mentals are genuinely strong, these companies will in time increase
earnings not only enough to justify present prices but to justify consid-
erably higher prices. Meanwhile, the number of truly attractive compa-
nies in regard to the first three dimensions is fairly small. Undervalued
ones are not easy to find. The risk of making a mistake and switching
into one that seems to meet all of the first three dimensions but actual-
ly does not is probably considerably greater for the average investor than
the temporary risk of staying with a thoroughly sound but currently
overvalued situation until genuine value catches up with current prices.
Investors who agree with me on this particular point must be prepared
for occasional sharp contractions in the market value of these tem-
porarily overvalued stocks. On the other hand, it is my observation that
those who sell such stocks to wait for a more suitable time to buy back
these same shares seldom attain their objective. They usually wait for a
decline to be bigger than it actually turns out to be. The result is that
some years later when this fundamentally strong stock has reached peaks
of value considerably higher than the point at which they sold, they
have missed all of this later move and may have gone into a situation of
considerably inferior intrinsic quality.

Continuing up our scale of ascending risks, we come next to the
stocks that are average or relatively low in quality in regard to the first
three dimensions but have an appraisal in the financial community
either lower than, or about in line with, these not very attractive funda-
mentals. Those with a poorer appraisal than basic conditions warrant
may be good speculations but are not suitable for the prudent investor.
In the fast-moving world of today there is just too much danger of
adverse developments severely affecting such shares.

Finally we come to what is by far the most dangerous group of all:
companies with a present financial-community appraisal or image far
above what is currently justified by the immediate situation. Purchase of
such shares can cause the sickening losses that tend to drive investors
away from stock ownership in droves and threaten to shake the invest-
ment industry to its foundations. If anyone wants to make a case-by-case
study of the contrast between the financial-community appraisals that
prevailed at one time about some quite colorful companies and the fun-
damental conditions that subsequently came to light, he will find plen-
ty of material in a business library or the files of the larger Wall Street

212 CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

houses. It is alarming to read some of the reasons given in brokerage
reports recommending purchase of these shares and then to compare
the outlook described in such documents with what actually was to
happen. A fragmentary list of such companies might include: Memorex
high 173%, Ampex high 49%, Levitz Furniture high 60%, Mohawk
Data Sciences high 111, Litton Industries high 101%, Kalvar high
176%.

The list could go on and on and on. However, more examples
would serve only to make the same point over and over. Since it should
already be quite apparent how important is the habit of evaluating any
difference that may exist between a contemporary financial-communi-
ty appraisal of a company and the fundamental aspects of that company,
it should be more productive for us to spend our time examining fur-
ther the characteristics of these financial-community appraisals. First,
however, to avoid risk of misunderstanding, it seems advisable to avoid
semantic confusion by defining two of the words in our original state-
ment of the rule governing all major changes in the price of common
stocks: Every significant price move of any individual common stock in relation
to stocks as a whole occurs because of a changed appraisal of that stock by the
financial community.

The phrase “ significant price changes” is used rather than merely
“price changes.” This is to exclude the kind of minor price variation
that occurs if, say, an estate has twenty thousand shares of a stock that a
clumsy broker rapidly dumps on the market with the result that the
stock drops a point or two and then usually recovers as the liquidation
ends. Similarly, at times an institution will determine that on going into
a new situation it must buy a minimum number of shares. The result is
frequently a small onetime bulge that subsides on completion of this
sort of buying. Such moves, in the absence of a genuinely changed
appraisal of the company by the financial community as a whole, have
no important or long-term effect on the price of the shares. Usually
such small price changes disappear once the special buying or selling
is over.

The term “financial community” has been used to include all those
able and enough interested to be potentially ready to buy or sell a par-
ticular stock at some price, keeping in mind that, with regard to impact
on price, the importance of each of these potential buyers and sellers is
weighted by the amount of buying or selling power each is in a posi-
tion to exercise.

More about
the Fourth Dimension

U p to this point our discussion of the financial community’s apprais-
al of a stock may have given the impression that this appraisal is
nothing more than an evaluation of that particular equity, consid-
ered by itself. This is oversimplification. Actually it always results from
the blending of three separate appraisals: the current financial-commu-
nity appraisal of the attractiveness of common stocks as a whole, of the
industry of which the particular company is a part, and, finally, of the
company itself.

Let us first examine the matter of industry appraisals. Everyone
knows that, over long periods of time, there can be a sizable decline in
the price-earnings ratio the financial community will pay to participate
in an industry as it passes from an early stage when huge markets appear
ahead to a much later period where it, in turn, may be threatened by
new technologies. Thus, in the early years of the electronics industry,
companies making electronic tubes, in that period the fundamental
building block of all electronics, sold at very high price-earnings ratios.
Then price-earnings ratios shrank drastically as the development of
semiconductors steadily narrowed the tube market. Makers of magnetic
memory devices have more recently suffered the same fate for the same
reason. All this is obvious and thoroughly understood. What is not so
obvious or comparably understood is how the image of an industry can
rise or fall in financial-community status, not because of such overpow-
ering influences as these but because at a given time the financial com-
munity is stressing one particular set of industry background influences
rather than another. Yet both sets of background conditions may have

214 CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

been quite valid for some time, and both may give every indication of
continuing to be for the reasonable future.

The chemical industry may be cited as an example. From the depths
of the Great Depression until the middle 1950s, the shares of the largest
U.S. chemical companies sold at quite high price-earnings ratios com-
pared to most other stocks. The financial community’s idea of these
companies might have been depicted in a cartoon as an endless con-
veyor belt. At one end were scientists making breathtaking new com-
pounds in test tubes. After passing through mysterious and hard-to-
imitate factories, these materials came out at the other end as fabulous
new products such as nylon, DDT, synthetic rubber, quick-drying paint,
and endless other new materials that seemed sure to be an ever-increas-
ing source of wealth for their fortunate producers. Then, as the 1960s
arrived, the image changed. The chemical industry, to the investment
community, came to resemble steel or cement or paper in that it was
selling bulk commodities on a basis of technical specification so that
Jones’s chemicals were more or less identical with Smith’s. Capital-
intensive industries usually are under major pressure to operate at high
rates of capacity in order to amortize their large fixed investments. The
result is frequently intense price competition and narrowing profit mar-
gins. This changed image caused the shares of the major chemical com-
panies to sell at significantly lower price-earnings ratios in relation to
stocks as a whole in the, say, ten-year period that ended in 1972 than
they had in the past. While still considerably higher than in many indus-
tries, chemical price-earnings ratios started more closely to resemble
those of industries like steel, paper, and cement.

Now the remarkable thing about all this is that with one important
exception there was little or nothing different in the fundamental back-
ground of this industry in the 1 960s than there was in the prior thirty
years. It is true that in the latter half of the 1960s there was a serious glut
of capacity in certain areas such as the manufacture of most synthetic
textile products. This was a major temporary depressant of the earnings
of certain of the leading chemical companies, particularly DuPont. But
the basic characteristics of the industry had in no way changed suffi-
ciendy to account for this rather drastic change in the industry’s status
in the financial community. Chemical manufacture always had been
capital-intensive. Most products had always been sold on a technical
specification basis so that Jones could seldom raise his price above Smith’s.
On the other hand, as a host of new and greatly improved pesticides,

More about the Fourth Dimension

2 1 5

packaging materials, textiles, drugs, and countless other products have
shown, the 1960s and the 1970s have afforded this industry an ever-
expanding market. Opportunities seem almost limitless for human
brains to rearrange molecules so as to create products not found in
nature that will have special properties to cater to the needs of man bet-
ter or more cheaply than the previously used natural materials.

Finally, in both the previous period of higher and the more recent
period of lower esteem for chemical stocks, still another factor had
remained almost constant. The older and larger-volume chemical
products, representing in a sense the “first step” processing of tailored
materials from such basic sources of molecules as salt or hydrocarbons,
were inevitably products sold mainly by specification and on a price-
competitive basis. Nevertheless, for the alert company there always was
and continued to be the opportunity to process these first-step prod-
ucts into much more complicated and higher-priced ones. These, at
least for a while, could be sold on a much more proprietary and there-
fore less competitive basis. As these products in turn become price
competitive, the alert companies have consistently found still newer
ones to add to the higher-profit-margin end of their lines.

In other words, all the favorable factors, so much in the financial
community’s mind when chemical stocks were darlings of the market,
continued to be there after they had lost considerable status. But the
unfavorable factors so much in the forefront in the 1960s were also there
in the earlier period when they were largely ignored. What had shifted
was the emphasis, not the facts.

But the facts, too, can change. Starting about the middle of 1973,
chemical stocks began regaining favor in the financial community. This
was because a new view of the industry was starting to prevail. In the
scarcity-plagued economy the major industrial nations have been expe-
riencing for the first time (except during major wars) in modern times,
manufacturing capacity can be increased only gradually; hence, it may
be years before cutthroat price competition will occur again. This image
opens up a whole new ballgame for the investor in chemical stocks. The
problem for investors now becomes one of determining whether the
background facts warrant the new image and, if they do, whether chem-
ical stocks, in relation to the market as a whole, have risen more than or
not as much as may be warranted by the new situation.

Recent financial history offers countless other examples of much
larger changes in price-earnings ratios that occurred because the financial

216

CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

community’s appraisal of the industry’s background changed radically
while the industry itself remained almost exactly the same. In 1969 the
computer peripheral stocks were great market favorites. These were
the companies making all the special equipment that could be added to
the central computing unit or mainframe of a computer to increase the
users benefits from that central unit. High-speed printers, extra memo-
ry units, and keyboard devices to eliminate the need for keypunch oper-
ators in getting data into a computer were some of the major products
in this group. The prevailing image then was that these companies had
an almost limitless future. While the central computer itself was largely
developed and its market would be dominated by a few strong, estab-
lished companies, the small independent would be able to undercut the
big companies in these peripheral areas. Today there is a new awareness
of the financial strain on small companies with products that are usual-
ly leased rather than sold and of the determination of the major com-
puter mainframe manufacturers to fight for the market of the products
“hung on” their equipment. Have the fundamentals changed or is it the
appraisal of the fundamentals that has changed?

An extreme case of a changed appraisal is the way in which the
financial community looked on the fundamentals of the franchising
business and franchise stocks in 1969 in contrast to 1972. Here again, as
with computer peripheral stocks, all the problems of the industry were
inherently there when these stocks were being bought at such high
price-earnings ratios but were being overlooked when the prevailing
image was one of uninterrupted growth for the company momentarily
doing well.

In this whole matter of industry image, the investor’s problem is
always the same. Is the current prevailing appraisal one more favorable,
less favorable, or about the same as that warranted by the basic economic
facts? At times this can present an acute problem to even the most
sophisticated investors. One example occurred in December 1958 when
Smith, Barney & Co., traditionally conservative investment bankers,
took a pioneering step that seems purely routine today but appeared
quite the contrary at that time: They made a public offering of the
equity shares of the A. C. Nielsen Co. This company had no factories,
no tangible product, and therefore no inventories. Instead it was in the
“service business,” receiving fees for supplying market-research infor-
mation to its customers. It was true that in 1958 banks and insurance
companies had long been well regarded in the marketplace as industries

More about the Fourth Dimension

217

worthy of conservative investment. However, such industries were hard-
ly comparable. Since the book value of a bank or insurance company is
in cash, liquid investments or accounts receivable, the investor buying a
bank or insurance stock seemed to have a hard core of value to fall back
on that did not exist for this new kind of service company being intro-
duced to the financial public. However, investigation of the A. C.
Nielsen situation revealed unusually good fundamentals. There was an
honest and capable management, a uniquely strong competitive position
and good prospects for many years of further growth. Nevertheless, until
experience showed how the financial community would react to its first
exposure to this kind of an industry, there did appear to be some reason
for hesitation in buying. Would it take years for a realistic appraisal of the
investment worth of such a company to displace the fear that might be
engendered by the lack of some of the familiar yardsticks of value? It
may seem ridiculous today, when for many years a company like A. C.
Nielsen has enjoyed a price-earnings ratio signifying a very high invest-
ment appraisal, but some of us who decided to take a chance on the
fundamentals being recognized and bought these shares at that time
experienced a sensation almost like stepping off a cliff and seeing if the
air would support us, so new was the concept of a service company in
contrast to concepts to which we were accustomed. Actually within a
few years the pendulum swung quite the other way. As A. C. Nielsen s
profits grew and grew, a new concept arose in Wall Street. A large num-
ber of companies, many quite different in economic fundamentals but
all dealing in services rather than products, were lumped together in a
financial-community image as parts of a highly attractive service indus-
try. Some began selling at higher price-earnings ratios than they might
have deserved. As always, in time, fundamentals dominated, and this false
image formed by lumping quite different companies into one group
faded away.

This point cannot be overstressed: The conservative investor must be
aware of the nature of the current financial-community appraisal of any industry
in which he is interested. He should constantly be probing to see whether
that appraisal is significantly more or less favorable than the fundamen-
tals warrant. Only by judging properly on this point can he be reason-
ably sure about one of the three variables that will govern the long-term
trend of market price of stocks of that industry.

Still More about
the Fourth Dimension

T he financial community’s appraisal of a company’s own characteris-
tics is an even more important factor in the price-earnings ratio
than is the appraisal of the industry in which the company is
engaged. The most desirable investment traits of individual companies
have been defined in our discussion of the first three dimensions of a
conservative investment. In general, the more closely the financial com-
munity’s appraisal of a particular stock approaches these characteristics,
the higher will be its price-earnings ratio. To the degree by which it falls
below these standards, the price-earnings ratio will tend to decline. The
investor can best determine which stocks are importantly undervalued
or overvalued by a shrewd determination of the degree to which the
real facts concerning any particular company present an investment sit-
uation significantly better or significantly worse than that painted by the
current financial image of that company.

In making a determination as to the relative attractiveness of two or
more stocks, investors often confuse themselves by attempting too sim-
ple a mathematical approach to such a problem. Let us suppose, for
example, they compare two companies, the profits of each of which,
after careful study, appear to afford prospects of growing at a rate of
10 percent a year. If one is selling at ten times earnings and the other at
twenty times, the stock selling at ten times earnings appears cheaper. It
may be. It also may not be. There can be a number of reasons for this.
The seemingly cheaper company may have such a leveraged capitaliza-
tion (interest charges and preferred dividends that must be earned
before anything accrues to the common-stock holder) that the danger

Still More about the Fourth Dimension

219

of interruption of the expected growth rate may be much greater in the
lower price-earnings-ratio stock. Similarly, for purely business reasons,
while the growth rate would seem a most probable estimate for both
stocks, nevertheless the chance of the unexpected upsetting these esti-
mates may be considerably more foi* the one stock than for the other.

Another far more important and far less understood way to reach
wrong conclusions is to rely too much on simple comparisons of the
price-earnings ratios of stocks that seem to be offering comparable
opportunities for growth. To illustrate this, let us assume that there are
two stocks with an equally strong prospect of doubling earnings over
the next four years and that both are selling at twenty times earnings,
while in the same market companies which are sound otherwise but
have no growth prospects are selling at ten times earnings. Let us sup-
pose that four years later the price-earnings ratios of stocks as a whole
are unchanged so that generally sound stocks, but ones with no growth
prospects, are still selling at ten times earnings. Let us also suppose that
at this same time, four years later, one of our two stocks has much the
same growth prospects for the time ahead as it had four years before so
that the financial community’s appraisal is that this stock should again
double its earnings over the next four years. This means it would still be
selling at twenty times the doubled earnings of the past four years, or, in
other words, that it had also doubled in price in that period. In contrast,
at this same time, four years after our example had started, the second
stock had also doubled its earnings, just as had been expected, but at
this point the financial community’s appraisal is for flat earnings in an
otherwise sound company over the next four years. This would mean
that owners of this second stock were in for a market disappointment
even though the four-year doubling of earnings had come through
exactly as forecast. With an image of “no growth in earnings for the
next four years,” they would now be seeing a price-earnings ratio of
only ten in this second stock. Therefore, while the earnings had dou-
bled, the price of the stock had remained the same. All this can be sum-
marized in a basic investment rule: The further into the future profits
will continue to grow, the higher the price-earnings ratio an investor
can afford to pay.

This rule, however, should be applied with great caution. It should
never be forgotten that the actual variations in price-earnings ratio will
result not from what will actually happen but from what the financial
community currently believes will happen. In a period of general market

220

CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

optimism a stock may sell at an extremely high price-earnings ratio
because the financial community quite correctly envisages many years
of great growth ahead. But many years will have to elapse before this
growth is fully realized. The great growth that had been correctly dis-
counted in the price-earnings rati'o is likely to become “undiscounted”
for a while, particularly if the company experiences the type of tempo-
rary setback that is not uncommon for even the best of companies. In
times of general market pessimism, this kind of “undiscounting” of
some of the very finest investments can reach rather extreme levels.
When it does, it affords the patient investor, with the ability to distin-
guish between current market image and true facts, some of the most
attractive opportunities common stocks can offer for handsome long-
term profits at relatively small risk.

A rather colorful example of how sophisticated investors attempt to
anticipate a changed investment-community appraisal of a company
occurred on March 13, 1974. The previous day the New York Stock
Exchange closing price of Motorola was 48%. On March 13 the clos-
ing quotation was 60, a gain of almost 25 percent! What had happened
was that after the close of the exchange on the 12th, an announcement
was made that Motorola was getting out of the television business and
was selling its U.S. television plants and inventory to Matsushita, a large
Japanese manufacturer, for approximate book value.

Now it had been known generally that Motorola’s television busi-
ness was operating at a small loss and to that extent was draining the
profits of the rest of the company’s business. This of itself would warrant
the news to cause some increase in the price of the shares, although
hardly the degree of rise that actually occurred. Considerably more
complex reasoning was the main motivation behind the buying. For
some time a considerable body of investors had believed that Motorola’s
profitable divisions, particularly its Communications Division, made this
company one of the very few American electronics companies qualified
as being of truly high-grade investment status. For example, Spencer
Trask and Co. had issued a report by security analyst Otis Bradley that
discussed the investment merits of Motorola’s Communications Divi-
sion in considerable detail. This report took the unusual approach of cal-
culating the current and estimated future price-earnings ratio, not for
Motorola’s earnings as a whole but merely for this one division alone.
The report compared the estimated sales volume and price-earnings
ratio of just this one division with those of Hewlett-Packard and

Still More about the Fourth Dimension

221

Perkin-Elmer, generally considered to be among the very finest of elec-
tronics companies from an investment standpoint. From the report the
inference could easily be drawn (this was not specifically stated) that the
investment quality of Motorola’s Communications Division was such
that it was worth, by itself, the then current price of Motorola shares so
that, in effect, a buyer of the stock was getting all the other divisions for
nothing.

With this opinion about Motorola existing in some highly sophis-
ticated places, what may be judged to have induced such eager buying
on the Matsushita news? These Motorola enthusiasts had long known
that many elements of the financial community were inclined to look
with disfavor on the stock because of its television-manufacturing
image. Most of the financial community, upon hearing “Motorola,” first
thought of television and secondly of semiconductors. At the time of
the Matsushita announcement, Standard & Poor’s stock guide, in the
small amount of space available for listing the principal business of each
company, described Motorola as “Radio & T. V.: semiconductors,” all of
which, though not inaccurate, was misleading in that it suggested a dif-
ferent sort of company from what, in fact, Motorola really was and com-
pletely overlooked the very important Communications Division,
which at the time comprised almost half of the company.

Some of those buying Motorola on the Matsushita news undoubt-
edly rushed in merely because the news was good and therefore could
be expected to send the stock up. But there is reason to ascribe consid-
erable buying to the belief that the financial community’s appraisal of
the company had been considerably less favorable than the facts war-
ranted. The historical record was such that in the television business
Motorola was regarded more as an “also ran” than as an industry leader
such as Zenith. With the television operations no longer blurring
investors’ vision of what else was there, a new image with a very much
higher price-earnings ratio would arise.

Were those who rushed in to pay these higher prices for Motorola
wise in so doing? Not entirely. In subsequent weeks the shares lost the
immediate gain so that a degree of patience would have paid. In down-
ward markets, a change for the worse in the financial community’s
image of a company gets accepted far more quickly than a change for
the better, just the opposite is true in rising markets. Unfortunately for
those who rushed in to buy Motorola on this news, the immediately
ensuing weeks saw a sharp upturn in short-term interest rates which

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CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

produced a downward trend in the general market and accentuated the
widespread bear-market psychology then prevailing.

Perhaps another influence was also at work against those who
snapped up Motorola shares overnight. This influence is one of the most
subtle and dangerous in the entire field of investment and one against
which even the most sophisticated investors must constantly be on
guard. When for a long period of time a particular stock has been sell-
ing in a certain price range, say from a low of 38 to a high of 43, there
is an almost irresistible tendency to attribute true value to this price
level. Consequently, when, after the financial community has become
thoroughly accustomed to this being the “value” of the stock, the
appraisal changes and the stock, say, sinks to 24, all sorts of buyers who
should know better rush in to buy. They jump to the conclusion that
the stock must now be cheap. Yet if the fundamentals are bad enough,
it may still be very high at 24. Conversely, as such a stock rises to, say,
50 or 60 or 70, the urge to sell and take a profit now that the stock is
“high” becomes irresistible to many people. Giving in to this urge can
be very costly. This is because the genuinely worthwhile profits in stock
investing have come from holding the surprisingly large number of
stocks that have gone up many times from their original cost. The only
true test of whether a stock is “cheap” or “high” is not its current price
in relation to some former price, no matter how accustomed we may
have become to that former price, but whether the company’s funda-
mentals are significantly more or less favorable than the current financial-
community appraisal of that stock.

As previously mentioned, there is a third element of investment-
community appraisal that also must be considered, along with its
appraisal of the industry and of the particular company. Only after all
three are blended together can a worthwhile judgment be reached as to
whether a stock is cheap or high at any given time. This third appraisal
is that of the outlook for stocks in general. To see the rather extreme
effect such general market appraisals can have in certain periods and
how far these views can vary from the facts, it may be well to review
the two most extreme such appraisals of this century. Ridiculous as it
may seem to us today, in the period from 1927 to 1929, the majority of
the financial community actually believed we were in a “new era.” For
years earnings of most U.S. companies had been growing with monot-
onous regularity. Not only had serious business depressions become a
thing of the past but a great engineer and businessman, Herbert Hoover,

Still More about the Fourth Dimension

223

had been elected President. His competence was expected to assure
even greater prosperity from then on. In such circumstances it seemed
to many that it had become virtually impossible to lose by owning
stocks. And many who wanted to cash in as much as possible on this sure
thing bought on margin to obtain rhore shares than they could other-
wise afford. We all know what happened when reality shattered this
particular appraisal. The agony of the Great Depression and the bear
market of 1929 to 1932 will be long remembered.

Contrary in outlook, but similar in being spectacularly wrong, was
the investment community’s appraisal of common stocks as an invest-
ment vehicle in the three years from mid- 1946 to mid- 1949. Most
companies’ earnings were extremely pleasing. However, pursuant to the
then current appraisal, stocks were selling at the lowest price-earnings
ratios in many years. The financial community was saying that “these
earnings don’t mean anything,” that they were “just temporary and
would shrink sharply or disappear in the depression that must come.”
The financial community remembered that the Civil War had been fol-
lowed by the panic of 1873, which marked the onset of a very severe
depression that lasted until 1879. Following World War I had come the
even worse crash of 1929 and another six years of major depression.
Since World War II had involved a vastly greater effort and therefore a
greater distortion of the economy than World War I, it was assumed that
an even bigger bear market and an even worse depression were on the
horizon. As long as this appraisal lasted, most stocks were so much on
the bargain counter that when it began to dawn on the investment
community that this image was false and that no severe depression lay
in wait, the foundations had been laid for one of the longest periods of
rising stock prices in U.S. history.

Since the bear market of 1972—1974 brought with it the only other
time in this century when most price- earnings ratios were about as low as
they were in the 1946—1949 period, the question obviously arises as to the
soundness of the financial community’s appraisal that brought this about.
Are the fears engendering these historically low price-earnings ratios valid?
Could this be another 1946—1949 all over again? An attempt will be made
to throw some light on these matters in a later section of this book.

There is a basic difference between the factors that affect changes in
the general level of all stock prices and those that affect the relative price-
earnings ratio of one stock compared to another within that general
level. For reasons already discussed, the factors at any given moment that

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CONSERVATIVE INVESTORS SLEEP WELL

affect this relative price-earnings ratio of one stock to another are sole-
ly matters of the current image in the investment community of the
particular company and the particular industry to which that company
belongs. However, the level of stocks as a whole is not solely a matter of
image but results partly from the' financial community’s current apprais-
al of the degree of attractiveness of common stocks and partly from a
certain purely financial factor from the real world.

This real-world factor is mainly involved with interest rates. When
interest rates are high in either the long- or short-term money markets,
and even more so when they are high in both, there is a tendency for a
larger part of the pool of investment capital to flow toward those markets,
so the demand for stocks is less. Stocks may be sold to transfer funds to
these markets. Conversely, when rates are low, funds flow out of those
markets and into stocks. Therefore, higher interest rates tend to lower the
level of all stocks and lower interest rates to raise that level. Similarly, when
the public is in a mood to save a larger percentage of its income, more
funds flow into the total capital pool and there is a more bullish pull on
stock prices than when the pool of capital funds is rising more slowly.
However, this is a much smaller influence than is the level of interest rates.
An even smaller influence is the degree of fluctuation in new stock issues,
which are a drain on the capital pool available to the stock market. The
reason the new-issue supply is not a bigger factor on the general level of
stock prices is that when other influences cause stocks to be in favor, the
new-issue volume rises to take advantage of this situation. When com-
mon-stock prices reach low levels, supply of new issues tends to diminish
drastically. As a result, fluctuations in new-issue volume are much more a
result of other influences than an influencing factor themselves.

This fourth dimension to stock investing might be summarized in
this way: The price of any particular stock at any particular moment is
determined by the current financial-community appraisal of the partic-
ular company, of the industry it is in, and to some degree of the gener-
al level of stock prices. Determining whether at that moment the price
of a stock is attractive, unattractive or somewhere in between depends
for the most part on the degree these appraisals vary from reality.
However, to the extent that the general level of stock prices affects the
total picture, it also depends somewhat on correctly estimating coming
changes in certain purely financial factors, of which interest rates are by
far the most important.

Part Three

DEVELOPING AN
INVESTMENT
PHILOSOPHY

Dedication to Frank E. Block

This book was first published at the request of the Institute of Chartered
Financial Analysts made under the C. Stewart Shepard Award. This
award was conferred on Frank E. Block C.F. A. in recognition of his out-
standing contribution through dedicated effort and inspiring leadership
in advancing the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts as a vital force
in fostering the education of financial analysts, in establishing high eth-
ical standards of conduct, and in developing programs and publications
to encourage the continuing education of financial analysts.

Origins of a Philosophy

T o understand any disciplined approach to investment, it is first nec-
essary to understand the objective for which the methodology is
designed. For any part of the funds supervised by Fisher & Co.,
except for funds temporarily in cash or cash equivalents awaiting more
suitable opportunities, it is the objective that they be invested in a very
small number of companies that, because of the characteristics of their
management, should both grow in sales and more importantly in prof-
its at a rate significantly greater than industry as a whole. They should
also do so at relatively small risk in relation to the growth involved. To
meet Fisher & Co. standards, a management must have a viable policy
for attaining these ends with all the willingness to subordinate immedi-
ate profits for the greater long-range gains that this concept requires. In
addition, two characteristics are necessary. One is the ability to imple-
ment long-range policy with superior day-to-day performance in all the
routine tasks of business operation. The other is that when significant
mistakes occur, as is bound at times to happen when management strives
for unique benefits through innovative concepts, new products, etc., or
because management becomes too complacent through success, these
mistakes are recognized clearly and remedial action is taken.

Because I believe I best understand the characteristics of manufac-
turing companies, I have confined Fisher & Co. activities largely to
manufacturing enterprises that use a combination of leading edge tech-
nology and superior business judgment to accomplish these goals. In
recent years, I have confined Fisher & Co. investments solely to this
group, because on the few occasions when I have invested outside it,

2 2 8 DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

I have not been satisfied with the results. However, I see no reason why
the same principles should not be equally profitable when applied by
those with the necessary expertise in such fields as retailing, transporta-
tion, finance, etc.

No investment philosophy, Unless it is just a carbon copy of some-
one elses approach, develops in its complete form in any one day or
year. In my own case, it grew over a considerable period of time, partly
as a result of what perhaps may be called logical reasoning, and partly
from observing the successes and failures of others, but much of it
through the more painful method of learning from my own mistakes.
Possibly the best way of trying to explain my investment approach to
others is to use the historical route. For this reason I will go back into
the early, formative years, attempting to show block by block how this
investment philosophy developed.

THE BIRTH OF INTEREST

My first awareness of the stock market and the opportunities which
changing stock quotations might make possible occurred at a fairly early
age. With my father the youngest of five and my mother the youngest
of eight, at my birth I had only one surviving grandparent. This may
have been one of the reasons why I felt particularly close to my grand-
mother. At any rate, I went to see her one afternoon when I was bare-
ly out of grammar school. An uncle dropped in to discuss with her his
views of business conditions in the year ahead, and how this might affect
the stocks she owned. A whole new world opened up to me. By saving
some money, I had the right to buy a share in the future profits of any
one I might choose among hundreds of the most important business
enterprises of the country. If I chose correctly, these profits could be
truly exciting. I thought the whole subject of judging what makes a
business grow an intriguing one, and here was a game that if I learned
to play it properly would by comparison make any other with which I
was familiar seem drab, meaningless and unexciting. When my uncle
left, my grandmother turned to me and said how sorry she was that he
happened to come in when I was there, forcing her to spend time on
matters which could not possibly interest me. I told her that, to the con-
trary, the hour he spent with her had seemed like ten minutes, and that
I had just heard something that interested me tremendously. Years later

229

Origins of a Philosophy

I was to realize how very few were the shares she owned and how
extremely superficial were the comments I heard that day, but the
interest that was kindled by that conversation has continued all during
my life.

With this degree of interest and in a period when most businesses
were far less concerned with the legal hazards of dealing with minors
than is the case today, I was able to make a few dollars for myself dur-
ing the roaring bull market of the middle 1920 s. I was strongly dis-
couraged from this, however, by my physician father, who felt that it
would simply teach me gambling habits. This was unlikely, as I am not
by nature inclined to take chances merely for the sake of taking chances,
which is the nature of gambling. On the other hand, as I look back upon
it, my tiny scale stock activities of that period taught me almost noth-
ing of any great value so far as investment policies were concerned.

FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES

Before the Great Bull Market of the 1920’s was to come to its crashing
end, I did have an experience, however, that was to teach me much of
real importance for use in the years ahead. In the 1927-28 academic year
I was enrolled as a first-year student in Stanford University’s then fledg-
ling Graduate School of Business. Twenty per cent of that years course,
that is one day a week, was devoted to visiting some of the largest busi-
ness enterprises in the San Francisco Bay area. Professor Boris Emmett,
who conducted this activity, had not been given this responsibility
because of the usual academic background. In those days, the large mail
order companies obtained a significant part of their merchandise through
contracts with suppliers whose sole customer was one or the other of
these firms. These contracts frequently were so hard on the manufactur-
er and afforded him so little profit margin that from time to time a man-
ufacturer would find himself in severe financial difficulty. It was not in
the interest of the mail order houses to see their vendors fail. Professor
Emmett had for some years been the expert employed by one such mail
order firm with the job of salvaging these faltering companies when they
had been squeezed too tightly. As a result, he knew a great deal about
management. One of the rules under which this course was conducted
was that we would visit no company that would just take us through the
plant. After “seeing the wheels go around,” the management had to be

2 30 DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

willing to sit down with us so that, under the very shrewd questioning
of our professor, we could learn something of what the strengths and
weaknesses of the business really were. I recognized that this was a learn-
ing opportunity of just the type that I was seeking. I was able to jockey
myself into a position to take particular advantage of it. In that day, over
a half century ago, when the ratio of automobiles to people was tremen-
dously lower than it is today. Professor Emmett did not have a car. I did.
I offered to drive him to these various plants. I did not learn much from
him on the way over. However, each week on the way back to Stanford,
I would hear comments of what he really thought of that particular com-
pany. This provided me with one of the most valuable learning experi-
ences I have ever been privileged to enjoy.

Also on one of these trips I formed a specific conviction that was
to prove of tremendous dollar value to me a few years in the future.
It was actually to lay the foundation for my business. One week we
visited not one but two manufacturing plants that were located next
door to each other in San Jose. One was the John Bean Spray Pump
Company, the world leaders in the manufacture of the type of pumps
that were used to spray insecticides on orchards to combat natural
pests. The other was the Anderson-Barngrover Manufacturing Com-
pany, also world leaders, but in the field of equipment used by fruit
canneries. In the 1920 s the concept of a “growth company” had not
yet been verbalized by the financial community. However, as I some-
what awkwardly worded it to Professor Emmett, “I thought that
those two companies had probabilities of growing very much beyond
their present size to a degree that I had seen in no other company we
had visited.” He agreed with me.

Also, through spending part of the time on these automobile trips
by asking Professor Emmett about his previous business experiences, I
learned something else that was to stand me in good stead in the years
ahead. This was the extreme importance of selling in order to have a
healthy business. A company might be an extremely efficient manufac-
turer or an inventor might have a product with breathtaking possibilities,
but this was never enough for a healthy business. Unless that business
contained people capable of convincing others as to the worth of their
product, such a business would never really control its own destiny. It
was later that I was to build on this base to conclude that even a strong
sales arm is not enough. For a company to be a truly worthwhile invest-
ment, it must not only be able to sell its products, but also be able to

Origins of a Philosophy 2 3 1

appraise changing needs and desires of its customers; in other words, to
master all that is implied in a true concept of marketing.

FIRST LESSONS IN THE SCHOOL OF EXPERIENCE

As the summer of 1928 approached and my first year in the business
school came to an end, an opportunity arose which seemed to me too
good to pass up. In contrast to the hundreds of students that are enrolled
each year in this school today, my class, being only the third in the grad-
uate school’s history, contained nineteen students. The graduating class
one year ahead of me contained only nine. Just two of these nine were
trained in finance. In that day of great stock market ferment, both were
snapped up by New York-based investment trusts. At the last minute, an
independent San Francisco bank, which years later was acquired by the
Crocker National Bank of that city, sent down to the school a request
for a graduate trained in investments. The school was anxious not to pass
up this opportunity because if their representative merited the approval
of the bank, it could be the forerunner of many opportunities for plac-
ing future graduates in the years to come. However, they had no grad-
uate to send. It was not easy to do, but when I heard of this opportunity,
I finally persuaded the school to send me with the thought that if I were
to make good, I would stay there. If I could not fill the job, I would
come back and take second-year courses, with the bank realizing that
the school had made no pretense of sending them a completely trained
student.

Security analysts in those pre-crash days were called statisticians. It
was three successive years of sensationally falling stock prices that were
to occur just a short time ahead that caused the work of Wall Street’s
statisticians to fall into such disrepute that the name was changed to
security analysts.

I found that I was to be the statistician for the investment banking
end of the bank. In those days, there was no legal barrier to banks being
in the brokerage or investment banking business. The work I was
assigned to do was extremely simple. In my opinion, it was also intel-
lectually dishonest. The investment arm of the bank was chiefly engaged
in selling high interest rate, new issues of bonds on which they made
quite sizable commissions as part of underwriting syndicates. No
attempt was made to evaluate the quality of these bonds or any stocks

232 DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

they sold, but rather in that day of a seller’s market they gratefully
accepted any part of a syndicate offered them by their New York asso-
ciates or by the large investment banking houses. Then the security
salesmen for the bank would portray to their customers that they had a
statistical department capable of surveying those customers’ holdings
and issuing to them a report on each security handled. What was actu-
ally done in those “security analyses” was to look up the data on a par-
ticular company in one of the established manuals of the day, such as
Moody’s or Standard Statistics . Then someone like myself, with no further
knowledge than what was reported in that manual, would simply para-
phrase the wording of the manual to write his own report. Any company
that was doing a large volume of sales was invariably reported as “well
managed,” just because it was big. I was under no direct orders to rec-
ommend that customers switch some of the securities I “analyzed” into
whatever security the bank was attempting to sell at the moment, but
the whole atmosphere was one of encouraging this type of analysis.

BUILDING THE BASICS

It was not very long before the superficiality of the whole procedure
caused me to feel that there must be a better way to do this. I was
extremely fortunate in having an immediate boss who completely
understood why I was concerned and granted me the time to make an
experiment which I proposed to him. At that time, in the fall of 1928,
there was a great deal of speculative interest in radio stocks. I introduced
myself as a representative of the investment arm of the bank to the
buyers of the radio department of several retail establishments in San
Francisco. I asked them their opinions of the three major competitors
in this industry. I was given surprisingly similar opinions from each of
them. In particular, I learned a great deal from one man who was him-
self an engineer and who had worked for one of these companies. One
company, Philco, which from my standpoint unfortunately was private-
ly owned so that it represented no stock market opportunity, had devel-
oped models which had especial market appeal. As a result, they were
getting market share at a beautiful profit to themselves because they
were highly efficient manufacturers. RCA was just about holding its
own market share, whereas another company, which was a stock market
favorite of the day, was slipping drastically and showing signs of getting

233

Origins of a Philosophy

into trouble. None of this was the direct business of the bank, for it was
not handling radio stocks. Nevertheless, an evaluative report seemed
likely to help me considerably within the bank because many key bank
officers who would see it were personally involved in speculation in
these issues. Nowhere in material from Wall Street firms who were talk-
ing about these “hot” radio issues could I find a single word about the
troubles that were obviously developing for this speculative favorite.

In the ensuing twelve months, as the stock market continued on its
reckless but merry way with most stocks climbing to new highs, I
noticed with increasing interest how the stock I had singled out for
trouble was sagging further and further in that rising market. It was my
first lesson in what later was to become part of my basic investment
philosophy: reading the printed financial records about a company is
never enough to justify an investment. One of the major steps in pru-
dent investment must be to find out about a company’s affairs from
those who have some direct familiarity with them.

At this early point, however, I had not achieved the next logical step
in this type of reasoning: it is also necessary to learn as much as possible
about the people who are running a company under investment con-
siderations, either by getting to know those people yourself or by find-
ing someone in whom you have confidence who knows them well.

As 1929 started to unfold, I became more and more convinced of
the unsoundness of the wild boom that seemed to be continuing. Stocks
continued climbing to ever higher prices on the amazing theory that we
were in a “new era.” Therefore, in the future, year after year of advanc-
ing per-share earnings could be taken as a matter of course.Yet as I tried
to appraise the outlook for America s basic industries, I saw a number of
them with supply-demand problems that seemed to me to indicate their
outlook was getting rather wobbly.

In August of 1929 I issued another special report to the officers of
the bank. I predicted that the next six months would see the beginning
of the greatest bear market in a quarter of a century. It would be very
satisfying to my ego, if at this point, I could alter drastically the tale of
just what happened and leave the impression that, having been exactly
right in my forecasting, I then profited greatly from all this wisdom. The
facts were quite to the contrary.

Even though I felt strongly that the whole stock market was too
high in those dangerous days of 1929, I was nevertheless entrapped by
the lure of the market. This caused me to look around to find a few

234

DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

stocks that “were still cheap” and were worthwhile investments because
“they had not gone up yet.” As a result of the small profits from the tiny
amount of stock transactions a few years back and the saving of a good
part of my salary, plus some money I had earned in college, I managed
to scrape together several thousand dollars as 1929 went along. I divid-
ed this almost equally among three stocks which, in my ignorance, I
thought were still undervalued in that overpriced market. One was a
leading locomotive company with a still quite low price-earnings ratio.
With railroad equipment being one of the most cyclical of all industries,
it takes very little imagination to see what was to happen to that com-
pany’s sales and profits in the business depression that was about to
engulf us. The other two were a local billboard company and a local
taxicab company, also selling at very low price-earnings ratios. In spite
of my success in ferreting out what was going to happen to the radio
stocks, I just did not have the sense to start making similar inquiries
from people who knew about these two local enterprises, even though
obtaining such information or even getting to meet the people who ran
these businesses would have been relatively simple, since they were close
at hand. As the depression increased, I learned rather vividly why these
companies had been selling at such low price-earnings ratios. By 1932,
only a tiny percentage of my original investment was represented by the
market value of the shares in these companies.

THE GREAT BEAR MARKET

Fortunately for my future well-being, I have an intense dislike for los-
ing money. I have always believed that the chief difference between a
fool and a wise man is that the wise man learns from his mistakes, while
the fool never does. The corollary of this is that it behooved me to go
over my mistakes pretty carefully and not to repeat them again.

My approach to investing expanded as I learned from my 1929 mis-
takes. I learned that, while a stock could be attractive when it had a low
price-earnings ratio, a low price-earnings ratio by itself guaranteed
nothing and was apt to be a warning indicator of a degree of weakness
in the company. I began realizing that, all the then current Wall Street
opinion to the contrary, what really counts in determining whether a
stock is cheap or overpriced is not its ratio to the current year’s earn-
ings, but its ratio to the earnings a few years ahead. If I could build up

235

Origins of a Philosophy

in myself the ability to determine within fairly broad limits what those
earnings might be a few years from now, I would have unlocked the key
both to avoiding losses and to making magnificent profits!

In addition to learning that a low price-earnings ratio was just as apt
to be a sign that a stock was an investment trap as that it was a bargain,
acute awareness of my miserable investment performances during the
Great Bear Market made me vividly aware of something of possibly
even greater importance. I had been spectacularly right in my timing of
when the bull market bubble was about to burst, and almost right in
judging the full force of what was to happen. Yet except for a possible
small boost in my reputation among a very small circle of people, this
had done me no good whatsoever. From then on, I was to realize that
all the correct reasoning about an investment policy or about the desir-
ability or purchase or sale of any particular stock did not have the least
bit of value until it was translated into action through the completion
of specific transactions.

A CHANCE TO DO MY THING

In the spring of 1930 I made a change of employers. I only mention this
because it triggered the events that were to cause the emergence of the
investment philosophy that has guided me since that time. A regional
brokerage firm came to me and made me a salary offer which, at age 22
and for that time and place, I found quite difficult to refuse. Further-
more, they offered me a vastly more appealing work assignment than the
dissatisfying experience as a “statistician” in the investment banking arm
of the bank. With no assigned duties whatsoever, I was to be free to
devote my time to finding individual stocks which I thought were par-
ticularly suitable candidates for either purchase or sale because of their
characteristics. I was then to write reports on my conclusions to circu-
late among the brokers employed by this firm to help them stimulate
business that would be profitable for their clients.

This offer came to me just after Herbert Hoover had made his
famous “Prosperity is just around the corner” statement. Several partners
of the firm involved implicitly believed this. As a result of the 1929
crash, their total payroll had dropped from 125 employees to 75. They
told me that if I accepted their offer, I would be number 76. I was just
as bearish at the time as they were bullish. I felt sure the bear market was

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

a long way from over. I told them that I would come on one condition.
While they were free to fire me at any time if they did not like the
quality of my work, lack of seniority must be no influence whatsoever
if adverse financial markets forced them to make further reduction in
payroll. They agreed to this provision.

FROM DISASTER, OPPORTUNITY SPRINGS

As employers, I could not have asked for nicer people. In the ensuing
eight months, I had one of the most valuable business educational
experiences of my life. I saw at first hand example after example of
how the investment business should not be conducted. As 1930
unfolded and stocks once again continued on what seemed like an
almost endless decline, my employers’ position got more and more
precarious. Then, just before Christmas of 1930, we, who had so far
survived the economic holocaust, witnessed the grim picture of the
whole firm being suspended from the San Francisco Stock Exchange
for insolvency.

This grim news for my associates was to prove one of the most for-
tunate business developments, if not the most fortunate, of my life. For
some time I had had vague plans that when prosperity returned I would
start my own business by charging clients a fee for managing their
investments. I am purposely using this roundabout way to describe the
activities of an investment counselor or an investment advisor because
in those days neither of these terms had yet been used. However, with
almost everyone in the financial business retrenching during that
gloomy January of 1931, the only security industry job I could find was
a purely clerical and, to me, a quite unattractive one. If I had properly
analyzed the situation, I would have realized that this was exactly the
right time to start a new business of the kind I had in mind. I was to
find that there were two reasons for this. One was that, after almost two
years of the most severe bear market this nation had ever seen, nearly
everyone was so dissatisfied with their existing brokerage connections
that they were in the mood to listen even to someone both young and
advocating a radically different approach to the handling of their invest-
ments as was I. Also, as the economy reached its depths in 1932, many
key businessmen had so little to do in pursuing their own affairs that
they had the time to see someone who was calling on them. In more

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Origins of a Philosophy

normal times, I would never have gotten by their secretaries. One of the
most worthwhile clients of my entire business career and a man whose
family’s investments I still handle was a typical example of this. Some
years afterwards he told me that on the day I called he had had almost
nothing to do and had already finished reading the sports section of the
newspaper. So when my name and purpose were told him by his secre-
tary, he thought, “Listening to this guy will at least occupy my time.” He
confessed, “If you had come to see me a year or so later, you never
would have gotten into my office.”

A FOUNDATION IS FORMED

All this was to result in several years of very hard work in a tiny office
with low overhead. With no windows and merely glass partitions to
serve as two of the walls, my total floor space was little larger than that
needed to jam together a desk, my chair, and one other chair. For this,
together with free local telephone service and a reasonable amount of
secretarial help from the secretary-receptionist of the gentleman from
whom I leased this space, I paid the princely sum of $25 per month. My
only other expenses were stationery, postage and a very occasional long
distance call. The account book still in my possession provides an indi-
cation of how difficult it really was to start a new business in 1932. After
very long hours of work over and above this overhead, I made a net
profit averaging $2.99 per month for that year. In the still difficult year
of 1933, I did a trifle better, showing an improvement of just under
1000 percent, an average monthly earnings of just over $29. This possi-
bly was about what I would have made as a newsboy selling papers on
the street. Yet in what those years were to bring me in the future, they
were two of the most profitable years of my life. They provided me with
the foundation for an extremely profitable business and with a group of
highly loyal clients by 1935. It would be nice if I could claim that it was
brilliant thinking on my part that caused me to start my business when
I did rather than waiting until better times were to arrive. Actually, it was
the unattractiveness of the only job that seemed open to me that pushed
me into it.

Leorning from Experience

W hile I had been working at the bank, I had noticed with con-
siderable interest a news item about the two neighboring San
Jose companies that had intrigued me so much during my
student days at the Stanford Business School. In 1928 the John Bean
Manufacturing Co. and the Anderson-Barngrover Manufacturing
Co. had merged with a leading vegetable canning manufacturer,
Sprague Sells Corporation of Hoopeston, Illinois, to form a brand
new entity called the Food Machinery Corporation.

As in other periods of rampant speculation the nation was in the throes
of such a stock buying mania that the supply of Food Machinery Corpo-
ration stock offered for sale rose in price in an attempt to meet the
demand. In that same year of 1928, at least twenty other new issues, and
perhaps twice that many, were sold by members of the San Francisco Stock
Exchange to eager buyers in the Bay area. The lack of soundness of some
of these issues was little short of appalling. An officer of one stock exchange
firm, that sold shares in a company that was to sell botded water from
across the Pacific, told me that these shares were sold without a complete
set of financial statements in the hands of the underwriters, who had little
more than a photograph of the spring from which the water was supposed
to come and a minor amount of personal contact with the selling share-
holders! In the public mind, the stock of the Food Machinery Corpora-
tion was just another of the exciting new offerings of that year, neither sig-
nificantly better nor worse than the rest. It was offered at a price of $21 Vi
In those days, pools for the manipulation of shares were entirely
legal. A local group with little expertise in running a pool but headed

239

Learning from Experience

by a man with great enthusiasm for Food Machinery Corporation
decided to “run an operation” in the company’s shares. The methods of
all these pools were fundamentally similar. The members would sell
stock back and forth among themselves at gradually rising prices. All this
activity on the stock tape would attract the attention of others, who
would then start to buy and take the pools shares off its hands at still
higher prices. Some highly skilled manipulators, some of whom had
made many millions of dollars and one of whom, a year or so later, was
to offer me a junior partnership, were quite experienced and able prac-
titioners of this rather questionable art. Manipulation was not the objec-
tive of the operators of this Food Machinery pool, however. As the
autumn of 1929 was to arrive and stocks were to face the precipice that
lay ahead, the pool managed to buy for itself most of the shares that had
been offered to the public. Although the quoted price of the Food
Machinery shares at the peak was in the high 50’s, there was very little
stock in the hands of the public as a result.

As in each of the succeeding years the general level of business
activities worsened relative to the year before, it was obvious what was
to happen to the flotsam and jetsam of small companies that went pub-
lic in the 1928 excitement. One after another of these companies passed
into bankruptcy, with many of the remainder reporting losses rather
than profits. The market for the shares of these firms largely dried up.

There were one or two companies in this group other than Food
Machinery that were fundamentally both sound and attractive. However,
the general public showed no discrimination whatsoever, considering all of
them little more than speculative junk. By the time the market was to reach
its final low in 1932, and again equal that low at the time of closing of the
entire banking system of the country coincidental with the inauguration
of Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 4, 1933, Food Machinery shares were
down to a price of between $4 and $5, with the all-time low being 100
shares at $3%.

FOOD MACHINERY AS AN
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY

As 1931 unfolded and I cast about seeking an opportunity for my infant busi-
ness, I looked upon Food Machinery’s situation with increasing excitement.

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

Recognizing the costliness of my not having taken the trouble to meet
with and judge the managements of the two local companies in which
I had lost such a large percentage of my investment a few years before,
I determined never to make this mistake again. The more I got to know
the Food Machinery people, the greater my respect for them grew.
Because in many ways this company, as it existed in the depths of the
Great Depression, was a microcosm of the type of opportunity I was to
seek in the years ahead. It may be helpful to explain just what it was that
caused me nearly a half century ago to see such a future in this partic-
ular corporation.

Parenthetically and unfortunately, I did not carry my policy of in-
depth field analysis through to its logical conclusion in the immediate
years. I was less diligent in getting to know and to judge managements
that were located in more distant areas.

In the first place, even though Food Machinery was relatively small,
it was a world leader in size and, I believe, in quality of the product line
in each of the three activities in which it was engaged. This gave the
firm the advantage of scale; that is, as a large and efficient manufacturer
the firm could also be a low-cost producer.

Next, its marketing position was, from a competitive standpoint,
extremely strong. Its products were highly regarded by its customers. It
controlled its own sales organization. Furthermore, its canning machin-
ery lines, with a large number of installations already in the field, had a
“locked up” market of some proportions. This consisted of spare and
replacement parts for the equipment already in the field.

Added to this sound base was the most exciting part of the business.
For a company of its size, the firm enjoyed a superbly creative engi-
neering or research department. The company was perfecting equip-
ment in promising new product areas. Among these were the first
mechanical pear peeler ever to be offered to the industry, the first
mechanical peach pitter, and a process for synthetically coloring
oranges. Oranges from areas which produced fruit with the most juice
was at a competitive disadvantage because the product looked less
attractive to the housewife than other types in which intrinsic quality
was no better. At only one other time in my business life have I seen a
company which, in my judgment, had on the horizon as big a dollar
volume of potentially successful new products in relation to the then
existing size of business as was the case with the Food Machinery
Corporation in the period from 1932 through 1934.

Learning from Experience 2 4 1

By this time, I had learned enough to know that, no matter how
attractive, such matters by themselves were not sufficient to assure great
success. The quality of the people involved in the company was just as
critical. I use the word quality to encompass two quite different charac-
teristics. One of these is business ability. Business ability can be further
broken down into two very different types of skills. One of these is han-
dling the day-to-day tasks of business with above-average efficiency. In
the day-to-day tasks, I include a hundred and one matters, varying all
the way from constantly seeking and finding better ways to produce
more efficiently to watching receivables with sufficient closeness. In
other words, operating skill implies above-average handling of the many
things that have to do with the near-term operation of the business.

However, in the business world, top-notch managerial ability also
calls for another skill that is quite different. This is the ability to look
ahead and make long-range plans that will produce significant future
growth for the business without at the same time running financial risks
that may invite disaster. Many companies contain managements that are
very good at one or the other of these skills. However, for real success,
both are necessary.

Business ability is only one of the two “people” traits that I believe
is absolutely essential for a truly worthwhile investment. The other falls
under the general term of integrity and encompasses both the honesty
and the personal decency of those who are running a company. Anyone
receiving his first indoctrination into the investment world in the period
that preceded the 1929 crash would have seen rather vivid examples of
the extreme importance of integrity. The owners and managers of a busi-
ness are always closer to that business’s affairs than are the stockholders.
If the managers do not have a genuine sense of trusteeship for the stock-
holders, sooner or later the stockholders may fail to receive a significant
part of what is justly due them. Managers preoccupied by their own per-
sonal interests are not likely to develop an enthusiastic team of loyal peo-
ple around them — something that is an absolute must if a business is to
grow to a size that one or two people can no longer control.

As I saw the situation in those dark days of the deep depression, and
as I see it now after all these years, this infant Food Machinery Corpo-
ration was unusually attractive from the “people” standpoint. John D.
Crummey, the president and son-in-law of the original founder of the
John Bean Manufacturing Co., was not only an extremely efficient
operating head and highly regarded by his customers and his employees,

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

but also he was a deeply religious man who scrupulously lived up to a
high moral code. The chief engineer of the company was a brilliant
conceptual designer. Also of considerable importance, he was a man
who designed along lines that would give his products worthwhile
patent protection. Finally, to round out the strength of this relatively
small organization, John Crummey persuaded his son-in-law, Paul L.
Davies, who was reluctant to abandon what appeared to be a most
promising career in banking, to join the company to give it financial
strength and conservatism. Actually, Paul Davies at first made this move
so reluctantly that he only agreed to take a one-year leave of absence
from the bank to help his family business over the first rough year of
merger. During that year, he became so interested in the exciting
prospects that lay ahead that he decided to stay permanently with the
company. Later, as its president, he was to lead it to a size and degree of
prosperity that was to dwarf the pleasing accomplishments of the next
few years.

This then was a company that inherently had desirable characteristics
that are only occasionally found among available investments. The people
were outstanding. Yet, small as the company was, it was not just one man
who was making key contributions. In relation to competitors, the com-
pany was unusually strong, it was handling its business well, and it had in
the offing enough new product lines with potentials that were large in
relation to the then size of the company. Even if some of these products
did not materialize, the future should be very bright with others.

ZIGGING AND ZAGGING

However, to all this should be added something of equal importance if
an investment is to prove a genuine bonanza. The largest profits in the
investment field go to those who are capable of correctly zigging when
the financial community is zagging. If the future of the Food Machin-
ery Corporation had been properly appraised at that time, the profits
that were to accrue to those who bought the shares in the 1932-1934
period would have been very much smaller. It was only because the true
worth of this company was not generally recognized and Food Machin-
ery was thought to be just another of the many “flaky” companies
which were sold to the public at the height of a speculative orgy that it
was possible to buy these shares in quantity at the ridiculous price to

Learning from Experience 2 4 3

which they had sunk. This matter of training oneself not to go with the
crowd but to be able to zig when the crowd zags, in my opinion, is one
of the most important fundamentals of investment success.

I wish I had the command of English to be able to describe ade-
quately the degree of my internal, emotional and intellectual excitement
as I contemplated what this as yet financially unrecognized Food
Machinery Corporation might do for both my tiny personal finances
and for the infant business I was attempting to get started. My timing
seemed right. Like a spring that had been compressed too far and was
starting to recoil, the years from 1933 to 1937 were to see stocks as a
whole advancing slowly at first, and then bursting into a full bloom bull
market, followed by a sizable break in 1938 and a full recovery the fol-
lowing year. With a deep conviction that Food Machinery would vast-
ly outperform the market as a whole, I bought my clients every share
that I was able to convince them to hold. I made the possibilities of this
business the spearhead of my approach in talking to any potential clients
I could reach. I felt that here was just the type of unique, almost once
in a lifetime, opportunity that Shakespeare so well described when he
said, “There is a tide in the affairs of men which, taken at the flood, leads
on to fortune.” In those exciting years when my hopes were high and
both my purse and reputation in the financial community were almost
non-existent, I quoted those exciting words to myself time and time
again to stiffen my determination.

CONTRARY, BUT CORRECT

Much has been written in the literature of investments on the impor-
tance of contrary opinion. Contrary opinion, however, is not enough. I
have seen investment people so imbued with the need to go contrary to
the general trend of thought that they completely overlook the corol-
lary of all this which is: when you do go contrary to the general trend
of investment thinking, you must be very, very sure that you are right.
For example, as it became obvious that the automobile was largely to
displace the streetcar and the shares of the once favored urban railways
began to sell at ever lower price-earnings ratios, it would have been a
rather costly thing just to be contrary and buy streetcar securities only
on the grounds that because everyone thought they were in a declining
stage, they must be attractive. Huge profits are frequently available to

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

those who zig when most of the financial community is zagging, pro-
viding they have strong indications that they are right in their zigging.

If a quotation from Shakespeare was a vital force in formulating my
policies on the matter, so also, strangely enough, was a popular song
from World War I.As one of the very thinning ranks of those who can
still remember how the home front reacted in the stirring days of 1918,
I might point out that in its excitement and enthusiasm for that war the
American public had a naivete then quite different from its grimness
about such matters in World War II, when the horrors of war were more
clearly understood. Firsthand news of the casualties and the filth and the
terror of those in the front lines had not yet permeated the continental
United States in 1918. As a result, the popular music of the day was
filled with cheerful and humorous war songs in a way that happened on
a much smaller scale in World War II, and not at all during the Vietnam
fiasco. Most of these songs came out in the form of sheet music for
pianos. One of these songs, published with a picture of a proud mama
looking down on parading soldiers, had the title, “They’re All Out of
Step But Jim.”

I recognized from the very first that I was running a distinct risk of
being “out of step.” My very early purchases of Food Machinery and a
number of other companies were bought “out of phase,” when their
intrinsic merit was completely unrecognized by the financial commu-
nity. I might be completely wrong in my thinking and the financial
community could be right. If so, nothing would be worse for my clients
or myself than letting my firm convictions about a particular situation
lock up a sizable amount of funds unprofitably for an endless period of
years because I zigged when the financial community had zagged, and
I had been wrong in doing so.

However, while I realized thoroughly that if I were to make the
kinds of profits that are made possible by the process that I have
described as zigging when the rest zags, it was vital that I have some sort
of quantitative check to be sure that I was right in zigging.

PATIENCE AND PERFORMANCE

With this in mind, I established what I called my three-year rule. I have
repeated again and again to my clients that when I purchase something
for them, not to judge the results in a matter of a month or a year, but

245

Learning from Experience

to allow me a three-year period. If I have not produced worthwhile
results for them in that time, they should fire me. Whether I have been
successful in the first year or unsuccessful can be as much a matter of
luck as anything else. In my management of individual stocks over all
these years I have followed the saijie rule, only once having made an
exception. If I have a deep conviction about a stock that has not per-
formed by the end of three years, I will sell it. If this same stock has per-
formed worse rather than better than the market for a year or two, I
won’t like it. However, assuming that nothing has happened to change
my original view of the company, I will continue to hold it for three
years.

In the second half of 1955, 1 bought a substantial number of shares
in two companies in which I had never previously invested. They proved
to be almost a classic example of the advantages and problems of invest-
ing contrary to the currently accepted view of the financial community.
Looking back, 1955 could be considered the beginning of a period of
almost fifteen years that might be termed the “first Golden Age of elec-
tronic stocks.” I am using the adjective “first” so that there can be no
confusion in anyone’s mind with what I believe will be considered the
Golden Age for semiconductor stocks, something which I suspect lies
ahead of us and will be associated with the 1980’s. At any rate, in 1955
and immediately thereafter, the financial community was about to be
dazzled by a whole series of electronic companies which were to show
gains that by 1969 had reached truly spectacular proportions. IBM, Texas
Instruments, Varian, Litton Industries and Ampex are a few that come to
mind. However, in 1955, all of that lay ahead. At that time, with the
exception of IBM, all these stocks were considered highly speculative
and beneath the notice of conservative investors or big institutions.
However, sensing part of what might lie ahead, I acquired what for me
were rather sizable positions in both Texas Instruments and Motorola
during the latter parts of 1955.

Today Texas Instruments is the largest world-wide producer of
semiconductors, with Motorola running a close second. At that time,
Motorola’s position in the semiconductor industry was insignificant. It
was no factor at all in causing me to buy the shares. Rather, I became
impressed both with the people and with Motorola’s dominant posi-
tion in the mobile communications business, where an enormous
potential seemed to lie; whereas the financial community was valuing
it as just another television and radio producer. Motorola’s subsequent

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

rise in the semiconductor area, resulting at least in part from their
acquiring the services of Dr. Daniel Noble, was all to come later and
was additional icing on the cake not anticipated by me at the time of
purchase. In the case of Texas Instruments, aside from an equally great
liking and respect for the people, J was influenced by a quite different
set of beliefs. I saw, as did others, a tremendous future that could be
built out of their transistor business as the complexities of semicon-
ductors were yielding to human ingenuity. I felt that those were peo-
ple who could compete on at least even terms, and probably better than
even terms, with General Electric, RCA, Westinghouse, and other giant
companies despite the opinion of much of Wall Street. A number of
people criticized me for risking funds in a small “speculative company”
which they felt was bound to suffer from the competition of the cor-
porate giants.

After buying these shares, the near-term results in the stock market
were quite different. Within a year, Texas Instruments had increased in
value quite handsomely. Motorola fluctuated in a range from 5 percent
to 10 percent below my cost of purchase. It performed sufficiently
poorly that one of my major clients became so irritated by its market
action that he refused to call Motorola by name. He only referred to it
as “that turkey which you bought me.” These unsatisfactory quota-
tions were to continue for moderately over a year. Yet as awareness of
the investment significance of the communications arm of Motorola
was to seep into the consciousness of the financial community, togeth-
er with the first signs of a turnabout in the semiconductor area, the
stock then became a rather spectacular performer.

While I was buying Motorola, I was doing so in conjunction with
a large insurance company that had let the Motorola management
know that they were also interested in the conclusions of my first visit.
Shortly after the insurance company too had bought a significant
amount of Motorola stock, they submitted their entire portfolio to a
New York bank for appraisal. With the exception of Motorola, the bank
divided their portfolio into three groups: most attractive, less attractive,
and least attractive. They refused to place Motorola in any category,
however, saying this was not the type of company on which they spent
time; therefore they had no opinion about it. Yet one of the officials of
the insurance company told me over three years later that in the face
of this rather negative Wall Street view, Motorola had by that time
outperformed every other stock in their portfolio! If I had not had my

Learning from Experience 2 4 7

“three-year rule,” I might have been less firm in holding my own
Motorola intact through a period of poor market action and of some
client criticism.

TO EVERY RULE, THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS...

BUT NOT MANY

Have I ever sold stock because of this three-year rule and then later
wished I had not made this sale because of a subsequent major rise in
the stock? Actually, there have only been a relatively small number of
times when I have made a sale triggered by this three-year rule and
nothing else. This is not because there have been so few times that pur-
chases made by me have failed to provide the major rise which was my
purpose in initiating them. In the majority of such cases, further
insights about the company opened up as I continued to investigate
additional aspects of the situation, and these insights caused me to
change my views about it. However, in those relatively few cases where
it was the three-year rule and only that which caused me to sell, I can-
not recall a single case where subsequent market action caused me to
wish I had held on to the shares.

Have I ever violated my own three-year rule? The answer is yes,
exactly once, and this was many years later, toward the middle of the
1970’s. Three years before, I had acquired a moderately substantial
block of shares in the Rogers Corporation. Rogers had expertise in
certain areas of polymer chemistry, and I believed they were on the
way to developing various semiproprietary families of products
which would show quite dramatic increase in sales and not just for a
year or two, but for many years.Yet, at the end of three years the stock
was down, and so were the earnings of the company. Several influ-
ences were at work, however, which made me feel this was one time
to ignore my own standards and to make this “the exception that
proves the rule.” One of these influences was my strong feeling about
Norman Greenman, the company’s president. I was convinced he had
unusual ability, the determination to see these matters through, as
well as something else which I consider of great value to an intelli-
gent investor: the kind of honesty that caused him not to conceal
repeated bad news that could not fail but be embarrassing for him to
tell. He saw to it that those interested in his company understood all

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

the unfavorable aspects of what was happening, as well as the favor-
able potentials.

There was another element which influenced me greatly: a major
reason the company’s profits were so poor was that Rogers was spend-
ing a quite disproportionate amount of money on a single new product
development seeming to offer prospects of great results. This was divert-
ing both money and people from other potentially exciting new prod-
ucts which were getting less corporate effort. New products of this type
do have magnificent potential. When the painful decision was made to
abandon all the effort on this one particular product, it was not long
before it became quite apparent that several other innovations of great
promise were starting to flower. All this, however, took time. In the
meanwhile, the company’s failure to live up to the hopes of many of
those who had bought the shares caused the stock to drop to levels that
were absurd in relation to its sales, its assets, or any type of normal earn-
ing power. Here seemed a classic example of zigging when the financial
community was zagging. Therefore, three-year rule or no, I sizably fur-
ther increased my holdings and those of my clients, even though a few
of those clients, influenced by the years of waiting and the negative per-
formance, looked at this with a degree of apprehension. As so often hap-
pens in situations of this sort, when the turn came, it came fast. As it
became apparent that the betterment of earnings was not a one- or two-
year matter, but gave strong indications of being but the basis for years
of genuine growth, the stock continued to rise proportionately.

AN EXPERIMENT WITH MARKET TIMING

All this, however, gets me years ahead of my story, because back in the
1930 s there were other things I also had to learn through trial and
error as my investment philosophy was gradually taking shape. In my
casting around for ways to make money through common stocks, I
began realizing that I might have a worthwhile by-product from my
study of the Food Machinery Corporation. Enough of their business
was dependent on the fruit and vegetable canning industry so that in
order to be reasonably sure I was right about my Food Machinery
purchases, I had inadvertently learned a good deal about what influ-
enced the fortunes of the fruit and vegetable canning companies
themselves. This industry was highly cyclical because of both fluctuating

Learning from Experience 2 4 9

general business conditions and erratic weather influences as they
affected specific crops.

As long as I was becoming somewhat familiar with the characteris-
tics of the packing industry anyway, I decided I might as well try and
take advantage of this knowledge, not through long-term investments,
as I was doing with Food Machinery, but through in and out transac-
tions in the shares of the California Packing Corporation, then an inde-
pendent company and the largest fruit and vegetable canner. Three dif-
ferent times, from the depths of the Big Depression to the end of that
decade, I bought shares of this company. Each time, I sold them at a
profit.

Superficially, this might sound like I was doing something quite
worthwhile. Nevertheless when, for reasons I will explain shortly, I
endeavored a few years later to analyze the wise and unwise moves I made
in my business, it became increasingly apparent to me how silly these
activities were. They took a great deal of time and effort that could well
have been devoted to other things. Yet the total rewards in dollars in
relation to the sums at risk were insignificant in comparison to the prof-
its I had made for my people in Food Machinery and in other situations
where I had bought for long-range gains and held over a considerable
period of years. Furthermore, I had seen enough of in and out trading,
including some done by extremely brilliant people, that I knew that
being successful three times in a row only made it that much more like-
ly that the fourth time I would end in disaster. The risks were consider-
ably more than those involved in purchasing equal amounts of shares in
companies I considered promising enough to want to hold them for
many years of growth. Therefore, at the end of World War II, by which
time much of my present investment philosophy was largely formulat-
ed, 1 had made what I believe was one of the more valuable decisions
of my business life. This was to confine all efforts solely to making major
gains over the long run.

REACHING FOR PRICE, FOREGOING OPPORTUNITY

During the 1930’s I learned, or at least partially learned, something else
which I consider truly important. I have already mentioned my complete
failure to benefit from my correct forecasts of the Great Bear Market
which started in 1929. All the correct reasoning in the world is of no

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

benefit in stock investment unless it is turned into specific action. My
first experience in operating my own business occurred during the
depth of the Great Depression, when very small amounts of money
became of abnormal significance. Possibly because of this, or possibly
because of my personal characteristics, as I started my business I found
myself constantly battling for “eighths and quarters .” Brokers who knew
much more than I did kept telling me if I believed that a stock would
rise in a few years to several times its current price, it really made very
little difference whether I acquired its shares at $10 or $1014. Yet I con-
tinually placed limit orders with no better reason for a limit than a purely
arbitrary decision on my part that I would pay, say, $1014 and no more.
Logically, this is ridiculous. I have observed it to be a bad investment
habit that is deeply ingrained in many people besides myself, but not
ingrained at all in others.

The potential dangers of arbitrary limits were made clear to me as
the result of a mistake of someone else. I remember as though it were
yesterday running into one of my more important clients by chance on
the sidewalk in front of a San Francisco bank. I told him that I had just
come back from visiting the Food Machinery Corporation, the outlook
was never so exciting, and that I thought he should buy some addition-
al shares. He completely agreed with me and asked where the stock had
closed that particular afternoon. I told him $34V2. He gave me a signif-
icant order and said he would pay $33% but no more. Over the next
day or two the stock fluctuated in a range just fractionally above his bid.
It never got down to it. I phoned him twice, urging him to go up a
quarter of a point so that I could buy stock. Unfortunately he replied,
“No, that is my price.” Within a few weeks the stock had risen over
50 percent and, after allowing for stock split-ups, never again in the
company’s history was it to come down to anywhere near where he
could have bought it.

This gentleman s actions made an impression on me that my own
stupidity had not. Gradually, I was to overcome much of this weakness
of mine. I am thoroughly aware that if a buyer desires to acquire a very
large block of stock, he cannot completely ignore this matter of an
eighth or a quarter, because by buying a very few shares he can signifi-
cantly put the price up on himself for the balance. However, for the great
majority of transactions, being stubborn about a tiny fractional difference
in the price can prove extremely costly. In my own case, I have com-
pletely conquered it in regard to buying, but only partially in regard to

Learning from Experience 2 5 1

selling. Within the past year, my placing a small sell order with a limit
rather than at the market caused me to miss a transaction by exactly a
quarter of a point, with the result that, as I write this, the shares are now
down 35 percent from where I placed my order. At levels only halfway
between that limit order and current prices, I sold only part of this not
very large holding.

The Philosophy Matures

O ur entry into World War II was not entirely without some signifi-
cance in the development of my investment philosophy. Early in
1942 I found myself in an unaccustomed role as a ground officer
doing various business related jobs for the Army Air Corps. For three and
a half years, I simply “beached” my business as I performed my not very
valuable services on behalf of Uncle Sam. In recent years, I have fre-
quently said that I did quite a job for my country. Neither Hitler nor
Emperor Hirohito ever succeeded in getting a man into the territories I
defended. These were Arkansas, Texas, Kansas, and Nebraska! At any rate,
during this time of various desk type jobs wearing Uncle Sams uniform,
I found that almost without warning I would alternate between two dif-
ferent types of periods. For a while, I would have so much to do that the
last thing I would be able to think about was my peacetime business. At
other times, I would sit at my desk with very little to do. When things
were slow, I found it less unpleasant to analyze in great detail just how I
would build up my business when the happy day that I would no longer
be wearing a uniform might arise than it was to think of the personal
living and Army type problems with which, from a short-range point of
view, I was confronted. It was during such periods that my present invest-
ment philosophy took steadily more definite shape. It was then I decid-
ed there was not enough future in the type of in and out trading that I
have described in the stock of California Packing.

During this period, I reached two other conclusions that were to be
of some significance to my future business. Before the war I had served
all types of clients, large and small, with varying types of objectives.

253

The Philosophy Matures

Most, but not all, of my business had been focused on finding unusual
companies that would enjoy significant, above-average growth in future
years. After the war, I would limit my clientele to a small group of large
investors with the objective of concentrating solely on this single class
of growth investment. For tax reasons, growth was more likely to ben-
efit these clients.

My other major conclusion was that the chemical industry would
enjoy a period of major growth in the postwar years. Therefore, a high
priority project on returning to civilian life was to endeavor to find the
most attractive of the larger chemical companies and make this a major
holding for the funds I was handling. I by no means spent 100 percent
of my time doing this, but in the first year after restarting my business
I did spend a rather considerable amount of time in talking to anyone I
could find who had real knowledge of this complex industry. Such peo-
ple as distributors who handled the lines of one or more large compa-
nies, professors in the chemical departments of the universities who had
intimate knowledge of chemical business people, and even some of
those in the major construction companies that had put up plants for
various of the chemical producers all proved extremely worthwhile
sources of background information. By combining these inputs with
analyses of the usual financial data, it only took about three months to
narrow the choices down to one of three companies. From there on, the
going was slower and the decisions more difficult. However, by the
spring of 1947 I decided that the Dow Chemical Company would be
my choice.

E PLURIBUS UNUM

There were many reasons for the choice of Dow Chemical from the
many promising chemical firms. I believe it might be worthwhile to
enumerate some of them because they are clear examples of the type of
things I seek in the relatively small number of companies in which I
desire to place funds. As I began to know various people in the Dow
organization, I found that the growth that had already occurred was in
turn creating a very real sense of excitement at many levels of manage-
ment. The belief that even greater growth lay ahead permeated the
organization. One of my favorite questions in talking to any top busi-
ness executive for the first time is what he considers to be the most

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

important long-range problem facing his company. When I asked this
of the president of Dow, I was tremendously impressed with his answer: “It
is to resist the strong pressures to become a more military-like organization
as we grow very much larger, and to maintain the informal relationship
whereby people at quite different levels and in various departments con-
tinue to communicate with each other in a completely unstructured way
and, at the same time, not create administrative chaos.”

I found myself in complete agreement with certain other basic
company policies. Dow limited its involvement to those chemical prod-
uct lines where it either was or had a reasonable chance of becoming
the most efficient producer in the field as the result of greater volume,
better chemical engineering and deeper understanding of the product
or for some other reason. Dow was deeply aware of the need for cre-
ative research not just to be in front, but also to stay in front. There was
also a strong appreciation of the “people factor” at Dow. There was in
particular a sense of need to identify people of unusual ability early, to
indoctrinate them into policies and procedures unique to Dow, and to
make real efforts to see if seemingly bright people were not doing well
at one job, they be given a reasonable chance to try something else that
might be more suitable to their characteristics.

I found that although Dows founder, Dr. Herbert Dow, had died
some seventeen years before, his beliefs were held in such respect that
one or another of his sayings was frequently quoted to me. While his
comments were directed primarily at matters within Dow, I decided
that at least two of them were equally appropriate to my own business,
in that they could be applied at least as well as to optimizing the selec-
tion of investments as to matters internal to the Dow Chemical Com-
pany. One of these was “Never promote someone who hasn’t made
some bad mistakes, because if you do, you are promoting someone who
has never done anything.” The failure to understand this element by so
many in the investment community has time and again created unusu-
al investment opportunities in the stock market.

The truly worthwhile accomplishment in the business world near-
ly always requires a considerable degree of pioneering, in which inge-
nuity has to be seasoned with practicality. This is particularly true when
the gains are sought through leading edge technological research. No
matter how able the people are and no matter how good may be most
of their ideas, there are times when such efforts are bound to fail, and
fail dismally. When this happens and the current years earnings drop

The Philosophy Matures 2 5 5

sharply below previous estimates as the costs of the failure are added up,
time and again the investment community’s immediate consensus is to
downgrade the quality of the management. As a result, the immediate
year’s lower earnings produce a lower than the historic price earnings
ratio to magnify the effect of reduced earnings. The shares often reach
truly bargain prices. Yet if this is the same management that in other
years has been so successful, the chances are the same ratio of average
success to average failure will continue on in the future. For this reason,
the shares of companies run by abnormally capable people can be
tremendous bargains at the time one particular bad mistake comes to
light. In contrast, the company that doesn’t pioneer, doesn’t take
chances, and merely goes along with the crowd is liable to prove a rather
mediocre investment in this highly competitive age.

The other of Dr. Dow’s comments which I have tried to apply to
the process of investment selection is “If you can’t do a thing better than
others are doing it, don’t do it at all.” In this day of heavy-handed gov-
ernment intervention in so many types of business activities, of high
taxes and labor unions, and of rapid shifts in public taste from one prod-
uct to another, it seems to me that the risk of common stock ownership
is seldom warranted unless it is confined to companies with enough
competitive spirit constantly to be trying and frequently succeeding in
doing things in a manner superior to industry in general. In no other
way are profit margins usually broad enough to meet the demands of
growth. This is, of course, particularly true during periods when infla-
tion is having a significant effect in eating away at reported profits.

HISTORY VERSUS OPPORTUNITY

There were some remarkable parallels between the period when I was
starting my business at the depths of the Great Depression and during
the years 1947 through the very early 1950’s, when I was restarting it
after a military service interlude of three and a half years. Both periods
were times when it was unusually hard to obtain immediate results for
clients in the face of overwhelming general pessimism. Both were times
that were to prove spectacularly rewarding for those who had the
patience. In the earlier period, stocks were driven to perhaps the lowest
level in relation to real value seen in the Twentieth Century, not just
because of the economic havoc wrought by the Great Depression, but

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

also because prices were discounting the worry of many investors as to
whether the American system of private enterprise would itself survive.
It survived, and in the ensuing years the rewards of those able and willing
to invest in the right stocks were fabulous.

Just a few years after World War II, another fear kept stocks at levels
almost as low in relation to intrinsic value as those seen at the depths of
the Great Depression. This time, business was good and corporate earn-
ings were steadily rising. Nevertheless, almost the entire investment
community were mesmerized by a simple comparison. A relatively few
years after the Civil War, a period of immediate prosperity was followed
by the Panic of 1873, and almost six years of deep depression. A some-
what similar period of prosperity after World War I was followed by the
Crash of 1929 and the even deeper depression of about the same length.
In World War II, the costs of war had run on a per diem basis about ten
times that of World War I. “Therefore,” reasoned the dominant invest-
ment view of this period, “current excellent earnings don’t mean any-
thing.” They will be followed by a horrendous crash and a period of
extreme adversity when all would suffer.

Year after year went by, and the per-share earnings of more corpo-
rations rose. Along about 1949, this period became known as the era in
which “American business is worth more dead than alive,” because as
soon as word spread that a publicly owned company was about to go
out of business, its shares would rise dramatically. The liquidating value
of many a company was so much more than its current market valua-
tion. Year followed year, and slowly it began dawning on the investment
public that perhaps stocks were being held back because of a myth. The
expected business decline never did arrive and, excepting for two rela-
tively minor recessions in the 1950 s, the stage was being set for the great
rewards to long-term investors that were to follow.

As I write these words in the closing weeks before the decade of the
80s is about to start, it amazes me that more attention has not been paid
to restudying the few years of stock market history that started in the
second half of 1946 to see whether true parallels may actually exist
between that period and the present. Now, for the third time in my life-
time, many stocks are again at prices which, by historic standards, are
spectacularly low. In relation to reported book value, they may not be
quite as cheap as they were in the post- World War II period. However, if
that reported book value is adjusted for replacement value in real dollars,
they may perhaps be cheaper than in either of the two prior, bargain

The Philosophy Matures 2 5 7

value periods. The question arises: are the worries that are holding back
stock values in the present period, such matters as the high cost of ener-
gy or the dangers from the political left or of overextended credit, with
the inevitable resulting drain on the level of business activity as liquidi-
ty is restored, more serious and more apt to stop the future growth in
this country than the fears that held back stock prices in these two prior
periods? If not, once the problems of overextended credit have been
solved, it might be logical to assume that the 1980’s and period beyond
may offer the same sort of rewarding opportunities that characterized
the two former periods of abnormally low prices.

LESSONS FROM THE VINTAGE YEARS

From a business standpoint, the fifteen years from 1954 through 1969
were a magnificent time for me, as most of the relatively few stocks I was
holding advanced significantly more than did the market as a whole.
Even so, I managed to make some bad mistakes. Successes came from
diligent application of the approaches I have already spelled out. It is the
mistakes that are more noteworthy. Each brought its own new lesson.

Good fortune can breed laxness. The mistake which now embar-
rassed me the most, although it was not the most costly, arose from the
careless application of a sound principle.

In the early 1960’s, I had technological investments that were prov-
ing quite pleasing in the electronic, chemical, metallurgical, and machin-
ery industries. I did not have a comparable investment in the promising
drug field, and started seeking one. Along the way, I talked to a medical
specialist who was preeminent in his field. At the time, he was tremen-
dously excited about a new drug family about to be introduced by a
small Midwestern manufacturer. These drugs he felt could have quite
favorable impact on the future earnings of this firm relative to others in
this field. The potential market seemed very, very exciting.

I then talked to just one of the officers of this company and to only
a few other investment people all of whom were equally excited about
the potentials of this new drug. Unfortunately, I did not pursue my
standard checks either with other drug companies or with other experts
knowledgeable in this particular specialty to see if they might have con-
trary evidence to offer. Regretfully, I subsequently learned, none of the
proponents had made a thorough investigation either.

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

The stock was selling at a price well above its worth before consid-
ering the benefits of this new family of drugs, but at a price which could
have been but a minor fraction of potential value if the new drugs were
all their supporters imagined. I bought the shares only to see them drop,
at first a mere 20 percent and then over 50 percent. Ultimately the
whole company was sold for cash at this low price to a large non-
pharmaceutical corporation seeking to enter the drug field. Even at this
price, now somewhat less than half of what I had paid for the shares,
I subsequently learned that the acquiring company lost money on the
deal. Not only did this new family of drugs fail to measure up to the
extensive hopes that had been enthusiastically projected by my friend,
the medical specialist, but also on painful “post-mortem” reexamination
of the situation, I found that there were management problems in this
small drug manufacturer. With a more thorough investigation both fail-
ings would, I believe, have become apparent to me.

From that embarrassing time forward, I have tried to be particular-
ly thorough in making investigations in periods when things were going
well. The only reason this particular investment folly wasn’t more cost-
ly stemmed from my caution. Since I had had only a slight contact with
the management, I made only a small initial investment, planning to buy
more as I got to know the company better. Their troubles overtook me
before I had a chance to compound my original folly.

As the long bull market was reaching its final peak in 1969 another
mistake occurred. To understand what happened it is necessary to recre-
ate the psychological fever which gripped most investors in technolog-
ical and scientific stocks at that time. Shares of these companies, partic-
ularly many of the smaller ones, had enjoyed advances far greater than
the market as a whole. During 1968 and 1969 only one’s imagination
seemed to cap the dreams of imminent success for many of these com-
panies. Some of these situations did have genuine potential, of course.
Discrimination was at a low ebb. For example, any company serving the
computer industry in any way promised a future, many believed, that
was almost limitless. This contagion spread into instrument and other
scientific companies as well.

Up to this time, I resisted the temptation to go into any of the sim-
ilar companies that had just “gone public” at very high prices in the pre-
vious year or two. Yet, being in frequent contact with those who were
sponsoring these excitement inducing companies, I kept looking for a
few that might be genuinely attractive. In 1969 I did find an equipment

The Philosophy Matures 2 5 9

company working in an extremely interesting new frontier of technology;
one that had a real basis for its existence. The firm was run by a brilliant
and honest president. I can remember still, after a long luncheon session
with this man, my pacing up and down the airport awaiting my airplane
home and trying to determine whether I should buy this company’s
shares at the prevailing market. After considerable deliberation, I decid-
ed to go ahead.

I was right in diagnosing the potential of this company for it did
grow in the years that followed. Nevertheless, it was a poor investment.
My mistake lay in the price I paid to participate in the promise. Some
years later, after the company had shown rather respectable growth, I
sold these shares, but at a price very little different from my original
cost. While I believe I was right in selling when I thought the company
had reached a point where its future growth was considerably more
uncertain, nevertheless selling an investment at a meager profit after it
has been held for a number of years is not the way to make capital grow
or even protect it against inflation. In this case, disappointing perform-
ance was the result of being seduced by the excitement of the times into
paying an unrealistic initiation price.

DO FEW THINGS WELL

A policy judgment that was wrong for me engendered quite a different
kind of mistake, and one which did cost a significant amount of dollars.
My mistake was to project my skill beyond the limits of experience. I
began investing outside the industries which I believe I thoroughly
understood, in completely different spheres of activity; situations where
I did not have comparable background knowledge.

When it comes to manufacturing companies that serve industrial
markets or to companies on the leading edge of technology that are
serving manufacturers, I believe that I know what to look for — where
both the strong points and pitfalls may lie. However, different skills
proved important in evaluating companies making and selling consumer-
type products. When the products of competitive companies are essen-
tially rather similar to one another, and when changes in market share
depend largely on shifting public tastes or on fashions greatly influenced
by the effectiveness of advertising, I learned that the abilities which I
had in selecting outstanding technological companies did not extrapolate

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

to the point where I could identify what produces unusual success in
real estate operations.

Others may do well in quite diverse investment arenas. Perhaps,
unlike the other types of mistakes I have made during my business
career, this one should properly' be ignored by others. Nevertheless, an
analyst must learn the limits of his or her competence and tend well the
sheep at hand.

STAY OR SELL IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLE
MARKET DOWNTURNS?

Should an investor sell a good stock in the face of a potentially bad
market? On this subject, I fear I hold a minority view given the invest-
ment psychology prevalent today. Now more than ever, the actions of
those who control the vast bulk of equity investments in this country
appear to reflect the belief that when an investor has achieved a good
profit in a stock and fears the stock might well go down, he should grab
his profit and get out. My view is rather different. Even if the stock of
a particular company seems at or near a temporary peak and that a siz-
able decline may strike in the near future, I will not sell the firm’s shares
provided I believe that its longer term future is sufficiently attractive.
When I estimate that the price of these shares will rise to a peak quite
considerably higher than the current levels in a few years time, I prefer
to hold. My belief stems from some rather fundamental considerations
about the nature of the investment process. Companies with truly
unusual prospects for appreciation are quite hard to find for there are
not too many of them. However, for someone who understands and
applies sound fundamentals, I believe that a truly outstanding company
can be differentiated from a run-of-the-mill company with perhaps 90
percent precision.

It is vastly more difficult to forecast what a particular stock is going
to do in the next six months. Estimates of short-term performance start
with economic estimates of the coming level of general business. Yet the
forecasting record of seers predicting changes in the business cycle has
generally been abysmal. They can seriously misjudge if and when reces-
sions may occur, and are worse in predicting their severity and duration.
Furthermore, neither the stock market as a whole nor the course of any

The Philosophy Matures

261

particular stock tends to move in close parallel with the business climate.
Changes in mass psychology and in how the financial community as a
whole decided to appraise the outlook either for business in general or
for a particular stock can have overriding importance and can vary
almost unpredictably. For these reasons, I believe that it is hard to be
correct in forecasting the short-term movement of stocks more than
60 percent of the time no matter how diligently the skill is cultivated.
This may well be too optimistic an estimate. On the face of it, it doesn’t
make good sense to step out of a position where you have a 90 percent
probability of being right because of an influence about which you
might at best have a 60 percent chance of being right.

Moreover, for those seeking major gains through long-term invest-
ments, the odds of winning are not the only consideration. If the
investment is in a well-run company with sufficient financial strength,
even the greatest bear market will not erase the value of holding. In
contrast, time after time, truly unusual stocks have subsequent peaks
many hundreds of percent above their previous peaks. Thus, risk/reward
considerations favor long-term investment.

So, putting it in the simplest mathematical terms, both the odds and
the risk/reward considerations favor holding. There is a much greater
chance of being wrong in estimating adverse short-term changes for a
good stock than in projecting its strong, long-term price appreciation
potential. If you stay with the right stocks through even a major tem-
porary market drop, you are at most going to be temporarily behind
40 percent of the former peak at the very worst point and will ulti-
mately be ahead; whereas if you sell and don’t buy back you will have
missed long-term profits many times the short-term gains from having
sold the stock in anticipation at a short-term reversal. It has been my
observation that it is so difficult to time correctly the near-term price
movements of an attractive stock that the profits made in the few
instances when this stock is sold and subsequently replaced at signifi-
cantly lower prices are dwarfed by the profits lost when timing is wrong.
Many have sold too soon and have either never gotten back in or have
postponed reinvestment too long to recapture the profits possible.

The example I will use to illustrate this point is the weakest one I
have experienced. In 1962, two of the major electronics investments I
had made had risen to heights that made the outlook for near-term
price movement extremely dangerous. Texas Instruments was selling at
over fifteen times the price I had paid for it seven years before. Another

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

company which I bought a year or so later, and which I shall call by the
fictitious name of “Central California Electronics,” had enjoyed a simi-
lar percentage rise. Prices had gone too far. I consequently informed
each of my clients that the prices of these two stocks were unrealistical-
ly high and discouraged them from using these prices in measuring their
current net worth. This is a practice I have rarely followed, and then
only when I had an unusually strong conviction that the next important
move for one or more of my stocks would be sharply downward. Nev-
ertheless, in the face of this conviction, I urged my clients to maintain
their holdings, in the belief that some years ahead both stocks would rise
to very much higher levels. When the correction in values came for
these two stocks, it proved even more severe than I had anticipated.
Texas Instruments at its subsequent bottom sold off 80 percent from its
1962 peak. Central California Electronics did not perform quite so
badly, but still sold off by almost 60 percent. My beliefs were being tested
in the extreme!

However, within a few years Texas Instruments was once again selling
at new high levels more than double its 1962 high. Patience had paid off
here. Central California Electronics’ performance was not a happy one.
As the general stock market started to recover, problems within the
management of Central California Electronics became apparent.
Changes in personnel occurred. I became quite worried and made what
1 believe was a thorough investigation. I reached two conclusions and
neither one pleased me. One was that I had misjudged the former man-
agement. I should have been more aware of its deficiencies, yet wasn’t.
Neither could I be sufficiently enthusiastic about the new management
to warrant continuing to hold the shares. I consequently sold these
holdings in the following twelve-month period at a price only slightly
better than half of the 1962 peak. Even so, my clients, depending on the
applicable purchase price, gained from seven to ten times the original
cost.

As I have already indicated, I am deliberately citing a weak example
rather than a dramatic one to illustrate why I believe it pays to ignore
near-term fluctuations in situations that hold real promise. My error in
the Central California Electronics instance was not in holding the shares
through a temporary decline, but in something far more important. I
had grown too complacent as a result of the enormous success of my
investments in this company. I began paying too much attention to what
I was hearing from top management and not doing sufficient checking

The Philosophy Matures 2 6 3

with people at lower levels and with customers. When I recognized the
situation and acted upon it, I was then able to make the same kind of
gains I had expected to make in Central California Electronics by
switching these funds to other electronic companies, chiefly Motorola,
which fortunately rose in the next 'few years to a value several times
higher than the prior peak of Central California Electronics.

IN AND OUT MAY BE OUT OF THE MONEY

There is more to learn from the Texas Instruments and Central Califor-
nia Electronics situations. When I originally acquired these Texas Instru-
ments shares in the summer of 1955, they were bought for the longest
type of long-range investment. It seemed to me the company fully war-
ranted this degree of confidence. About a year later, the stock had dou-
bled. With one exception, the various owners of the funds I managed,
familiar as they were with my method of operations, showed no more
interest in taking a profit than did I. However, at that time I had one rel-
atively new account owned by people who, in their own business, were
used to building up inventory when markets were low and cutting it
back sharply when they were high. Now that Texas Instruments had
doubled, they brought strong pressure to sell, which for a time I was able
to resist. When the stock rose an additional 25 percent to give them a
profit of 125 percent of their cost, the pressure to sell became even
stronger. They explained, “We agree with you. We like the company, but
we can always buy it back at a better price on a decline.” I finally com-
promised with them by persuading them to keep part of their holding
and sell the rest. Yet when the big drop occurred several years later and
the shares fell 80 percent from their peak, this new bottom was still
almost 40 percent higher than the price at which this particular holder
was so eager to sell!

After a very sharp advance, a stock nearly always looks too high to the
financially untrained. This client demonstrated another risk to those who
follow the practice of selling shares that still have unusual growth prospects
simply because they have realized a good gain and the stock appears tem-
porarily overpriced. These investors seldom buy back at higher prices
when they are wrong and lose further gains of dramatic proportions.

At the risk of being repetitious, let me underscore my belief that the
short-term price movements are so inherently tricky to predict that I do

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DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

not believe it possible to play the in and out game and still make the
enormous profits that have accrued again and again to the truly long-
term holder of the right stocks.

THE LONG SHADOW OF DIVIDENDS

In these comments I have tried to show how, as the years have passed,
various experiences gradually helped to shape my investment philoso-
phy However, looking back, I find no specific event, either a mistake or
a favorable opportunity, which caused me to reach the conclusions I
have on the matter of dividends. Many observations over a long period
of years gradually crystallized my views. I started out taking for granted
the belief, as widely accepted forty years ago as it is today, that dividends
were something highly favorable to the stockholder and something
which should be welcomed enthusiastically. Then I began seeing com-
panies that had so many exciting looking new ideas flowing from their
research departments that they could not capitalize upon them all.
Resources were too scarce or too expensive. I began thinking how
much better it might be for some stockholders if, instead of paying div-
idends, more of the company’s resources were retained and invested in
more of these innovative products.

I began increasingly to recognize that the interests of all stockhold-
ers were not identical. Some investors needed dividend income to sup-
port their lifestyle. These stockholders would undoubtedly prefer cur-
rent dividends to greater future profits and increased value for their
shares resulting from increased investment in promising products and
technologies. These investors could find investments in firms whose
needs and opportunities for productive use of capital were not too
demanding.

But how about the stockholder whose earning power or other
income sources exceeded needs and who was regularly saving money
anyway? Would it not be better for this investor if the company passed
up its dividends, which would often be subject to a fairly high income
tax rate, and instead reinvested the funds, tax-free, in future growth?

Shortly after World War II, when I started concentrating my invest-
ment activities almost solely on the attainment of major, long-range
capital appreciation, another aspect of the dividend payout issue became
even more apparent. The companies with the greatest growth prospects

The Philosophy Matures 2 6 5

were under tremendous pressure to pay no dividends at all. Their need
for funds and their ability to use funds productively was too large. The
cost of developing these new products was just the first heavy drain on
capital needed to finance growth. There followed the heavy marketing
expense needed to introduce them to the customer. With success, plant
expansion was needed to service a growing volume. Once the new line
was on its way, there were further capital requirements for the increased
inventories and accounts receivable which, in most cases, grow almost
in direct proportion to the volume of the business.

There seemed a natural fit of interest between those firms with
bountiful investment opportunities and certain investors who sought to
make the greatest possible profit in relation to the risk involved and
who neither needed additional income nor wanted to pay unnecessary
taxes. Such investors should, I believe, mainly confine investments to
non-dividend-paying companies with strong earning power and with
attractive places to reinvest their earnings. These were the clients I
sought to serve.

Recently, however, the situation has become less clear-cut. Institu-
tional holders have become an increasingly dominant force in day-to-
day stock transactions. Institutions such as pension and profit sharing
funds pay no income tax on their dividends. Many of them as a matter
of policy will not invest in a company unless it pays some dividend, no
matter how small. Attracting and holding these buyers have caused many
companies with unusual prospects to initiate modest dividend payments
of rather small percentage total annual earnings. Managers of some
would-be growth companies have concurrently reduced their payout
dramatically. Today, the skill in investing retained earnings wisely has
become a more critical factor in separating the unusual company from
the pack.

For these reasons, I have come to believe that the most that can be
said on this subject of dividends is that it is an influence that should be
downgraded very sharply by those who do not need the income. In
general, more attractive opportunities will be found among stocks with
a low dividend payout or none at all. However, so general is the feeling
among those who determine dividend policies that paying out divi-
dends is beneficial to the investor (as it is for some) that occasionally I
have found truly attractive opportunities among higher dividend payout
companies, although this has not happened very often.

Is the Market Efficient?

B y the coming of the 1970s nearly all of my investment philosophy
was firmly in place, molded by my experience of four prior
decades. It is not coincidence that with only one exception all of
both the wise and the foolish actions I have mentioned as examples that
helped form the background of this philosophy were incidents that
occurred during these four prior decades. This does not mean that I
have made no mistakes in the 1970 s. Unfortunately, it seems that no
matter how much I try, sometimes I must stub my toe more than once
in the same way before I truly learn. However, in the examples I have
used I usually took the first instance when a particular type of event
happens to illustrate my point, which explains why all but one of the
examples I used occurred during these earlier periods.

It might be helpful to notice the striking parallels in each of these
past ten-year periods. With the possible exception of the 1960’s, there
has not been a single decade in which there was not some period of
time when the prevailing view was that external influences were so
great and so much beyond the control of individual corporate manage-
ments that even the wisest common stock investments were foolhardy
and perhaps not for the prudent. In the 1930s there were years when
this view, influenced by the Great Depression, was at its most extreme,
but perhaps not any more than the fear of what the German war
machine and World War II might do in the 1940’s, or the certainty that
another major depression would hit in the 1950’s, or fear of inflation,
hostile government actions, etc., in the 1970’s. Yet every one of these
periods created investment opportunities that seemed almost incredible

Is the Market Efficient?

267

with all the advantages of hindsight. In each of these five decades there
were not a few, but many common stock opportunities that ten years
later yielded profits running to many hundreds of percent for those who
had bought and stayed with the shares. In some instances profits ran well
into the thousands of percent. Again in every one of these five decades
some stocks which were the speculative darlings of the moment were to
prove the most dangerous kind of trap for those who blindly followed
the crowd rather than those who really knew what they were doing. All
of these ten-year periods essentially resembled the others in that the
greatest opportunities came from finding situations that were extreme-
ly attractive but that were undervalued because at that particular
moment the financial community had significantly misjudged the situ-
ation. As I look back on the various forces that buffeted the securities
market over this fifty-year period and at the great waves of public opti-
mism and pessimism that succeeded each other over this time span, the
old French proverb, “Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose” (the more
things change, the more they remain the same), comes to mind. I have
not the slightest doubt that as we enter the emerging decade of
the 1980 s, with all the problems and the prospects that it now offers,
the same will continue to hold true.

THE FALLACY OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET

In the last few years, too much attention has been paid to a concept that
I believe is quite fallacious. I refer to the notion that the market is per-
fectly efficient. Like other false beliefs in other periods, a contrary view
may open up opportunities for the discerning.

For those unfamiliar with “efficient” market theory, the adjective
“efficient” does not refer to the obvious mechanical efficiency of the
market. A potential buyer or seller can get his order to the market where
a transaction can be executed very effectively within a matter of a cou-
ple of minutes. Neither does “efficiency” refer to the delicate adjustment
mechanism which causes stock prices to move up or down by fractions
of a point in response to modest changes in the relative pressure of buy-
ers and sellers. Rather, this concept holds that at any one time the mar-
ket “efficient” prices are assumed to reflect fully and realistically all that
is known about the company. Unless someone has some significant,
illicit inside information, there is no way genuine bargains can be found,

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DEVELOPING AS INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

since the favorable influences that make a potential buyer believe that
an attractive situation exists are already reflected in the price of stock!

If the market was as efficient as it has become, fashionable to believe,
and if important opportunities to buy or significant reasons to sell were
not constantly occurring, stock returns should not subsequently have
the huge variations that they do. By variation, I am not referring to
changes in prices for the market as a whole, but rather the dispersion of
relative price changes of one stock against another. If the market is effi-
cient in prospect, then the nexus of analysis that leads to this efficiency
must be collectively poor.

Efficient market theory grew out of the academic School of Random
Walkers. These people found that it was difficult to identify technical trad-
ing strategies that worked well enough after transactions costs to provide
an attractive profit relative to the risks taken. I don’t disagree with this. As
you have seen, I believe that it is very, very tough to make money with in
and out trading based on short-term market forecasts. Perhaps the market
is efficient in this narrow sense of the word.

Most of us are or should be investors, not traders. We should be
seeking investment opportunities with unusual prospects over the long
run and avoiding investment opportunities with poorer prospects. This
has always been the central tenet of my approach to investments in any
case. I do not believe that prices are efficient for the diligent, knowl-
edgeable, long-term investor.

Directly applicable to this is an experience I had in 1961. In the fall
of that year, as in the spring of 1963, 1 undertook the stimulating duty
of substituting for the regular finance professor in teaching the senior
course of investments at Stanford University’s Graduate School of Busi-
ness. The concept of the “efficient” market was not to see the light of
day for many years to come and had nothing to do with my motivation
in the exercise I am about to describe. Rather, I wanted to show these
students in a way they would never forget that the fluctuations of the
market as a whole were insignificant compared to the differences
between the changes in price of some stocks in relation to others.

I divided the class into two groups. The first group took the alpha-
betical list of stocks on the New York Stock Exchange, starting with the
letter A; the second group, those starting with the letter T. Every stock
was included in alphabetical order (except preferreds and utilities, which
I consider to be a different breed of cats). Each student was assigned four
stocks. Each student looked up the closing price as of the last day of

Is the Market Efficient?

269

business of 1956, adjusted the stock dividends and stock splits (rights
were ignored as not having sufficient impact to be worthy of the addi-
tional calculations), and compared this price with the price as of Friday,
October 13th (if nothing else, a colorful closing date!). The percentage
increase or decrease that occurred in each stock over this period of
almost five years was noted. The Dow Jones averages rose from 499 to
703, or by 41 percent in this period. Altogether, there were 140 stocks
in this sample. The results are displayed in the following table:

Percentage Capital

Gain or Loss

No. of Stocks
in Group

Percentage of
Total Group

200% to 1020% gain

15 stocks

11%

100% to 199% gain

18 stocks

13%

50% to 99% gain

14 stocks

10%

25% to 49% gain

21 stocks

15%

1% to 24% gain

31 stocks

22%

Unchanged

3 stocks

1% to 49% loss

32 stocks

23%

50% to 74% loss

6 stocks

140 stocks

100%

These data are quite insightful. In a period when the Dow Jones
averages rose 41 percent, 38 stocks, or 27 percent of the total, showed a
capital loss. Six of them, or 4 percent of the total, recorded a loss of over
50 percent of their total value. In contrast, roughly one quarter of the
stocks realized capital gains that would have been considered spectacular.

To drive the point home, I noted that if a person invested $10,000
in equal amounts in the five best stocks on this list, at the outset of this
four and three-quarter year period, his capital would now be worth
$70,260. On the other hand, if he had invested the $10,000 in the five
worst stocks, his capital would have shrunk to $3,180. These extreme
results were most unlikely. It would take luck, either good or bad, as well
as skill, to hit either of these extremes. It would not be so implausible
for a person with real investment judgment to have picked five out of
the ten best stocks for his $10,000 investment, in which case his net
worth on Friday the 13th would have been $52,070. Similarly, some
investors consistently select stocks for the wrong reasons and manage to
pick lemons. For them selecting five out of the ten poorest in performance

270

DEVELOPING AS INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

is also not an entirely unrealistic expectation of results. In that case, the
$10,000 investment would have shrunk to $4,270. On the basis of this
comparison, there might be, in less than five years, a difference of
$48,000 between a wise and an unwise investment program.

A year and a half later, when I also taught this same course, I repeat-
ed the exact same exercise, with the exception that instead of using the
letters A and T, I selected two different letters in the alphabet from
which to form the sample of stocks. Again, over a five-year time frame,
but with a different starting and a different closing date, the degree of
variation was almost exactly the same.

Looking back on most markets of five-year duration, I believe that
one can find stock performance results that are about as disparate. Some
of this dispersion may come as the result of surprises — important new
information about a stock’s prospects that could not be reasonably fore-
seen at the outset of the period. Most of the differences, however, can
be anticipated at least roughly both in terms of direction and general
magnitude of gains and losses relative to the market.

THE RAYCHEM CORPORATION

In view of this kind of evidence, it is hard for me to see how anyone can
consider the stock market efficient, again using the word “efficient” as it is
used by the proponents of this theory. But to belabor the point further, let
me take a stock market situation of just a very few years ago. In the early
years of the 1970 s, the shares of the Raychem Corporation had consider-
able prestige in the market place and were accordingly selling at a relative-
ly high price-earnings ratio. Some of the reasons warranting this prestige
may be perceived by some comments made by the company’s Executive
Vice President, Robert M. Halperin. In outlining what he called the four
cardinal points to Raychem s operating philosophy, he stated:

1. Raychem will not do anything technically simple (i.e., some-
thing that would be easy for potential competitors to copy).

2. Raychem won’t do anything unless it can be vertically integrat-
ed; that is, Raychem must conceive the product, manufacture it,
and sell it to the customer.

3. Raychem won’t do anything unless there is a substantial oppor-
tunity for real proprietary protection, which generally means

Is the Market Efficient?

271

patent protection. Unless this occurs, research and development
energies will not be employed on a project, even though other-
wise it might fit into Raychem s skills.

4. Raychem will only go into new products when it believes it can
become the market leader in Whatever niche, sometimes smaller,
sometimes larger, that product attempts to capture.

By the mid-1970s, awareness of these unusual strengths was suffi-
ciently prevalent among those who controlled large institutional funds
so that sizable blocks of shares had been taken out of the market by peo-
ple who believed that Raychem was a situation of unusual competitive
strength and attractiveness. However, it was another aspect of this com-
pany that gave Raychem its greatest appeal to these holders and was
probably the cause of the high price-earnings ratio at which it was then
selling. Many considered that Raychem, which was spending an above
average percentage of sales on new project development, had perfected
a research organization capable of producing an important enough
stream of new products so that the company could be depended on to
show an uninterrupted upward trend in sales and profits. These research
products had quite justifiably a special appeal to the financial commu-
nity because many of the newer ones only indirectly competed with
older products of other companies. Primarily, the new products enabled
high-priced labor to do the same job in considerably less time than had
previously been required. There were enough savings offered to the ulti-
mate customer of these products to justify a price which should afford
Raychem a pleasing profit margin. All this caused the stock toward the
end of 1975 to reach a high of over $42 V 2 (price adjusted for subsequent
stock splits) — a level about 25 times the estimated earnings for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1976.

RAYCHEM, DASHED EXPECTATIONS,

AND THE CRASH

Toward the close of the June 30, 1976, fiscal year, Raychem was hit by
two hammer blows, which were to play havoc with the price of the
stock and with the company’s reputation in the financial community
The financial community had become very excited about a proprietary

272

DEVELOPING AS INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

polymer, Stilan, which enjoyed unique advantages over other com-
pounds used by the airplane industry for coating wire and which was
then in the final research stages. Furthermore, the polymer was to be the
first product in which Raychem would go basic, that is, make the orig-
inal chemicals in its own plant rdther than buying raw materials from
others and compounding them. Because of the appeal of the product,
Raychem had allocated by a considerable margin more funds to this
research product than to any other in its history. The financial commu-
nity assumed this product was already on its way to success, and after
passing through the usual “learning curve” experienced by all new
products it would become highly profitable.

Actually, quite the opposite was occurring. In the words of the
Raychem management, Stilan was “a scientific success but a commer-
cial failure.” Improved products of an able competitor, while technical-
ly not as desirable as Stilan, proved adequate for the job and were far
cheaper. Raychem management recognized this. In the course of a rel-
atively few weeks, management reached the painful decision to abandon
the product and write off the heavy investments made in it. The result-
ing charge to earnings for that fiscal year was some $9.3 million. This
charge-off caused earnings, exclusive of some offsetting special gains, to
drop to $.08 a share from $7.95 the previous fiscal year.

The financial community was as much upset by the erosion of the
great confidence in the company’s research ability as by the precipitous
drop in earnings. Largely ignored was the basic rule that some new
product developments are bound to fail in all companies. This is inher-
ent in all industrial research activity and in a well-run company is far
more than offset in the long run by other successful new products. It
may have been just bad luck that the particular project on which the
most money had been spent had been the one to fail. At any rate, the
effect on the stock price was dramatic. By the fourth quarter of 1976,
the stock had dropped to a low of approximately $14% (again adjusted
for subsequent splits amounting to six to one) or to approximately one-
third its former high. Of course, only a tiny amount of stock could be
bought or sold at the low point for the year. Of greater impact, the stock
was available at prices only moderately above this low level for months
thereafter.

Another development also affected the profits of the company at
this moment and contributed to Raychem s fall from favor. One of the
most difficult tasks for those responsible for the success of any growing

Is the Market Efficient?

273

company is to change the management structure appropriately as the
company grows to allow for the difference between what is needed for
proper control of small companies and optimum control of big compa-
nies. Until the end of the 1976 fiscal year, Raychem management had
been set up along divisional lines batsed largely on manufacturing tech-
niques; that is, on the basis of the products produced. This worked well
when the company was smaller, but was not conducive to serving the
customer most efficiently as the company was growing. Therefore, at
about the end of the 1975 fiscal year, top Raychem management started
working on a “big company” management concept. The firm restruc-
tured the divisions by the industry served rather than by the physical and
chemical composition of the products being manufactured. The target
date to make the change was set at the end of the 1976 fiscal year. This
was done at a time when there was not the least thought within the
management that this date would coincide with the time of the huge
write-off for the abandonment of Stilan.

Everyone in Raychem knew that when the organizational change
was to occur there would be at least one quarter and probably a mini-
mum of two of substantially reduced earnings. While making these
changes caused almost no change in the individuals on the Raychem
management payroll, so many people now had different superiors, dif-
ferent subordinates, and different co-workers with whom they had to
interface their activities that a time of inefficiency and adjustment was
bound to occur until Raychem employees learned how best to coordi-
nate their work with the new faces with whom they were now dealing.
Perhaps no stronger indication could have existed to justify long-range
confidence in this company or to indicate that management was not
concerned with short-term results than its decision to go ahead with
this project as planned rather than to postpone what was bound to be a
second blow to Raychem s current earnings.

Actually, this significant change worked with considerably less diffi-
culty than had been anticipated. As expected, the first-quarter earnings of
the new fiscal year were much lower than would have been the case if the
change had not been made. However, the change was working so well
that as the second quarter progressed, the short-term costs of what had
been done had largely been eliminated. Fundamentally these develop-
ments should have been considered bullish by analysts. Raychem was now
in a position to handle growth properly in a way that could not have been
done before. It had successfully hurdled a barrier of the type that is most

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DEVELOPING AS INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

apt to dull the luster of otherwise attractive growth companies. By and
large, the financial community did not seem to recognize this, however,
and instead the temporary further shrinkage of earnings was just one
more factor holding the stock at the low levels to which it had fallen.

Making these price levels eve'n more attractive to potential investors
was another influence that I have seen happen in other companies
shortly after they had abandoned a major research project that had
proved unsuccessful. One financial effect of the abandonment of Stilan
was that a sizable amount of money that had heretofore been devoted
to that project was now free to be allocated elsewhere. Even more
important, it had similarly freed the time of key research people for
other endeavors. Within a year or two much like a field of flowers start-
ing to bloom when rain follows drought, the company began to enjoy
what was possibly a greater number of attractive research projects in
relation to its size than had ever before been experienced.

RAYCHEM AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET

Now what has Raychem’s situation to do with this theory of an “effi-
cient market” that has recently gained such a following in certain
financial quarters? According to that theory, stocks automatically and
instantly adjust to whatever is known about a company, so that only
those who might possess illicit “inside information” that is not known
to others could benefit from what might lie ahead for a particular
stock. In this instance, at the drop of a hat, the Raychem management
would and did explain to anyone interested all the facts I have just cited
and explained how temporary they believed was the period of poor
earnings.

Actually, well after all this had happened and when profits were
climbing to a new all-time high level, the Raychem management went
even further. On January 26, 1978, they held a long one-day meeting
at their headquarters which I had the privilege of attending. Raychem
management invited to this meeting the representatives of all institu-
tions, brokerage houses, and investment advisors who either had any
interest in Raychem or they thought might have. At this meeting
the ten most senior executives of Raychem explained with what I
believe was extreme frankness and in detail, such as I have only occa-
sionally seen at similar meetings of other companies, the prospects, the

Is the Market Efficient? 2 7 5

problems, and the current status of Raychem matters under their juris-
diction.

In the year or two following this meeting, Raychems earnings
growth developed exactly as might have been inferred from what was
said there. During that period, the fctock was to much more than dou-
ble from the price of $2314 at which it was selling that day. Yet in the
weeks immediately following this meeting, there was no particular
effect on the stock whatsoever. Some of those present were obviously
impressed by the picture being presented. Too many, however, were still
under the influence of the double shock that they had experienced a
year or two before. They obviously mistrusted what was being told them
then. So much for the theory of an efficient market.

What kind of conclusion does the investor or the investment pro-
fessional reach from experiences like Raychem? By and large, those
who have accepted and been influenced by this theory of the “efficient
market” fall into two groups. One is students, who have had a minimum
of practical experience. The other, strangely enough, seems to be many
managers of large institutional funds. The individual private investor, by
and large, has paid relatively little attention to this theory.

From this experience gained in applying my personal investment phi-
losophy, I would conclude that in my field of technological stocks, as the
decade of the 1970’s comes to an end, there would therefore be more
attractive opportunities among the larger companies, the market for
which is dominated by the institutions, than among the small technolog-
ical companies where the individual private investor plays a considerably
bigger role. Just as some ten years earlier those who recognized the folly
of the then prevailing concept of the two-tier market benefited from rec-
ognizing that particular nonsense for what it was, so in each decade false
ideas arise creating opportunities for those with investment discernment.

CONCLUSION

This then is my investment philosophy as it has emerged over a half cen-
tury of business experience. Perhaps the heart of it may be summarized
in the following eight points:

1. Buy into companies that have disciplined plans for achieving
dramatic long-range growth in profits and that have inherent

2 76 DEVELOPING AS INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

qualities making it difficult for newcomers to share in that
growth. There are so many details, both favorable and unfavor-
able, that should also be considered in selecting one of these
companies that it is obviously impossible in a monograph of this
length to cover them adequately. For those interested, I have
attempted to summarize this subject as concisely as I could in the
first three chapters of Conservative Investors Sleep Well* A brief
outline appears in the Appendix.

2. Focus on buying these companies when they are out of favor;
that is, when, either because of general market conditions or
because the financial community at the moment has misconcep-
tions of its true worth, the stock is selling at prices well under
what it will be when its true merit is better understood.

3. Hold the stock until either (a) there has been a fundamental
change in its nature (such as a weakening of management
through changed personnel), or (b) it has grown to a point where
it no longer will be growing faster than the economy as a whole.
Only in the most exceptional circumstances, if ever, sell because
of forecasts as to what the economy or the stock market is going
to do, because these changes are too difficult to predict. Never
sell the most attractive stocks you own for short-term reasons.
However, as companies grow, remember that many companies
that are quite efficiently run when they are small fail to change
management style to meet the different requirements of skill big
companies need. When management fails to grow as companies
grow, shares should be sold.

4. For those primarily seeking major appreciation of their capital,
de-emphasize the importance of dividends. The most attractive
opportunities are most likely to occur in the profitable, but low
or no dividend payout groups. Unusual opportunities are much
less likely to be found in situations where high percentage of
profits is paid to stockholders.

5. Making some mistakes is as much an inherent cost of investing for
major gains as making some bad loans is inevitable in even the
best run and most profitable lending institution. The important
thing is to recognize them as soon as possible, to understand their
causes, and to learn how to keep from repeating the mistakes.

* Conservative Investors Sleep Well, Harper & Row, 1975.

Is the Market Efficient?

277

Willingness to take small losses in some stocks and to let profits
grow bigger and bigger in the more promising stocks is a sign of
good investment management. Taking small profits in good
investments and letting losses grow in bad ones is a sign of abom-
inable investment judgment. 'A profit should never be taken just
for the satisfaction of taking it.

6. There are a relatively small number of truly outstanding compa-
nies. Their shares frequently can’t be bought at attractive prices.
Therefore, when favorable prices exist, full advantage should be
taken of the situation. Funds should be concentrated in the most
desirable opportunities. For those involved in venture capital and
quite small companies, say with annual sales of under
$25,000,000, more diversification may be necessary. For larger
companies, proper diversification requires investing in a variety
of industries with different economic characteristics. For indi-
viduals (in possible contrast to institutions and certain types of
funds), any holding of over twenty different stocks is a sign of
financial incompetence. Ten or twelve is usually a better number.
Sometimes the costs of the capital gains tax may justify taking
several years to complete a move toward concentration. As an
individuals holdings climb toward as many as twenty stocks, it
nearly always is desirable to switch from the least attractive of
these stocks to more of the attractive. It should be remembered
that ERISA stands for Emasculated Results: Insufficient Sophis-
ticated Action.

7. A basic ingredient of outstanding common stock management is
the ability neither to accept blindly whatever may be the domi-
nant opinion in the financial community at the moment nor to
reject the prevailing view just to be contrary for the sake of being
contrary. Rather, it is to have more knowledge and to apply bet-
ter judgment, in thorough evaluation of specific situations, and
the moral courage to act “in opposition to the crowd” when
your judgment tells you you are right.

8. In handling common stocks, as in most other fields of human
activity, success greatly depends on a combination of hard work,
intelligence, and honesty.

Some of us may be born with a greater or lesser degree of each of
these traits than others. However, I believe all of us can “grow” our

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DEVELOPING AS INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

capabilities in each of these areas if we discipline ourselves and make
the effort.

While good fortune will always play some part in managing com-
mon stock portfolios, luck tends to even out. Sustained success requires
skill and consistent application of sound principles. Within the frame-
work of my eight guidelines, I believe that the future will largely belong
to those who, through self-discipline, make the effort to achieve it.

Appendix

Key Factors in Evaluating Promising Firms*

M y philosophy calls for making a relatively small number of invest-
ments but only in unusually promising companies. Obviously, I am
looking for signs of growth potential in the companies I study As impor-
tant, I am trying, through my analysis, to avoid risk. I want to make sure
that the firm’s management has the wherewithal to capitalize on the
potential and to minimize my investment risks in the process. Summa-
rized below are some of the defensive characteristics that I search for in
the companies that are to meet my standards of unusual promise when I
undertake financial analysis, interviews with management, and discus-
sions with informed people associated with the industry.

FUNCTIONAL FACTORS

1 . The firm must be one of the lowest-cost producers of its products or
services relative to its competition, and must promise to remain so.
a. A comparatively low breakeven will enable this firm to sur-
vive depressed market conditions and to strengthen its market

*Excerpts from Fisher, Conservative Investors Sleep Well, Harper & Row, 1975. Chapters 1—3.

280

DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

and pricing position when weaker competitors are driven out
of the market.

b. A higher than average profit margin enables the firm to gen-
erate more funds internally to sustain growth without as
much dilution caused by equity sales or strain caused by ov-
erdependence on fixed-income financing.

2. A firm must have a strong enough customer orientation to rec-
ognize changes in customer needs and interests and then to react
promptly to those changes in an appropriate manner. This capa-
bility should lead to generating a flow of new products that more
than offset lines maturing or becoming obsolete.

3. Effective marketing requires not only understanding of what
customers want, but also explaining to them (through advertising,
selling or other means) in terms the customer will understand.
Close control and constant monitoring of the cost/effectiveness
of market efforts are required.

4. Even nontechnical firms today require a strong and well-directed
research capability to (a) produce newer and better products, and
(b) perform services in a more effective or efficient way.

5. There are wide differences in the effectiveness of research. Two
important elements of more productive research are (a) market/
profit consciousness, and (b) the ability to pool necessary talent
into an effective working team.

6. A firm with a strong financial team has several important
advantages:

a. Good cost information enables management to direct its
energies toward those products with the highest potential for
profit contribution.

b. The cost system should pinpoint where production, market-
ing, and research costs are inefficient even in sub-parts of the
operation.

c. Capital conservation through tight control of fixed and work-
ing capital investments.

7. A critical finance function is to provide an early warning system
to identify influences that could threaten the profit plan suffi-
ciently ahead of time to devise remedial plans to minimize
adverse surprises.

Appendix

281

PEOPLE FACTORS

1. To become more successful, a firm needs a leader with a deter-
mined entrepreneurial personality combining the drive, the
original ideas, and the skills necessary to build the fortunes of the
firm.

2. A growth-oriented chief executive must surround himself with
an extremely competent team and to delegate considerable
authority to them to run the activities of the firm. Teamwork, as
distinct from dysfunction struggles for power, is critical.

3. Attention must be paid to attracting competent managers at
lower levels and to training them for larger responsibilities. Suc-
cession should largely be from the available talent pool. The need
to recruit the chief executive from outside is a particularly dan-
gerous sign.

4. The entrepreneurial spirit must permeate the organization.

5. More successful firms usually have some unique personality
traits — some special ways of doing things that are particularly
effective for their management team. This is a positive not a neg-
ative sign.

6. Management must recognize and be attuned to the fact that the
world in which they are operating is changing at an ever increas-
ing rate.

a. Every accepted way of doing things must be reexamined peri-
odically, and new, better ways sought.

b. Changes in managerial approaches involve necessary risks,
which must be recognized, minimized and taken.

7. There must be a genuine, realistic, conscious and continuous
effort to have employees at every level, including the blue collar
workers, believe that their company is really a good place to
work.

a. Employees must be treated with reasonable dignity and
decency.

b. The firms work environment and benefits programs should
be supportive of motivation.

c. People must feel they can express grievances without fear and
with reasonable expectation of appropriate attention and

action.

282

DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY

d. Participatory programs seem to work well and be an important
source of good ideas.

8. Management must be willing to submit to the disciplines required
of sound growth. Growth requires some sacrifice of current profits
to lay the foundation for worthwhile future improvement.

BUSINESS CHARACTERISTICS

1 . Although managers rely heavily on return of assets in consider-
ing new investments, investors must recognize that historic assets
stated at historic costs distort comparisons of firms’ performance.
Favorable profit to sales ratios, notwithstanding differences in
turnover ratios, may be a better indicator of the safety of an
investment, particularly in an inflationary environment.

2. High margins attract competition, and competition erodes profit
opportunities. The best way to mute competition is to operate so
efficiently that there is no incentive left for the potential entrant.

3. Efficiencies of scale are often counterbalanced by the inefficien-
cies of bureaucratic layers of middle management. In a well-run
firm, however, the industry leadership position creates a strong
competitive advantage that should be attractive to investors.

4. Getting there first in a new product market is a long step toward
becoming first. Some firms are better geared to be there first.

5. Products are not islands. There is an indirect competition, for
example, for consumers’ dollars. As prices change, some products
may lose attractiveness even in well-run, low-cost companies.

6. It is hard to introduce new, superior products in market arenas
where established competitors already have a strong position.
While the new entrant is building the production, marketing
power, and reputation to be competitive, existing competitors
can take strong defensive actions to regain the market threatened.
Innovators have a better chance of success if they combine tech-
nology disciplines, e.g., electronics and nucleonics, in a way that
is novel relative to existing competitive competencies.

7. Technology is just one avenue to industry leadership. Developing
a consumer “franchise” is another. Service excellence is still another.
Whatever the case, a strong ability to defend established markets
against new competitors is essential for a sound investment.

Index

Accounting, 70, 116

Advances, large, 111-113, 263-264

Advisors. See Financial advisors

Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), 49

American Cyanamid, 93-95

American Stock Exchange, 129

Ampex Corporation, 84, 85, 142, 143, 212, 245

Anderson-Barngrover Manufacturing Company, 230, 238

Annual reports, tone of, 129—130

Appraisals, 156-161, 208-210, 211-212, 213-217, 222-224
company, 218—222, 223-224
industry, 157-160, 213-217, 223-224
Arthur D. Little, 166

Banks, commercial, 167-168
Battelle, 166

Beryllium Corporation, 140-141
Bonds, 40-42

Brand names. See Trade names
Brokers. See Stock brokers
Business ability, 241

Business cycle, 90-91, 102-104, 108, 160, 260-261
Businesses investment characteristics of, 198—206, 282. See also Growth
company; Industry appraisals

284

Index

Buying

finding stocks in, 47—78, 79-88
timing of, 89-104, 153-155, 276
on war scare, 144-147

California Packing Corporation, 249
Campbell Soup Company, 202-203
Capital gains taxes, 108, 111, 277
Changing world, 191-192
Chemical industry, appraisals of, 214-215
Civil War, 156, 223,256
Clamming up, 77

Commercial & Financial Chronicle , 90

Commercial banks, 167

Commercial plants, first, 92—94

Common stock, fifteen points to look for in, 47—78

Company appraisals, 218-222, 224

Competition

company in relation to, 71-73
profit margins and, 200, 282
in technology, 203-204
Computers, 90, 201-202, 258
Conservative investing, definition of, 178
Conservative investments, 178
1st dimension of, 180-186
2nd dimension of, 187—197
3rd dimension of, 198-206
4th dimension of, 207-212, 213-217, 218-224
Consulting research laboratories, 166
Contrary but correct, 243-244, 277. See also Appraisals
Coordination, 55—56
Corning Glass Works, 52-53
Cost analysis, 70—71

Crash, of Raychem Corporation, 271—274
Crash of 1929, 90, 102, 233-234, 235, 241, 256
Crash programs, 55-56
Crummey, John D., 241-242
Customers, attention to, 257, 280

Davies, Paul L., 242

Index

285

Day-to-day tasks, 241
Defense contracts, 56-58, 157-158
Deficits, 39, 42
Depreciation, 116-117

Depressions, 39, 42, 102, 157, 158, 223, 256, 266. See also Great Depression
Depth, management, 68-70
Development. See Research and development
Discipline, management, 196-197, 282
Discount, growth, 130-131
Diversification, 135—144, 277
Dividends, 114-122, 264-265, 276
dependability of, 120-121
and reinvesting, 90—91
Do few things well, 259-260
Don’ts for investors, 123-134, 135-161
Dow, Herbert, 254, 255

Dow Chemical Company, 61, 84, 85, 137, 156, 191-192, 195, 253-255
Dow Jones Industrial Averages, 130, 131, 177, 269
Drug industry. See Pharmaceutical stocks
Du Pont, 49-50, 84, 85, 137

Earnings, per-share, 149-153. See also Price-earnings ratio
Economic forecasting. See Forecasts
Economies of scale. See Scale
Efficient market, 266-278
fallacy of, 267-270
Raychem and, 274-275
Elox, 142

Emmett, Boris, 229-230

Employees. See also Labor relations; Personnel relations; People factors
former, and scuttlebutt, 46
of good place to work, 192-196
Engineering. See Research and development
Equity financing, growth and, 74-75
Evaluating firms, 279-282
Executive Institute (Motorola), 190, 195
Executive relations, 67-68
Experience

formative, 229-231
learning from, 238-251
school of, 231-232

286

Index

Feast-or-famine industry, 159-160
Federal Reserve System, 35

Fifteen points to look for in a common stock, 47-78
Financial advisors, 45, 81-83, 164-165 . ,See also Security analysts
Financial community

appraisals by. See Appraisals
definition of, 212

Financial skills, company, 184-185, 280
Finding growth stocks, 162-171

First dimension, of a conservative investment, 180-186
Fisher & Co., 31, 32, 227

Following the crowd, 155—161, 277. See also Appraisals
Follow the leader, in appraisals, 209

Food Machinery Corporation, 96-98, 238-244, 248-249, 250
Foote Minerals Company, 141, 142
Forecasts, 90-91, 260-261, 276. See also Business cycle
Formative experiences, 229—231
Fortunate and able, 48-49
Fortunate because they are able, 48, 49-50
Foundation, of financial advisor business, 237
Fourth dimension, of a conservative investment, 207-212,
213-217, 218-224
Franchising, appraisals of, 216
Friden Calculating Machine Co., Inc., 141, 142
Functional factors, evaluation of, 279-280

General American Transportation, 50
General Electric, 201
Generic names, 202

Golden Age of Electronic Stocks (first), 245
Good place to work, employees of, 192—196
Grapevine, business, 45. See also Scuttlebutt
Great Bear Market, 223, 233-235, 249
Great Bull Market, 222-223, 229

Great Depression, 223, 234, 240-241, 249, 250, 255-256, 266

Greenman, Norman, 247-248

Growth

discipline and, 196-197
equity financing and, 74—75
price-earnings ratio and, 130-132

Index

287

Growth company, concept of, 181, 230, 280
Growth stocks

finding of, 162-173

true, timing and price in buying, 89-104, 153-155

Halperin, Robert M., and Raychem’s operating philosophy,
270-271

Heller, Edward H., 187-188, 189
Hewlett-Packard Co., 60
History, vs. opportunity, 255-257
Hoover, Herbert, 222, 235

IBM. See International Business Machines
Income taxes, 39, 118-119

Industry appraisals, 157-160, 213-217, 273-274. See also Businesses;

Growth company
Inflation, 42, 104
and bonds, 42
In and out, 263—264
Institutional stocks, 83-84, 137, 265
Insurance costs, 71

Integrity, of management, 77-78, 241
Interest, in stock market, 228-229
Interest rates, 104, 224

International Business Machines (IBM), 61, 84, 85, 137, 152,
201-202, 245
Inventions, 104

Investment advisors. See Financial advisors
Investment characteristics, of some businesses, 198—206
Investment counselors. See Financial advisors
Investment philosopy. See Philosophy
Investors, don’ts for, 123-134, 135-161

John Bean Manufacturing Co., 238, 241
John Bean Spray Pump Company, 230

Kalvar, 212
Korean War, 146

288

Index

Labor relations, 65-67, 99-100. See also Employees

Leads for information, 164-166

Learning

from experience, 231-232, 238-251
from mistakes, 234-235
Lederle, 93, 95
Levitz Furniture, 212
Liquidity, 127-128
Litton Industries, Inc., 143, 212, 245
Long-range profits, 73—74

McGraw-Hill Publications, 98—99
Machine tool stocks, 159-160
Mallory, P. R„ & Co., 138-139, 141
Mallory-Sharon Metals Corporation, 138-139
Management

approaching of, 167-170, 171, 236-237, 253-254
change in concept of, 36, 273, 281
depth in, 68-70
deterioration of, 107
discipline of, 196-197, 282
integrity of, 77-78
knowing, 240-241
Margin, buying on, 125
Market

efficiency of, 266-278
possible downturns in, selling and, 260—263
Marketability, of stocks. See Liquidity
Marketing, 182-183, 205, 231, 240, 280, 282
Market potential, of products, 47-53
Market price trends, (chart) 76. See also Price entries
Market research, 58
Markets, exhaustion of, 107-108
Market timing, 248-249
Matsushita, 220, 221
Memorex, 212
Metal Hydrides, 143

Middle companies, in diversification, 137-142
Mistakes, 106, 254, 257-259, 276-277
Mohawk Data Sciences, 212

Index

289

Monopolies, 200
Montgomery Ward, 201

Motorola, 51, 52, 189-190, 195, 220-222, 245-247

National Association of Securities Dealers,

126-127

Needs, of investor, 79-88
New-issue supply, 224
New products, 92

New York Stock Exchange, 128, 129, 171
Nielsen, A. C., Co., 216-217
Noble, Daniel, 246

Opportunity

history vs., 255-257
price vs., 249—251

Overpriced stocks, 110-111, 131, 211
Over-the-counter stocks, 124—129

Panic of 1873, 223, 256
Past, clues from, 34-43
Patents, 72-73
Patience, 244-247

People-effectiveness program, 193-195

People factors, 187-197, 241-242, 254, 281-282

Performance, 244-247

Per-share earnings, past, 149-153

Personnel relations, 66-67. See also Employees

Pharmaceutical stocks

appraisals of, 158-159, 257—258
trade names and, 202
Philco, 232

Philosophy (of Philip A. Fisher)
investment, summary, 275—277
maturing of, 252—265
origins of, 227-237
Pilot-plant operation, 92, 93
Plants, first, 92-94
Pools, stock, 238-239

290

Index

Price

in buying true growth stock, 153-155
of conservative investment. See Price-earnings ratio
vs. opportunity, 249-251
significant changes in, 212 '

Price-earnings ratio
definition, 207

and growth, 130—132, 151—152, 153, 207—212, 213—217, 218—224,
234-235

Price ranges, past, 147-149, 152—153

Printed material, leads from, 165

Processes, 53-54. See also Products

Production, low-cost, 180—182

Products, 47-53, 53-54, 254, 270, 271, 279-280, 282

Professional advisor. See Financial advisors

Profitability, 1 98-200, 205-206

Profit margins, 62—63, 63—65, 184, 199—200, 205—206, 280, 282
Profits, 62, 184

short-range vs. long-range, 73-74
Promotional companies, 123-124. See also Young companies
Promotion from within, 188-189, 281

Quality, of people, 241

Quibbling over eighths and quarters, 132-134,

250-251

Rand Corporation, 140
Raychem Corporation, 270—275
RCA, 232

Recessions, 255—256, 260—261
and bonds, 42
Reporting, 77
Research, consulting, 166

Research and development, 36-38, 92, 183-184, 240, 254, 271, 272, 274, 280.
See also Market research; Scuttlebutt
and size, 54—59

Research scientists, as advisors, 45
Risk, 210-211

Rogers Corporation, 247—248

Rohm & Haas, 122
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 239

Safety of investment, 1 99-200 >

Sales

potential increases in, 47-53, 280
and profit margins, 205, 230-231
research and development and, 54-59
Sales organization, 59, 61—62, 230-231, 240
Saving, and stock prices, 224
Scale, 200-203, 240, 282
School of Random Walkers, 268
Scuttlebutt, 44-46, 58-59, 65, 70, 74, 166-168, 170
Sears, 201

Second dimension, of a conservative investment, 187—197
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 35, 125, 166
Securities dealers, 133-134. See also Stock brokers
Security analysts, 231, 232. See also Financial advisors
Selling

possible market downturns and, 260—263
timing of, 105-113, 211, 276
Semiconductors

growth of business, 151, 152
stock, 245-246

Services, businesses, appraisals of, 216-217
Service, 47-53, 279. See also Products
Shakedown period, 77, 92, 93
Shepherd, Mark, Jr., 195
Short-range profits, 73-74
Significant price changes, 212
Size, research and development and, 54-59
Smith, Barney & Co., 216
Sprague Electric Company, 142
Sprague Sells Corporation, 238
Stanford Research Institute, 166
Stanford University, 229-230, 231, 268
Statisticians, 231—232, 235
Stock brokers, 133-134, 236-237
vs. stock salesmen, 126
Switching investments, 108-110

292

Index

Taxes

capita] gains, 108, 111, 277
income, 39, 118-119

Technical effort, 183-184. See also Research and development
Technology, competition in, 203-204, 254-255
Texas Instruments, Inc., 149-152, 193-195, 245, 246, 261-262, 263
Third dimension, of a conservative investment, 1 98-206
Three-year rule, 244-247
exceptions to, 247-248
Timing

of appraisals, 209, 243
of buying, 89-104, 153-155
market, 248-249
of selling, 105-113
Trade associations, and data, 45—46
Trade names, 202—203

Union Carbide, 50
Unions, 65-67

Vintage years, 257—259
Vivid spirit, 187, 189

War scare, buying on, 144-147

What to buy, 47-78, 79-88

When to buy, 89-104

When to sell, 105-113

World, changing, 191-192

World War I, 146, 156, 223, 244, 256

World War II, 96, 146, 233, 244, 252, 256, 264, 266

Young companies, 84-85, 86, 123, 142-144

Zigging and zagging, 242-243, 244, 248. See also Appraisals

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